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Abstract 
An agreement on the inclusion of a social clause in the World Trade Organization‟s (WTO) 
multilateral trade agreements largely depends on reassuring objecting member states that such 
inclusion will contribute to an improved recognition of core labour standards in trade, without 
altering the competitive advantage of one trading partner over another. Reassurance must be 
given to the effect that incorporating a social clause in the WTO legal framework would not be 
used as a trade restricting mechanism which might have direct, negative effects on the 
development of countries worldwide. Such an argument may not be won easily from a legal and 
economic perspective. There is an omnipresent conflict at the international level between the 
basic values underlying multilateral trade agreements and principles governing the protection of 
core labour standards. On the one hand, supporting the stance of free trade is the fundamental 
force of profit maximization while on the other hand, and in direct opposition to this market 
driven value system, are human rights-based calls for recognising core labour standards in 
employment matters related to trade. Increased international trade is a powerful tool for tackling 
poverty and social misery worldwide. It could thus be important to adopt a legal framework in 
the multilateral trade system to harness potential opportunities a trade-labour linkage could 
provide. In that case, the legal questions of whether or not there should be a tradeoff between the 
right to trade and compliance with core labour standards and whether a social clause in the WTO 
would achieve this purpose had to be addressed. 
 
However, without a compatible underpinning legal framework of universally accepted trade-
labour standards, incorporating a social clause in the WTO would be a misplaced legal objective 
which is unachievable as it could lead to a conflict between the WTO and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and at most could create a legal fiction whose results may not be 
positively measurable. Setting two international legal norms at conflict with each other is 
systematically studied as a conflict in which the values of the global market economy are in a 
supposed confrontation with those protecting core labour standards as human rights. Therefore, 
this study undertook a contemporary legal analysis of the possibilities and challenges of 
incorporating a social clause in the WTO for purposes of entrenching the protection of core 
labour standards. It put forward arguments and tentative proposals for a trade-labour linkage 
legal framework which could dispel calls for excluding a social clause in the WTO.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction and Overview of the Study 
 
1 1 INTRODUCTION  
Linking the right to engage in international trade to respect for human rights has emerged as one 
of the most controversial debates in contemporary international law discourses.
1
 In an era in 
which countries are vigorously competing for investment by multinational corporations, there is 
a growing fear that a “race to the bottom” is occurring in the logic that labour standards are being 
lowered to attract investors.
2
 This argument is important if one considers that a region like 
Southern Africa stands as one of the impoverished regions in the world, and therefore 
unquestionably requires investment to fight poverty and unemployment. Southern African 
countries like any other developing countries may be persuaded to neglect labour rights as 
human rights in order to lure investors.
3
 However, it must be observed that workers should not be 
viewed as mere economic interests, but rather as bearers of fundamental human rights.
4
   
                                                          
 
1
  See Griffin, Nyland and O‟Rourke “Trade Unions and the Social Clause: A North-South Divide” 
http://council.labor.net.au/labor_review/100/update1002.html (accessed 31-08-2011). 
2
  See Trebilcock and Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2005) 561. Trebilcock and Howse represent a 
class of academics who do not submit to the “race to the bottom” concept and do not see any need for the 
protection of core labour standards as human rights in the multilateral trade system. They have argued that: 
“…there is little reason to suppose that liberal trade and investment regimes will precipitate a race to the bottom. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence provides no support for the claim that liberal international trade and 
investment regimes are leading developed countries to relax their core labour standards or labour standards 
generally or that foreign direct investors are investing with weak core labour standards.” Trebilcock and Howse‟s 
views represent the differences in opinions amongst Members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 
whether or not there is a need to recognise the protection of core labour standards in the WTO legal framework. 
This study will examine such views with a view to establishing whether or not there could be a need in the global 
era for a trade-labour linkage in multilateral trade arrangements.  
3
  As current developments already indicate, South Africa which is generally regarded as the possible example for 
countries in the region concerning the adoption of sound labour legislation has seen its Minister of Finance 
calling for a relaxation of labour standards to attract investors in the face of threats by foreign investors in 
Newcastle, Kwa-Zulu Natal to relocate to Botswana or Lesotho should they be compelled to pay workers a 
minimum wage. However Trebilcock observed that there is, “…an entirely cogent basis for collective global 
action to ensure that core labour standards in all countries, conceived of as universal human rights, and other 
international human rights are respected. Basic universal human rights, while defying precise definition, have 
increasingly come to be viewed as a fundamental element of customary international law (Jus Cogens), and to 
the extent that they extend beyond particular treaty obligations, are viewed as obligations Erga Omnes which are 
owed to the international community at large and hence are enforceable by all members of that community.” See 
Trebilcock Understanding Trade Law (2011) 172-173. From Trebilcock‟s observation, the need to protect core 
labour standards in trade must not be regarded as an after thought or a secondary objective to trade but rather a 
complementary objective of free trade likely to lead to sustainable development. 
 
 
2 
 
Workers‟ rights have come to be viewed as a fundamental element of customary 
international law and are known as core labour standards.
5
 That core labour standards are human 
rights is uncontroversial.
6
 This could imply that if core labour standards are human rights then 
there is a need to protect them by way of incorporation into the legal framework of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).
7
 The basis of such a proposal rests in the argument that the 
collective supply of public goods, such as the global division of labour, may not be politically 
feasible without comprehensive package deals including solitary responses to market failures and 
redistributive justice.
8
 Liberal trade rules must be supplemented by competition and social rules 
promoting fair opportunities and the equitable distribution of gains from trade.
9
 This conceptual 
framework would thus require that global trade integration law must pursue not only economic 
efficiency but also democratic legitimacy and social justice as defined by human rights.
10
 An 
evaluation of the distributive justice, law and economy, natural law, sociology of law and 
utilitarian law theories, in this study, will establish whether or not there is any basis to proposals 
aiming at incorporating a social clause into legal framework of the WTO.  
It has become apparent in a world driven by the globalisation agenda that as long as 
human beings trade, the subject of human rights must be struggled with.
11
 Human rights are seen 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4
   See Lester, Mercurio and Davies World Trade Law: Text Materials and Commentary (2012) 878-879. Lester et 
al opined that: “The fact that core labour standards are human rights is uncontroversial…any comparative 
advantage gained by non-compliance with these standards is not an advantage that should be shielded or trumped 
by liberalized trade…It is therefore, extremely rare (if not completely unheard of) for a trade representative to 
publicly state that their country‟s competitive advantage is in child labour and the prohibition of unionization.” 
5
  Core labour standards were outlined in the 1998 International Labour Organisation Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work as well as the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. They are as follows: 
1) Freedom of association and the right to engage in collective bargaining; 2) the elimination of forced labour; 3) 
the elimination of child labour; and 4) the elimination of discrimination in employment. 
6
  Lester et al 878. 
7
  Petersmann “Time for a United Nations „Global Compact‟ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
Worldwide Organisations: Lessons from European Integration” 2002 European Journal of International Law 
621. 
8
  Lester et al 883. 
9
   Ibid. 
10
  Ibid. 
11
  See Hafner-Burton Forced to be Good: Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights (2009) 1. There are 
however divergent views on the need to incorporate human rights into the legal framework of international trade 
law. See Alston “Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann” 
2002 European Journal of International Law 815.  Alston argued that: “The proposed agenda is in fact a 
revolutionary and radical one which, if adopted, would have far-reaching consequences for the international 
human rights regime as well as for the balance of values reflected in the vast majority of existing constitutional 
orders. The most fundamental change is that human rights would...become detached from their foundations in 
3 
 
as obligatory and supportive of development,
12
 whilst trade is regarded as a vital element of any 
development strategy.
13
 The contemporary idea of human rights originates from the late 
eighteenth century in the French and American revolutions.
14
 The “rights of man” were declared 
and defended by allusion to liberty and equality as the core underlying principles.
15
 Despite the 
fact that human rights as a concept is occasionally misrepresented, it can be seen in the liberation 
movement and the abolition of slave trade through to the founding of the United Nations and the 
formulation of global legal standards founded on principles set out in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948.
16
 In the twentieth century, the expansion of universal human rights 
was driven by two major issues: the atrocities perpetrated against civilians and non-combatants 
in the two World Wars, more so in the Holocaust; and the maltreatment and brutal repression of 
challengers of dictatorial or colonial governments.
17
 Loss or denials of liberty and democratic 
expression have been a common feature of both, as has discrimination; a denial of equality in the 
form of political, social and economic marginalisation.
18
 It is assumed that the current 
developments in the twenty-first century, especially in the world of work, may perhaps further 
strengthen the concept of human rights in international law.
19
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
human dignity and would instead be viewed primarily as instrumental means for the achievement of economic 
policy objectives.” Alston‟s views echo the arguments held by trade purists to the effect that core labour 
standards as human rights do not have a place in the trade agenda. This is an issue which this study will explore 
as regards its merits and demerits in a world in which free trade is growing in the face of increased poverty in 
developing countries. 
12
  The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples 
are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. (Article 1.1, Declaration on the Right to 
Development). The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human 
Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.” 
(Article 1.2) 
13
  See Gandhi “International Trade and Right to Development” http://works.bepress.com/preeti_gandhi/1 (accessed 
11-03-2011). 
14
  See Cmiel “The Recent History of Human Rights” 2004 The American Historical Review 122. 
15
  See Desan “Reconstituting the Social after the Terror: Family, Property and the Law in Popular Politics” 1999 
Oxford University Journal 84.  
16
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations in resolution 217 A (lll) of 10 December 1948. See also Darcy “Human Rights and 
International Legal Standards: What do Relief Workers need to know” 
http://www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/index.html (accessed 04-10-2011). 
17
  Darcy 10. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  See Trebilcock and Howse 652. Trebilcock and Howse argue that: “…the linkage of international trade policy, 
including trade or other economic sanctions, with core labour standards that reflect basic or universal human 
rights is a cogent one…it is sufficient…to restate the point that to the extent that core labour standards are 
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Defining and giving global acceptance to human rights has involved, to a certain degree, 
limiting the extent of the concept of sovereignty.
20
 It is accepted that the previous basis on which 
international relations rested, absolute respect for national sovereignty and a reluctance to 
question a state‟s behaviour towards individuals within its territory, provided insufficient 
safeguards.
21
 The recognition of individuals as „subjects‟ of international law, and so of global 
interest, was a ground-breaking step which can be viewed as recognition that state sovereignty, 
the foundation of international law and relations, has two features.
22
 It carries with it both rights 
and duties. The duties of the state include, as a minimum, the protection of the human rights of 
those within its jurisdiction.
23
 Inability to do so may bring into question a state‟s sovereign 
rights, and resultantly its legitimacy. 
Human rights can be expressed as claims that all persons have purely by virtue of their 
humanity.
24
 They are essentially moral claims. In legal terms, they are framed as claims against 
the state; and (crucially) most states have recognised the validity of those claims by ratifying 
human rights treaties and so formally accepting their obligation to respect and ensure the rights 
in question to all within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction. In moral terms, human 
rights are claims we all have against everyone else; that is, they are not restricted to the 
relationship between state and individual. 
Although a large part of what follows is related to the legal structure in which those rights 
have been codified, the law did not create the rights: it recognises that individuals have such 
(moral) rights and involves formal (legal) undertakings by states to ensure that those rights are 
respected.
25
 Human rights remain comparatively broad principles, and it is imperative to 
appreciate that they comprise a set of fundamental minimum safeguards that should not be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appropriately characterised as basic or universal human rights, a linkage between trade policy and such labour 
standards is not only defensible but arguably imperative…”  
20
  See Lenzerini “Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples” 2006 
Texas International Law Journal 155. 
21Darcy 10. See also Nagan “The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law” 
http://milestonesforlife.com/thetaxistand/sov.pdf (accessed 04-10-2011). 
22
  See Jackson “Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept” 
http://www.asil.org/ajil/jackson.pdf (accessed 04-10-2011). 
23
   See Caplan “State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens” www.asil.org/ajil/caplan.pdf (accessed 03-10-
2011). 
24
  See the Preamble to the UDHR. 
25
  Ibid. 
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extended outside their core import.
26
 They are not always unlimited rights. The limits set on 
human rights and freedoms are those essential to guarantee that the rights of others are not 
themselves infringed, or to ensure the security of society and the state.
27
  
Human rights can be classified into three categories: the first generation, second 
generation and third generation.
28
 The first generation rights address the issue of threats to liberty 
and are called the civil and political rights.
29
 They create generally three sorts of claims. First, 
they make „liberty‟ claims: to be left alone, not to be interfered with, to be allowed to act as one 
wishes, individually and in community.
30
 Second, they make claims to recognition of civil, legal 
and political status from which flow certain safeguards and rights of political and legal access.
31
 
Third, and crucially, are various prohibitions mostly framed as „freedoms from‟ and these 
include the right of freedom from torture.
32
 
The second generation deals with the economic, social and cultural rights.
33
 These 
include a number of claims that are of a different type: they are claims to social security and a 
                                                          
 
26
  Darcy 11. 
27
  Ibid. 
28
  The division of human rights into three generations was initially proposed in 1979 by the Czech jurist Karel 
Vasak at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg. He used the term at least as early as 
November 1977. Vasak‟s theories have primarily taken root in European law. His divisions follow the three 
watchwords of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. The three generations are reflected in 
some of the rubrics of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
29
  First-generation rights include, among other things, freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial, freedom of 
religion, and voting rights. They were pioneered by the United States Bill of Rights and in France by the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in the 18th century, though the right to a due process goes 
back to the Magna Carta of 1297. They were first enshrined at the global level by the 1948 UDHR and given 
status in international law in Articles 3 to 21 of the UDHR, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). 
30
  See for example, the rights to freedom of speech, Article 19, freedom of movement, Article 13 and freedom of 
association, Article 20 in the UDHR. 
31
  See for example the right to a fair trial, Article 10 of the UDHR. 
32
  Article 5 of the UDHR. 
33
  The second generation of human rights is based on the principles of social justice and public obligation. They 
tend to be “positive” rights, based on continental European conceptions of liberty as equality. This generation of 
human rights developed through those who had a strong desire for the state to provide protection for its neediest 
inhabitants through providing relief to the less fortunate. This second generation of rights has since evolved into 
what are now known as “social” or “economic” rights. Important examples of second generation rights include: 
the right to just and favorable conditions of work, the right of protection against unemployment, the right to 
equal work for equal pay all in Article 23 of the UDHR, the right to rest and leisure as an employee, the right to 
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic paid holidays in Article 24 of the UDHR, the right to free 
elementary education, the right to higher education equally accessible to all via merit, the right to education 
which promotes tolerance and understanding all in Article 26 of the UDHR. See also Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted and opened for signature, 
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certain standard of living, including claims to adequate food, clothing, housing, health care, and 
education.
34
 This set of rights addresses the issue of poverty. The failure to make progress on the 
fulfilment of these rights, and indeed the lack of international commitment to their fulfilment, 
has been one of the chief failings of the human rights movement. Denial or neglect, accompanied 
by discrimination, is the cause of amongst other things chronic suffering and its humanitarian 
consequences. Some of these negative effects emanate from characterising this second set of 
rights as merely welfare claims.
35
 Second generation rights do indeed imply certain welfare 
entitlements where individuals and communities lack the ability to secure subsistence needs for 
themselves. However, just as significantly, they are about equitable access and the creation of 
conditions where people (individually and collectively) can pursue viable livelihoods and satisfy 
their own needs.
36
 It is in this respect that they are most obviously linked to the first generation 
rights, and why the two sets are rightly said to be indivisible. 
Third-generation human rights are those rights that go beyond the mere civil and social 
aspects, as expressed in many progressive documents of international law.
37
 Due to the present-
day shift towards national sovereignty and the preponderance of would-be offender nations, 
these rights have been hard to enact in legally binding documents. The term “third-generation 
human rights” remains largely unofficial, and thus houses an extremely broad spectrum of 
rights.
38
 The global human rights agenda embraces the view that human rights are a function of 
one‟s humanity.  It proceeds to provide that human rights are not reliant on law or social 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXl) of 16 December 
1966. 
34
  Second-generation human rights are related to equality and began to be recognized by governments after World 
War I. They are fundamentally economic, social and cultural rights in nature. They ensure different members of 
the citizenry equal conditions and treatment. Secondary rights would include a right to be employed, rights to 
housing and health care, as well as social security and unemployment benefits. Like first-generation rights, they 
were also covered by the UDHR, and further embodied in Articles 22 to 27 of the UDHR, and the ICESCR. 
35
  For an analysis of the significance of not confusing human welfare and human rights, see Howard-Hassmann 
“Human Security: Undermining Human Rights?” http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2011/63-
hassmann-2011.pdf (accessed 05-10-2011). 
36
  Darcy 11. 
37
  See the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 
38
  Examples are the Group and collective rights, right to self-determination, right to economic and social 
development, right to a healthy environment, right to natural resources, right to communicate and 
communication rights, right to participation in cultural heritage, and rights to intergenerational equity and 
sustainability. All these rights are embodied in principles 1 to 26 of the Stockholm Declaration and principles 1 
to 27 of the Rio Declaration. 
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custom.
39
 All human rights must be regarded as equal, and with comparable importance.  It is on 
this basis that the UDHR was adopted with the intent of putting in motion legal and cultural 
forces which made it clear that the global community would no longer accept the outrages in 
previous decades, in particular any events which mirrored the inhuman behaviour that 
characterised the holocaust.
40
 Furthermore, fundamental principles of labour rights and human 
rights were set out in the International Labour Organisation‟s (ILO) Constitution of 1919 and in 
the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944. The later has since been appended to the ILO 
Constitution. Of note, is the preamble to the ILO Constitution which mentions the “recognition 
of the principle of freedom of association” to confront injustice, hardship and deprivation.41 This 
is a central principle to the elevation of labour rights as human rights.  
Provoked yet again with questions as to the significance and universality of fundamental 
labour rights and human rights, the ILO International Labour Conference of 1998 affirmed that 
all member States have the duty “to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith the 
fundamental rights which are the subject of those advanced in fundamental ILO Conventions.
42
 
If it is accepted that essentially all countries and territories are members of the ILO, and that the 
number of independent States is much larger now than in 1919, this affirmation is very important 
particularly in the framework of recognising labour rights as human rights. 
Through negotiating trade liberalisation agreements countries seek to be competitive so 
as to sell their products and improve the added value of their goods and services.
43
 This 
contributes to economic growth with a positive impact on employment.
44
 However, development 
                                                          
 
39
  As stated in the Vienna Declaration issued by the United Nations‟ Global Conference on Human Rights, they are 
“universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.” 
40
  The UDHR was positively aspirational. It envisioned and aspired to a world in which the dignity and worth of 
every human being was honoured and secured. Many of the issues declared to be human rights in the declaration 
were relevant to the world of work including freedom from slavery, child labour and discrimination at work and 
freedom of association. See also Articles 23 and 24 of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ICESCR. 
41
  See Article I (b) of the Declaration of Philadelphia reaffirms that “freedom of expression and association are 
essential to sustained progress” and constitute a fundamental principle on which the ILO is based. 
42
   See Article 2 of the Declaration of Philadelphia. Such rights include the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining”. 
43
  See Grandi “Trade Agreements and their Relation to Labour Standards: The Current Situation” 2009 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 42. 
44
  Ibid. 
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frequently involves conditions adverse to human rights protection with governments often 
limiting the enjoyment of these rights in the interest of economic development.
45
   
The WTO
46
 regardless of its crucial role in controlling the international trade and 
investment regime does little to protect human rights, especially labour rights.
47
 The WTO‟s 
rules make no explicit mention of human rights though one of its key objectives is to enhance 
human welfare.
48
 Core labour standards are considered to be enabling human rights; they set 
standards concerning the content and protection of rights such as freedom of association.
49
 Bal
50
 
has argued that making labour standards compliance a proviso for availing products to the 
market constitutes a non-tariff barrier to trade and goes against the requirements of the WTO to 
liberalise trade and eradicate barriers to trade.
51
 However, it is worth noting that Article XX of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
52
 provides exceptions to the non-
discrimination principle, so long as the measures taken are „necessary to protect public morals 
and to protect human, animal or plant life or health.‟53  Labour rights are assumed to fall under 
                                                          
 
45
  See WTO, Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (11-03-2011). See also Lester et al 872. 
Lester et al whilst acknowledging that some countries, especially developed countries and a few developing 
countries, would like to realise the protection of core labour standards, the larger majority of developing 
countries believe that the issue of a trade-labour linkage, “…has no place in the WTO framework. They argue 
that the campaign to bring labour issues into the WTO is actually a bid by industrial nations to undermine the 
comparative advantage of lower wage trading partners, and could undermine the ability to raise standards 
through economic development, particularly if it hampers their ability to trade. They also argue that the proposed 
standards are too high for them to meet at their level of development. These nations argue that efforts to bring 
labour standards into the arena of multilateral trade negotiations are little more than a smokescreen for 
protectionism.” This study analysed these arguments with a view to establishing whether or not they are 
plausible.  
46
  The WTO came into effect on 1 January 1995. It was created to govern trade relations among member states. It 
commenced under the Marrakech Agreement signed in 1994 in Morocco. The WTO is the internationally 
approved institution for negotiating multilateral trade barrier reduction and settling disputes regarding policies 
that one or more nations observe as distorting trade. 
 
47
  See Bal “International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT” 
2001 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 62. 
48
  See Bartels “The Application of Human Rights Conditionality in the EU‟s Bilateral Trade Agreements and Other 
Trade Arrangements with Third World Countries” 2008a European Union Parliament November.  Bartels states 
that the WTO system is a system of negative regulation; WTO rules provide little guidance on what government 
officials can do to promote human rights as they work to expand trade. 
49
  See Dessing “The Social Clause and Sustainable Development” 2001 International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development Resource 21. 
50
  Bal 2001 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 62. 
51
  Article I of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947. 
52
  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) formed in 1947 and negotiated during the United Nations 
conference on Trade and Employment is the only instrument that attempts to deal with labour matters. 
53
  See Charnovitz “The Moral Exception in Trade Policy” 1998 Virginia Journal of International Law 689. 
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the above exceptions.
54
 Such disparities in views explain the current status quo in which the 
WTO appears unsure, if not disinterested, in protecting core labour standards as human rights 
within its multilateral regulatory scheme.   
1 2  CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
In international law discourses, there have been unending calls for including a social clause
55
 in 
the WTO.
56
 Central to the social clause debate has been the common view advanced by 
developing countries that international law has at times been used as a tool to legitimize the 
actions of conquerors and the dominant.
57
 Inequalities in levels of development have been 
identified as a reason to exclude a social clause in the WTO.
58
  As such, the legal responsibilities 
of the WTO and its developing and developed member states towards curbing the violation of 
core labour standards globally in trade related practices (whilst promoting the development 
agenda) are called into question. A consideration of the normative function of the right to 
development in offering a legal framework with the potential to humanize the global marketplace 
offers a normative legal basis for this work to explore the issue of incorporating a social clause in 
the WTO.
59
   
                                                          
 
54
  See Howse “The World Trade Organisation and the Protection of Workers‟ Rights” 1999 Journal of Small and 
Emerging Business Law 131. 
55
  The legal term of “social clause” is defined as any trade agreement provision that constrains the signatory states 
to respect core labour standards. The contractual nature of the social clause makes it more binding for 
contracting parties than a simple moral commitment. The WTO has favoured moral commitments to protect 
labour rights in trade matters as observed in the Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996. 
56
   Howse 1999 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 2. 
57
  See Maskus “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development” 2000 University of Colorado Boulder 
11. Trade promotes important aspects of economic development, including trade related technology transfer, 
access to new products and product ideas, competition on the global market, and comparative advantage. The 
international community uses trade concepts to support the idea of development. However including a social 
clause in the WTO would deprive developing countries of their comparative advantage and hence lead to 
underdevelopment. It must be considered that developed countries benefited from cheap labour to improve their 
societies. Perhaps the argument now is not for slack labour standards but to allow for a reasonable construction 
of fair labour standards which is not prejudicial to developed countries that now have higher levels of 
development and resultantly improved labour standards.  
58
  See Anderson “Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Agenda” 
http://www.uneca.org/ednd/atpc/documents/april/agric%20trade%20reform%20and%20dda.pdf.  (accessed 11-
03-2011). A practical example of this was noted in Agricultural protectionism, dirty tariffication, and subsidies 
which appear to be the main reasons that the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) failed and, also proof that 
developed countries and the WTO may not be serious about the material state of the underdeveloped countries. 
59
  See Salomon Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law 
(2007) 17. 
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The right to development has an important juridical contribution to defining features of 
the international economic order, with the most salient element of this right being found in its 
potential challenge to existing global political and economic arrangements.
60
  In this era of 
globalization that seeks to provide for an international environment conducive to the further 
accumulation of wealth by the wealthy through the expansive tendencies of global capital, the 
right to development demands international cooperation under law for the creation of a structural 
environment favourable to the realization of basic human rights for everyone.
61
  
Whilst an agreement appears to be present concerning the fundamental values of a 
suitable development course, a number of diverse interpretations of how human rights and 
development ought to relate, and what is meant by rights-based approaches still exist.
62
  Whether 
the concept of the right to development, as a matter of fact, shares with the other human rights 
based approaches to development the emphasis given to elements such as equality, freedom, 
participation and non-discrimination, remain to be established. However it is imperative to note 
that the right to development contains a bit more: it not only prescribes definite guidelines 
according to which development should be realized, but also expresses development itself as a 
human right.
63
 It is this supplementary part which has vital consequences, in a number of ways, 
both at the academic and everyday levels in trying to analyse the development agenda. To begin 
with, the definition of development as a human right suggests a unique critical reflection of the 
development agenda in all its facets, from financial distribution to priorities of global 
                                                          
 
60
  The Declaration on the Right to Development (DRD) [DRD, GA res A/RES/41/128, December 4, 1986, annex 
41 UN GAOR Supplement. (no 53) 186, UN Doc A/RES/41/53 (1986)] makes a vital contribution in this area 
with duties of international cooperation informing its logic and shaping its structure: Article 3(1) provides that 
states have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favorable to the 
realization of the right to development; Article 3(3) refers to the duty of all states to cooperate with each other in 
ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development. This is followed by Article 4(1) which refers to 
the duty of all states to take steps individually and collectively to formulate international development policies in 
order to facilitate the full realization of the right to development. In Article 4(2) the DRD unambiguously accepts 
that effective international cooperation is essential “[a]s a complement to the efforts of developing countries 
[and] in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their comprehensive 
development.” 
61
  Salomon 17. 
62
  See Barsh “The right to development as a human right: Results of the Global Consultation” 1991 Human Rights 
Quarterly 13. 
63
  See Gutto The Legal Nature of the Right to Development and Enhancement of its Binding Nature UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/16. 
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development collaboration.
64
 In addition, it enforces a change, in the dialogue of global 
development collaboration, from a context of need or charity or aid to a framework of right or 
responsibility or collaboration, both at the individual and at the collective point of view, with 
central, practical consequences for all the stakeholders, including Non-Governmental 
Organisations and non-state actors.
65
 
The right to development also has both external and internal dimensions.
66
  The external 
dimension addresses disparities of the international political economy which evidence massive 
global inequities,
67
 and the consequent post cold war growth in social and material inequality 
between states.
68
 This aspect of the right engages the responsibilities of states internationally 
when acting individually or collectively.
69
 The internal dimension of the right to development 
focuses on the duties of each state to ensure domestic policies that seek to contribute to the 
realization of the fundamental human rights of all its subjects.
70
  
The right to development will be an important legal tool in assessing the levels of human 
rights protection in bilateral trade agreements, regional trade agreements
71
 and the WTO 
multilateral trade agreements concerning the protection of core labour standards.  Bilateral and 
regional trade agreements incorporate social clauses regardless of the levels of development of 
the contracting parties as opposed to the WTO‟s approach of excluding them.  Regional trade 
agreements in particular co-exist with the multilateral trade system and impact it in manners that 
are still to be fully understood. Regional trade rules often replicate multilateral trade rules, but 
                                                          
 
64
  See Azzam The Right to Development and Practical Strategies for the Implementation of the Millennium 
Development Goals UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/TF/CRP.1. 
65
  See Alston “Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development” 1988 Human Rights 
Yearbook I. 
66
  Salomon 17. 
67
  See World Bank “World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development” 2006 World Bank/Oxford 
University Press 16. 
68
  See United Nations Development Programme “Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a 
Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World” (2005) 36-37. 
69
  Orford “Globalization and the Right to Development” in Alston (ed) Peoples‟ Rights (2001) 127. 
70
  Salomon 18. 
71
  Grandi “Trade Agreements and their Relation to Labour Standards: The Current Situation” 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/12/trade-agreements-and-their-relation-to-labour-standards.pdf (accessed 09-12-
2012). Regional Trade Agreements have become a distinctive feature of the international trading landscape. 
They are already an integral part of the international trade framework, and influence the behavior of 
governments and traders. 
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sometimes go beyond them by incorporating some commitments that have implications for 
sustainable development such as labour related obligations.
72
   
The integration process which brings together Southern African states through the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) is critical to this work.
73
 Perhaps SADC 
may offer a sample best practices legal framework for incorporating a social clause in trade 
agreements. Apart from incorporating labour provisions in its instruments, SADC is currently a 
party to a unique Tripartite African Free Trade Area (TAFTA) whose objectives will be to 
remove trade barriers.
74
 The TAFTA‟s objectives do not only seek to remove trade barriers but to 
also improve levels of development and the welfare of people in the two regions.
75
 It will be 
significant to this study to consider the importance (if any) to be placed on a social clause by 
SADC. This may provide clarity on whether or not resistance to the inclusion of a social clause 
in the WTO is justified on grounds of inequalities in levels of development or whether this can 
be plausibly dismissed as a flimsy excuse for effectively allowing a race to the bottom in order to 
maximize profits at the expense of human rights.
76
 Furthermore, an appraisal of the efforts being 
made to link trade with non-trade matters such as the environment will be done with a view to 
establishing whether or not there may be any lessons which can be drawn in efforts to develop a 
framework to link trade and labour in the WTO. The analyses will also address concerns as to 
whether or not inequalities in levels of development render a social clause impractical for the 
WTO. 
                                                          
 
72
  Ibid. 
73
  The SADC was founded in 1992 and is an association agreement with broad political and development aims, 
rather than a trade agreement, although it includes a trade component.  The agreement contains a section on work 
and employment and a tripartite commission for labour and social affairs which in 2001 adopted a Social Charter 
on Fundamental Labour Rights in Southern Africa. 
74
  See BuaNews “Plans for African Free Trade Agreement” http://www.africagoodnews.com/business/trade-and-
investment/2461-plans-for-african-free-trade-agreement.html (accessed 14-06-2011). South Africa pushed to 
secure a free trade agreement between the SADC, the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market 
for East African States (COMESA). The free trade agreement has been adopted and is known as the Tripartite 
Free Trade Area (TAFTA). A more detailed discussion regarding this free trade agreement will be done in 
chapter seven of this thesis. 
75
  Ibid. 
76
  See Hudec “International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium: Does the Agreement on Agriculture Work?” 
http://purl.umn.edu/14612 (accessed 26-11-2012). Hudec whilst characterizing the situation in agriculture before 
the Uruguay Round once stated “…if governments lack the political will to obey rules, the rules will not work, 
no matter how well they are crafted.” 
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1 3  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The WTO excludes core labour standards from its instruments. This may be viewed by some as 
academically inexcusable and has the potential to eventually weaken public support for 
international trade. The proposal to establish a trade-labour linkage in the WTO legal framework 
has been controversial in the past decade and has been one of concern in relations between 
advanced industrialised and developing countries.
77
 Advocates of a trade-labour linkage argue 
that a risk exists if countries competitively lower their labour standards in order to preserve their 
comparative advantage relative to other countries.
78
 Similarly, countries with higher levels of 
labour protection may be discouraged from raising their standards, the so called “regulatory 
chill”.79 These arguments are credible if one considers that trade openness in some (if not most) 
developing countries has not been accompanied by an improvement in labour standards but 
rather by a rapid decline.
80
 Those who oppose a trade-labour linkage in the WTO legal 
framework regard it as a largely incoherent agenda.
81
 Trebilcock and Howse observed that: 
 “...From the perspective of importing countries, generically lower labour costs in exporting 
countries enhance consumer welfare in importing countries, and by more than reductions in 
producer welfare in the latter. From the perspective of exporting countries, particularly 
developing countries, the latter rightly argue that in the early stages of industrialization, 
entailing mass production of low-technology products (e.g. textiles, clothing, footwear, 
processed agricultural products), low-cost and low-skilled labour is one of the principal 
sources of their competitive advantage, and to deny them the ability to exploit this is to 
consign them forever to low-value added commodity production for developed-country 
markets („hewers of wood and drawers of water‟).”82 
 
However, in a world which places value in human rights protection, maintaining or adopting an 
approach to industrialisation employed during the industrialisation era by western countries 
                                                          
 
77
  See Stem “Labour Standards and Trade Agreements” http://www.spp.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/wp.html. 
(accessed 12 February 2011).  See also Trebilcock and Howse 557. Trebilcock and Howse have opined that the 
trade-labour linkage debate is “...one of the most contentious contemporary issues in trade and labour policy 
circles...” 
78
  In the United States and some industrialised countries such as Britain and France, labour interests and social 
activists have argued that “unfair” labour practices and conditions exist in developing country trading partners 
and need to be offset by appropriate trade policy measures in order to level the playing field.  
79
  See Staiger “The International Organization and Enforcement of Labor Standards” in Basu, Horn, Roman and 
Shapiro (eds) International Labor Standards (2003) 271.  
80
  See Granger and Siroen “Core Labour Standards in Trade Agreements: From Multilateralism to Bilateralism” 
Universite Paris Dauphine Departement d‟Economie Applique Place du Marechal da Tassigny 75775 Paris 
Cedex 16 France 1. 
81
   Trebilcock and Howse 560. 
82
   Ibid. 
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might be inconsistent with the human rights agenda. In spite of the comments made by 
Trebilcock and Howse above, they have also observed that: 
  “...core labour standards viewed as basic or universal human rights, by promoting human 
freedom of choice, are entirely consistent with a liberal trading regime that seeks to ensure 
other human freedoms, in particular the right of individuals to engage in market 
transactions with other individuals without discrimination on the basis of country of 
location.”83 
  
If core labour standards as human rights are consistent with a free trade regime it would be 
correct to conclude that the WTO founding Agreement should include a social clause in order to 
promote fair trade. Although efforts were made during the 20
th
 century to link trade and labour 
matters, no policy or legislative position has been taken within the WTO to address the continual 
violation of core labour standards in trade related matters.
84
 Emphasis has been placed on 
promoting the WTO as an institution for “free trade” with the proposals to incorporate a social 
clause in the legal framework of the multilateral trade system being viewed as an impediment to 
free trade. However, the perception that the WTO is purely a “free trade” institution might not, 
on the whole, be accurate as rules of fair trade have been extended by the WTO into non-trade 
areas.
85
 This raises the question as to why the same multilateral arrangement cannot be adopted 
to protect core labour standards as human rights in trade.
86
  
                                                          
 
83
  Trebilcock and Howse 563. 
84
  See World Trade Organisation 2007a Informe Sobre el Comercio Mundial 2007 Geneva 380. See also Hoekman 
and Kostecki The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond (2009) 626. Hoekman 
and Kostecki have observed that: “Trade policy is an efficient tool to enforce labour standards, assuming 
agreement could be reached on what the relevant standards should be.” However, Hoekman and Kostecki also 
observed that: “Trade restrictions will generally have a detrimental effect on the realization of the non-economic 
objectives that are pursued by pro-labour standards groups. Trade restrictions raise the prices of imports, thus 
importing a welfare cost at home, while at the same time worsening the labour situation in the target country. 
Demand for labour services will fall, and plants will downsize.” 
85
  See Lester et al 67. Lester et al have observed that: “The system does allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, 
other forms of protection. More accurately, it is a system of rules dedicated to open, fair and undistorted 
competition. The rules on non-discrimination-MFN and national treatment-are designed to secure fair conditions 
of trade. So too are those on dumping (exporting at below cost to gain market share) and subsidies. The issues 
are complex, and the rules try to establish what is fair or unfair, and how governments can respond, in particular 
by charging additional import duties calculated to compensate for damage caused by unfair trade. Many other 
WTO agreements aim to support fair competition: in agriculture, intellectual property, services, for example...”  
86
   See Trebilcock 173. Trebilcock critiques the incorporation of core labour standards, as human rights, into the 
multilateral trade framework when their precise content is subject to debate. He questions “what forms of child 
labour are acceptable; what limits on collective bargaining and the right to strike are acceptable?” He further  
opined that: “In addition, adopting a human rights perspective on core labour standards, the trade policy-labour 
standards linkage is problematic to the extent that it is triggered by the importation of goods from countries 
where the goods are produced in violation of core labour standards. Many violations of core labour standards 
15 
 
Statistics from ILO reports
87
 and other official reports
88
 reveal the persistence or 
deterioration of the worst forms of exploitation such as child and forced labour. Child labour is 
also excluded from the current WTO instruments. Only products of prison labour are currently 
prohibited by the WTO.
89
 An ILO paper released in 2003 indicated that discrimination in hiring, 
wages, benefits, and career development, lack of accommodation, and issues of working hours, 
pregnancy, maternity leave and child care have all been identified as problems characteristic of 
trade oriented zones.
90
 Faced with these facts, a demand for respect of minimum labour standards 
in global, regional and national trade agreements has arisen. Increased imports from countries in 
which labour standards are ostensibly not enforced vigorously may be detrimental to wages and 
working conditions in the industrialised importing countries.
91
 Workers in developing countries 
appear consigned to exploitative and abusive conditions, and their wages are suppressed.
92
 With 
no action being taken by the WTO, regional pacts containing obligations that go beyond existing 
multilateral commitments and others dealing with areas not yet included in the WTO such as the 
social clause have been concluded.
93
 This leads to the problematic perception that instead of 
actively pursuing a resolution of the negative impact of excluding core labour standards from its 
multilateral trade agreements, the WTO becomes part of the problem contributing to an endless 
controversy concerning the trade-labour linkage debate.
94
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
occur in non-traded goods sectors (e.g., use of child labour) hence they are likely to escape the reach of trade 
sanctions by importing countries.” However, contrary to Trebilcock‟s views, this study will show that child 
labour in some Southern African countries, especially Malawi is actually being used in traded goods, such as 
tobacco, which are key drivers of the world economy. 
87
  See the International Labour Office Every Child Counts-New Global Estimates on Child Labour Geneva April 
2002; International Labour Office Application of International Labour Standards 2004 (1) Report 92 III Part IA 
Geneva 2004. The ILO estimates that more than 12 % of the world‟s children aged between 5 and 9 are at work.  
The percentage rises to 23 % for children from 10 to 14.  One hundred and seventy-nine (179) million children 
are subject to the “worst forms” of labour such as hazardous work, forced and bonded labour. 
88
  See the series of the United States (US) Department of Labour By the Sweat and Toil of Children 6 Volumes 
issued since 1994; US Department of Labour Report Series Foreign Labour Trends, The Department of Labour‟s 
2004 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labour Washington DC (annual series).    
89
  Child labour is one of the most critical issues in trade which must be considered in the same length as prison 
labour. A couple of international instruments have been adopted to curb the abuse of children in employment 
matters. These include the ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 138 of 1973 (See Articles 2, 3 and 7) and the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation No. 190 of 1999 (Article II). Child labour is a key area of 
concern in countries such as India and China where minors are used as cheap labour. 
90
  See ILO “Employment and Social Policy in Respect of Export Processing Zones” 2003 ILO Geneva 9. 
91
  Stem 1. 
92
  Ibid. 
93
  Grandi V. 
94
  In the Singapore Declaration, the WTO distanced itself from labour matters, regardless of whether they are trade 
related or not. The WTO chose to allow the ILO to deal with all labour matters. What is disturbing though is that 
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No study has proposed a social clause which could be incorporated into the WTO legal 
framework without undermining the gains from trade for WTO Member States. The international 
community is yet to develop a legal framework for managing a trade-labour linkage in the WTO 
which is acceptable to developed and developing countries as well as human rights advocates. 
The failure to establish a legal framework which ensures a fair, effective and equitable means of 
managing the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO justifies the fears of developing countries 
that a social clause will undermine their trade gains. Equally, it could strengthen the developed 
countries‟ controversial argument that “…it is unfair for firms and workers in developed 
countries to have to compete with firms and workers in developing countries where labour 
standards and labour costs are much lower, and hence risk losing market share and jobs to these 
countries.”95 Perhaps adopting a legal framework for a trade-labour linkage which balances the 
interests of WTO Member States, placing emphasis on compliance with a social clause subject to 
countries‟ levels of development could be a plausible proposal for protecting core labour 
standards in trade. However, no such framework has been developed hence there is still no 
consensus regarding an acceptable approach to establishing a trade-labour linkage in the WTO 
legal framework. This is the most critical contribution this study seeks to make. 
1 4  JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
The Havana Charter, which was the foundation for the unsuccessful International Trade 
Organization (ITO),
96
 contained a stipulation that members were to take measures against “unfair 
labour conditions.” The GATT contains no explicit provision permitting or requiring trade action 
against violations of core labour standards. At most, Article XX (e) permits otherwise the GATT 
inconsistent measures “relating to the products of prison labour.” However the GATT permits 
members to impose compensatory duties, under certain circumstances, against imports associated 
with two kinds of “unfair” trade practices: dumping and subsidization by the exporting country.   
As defined in GATT Article VI, dumping is the export of a product for a price lower than 
that for which it is sold in the market of the country of origin or, alternately, export sales below 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
there are instances where trade and labour matters overlap. Such areas require the WTO to be involved through 
promoting the recognition of core labour standards in its instruments. This position is yet to be adopted by the 
WTO.   
95
  Trebilcock 172. 
96
  The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 recognized the need for a comparable institution for trade, the proposed 
International Trade Organization, to complement the International Monetary fund and the World Bank. 
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the cost of production. Unfair subsidization is defined in a complex manner in the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
97
 Although the export of products 
manufactured with “unfair” labour practices is sometimes described rhetorically as “social 
dumping” or a “negative” subsidy, there is little question that the existing law on dumping and 
subsidization fails to provide legal justification for imposition of duties on products from 
countries with low labour standards on the basis of commercial unfairness.
98
 
The discussion of and debate on “social issues” during the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT/WTO negotiations highlighted the potential impact of trade liberalisation on certain 
human rights, for example labour standards and environmental protection.
99
 However while the 
concept of trade-labour linkage may seem straight forward, interpretation and conversion into 
enforceable measures remain hotly disputed and often generates counter arguments of 
protectionism.
100
 Trade liberalisation and the protection of human rights are based on two 
fundamentally different philosophies, the one of the free market, and the other of state 
intervention, at least in relation to economic and social rights,
101
 as well as “third generation” 
rights.
102
 Not surprisingly, the two concepts have been difficult to align and each of the concepts 
has taken a rather different path and pace in development. The re-union of the two is a more 
                                                          
 
97
  WTO “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)” 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm (accessed 09-12-2012). The SCM Agreement addresses 
two separate but closely related topics: multilateral disciplines regulating the provision of subsidies, and the use 
of countervailing measures to offset injury caused by subsidized imports. 
98
  See Adams and Turner “The Social Dimension of Freer Trade” in Cook and Katz (eds) Regional Integration and 
Industrial Relations in North America (1994) 82. 
99
  See Charnovitz “The World Trade Organisation and Social Issues” 1994 Journal of World Trade 17. 
100
  See Tsogas “Labour Standards in International Trade Agreements: An Assessment of the Arguments” 1999 The 
International Journal of Human Resource Management 354. 
101
  Economic, social and cultural rights are socio-economic human rights, such as the right to education, the right to 
housing, and the right to health. Economic, social and cultural rights are recognized and protected in 
international and regional human rights instruments. Member states have a legal obligation to respect, protect 
and fulfill economic, social and cultural rights and are expected to take progressive action towards their 
fulfillment. The UDHR is one of the most important sources of economic, social and cultural rights. It recognizes 
the right to social security in Article 22, the right to work in Article 23, the right to rest and leisure in Article 24, 
the right to an adequate standard of living in Article 25, the right to education in Article 26, and the right to 
benefits of science and culture in Article 27. The ICESCR is the primary international legal source of economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
102
  Third-generation human rights are those rights that go beyond the mere civil and social concepts. They include 
Group and collective rights, Right to self-determination, Right to economic and social development, Right to a 
healthy environment, Right to natural resources, Right to communicate and communication rights, Right to 
participation in cultural heritage and Rights to intergenerational equity and sustainability.  
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recent event, but the union has hardly been a happy or harmonious one. Resultantly the violation 
of core labour standards in trade practices persists with no solution in sight. 
1 5  RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
1 5 1  Aims 
The discussion concerning the inclusion of core labour standards in multilateral trade agreements 
was excluded from the Doha agenda.
103
 At the inception of the WTO, labour supporters argued 
that the WTO would accelerate the headlong rush to laissez-faire by dismantling national 
regulations.
104
 They further argued that the WTO would overwhelm attempts by nations (mostly 
developing countries) to defend living standards and the ability of unions to fight for wages and 
health and safety laws and it would make it harder for nations to defend the rights of workers to 
join unions.
105
 Labour therefore lobbied hard against the WTO.
106
 This study engages the debate 
on the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO. Focus will be placed on arguments that a social 
clause in the WTO may diminish the comparative advantage of nations, in particular, developing 
countries. Labour‟s best hope for mitigating the effects of competition from low-wage countries 
will thus be decided under the aegis of the WTO, where the battle lines have been drawn 
between a handful of industrial countries that seek to link trade rules with labour rights and an 
alliance of Third World countries with their corporate patrons who are opposed.
107
 The study 
will show that the WTO might well be a suitable forum for advancing workers‟ rights worldwide 
as the WTO has the power to review nations‟ domestic laws that create unfair trade advantages 
including, potentially, labour laws. The WTO could define fair trade to include compliance with 
labour standards. Such linkage would be a historic change in the world‟s trading regime, and 
labour‟s stake in it considering that regional trade agreements already include social clauses.  
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  See Fergusson “World Trade Organisation Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda” 2008 CRS Report for 
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104
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1 5 2  Research objectives 
Improving compliance with labour standards in conjunction with trade openness might speed up 
development and possibly the stability of international trade relations. Accordingly, the 
following are the specific research objectives of this study: 
 To propose or develop a legal framework which could assist the WTO to equitably 
enforce a social clause amongst its Member States without undermining their gains from 
trade or derailing their development plans. 
 To evaluate views surrounding proposals to incorporate a social clause into the WTO 
legal framework and draw lessons from the failed International Trade Organisation (ITO) 
regarding the importance of a trade-labour linkage. 
 To evaluate the legal significance of including social clauses in bilateral as well as 
regional trade agreements which often replicate multilateral trade agreements, and the 
necessity of making separate rules for protecting core labour rights in the WTO 
borrowing from a similar approach adopted in the trade and environment context, in order 
to impose some discipline on trade practices which impact negatively on core labour 
standards. 
 To evaluate the outcomes of relying on low labour standards as a comparative advantage 
in trade amongst selected Southern African countries and establish the basis of such an 
approach. 
 To assess the potential and prospects of using trade restrictions as enforcement 
mechanisms for resolving the violation of core labour standards in trade practices. 
 
1 6  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The fundamental questions this thesis seeks to address are as follows: 
 What is the place for core labour standards in the international trade regime and to what 
extent does the WTO legal and policy framework recognise human rights? 
 Is it possible to adopt a social clause in the WTO legal framework and if so, how? 
 Does the violation of core labour standards in trade-related matters amount to an unfair 
competitive advantage in international trade where unequal trade partners are involved? 
20 
 
 Does a lowered compliance with labour standards during industrialization in the western 
countries justify the reliance upon a lowered compliance with core labour standards in 
today‟s world? 
 Does a lowered compliance with core labour standards in trade lead to development or 
industrialisation?  
 Is free trade related to a lowered compliance with core labour standards? 
 Does the incorporation and implementation of a social clause in regional trade 
agreements provide justification for incorporating a social clause in multilateral trade 
agreements in future? 
 
1 7  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research is a qualitative study based on literature review and survey of primary sources in 
the form of soft law as developed by reports of United Nations (UN) Agencies, UN treaty bodies, 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly as well as regional bodies such as the European Union, 
SADC and SACU. ILO Conventions, the Havana Charter and the GATT will also be consulted.  
It will also utilise secondary sources such as books, works of publicists of international law, 
international human rights, labour law, economics, industrial relations as well as academic 
materials from the internet.  Reports of governments and international organisations, global 
research and policy institutions as well as works of academics in the fields of economics, human 
rights, labour and trade law will be consulted. This work is designed to provide tentative 
recommendations for dealing with the continued exclusion of a social clause in the WTO.  The 
methodology adopted in this study will combine purely legal and socio-legal approaches to the 
subject of the thesis. 
 
1 8  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concept of a trade-labour linkage has never been an easy concept to articulate from an 
academic perspective.  Whilst an array of literature discussing the trade-labour linkage debate 
exists, authors are yet to demonstrate the legal implications of the continued exclusion of a social 
clause from the WTO regime whereas regional trade agreements, which seem to have become a 
distinctive feature of the international trade landscape, have social clauses incorporated in them. 
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 Lester, Mercurio and Davies
108
 have argued that it would be productive to pursue the 
debate over the appropriate relationship between trade and human rights using two 
approaches.
109
 The first approach would focus on how trade law and human rights laws could be 
reconciled and made complementary to the greatest extent possible.
110
 The second approach 
would be to focus on the need to strengthen human rights protection in global integration law.
111
 
Before then, Petersmann had argued that: “In order to remain democratically acceptable, global 
integration law (e.g. in the WTO) must pursue not only „economic efficiency‟ but also 
„democratic legitimacy‟ and „social justice‟ as defined by human rights.”112  
 Trebilcock has argued that imposing sanctions on importing goods produced in 
circumstances in which there is a perceived non-compliance with core labour standards risked a 
protectionist abuse by importing countries rather than placing exclusive focus on the effect of 
inadequate labour standards on the welfare of citizens in exporting countries.
113
 Earlier, 
Trebilcock and Howse had opined that privileging core labour standards over other human rights 
by protecting them through hard law such as the multilateral trade legal framework was “…to 
risk a protectionist rationale for trade or other economic sanctions.”114 
 Hoekman and Kostecki have argued that, “…using trade remedies to enforce labour 
standards would worsen the problems at which they are aimed (by forcing workers in targeted 
countries into informal or illegal activities).”115 Further, they opined that, “…unemployment will 
rise and, given the absence or weakness of social safety nets (unemployment insurance), can be 
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  See Lester et al 886. 
109
  Ibid. 
110
  Ibid. 
111
  See Lester et al 882. See also Petersmann “Time for a United Nations „Global Compact‟ for Integrating Human 
Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration” 2002 European Journal 
of International Law 621. Petersmann argued that, “…European integration confirms that the collective supply 
of public goods (such as the global division of labour) may not be politically feasible without comprehensive 
„package deals‟ including solitary responses to „market failures‟ and redistributive „principles of justice‟. Less 
developed countries, for instance, often perceive market competition as a „license to kill‟ for multinational 
corporations from developed countries as long as liberal trade rules are not supplemented by competition and 
social rules…promoting fair opportunities and equitable distribution of gains from trade.”   
112
  Petersmann 621. See also Lester et al 885. Lester et al have observed that: “The protection of human dignity and 
human rights across frontiers through global integration law based on mutually coherent legal guarantees of 
„state sovereignty‟, „popular sovereignty‟ and „individual sovereignty‟ remains the biggest constitutional 
challenge of law and governance in the twenty-first century.” 
113
  Trebilcock 173. 
114
  Trebilcock and Howse 566. 
115
  Hoekman and Kostecki 627. 
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expected to have a detrimental impact on poverty.”116  Hoekman and Kostecki then conclude that 
based on the arguments they advanced, it is not surprising that developing countries oppose a 
trade-labour linkage. 
Barnacle
117
 has acknowledged that there is little or no express recognition of labour rights 
in the WTO multilateral agreements and the investment agreements.
118
 Charnovitz
119
 examined 
the long history of proposals to link workers rights with international trade. His proposals center 
around the proposition that core labour standards must be incorporated into international trade 
agreements through a social clause.   
Brown
120
 has indicated that the trade-labour linkage debate has engendered ongoing and 
vigorous debate amongst academics, governments, policy makers, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and unionists. Brown has further opined that, along with issues such as 
environmental protection, it ranks among the most contentious issues within the WTO.  
Tsogas
121
 categorised the various protagonists in this debate into two groupings. The first 
group consists of neo-classical economists and free traders, major international employers and 
transnational corporations, third world governments, political and economic elites, and some 
NGOs. The arguments advanced by this group centre around two themes: that social clauses are 
a form of disguised protectionism by developed economies and a form of neo-colonialism, 
imposing western values on other cultures. In the second group Tsogas included neo-Keynesian 
and neo-institutionalist economists, international employers who have developed “ethical” codes 
of conduct, national and international trade unions, some developed country governments and a 
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  Ibid. 
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Saskatchewan Law Review 629. 
118
 WTO “Trade and Investment” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm (accessed 09-12-
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121
  See Tsogas G Labour Regulation in a Global Economy (2001) 21-22. 
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plethora of NGOs, including human rights and religious groups.
122
 This group advances 
arguments about human rights, economic efficiency and skills development.   
Maitland
123
 has pointed out that the trade-labour rights demand enjoys no support 
amongst the people or the trade unions of the developing nations. Labour, he contends, lobbied 
hard against the WTO. When seven years of trade negotiations at last gave birth to the WTO in 
1995, the labour movement was one of its leading skeptics with their greatest fear being that the 
WTO would infringe upon the trade unions‟ ability to organise in the workplace.124 
Egger and Schumperli
125
 have conducted a survey of NGOs, research centres and trade 
unions of the South and of Eastern Europe in 1996.  Of the 82 respondents, 67 were from the 
South but only 19 of these Southern respondent organisations were trade unions. Whilst the 
results of their research revealed overwhelming support for the introduction of a social clause in 
international trade, the findings were representative more of the views of NGOs than of trade 
unions.   
Salazar-Xirinachs
126
 and Fields
127
 have analysed the single most common reason cited 
against the inclusion of core labour standards in international trade agreements, protectionism or 
“disguised protection” by the North designed to undermine developing countries‟ comparative 
advantage, namely low wages. Panagariya
128
 has argued that cheap labour is viewed as an unfair 
competitive advantage by developed countries and claims that this is essentially the age-old 
pauper labour argument that labour unions have repeatedly used to seek protection for labour- 
intensive industries in developed countries. Panagariya has further indicated that a large number 
of Northern unions, as well as those from the South, oppose a social clause.
129
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Khor
130
 has argued that any form of linkage between labour issues and the WTO can only 
be detrimental to the interests of developing countries and workers in the South. Dubey
131
 and 
Shaffer
132
 supported this view with the latter referring to the demand for a trade-labour linkage 
as a „western perspective‟.  
Bhagwati
133
 referred to the opposition to a social clause by the Indian trade union 
movement as if this somehow concludes the issue. Nigam argued that Bhagwati failed to discuss 
the nuances or differences of opinion within the Indian community on the social clause proposal. 
Certainly, in 1995, all the major Indian unions attending the 32
nd
 Session of the Standing Labour 
Committee, endorsed the Indian government‟s opposition to a trade-labour linkage, support 
based upon the notion of anti-imperialism and national sovereignty.
134
   
Hensman
135
 has noted that, on the whole, the proposal for a workers‟ rights clause in 
WTO agreements has been greeted in a positive light by informal sector activists as these 
activists see little hope of securing rights for workers through purely domestic action, a view 
supported by Nigam.
136
  Palo et al.
137
 have referred to the Commission on Labour Standards and 
International Trade appointed by the Indian government to examine the issue of linkage. The 
Commission, headed by Subramanian Swamy, former Minister of Commerce, suggested that: 
“There are some desirable core labour standards which deserve to be uniformly enforced 
internationally for which trade sanctions are ultimately necessary to obtain serious 
compliance. India should give up its defensive approach and play a proactive role in 
global forums, particularly in the World Trade Organisation, in evolving a moderate 
„Middle Path‟ concept of [the] social clause.”138 
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Howse
139
 has argued that currently, the WTO‟s main role with respect to labour standards is, 
through interpretations of legal provisions, to constrain the use of trade measures as a means of 
putting economic pressure on countries or firms to comply with such standards. In some existing 
interpretations of a number of GATT provisions, the kind of obstacles to such measures appears 
to far exceed what is required to exclude purely protectionist or arbitrarily discriminatory 
measures. Howse and Trebilcock
140
 undertook a survey of the development-related provisions of 
the GATT. They concluded that the encouragement of developing economies in trade was 
arguably regarded as a natural side-effect of trade expansion, with a few development-oriented 
patches added on to trade liberalizing rules. 
Broude
141
 has critically analyzed the role of development and poverty alleviation in the 
legal and institutional workings of the WTO. By analogy to Joseph Weiler‟s142 analysis of the 
dynamics of internal and external legitimacy in WTO dispute settlement, Broude suggested the 
existence of an inconsistency in the evolution of the WTO, between the marked shift in the 
organizational rhetoric of development, and the virtual standstill in the adaptation of the WTO‟s 
functional design to its newly trumpeted development goals.  
Irwin
143
 undertook a study on the subject of the importance of international trade to 
development vis-a-vis economic growth, though the debate has never been free of theoretical 
controversy and political contention.  
Frank Garcia
144
 has showed that the present development debate is not about global 
economic expansion as such but rather about the erasure of economic inequities, over the 
capacity of international trade policy to lift the world‟s deprived masses from poverty and to 
promote the economies of developing countries where the vast majority of the impoverished 
reside. 
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Sylvia Ostry
145
 has looked at the trend of the so called “developmentification” of the 
WTO and indicates that it is in fact not so surprising, given the recent history of the WTO.  
Rubens Ricupero
146
 has analysed the perceptions of the unbalanced rules of the 
GATT/WTO and concluded that their failure to promote development have fuelled complaints 
about the legitimacy gap in the WTO.   
1 9  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Certain limitations of this study must be made clear from the outset.  The debate over the role of 
the WTO in international efforts to raise labour, social and human rights standards is a debate 
about the means to an end, not about the end in itself.
147
 The trade-labour linkage debate is also a 
long standing issue which has been resuscitated by the never-ending effects of globalisation on 
labour standards in an open trading environment. Strydom
148
 has noted with regard to the ever 
growing nature of public international law that: 
“At the heart of the matter lies the problematic nature of the traditional conceptualization 
of the sources of international law in view of the impact of several fast developing new 
fields and uncertainties these developments have brought in the wake with regard to law 
creating competence of various international law organs and the legal status of the 
documents they produce.”149 
 
 The WTO has found it difficult to deal with the trade-labour linkage debate. Diverse opinions 
exist regarding the possible benefits and disadvantages of including a social clause in the WTO 
where equal compliance is sought from both developed and developing countries. However, 
there is no clear-cut answer to this complex question as the implications of a social clause may 
depend largely on its specific content and the extent to which it accommodates the interests of all 
concerned. Regardless of this position, a solution must be found. To determine how the social 
clause may affect the WTO regulatory framework in particular, several existing FTAs have to be 
examined.   
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This work explores the significance of incorporating a social clause in FTAs where 
countries with unequal levels of development are yet to develop dispute settlement structures 
which give clear indications on resolution of complaints existing in their regions concerning 
violations of core labour standards. This information is not easily obtainable as countries seek to 
promote trade over human rights and would go to great lengths to conceal the existence of any 
such violations. This work also has to cover regional agreements whose significance in 
international trade law is such that they may influence changes in international trade practices. 
However, there are so many of these agreements. Therefore, this study will focus on the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
150
 and the SADC trade agreements. The justification 
for paying particular attention to these two regions is that the NAFTA has taken the lead role in 
trying to incorporate core labour standards in bilateral and regional trade agreements whilst the 
SADC also recognises core labour standards in its regional trade agreement with a more 
interesting development coming in the form of the TAFTA. The TAFTA may just be a good 
indication of the developing countries‟ sincerity in objecting to the inclusion of a social clause in 
the WTO, if they have it in their own trade instruments. Focus will also be placed on concerns 
around the impact of a social clause on the comparative advantage of developing countries and 
enforcement of the proposed social clause in the WTO amongst countries with different levels of 
development. 
1 10  SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study focuses on the debate on enlarging the place of human rights and development in the 
WTO with emphasis on the need to include a social clause in its regulatory framework.
151
 The 
study will explore whether including a social clause in the WTO will infringe on the comparative 
advantage of developing countries or not. The study will also explore the impact of enforcing the 
WTO‟s findings concerning nations‟ violation of core labour standards as human rights in trade 
related matters, especially where such enforcement is required in instances where nations have 
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different levels of development. The objective in this instance is to assess whether there is any 
prejudice which states at the lower echelons of the development chain will suffer if a social 
clause was to be incorporated into the WTO. The study will pay attention to the legal paradigm 
underlying the WTO, one of sovereignty that does not permit extra-jurisdictional action to be 
taken through trade policies. Analysis will also be done on why a prohibition exists concerning 
trade in products from prison labour as opposed to the critical area of child labour.  
The case of an environment and trade linkage
152
 will be reviewed to ascertain whether the 
legal principles employed to deal with disputes in these areas may not be employed in resolving 
the trade, labour and human rights linkage debate in the WTO. The study will further enquire 
whether there have been complaints from the implementation of social clauses in regional trade 
agreements so as to ascertain the dissatisfaction or satisfaction levels regarding the effectiveness 
of a social clause as a mechanism to improve the protection of core labour standards as human 
rights in trade. 
1 11  OUTLINE AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The study consists of nine (9) chapters. Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to the study. 
The contextual background to the study is presented. It identifies the research problem, gives the 
justification for the study and articulates the aims, objectives, scope, methodology, research 
questions, literature review, scope and limitations of the study. It also gives the outline and 
overview of the chapters in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 discusses the historical context of the trade-labour linkage with a view to 
highlighting the historical antecedents of calls for the incorporation of a social clause in the 
WTO instruments. It assesses the violations of labour standards in the Pre- and Post World War 
II eras, highlights the initial inclusion of a social clause in the Havana Charter and its later 
exclusion from the GATT. The chapter also seeks to establish whether there are any lessons to be 
learnt from the failed ITO which could inform the contemporary debates regarding proposals to 
incorporate a social clause into the WTO legal framework. 
Chapter 3 discusses the relevance and implications of the right to development and the 
concept of human rights to the trade-labour linkage debate. An analysis of the legal 
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characteristics of the right to development as a human right and its intended impact on global 
trade flows reveals how the duty to protect human rights is an obligation for both developed and 
developing countries, internally and externally. The chapter also evaluates the scope of a rights-
based approach to development vis-à-vis the demands for a New International Economic Order. 
It examines the legal basis of the WTO‟s human rights commitments with a view to pointing out 
that the WTO like any other international organisation has a duty to protect core labour standards 
as human rights. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the theoretical and empirical evidence relevant for understanding the 
trade-labour linkage debate within the WTO. The chapter examines legal arguments concerning 
the trade-labour linkage debate and explores the debates regarding the exclusion of the social 
clause in international trade on the basis of its presumed threat to developing nations‟ 
comparative advantage. It proceeded to assess the economic theories concerning labour market 
functions and trade with a view to establishing their relevance in the global era. The analysis is 
limited to the most important and representative literature, trends and issues surrounding the 
contemporary trade-labour linkage debate.  
Chapter 5 undertakes a legal analysis of the incorporation of the social clause in bilateral 
and regional trade agreements. The chapter also explores how the adoption of a social clause in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements may enlarge the place of human rights and development 
in the WTO‟s multilateral trade regulatory framework. By analysing some of the cases heard 
under the NAALC, the chapter seeks to assess whether the inclusion of a social clause in 
bilateral or regional trade agreements is mere grandstanding or a genuine attempt to protect core 
labour standards in trade. The key objective of the analysis in chapter five is to show that it is 
possible to establish a trade-labour linkage legal framework in the WTO and failure to do so 
could compromise the legitimacy of the institution.  
 Chapters 6 and 7 evaluate the protection of core labour standards in selected Southern 
African countries. Chapter 6 discusses the current developments surrounding a social clause in 
South Africa. Placing focus on the role of the Chinese in the violation of labour standards in 
trade, the violation of labour standards to lure investors and the labour unrest in South Africa‟s 
farming as well as mining sectors the chapter examines the factors prompting the violation of 
labour rights in trade. Chapter 7 focuses on the violation of labour standards in selected Southern 
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African countries, apart from South Africa, in a bid to lure foreign investors. The chapter is the 
second part of the discussion on a trade-labour linkage from a Southern African perspective. It 
proceeds from the analysis in chapter 6 and explores the widespread nature of the violations of 
core labour standards in trade, in the region. 
 Chapter 8 examines the practicality of incorporating a social clause into the WTO 
regulatory framework. It uses as it basis the attempts made to link trade with environment. It 
proceeds to assess the dangers posed to the multilateral trade system by the exclusion of core 
labour standards from the WTO legal framework. An examination of the legitimacy crisis 
presently facing the WTO reveals that it may need to recognise the protection of human rights as 
one of its key objectives to ensuring sustainable development, especially for developing 
countries. 
Chapter 9 offers a synthesis of the study in order to summarise the main findings and 
draw conclusions to the thesis. Based on contextual factual and legal discussions in the previous 
chapters, chapter 9 concludes by making practical recommendations for the purposes of 
combating the continued deterioration in compliance with core labour standards in the face of 
trade openness. The chapter proposes a legal framework for incorporating a social clause into the 
WTO system which takes into consideration the different levels of development of the WTO 
Member States and their developmental interests. 
 
1 11 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This work is purely a desk top research in which all primary and secondary sources used will be 
referenced. As such no individual or group interviews/questionnaires will be used as instruments 
of research with the objective of holding discussions concerning any topics or issues that might 
be sensitive, embarrassing or upsetting. No criminal or other disclosures requiring legal action 
and having potential adverse effects, risk or hazards for research participants will be made in the 
course of the study. There is therefore no need for arrangements to be made in respect of 
insurance and/or indemnity to meet the potential legal liability of the University of Fort Hare for 
harm to participants arising from the conduct of the research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Linkage between International Trade and International Labour Standards in 
Historical Perspective 
 
2 1  INTRODUCTION 
Attempts to use international labour standards to protect workers from economic exploitation in 
trade related matters must not be seen as an exclusively modern-day concept as they have a long 
history.
1
 The violation of labour standards in trade-related practices, predominantly for economic 
growth, may well be traced to as early as the age of slave trade. This is in spite of the reality that 
the first genuine proposals to defend workers‟ rights in trade related practices were only to be 
advanced by individual social reformers in Europe during the first half of the 19
th
 century in the 
early stages of the industrial revolution.
2
 The proposals were developed by French social 
reformers and were based upon their views on the advantages of abolishing the weekly day of 
rest to a state, until its actions were emulated by other states.
3
   
This chapter presents a historical account of the trade-labour linkage debate. It proceeds 
by investigating historical attempts at advancing the position of labour rights as human rights in 
the multilateral trade system, from the International Trade Organisation (ITO) to the present day 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). The eras of slave trade, colonialism and industrial revolution 
which strongly influenced international trade in history will be examined. Importance will be 
placed on developments relating to the history of trade-labour linkage from the pre-World War I 
era to the time immediately following World War II, when efforts began in earnest to establish 
an international trading regime the result of which was the eventual establishment of the WTO in 
1995.
4
 The aim of such an approach is to ascertain the mischief that gave rise to calls for 
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including a social clause in multilateral trade agreements and the related challenges. Perhaps 
finding the mischief underlying the trade-labour linkage debate could assist in advancing the 
debate in contemporary academic discourse beyond its present state defined by the continual 
omission of a social clause from multilateral trade agreements. Such a development may 
influence the somewhat unrestrained infringement of workers‟ labour rights in the face of 
persistent growth of the so called „free trade‟. It is hoped that suspicions of the existence of 
modern day slavery in the form of lowered compliance with labour standards for economic gain, 
a key feature of international trade in the eras of slave trade and industrialization, may be 
dismissed or addressed in instances where they are found to be genuine.  
2 2  PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA 
2 2 1 Early history 
Advocates for the incorporation of labour rights into trade rules have advanced their opinions in 
response to the conservative case for unrestricted trade.
5
 If international trade is to be 
unrestricted, markets in trade practicing states must not be fixed to boost exports and discourage 
imports.
6
 This philosophical principle was then developed to become the central norm of free 
trade and remains the dominant principle of modern day trade.
7
 However, free trade as a concept 
was „tainted‟ by the legacy of colonialism.8 Intellectuals trying to comprehend the global 
political relations expressed in multilateral trade arrangements must be familiar with the 
significant influence colonialism has had on the conduct of developing nations, even in the 
contemporary world, particularly on their stance on the inclusion of a social clause in trade 
agreements.
9
 Such was the aversion to colonialism amongst developing nations that as soon as 
they attained independence from their colonial masters, they embarked on overturning the 
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policies that were imposed on them by colonial governments, and demanded freedom to utilize 
the commercial restraints that the Western governments had previously reserved for their 
exclusive use.
10
 Freedom in commercial policy-making became bound up with emerging 
political freedom.
11
  Hudec has noted that relations between developed and developing countries 
had previously been almost exclusively either de jure or de facto colonial.
12
  Indeed, the legacy 
of colonialism and the ensuing doubt expressed by developing countries towards the trade 
policies of the colonial states is largely ignored. However, appreciating the lasting impact of this 
knowledge on the attitudes of developing countries to international trade regulation is critical to 
understanding their position concerning the trade-labour linkage debate.  It is submitted that 
making no attempts to consider the impact colonialism had on attitudes as well as policies 
adopted by developing countries towards the ITO/GATT may militate against the adoption of an 
appropriate solution to the challenges faced by the proposal to link trade and labour standards. 
In the opinion of developing countries, trade liberalisation as advanced by the US and 
UK in the plans for the ITO was largely based on self-interest in opening new markets for 
manufactured goods and securing supplies of raw materials.
13
  India once commented: 
“As leading industrial powers, the prosperity of both the United Kingdom (UK) and United 
States of America (US) depends on the ready supply of cheap raw materials and on 
expanding markets for manufactured goods. Exports on an ever-increasing scale rather 
than internal development, is the primary objective of both. The insistence on world-wide 
reduction of tariffs and the removal of trade barriers and on „equal access to the markets 
and raw materials of the world‟ which has characterized every statement of policy made by 
either Government … is thus easily explained”.14 
Clearly the ITO was the brain child of the US and UK, with the US being the more dominant 
actor.
15
 The proposal for a post-war trade organization was developed by a set of inter-
departmental and inter-agency committees that met in Washington DC from 1943 to 1945.
16
 The 
four foundations of the ITO were the generalized most-favoured-nation treatment, freeze in 
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existing preferences, a commitment to negotiate reductions in existing trade barriers and a ban on 
using quantitative restrictions except under exceptional conditions. The US provided an early 
version of their proposal to the UK in 1944.
17
 Meade described the UK‟s alarmed reaction as 
follows: 
“There is a very dangerous trend of thought in the US, of which Will Clayton in the State 
Department may be taken as the symbol, that the way to cure unemployment is to have 
stable exchange rates and free trade rather than (what is much nearer the truth) that the 
only way to achieve the conditions in which one can establish freer trade and more stable 
exchange rates is for countries to adopt suitable domestic policies for maintaining 
employment.”18 
An apparently prostate Britain had little choice. As a condition for the 1945 Anglo-American 
loan, the UK committed to the restoration of current account convertibility and non-
discriminatory trade.
19
 In notes exchanged with the US between 1945 and 1946, Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey, all recipients of US aid, 
committed to similar goals.
20
 The first round of negotiations was convened in London in 1946. 
Participants agreed that quantitative restrictions should be removed and that all trade barriers 
should be applied in non-discriminatory fashion.
21
 However, the UK and France emphasized the 
need for import controls to support their fragile balance of payments positions.
22
 The UK further 
stressed the importance they attached to trade with the Commonwealth.  
Australia insisted that regulatory measures were needed to facilitate industrialization and 
the pursuit of full employment.
23
 It was of the opinion that the US proposals to liberalise trade 
would „fossilize‟ the existing international division of labour in favour of the wealthy 
industrialised countries, threatening their plans for industrialization.
24
 The UK, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands opposed the US proposals for sanctions against state trading and cartels.
25
 With this 
unstable background to free trade owing to colonialism and the non-industrialized countries‟ 
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desire to develop, it should be no surprise that the trade-labour linkage debate has proved to be 
more complicated than it perhaps should be.  At the centre of the debate has been the view that 
cheap labour is critical for the development of developing countries. These countries argue that 
cheap labour during the industrial era was a vital tool for the development of the US and the 
UK.
26
 The same argument has been leveled against all other industrialised countries aside from 
the US and UK. In response, the US has been resolute in dismissing the importance placed by 
developing countries on industrialization. Wilcox has ridiculed the use of industrialization as a 
tool for development, and expressed the view that this opinion is based on the unreasonable idea 
that it was only through swift industrialization that developing countries could secure improved 
standards of living.
27
 It may be necessary to establish whether this is the route developing nations 
also want to follow in the pursuit of development in the modern era.  This may serve to inform 
the world as to what is necessary, free trade at the expense of human rights or the protection of 
human rights at the expense of free trade or a balance of human rights and free trade. This is a 
critical element of this study. The following discussion starts with a brief analysis of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade with a view to showing how cheap labour from slaves led to an unfair export boost.  
2 2 2 Atlantic slave trade 
The Atlantic Slave Trade
28
 was driven by European colonists‟ desire to utilize New World land 
and resources for capital profits.
29
 It remained one of the least studied areas in modern 
historiology until the past quarter century. Klein attributes such an academic omission to the 
slave trade‟s close association with European imperialism, which resulted in a lack of interest in 
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a morally difficult problem.
30
 At the centre of slave trade was labour shortage. Initially, 
Europeans relied upon the indigenous people for unpaid slave labour, until a great number died 
from overwork and Old World diseases.
31
 Optional sources of labour, such as indentured 
servitude,
32
 failed to provide a sufficient workforce. As many crops could not be sold for profit, 
or even grown in Europe,  exporting crops and goods from the New World to Europe often 
proved to be more profitable than producing them on the European mainland.
33
  This meant that 
huge amounts of labour were required to produce and maintain plantations that required hard 
work to grow, harvest, and process valued tropical crops.
34
   
 Western Africa, and later Central Africa, became the sources for enslaved people to meet 
the demand for labour.
35
  The slaves supplied labour which ensured maximum profits for the 
trader at no labour cost at all, with slaves often working in harsh and abusive environments.
36
 
Perhaps, that not so much was written concerning slave labour which directly related to trade 
during the era of the Atlantic Slave trade maybe an indication that the beneficiaries saw no evil 
as the economic benefits of slave labour far outweighed their interests in the conditions under 
                                                          
 
30
   Klein 219. The issue of the use of slave labour for trade purposes is a relevant academic issue to pursue. It 
certainly raises questions as to the relationship of the violation of labour standards by developing countries in the 
interest of trade in the modern world to the violation of labour standards in the industrial era by developed 
countries for economic gains. The difficult question to address is whether it is fair to prohibit developing states 
from using cheap labour for economic gains when developed countries benefited from the same. It becomes 
complicated however when one considers that workers in developing countries will have to serve as cheap labour 
for their own nations as did their forefathers for the colonialists. It thus becomes necessary to question whether 
this is the route to attain development envisaged by developing countries in a human rights era?  
31
  See Hugh The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 (1997) 10. The Old World diseases 
included yellow fever, black small pox, sweating sickness and paralysis. 
32
  See Shannon Economic History of the People of the United States (1934) 73. See also Ballagh White Servitude in 
the Colony of Virginia: A Study of the System of Indentured Labour in the American Colonies (1895). Indentured 
servitude refers to the historical practice of contracting to work for a fixed period of time, typically three to seven 
years, in exchange for transportation, food, clothing, lodging and other necessities during the term of indenture. 
They included men and women; most were under age 21, and most became helpers on farms (performing manual 
labour) or house servants (performing domestic servitude). They were not paid; wages and cash were in too short 
supply for that. It was a system that provided jobs and most important transportation for poor young people from 
the overcrowded labour markets of Europe to labour-short America.  
33
  See Harley “Trade: Discovery, Mercantilism and Technology” in Floud and Johnson (eds) The Cambridge 
Economic History of Britain since 1700: 1700-1860 (2002) 2. 
34
  Shannon 76. 
35
  See Nunn “The Long-Term Effects of Africa‟s Slave Trades” 2008 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 
141. 
36
  See Barrientos “„Labour Chains‟: Analyzing the Role of Labour Contractors in Global Production Networks” 
http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/bwpi-wp-15311.pdf (accessed 10-08-2011). 
37 
 
which the slaves worked.
37
 It should then come as no surprise that after the era of slave trade, 
trade continued to be associated with new forms of slave labour. Two areas of concern 
threatened the legitimacy of the principle of free trade after slave trade; uses of child labour
38
 and 
prison labour.
39
  Both forms of cheap labour, as the case was in the era of slave trade were aimed 
at producing labour intensive goods for trade purposes at a minimal cost while obtaining 
maximum profits.  The chief protagonists for these forms of labour were the UK and the US, the 
parties who later stood at the forefront of advocating for the principle of free trade under the 
ITO/GATT arrangement. An analysis of the use of child and prison labour in the UK and the US 
follows below. 
2 2 3 Child labour in the UK and the US 
The advent of the industrial revolution led to a high demand for labour in the UK and the US, as 
the case had been during the slave trade era.
40
 In the UK, families hastily moved to the newly 
industrialized cities from the rural farm areas to find work but sadly, once the families got there, 
things did not look as bright as they promised to be.
41
 All able members of the family now had to 
go to work in order to survive sometimes at the lowest level of poverty.
42
 The resultant effect 
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was a sharp increase of child labour in factories.  It was in these factories that children were 
abused, over worked, and poorly paid.
43
  The treatment of children in factories was often 
malicious, inhumane and abnormal with their safety being generally neglected.
44
 Their working 
hours varied from 12 to 14 per day with minimal breaks.
45
 It was thus not surprising that 
numerous accidents occurred in the process injuring or killing children on the job. Children‟s 
wages were just but a fraction of what an adult would get, with factory owners sometimes getting 
away with paying them nothing.
46
 Factory owners loved child labour and supported it with 
arguments that it was good for everything from the economy to the building of the children‟s 
characters.
47
 Parents of working children were virtually forced to approve of it because they 
needed the income.
48
 As a result, a significant number of people placed great emphasis on 
fighting for the regulation, improvement, and the abolition of child labour with such efforts 
leading to the promulgation of the Factory Act of 1833
49
 in the UK resulting in reduction of child 
labour abuses.
50
 
In the US, child labour became progressively more common due to economic interests. 
The industrial revolution was an English idea.
51
 The US however had rapidly adopted 
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industrialization and not only did US citizens believe in the industrial revolution which was 
occurring in England but they wanted to reproduce the same things in their own country albeit in 
a better way than in the UK.
52
 The Industrial revolution in the US was represented by new 
technology like the cotton gin and a rising economy. This era in history which could be traced to 
around 1700s-1800s, changed the way people survived and worked. As a result of the rise of 
cities, countless families migrated from rural areas as was the case in the UK.
53
 Conditions in 
industry changed along with social and political conditions. Farm labourers and artisans flocked 
to the manufacturing centres and became industrial workers.
54
 Cities grew rapidly. The change 
from domestic industry to the factory system meant a loss of independence to the worker. A 
factory worker had to work long hours and was forced to work continuously at the pace set by 
the machine. The long hours and the monotonous toil were an especially great hardship for the 
women and children. By 1816, the vast majority of the jobs were held by them.
55
  
Industrialization brought problems of capital and labour. A person had to have a lot of 
capital to buy machines and open a factory. Those who were successful made huge profits with 
which to buy more machines, put up larger buildings, and purchase supplies in greater quantities 
at enormous savings.
56
 Thus capital increased far more rapidly than it ever had before. Much of it 
was invested in building canals, railroads, and steamships and in developing foreign trade.
57
 The 
men who controlled these enterprises formed a powerful new class known as the industrial 
capitalists. However, the industrial capitalists struggled to obtain a voice in the government.
58
 
They needed a better system of banking, currency, and credit. They had to find and hold markets 
for their products. They had many difficulties in organizing their factories to run efficiently. 
They also had to make a profit on their investments in the face of intense competition. This 
resulted in a laissez-faire approach to industrialization.  
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Governments in the industrial era established the doctrine that they should keep their 
hands off business.
59
 Factory owners could therefore arrange working conditions in whatever 
way they pleased. Grave problems arose for the workers with problems of working hours, wages, 
unemployment, accidents, employment of women and children, and housing conditions 
becoming prevalent.
60
 Children could tend most of the machines as well as older persons could, 
and they could be hired for less pay. Great numbers of them worked from 12 to 14 hours a day 
under terrible conditions. Many were apprenticed to the factory owners and housed in miserable 
dormitories.
61
  
More than two million children worked during this era.
62
 Child labour was seen in all 
aspects of work.
63
 Children worked in factories, fields, mines and in the city streets.
64
  Children 
were an asset to the employers because they were cheap labour,
65
 whilst they also worked to help 
support their families. At five years of age, some children were regarded as old enough to help in 
generating more income for their families.
66
 At this time in history, children were mostly 
uneducated except if they came from wealthy families. A famous statement made concerning 
child labour in the US is as follows: “There is work that profits children, and there is work that 
brings profit only to employers. The object of employing children is not to train them, but to get 
high profits from their work.”67 This quote sets the tone of how child labour was recognized by 
the American government during the late 1800‟s and early 1900‟s. A general consensus that 
blames the industrial revolution for the rise of exploitation of child labour thus exists. Not only 
were children subjected to work at such a young age but they had to work under deplorable 
conditions. Children laboured for pennies after a seventy hour work week with those children 
who worked in the factories suffering from many health conditions such as bronchitis and 
tuberculosis due to poor ventilation.
68
 Children who worked in the coal mines would face sweaty 
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and depressing conditions.
69
 Many of them had to transport the coal on their back which led to 
back problems, paralysis and on the whole, a large number of them eventually died. 
Regardless of the gross violations of children‟s rights in labour matters related to trade, 
employers who favoured child labour suggested that it added to the moral fiber of the child by 
instilling a value system of work ethic. The president of Merchants Woolen Company, Charles 
Harding stated:  
“There is a certain class of labour in mills where there is not as much muscular exercise 
required as a child would put forth in play, and a child can do it about as well as a grown 
person…There is such thing as too much education for working people sometimes. I have 
seen cases where young people are spoiled for labour by…too much refinement.”70 
 
In the early 1900‟s a social movement was established to remonstrate against the use of child 
labour in the US. Facing resistance by employers many felt that social reformers were incapable 
of appreciating how child labour was the dynamic power behind the United States economy. The 
parties leading the movement were termed the reformers. They had a concern that the national 
government had to address. The welfare of the child and the abolition of child labour were at the 
centre of the reformers‟ objectives.71 The first organized group of reformers known as The 
National Child Labour Committee (NCLC) was formed in 1904.
72
 The Committee debated the 
issue of child labour and was comprised of social workers, citizens and politicians.  In this 
Committee, the most celebrated reformers were Jane Addams and Lewis Hine,
73
 with Jane 
Addams playing a key role in the creation of the National Progressive Movement.
74
 Changing 
the social atmosphere in the United States, in her view, could be attained through advocating for 
the enactment of laws that would advance improved education for children by the government.  
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Lewis Hine also made his contribution towards abolishing child labour. A charter from 
the US Congress was granted to the NCLC in 1907.
75
 This development enabled the NCLC to 
hire Lewis Hine, a teacher, to research the problems associated with the child labour industry in 
1908.
76
 Hine, in the several years that followed his hiring, traveled to the US factories 
photographing the abuse of children in the work place.
77
 The pictures he took were later 
published and seen by many. The pictures had profound impact on America.  A tale that revealed 
horrible violations against children was divulged by the pictures.
78
  
But it was not until 1916 that the courts in the US made attempts to deal with the issue of 
child labour. In this year, the US Congress had passed the first child labour bill, known as the 
Keating-Owen Act.
79
 The Supreme Court declared the Keating-Owen Act unconstitutional on the 
basis that Congress was using its authority to go outside its mandate to regulate inter-state 
trade.
80
  The resultant effect of the Supreme Court‟s decision was the abolition of the first child 
labour bill, the Keating-Owen Act. A significant amount of tension was created between the 
Congress and the Supreme Court as a result of the Supreme Court‟s decision.  All this tension 
emanated from the case of Hammer v Dagenhart,
81
 in which a father, Roland Dagenhart filed a 
suit on behalf of his two sons Reuben and John who were employed in a cotton mill in Charlotte, 
North Carolina.  Reuben and John were both under sixteen years of age. Dagenhart‟s law suit 
claimed that Congress had violated his sons‟ freedom to work. In response to Dagenhart‟s claim, 
the United States District Court filed a response that stated that the child labour bill directly 
violated child labour laws dealing with commerce from state to state as addressed two years prior 
by the Keating-Owen Act.  
Initially, the case had been heard by the District Court of North Carolina which in its first 
decision held that the child labour bill was unconstitutional. The District Court further stated that 
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Congress had violated several laws including the Constitution.
82
 The court also had a reservation 
to the effect that Congress had violated the Fifth Amendment dealing with due process clause.
83
 
The Supreme Court then had to address the critical question of whether Congress had the right to 
regulate goods sold between states made by children less than sixteen years old or not. Justice 
Day and the majority of the Court held the Keating-Owen Act to be unconstitutional. The 
judgment of the Court affirmed that Congress had acted ultra vires its mandate and that Congress 
misinterpreted the Commerce Clause which was affirmed by the Keating-Owen Act.
84
 Open to 
various interpretations, it could be argued using the Commerce Clause that commerce was not 
defined by manufacturing, (the making of products locally) but by the shipment (the actual 
transportation of the manufactured goods which are shipped interstate).
85
  
The judgment of the Supreme Court was not unanimous in that, there was a dissenting 
opinion.
86
 But the judgment of the 3rd of June 1918 left scores of people perplexed. They 
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questioned why the Court did not find Hammer v Dagenhart a moral problem. They believed it 
was the Court‟s job to uphold the integrity and ethical standards upon which the US was 
founded.  The US Congress was not deterred by the Supreme Court‟s decision and therefore did 
not give up on its efforts to address the problem of child labour. As a result, in 1933, the National 
Recovery Act (NIRA) was passed.
87
 This Act assisted with child labour regulation because it 
outlawed all forms of child labour. The Act set age limits and working conditions resulting in a 
significant decline in the number of working children. Assistance from political supporters and 
labour unions helped make the vision a reality.
88
 However, just like prior attempts, in 1935, the 
Supreme Court ruled the NIRA unconstitutional in the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation v 
United States.
89
  
In 1938, another attempt was made by the US Congress to address the problem of child 
labour usage. The Fair Labour Standards Act also known as Federal Wage and Hour Law was 
finally recognized by the US federal government.
90
 This Act made it mandatory for employers to 
give children minimum wage of twenty-five cents an hour and a maximum amount of work 
hours.  Additionally, it set age limits and limited certain jobs that children could obtain. Once 
this Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1941, in the case of US v Darby,
91
 children soon 
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began to stop working and focus on education.  As a result of the many laws that were deemed 
unconstitutional, children in the US today can look back at history and be thankful for the road 
that was paved on their behalf. The Fair Labour Standards Act still exists and is recognized by 
the US Supreme Court. The use of child labour in the US and UK was to overlap with other 
countries. One such country of note was France which modeled its use of child labour after the 
UK system of child labour usage as driven by industrialization. A concise analysis of the French 
situation follows below. 
2 2 4  The use of child labour in France 
France was one of a small group of countries that embarked on the path to industrialization 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
92
 It had its share of spinning mills, coal 
mines, ironworks, and other manifestations of modern industrial society not least the widespread 
employment of child labour as conventionally understood during the industrial era.
93
 The 
conventional story of child labour in France began with the borrowing of new British 
technologies for spinning cotton and other fibers during the late eighteenth century.
94
 James 
Milne, one of the first renegade workers to smuggle new inventions from Lancashire in the UK 
to France, supported his bid for government funding during the 1780s by emphasizing the 
potential for employing the previously unemployable on his textile machinery, including “very 
small children.”95  Some of the early mills mobilized child labour on a large scale. Nine-tenths of 
the labour force at the Foxlow mill in Orleans in 1790 were boys and girls between five and 
sixteen, or widowed and infirm women.
96
 The Perret spinning mill at Neville, in the Lyonnais, 
employed forty-two women and ninety young girls in 1783.
97
  
The association of the first generation of textile mills with the employment of marginal 
elements in the labour force encouraged a further parallel with British experience: the drafting of 
children onto the shop floor.
98
 Charitable institutions in France had a long tradition of placing 
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orphaned and abandoned children on farms or in workshops to help give them a start in life.
99
 
The turbulent period of revolution and war during the 1790s swelled the ranks of such children, 
providing the new breed of industrial entrepreneurs with one solution to a tricky problem: 
tempting workers into the unfamiliar conditions of the factory system.
100
 The unfortunate 
children became, in effect, forced labour. A decree of 1796 allowed employers to bid for batches 
of children to take on as apprentices.
101
 The hard-pressed administration was relieved of the need 
to pay for their upkeep, and the employers benefited from the long-term contracts imposed on 
them.
102
 Cotton spinners Bernard Delaitre and Antoine Noel, for example, requested a contingent 
of 120 such girls aged between ten to fourteen years, arguing that labour was difficult to recruit 
in their rural area of Seine-et-Oise de-partement.
103
 Their contracts revealed that the girls had to 
remain with the firm until they were twenty-one, and any who tried to escape were liable to be 
arrested and returned to the mill.
104
 The 1790s set the pattern for the routine employment of 
children in French textile mills. Contemporaries soon came to perceive child labour as an issue 
associated with the factory system. An Alsatian industrialist and reformer Bourcat once wrote:  
“It is in industrial establishments where power-driven machinery necessitates the work of 
children beside adults, and especially in all types of mechanized spinning mills and similar 
workshops, that the harmful effects of excessive child labour have been particularly 
noted.”105  
Sadly, decades after industrialization, child labour still exists in the global era and organizations 
such as the ILO are still trying to eliminate it. The use of child labour has now become a 
common feature of trade practices of developing countries as the next chapter will show. It is 
such history that developing countries are looking at when they argue that developed countries 
employ double standards when it comes to the industrialization of the former. Apart from child 
labour, the industrialization process was marred by the heavy reliance on prison labour for 
economic purposes as shown in the immediately following discussion. 
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2 2 5  Industrial prison labour in the US 
The rationale behind the use of prison labour was the increase in the dependence of several 
industries on the cheap, abundant labour force supplied by the prison system.
106
 In the 1800s, 
prisons in America recovered their expenses by hiring prisoners to private companies. In 1885, 
three-quarters of prisoners were engaged in various forms of labour, frequently for private 
companies or individuals.
107
 This had little to do with efforts at rehabilitation. Prisoners were 
compelled to labour with no pay, often in hazardous environments; with prisoner miners being 
killed in cave-ins in the 1800s.
108
  
The use of prison labour was necessitated by the system of industry and trade, advanced 
only for private profit without concern as to the consequences befalling those involved in it, 
specifically the men, women and children who supplied the valuable and fruitful labour which 
produced all the capital and development.
109
 Thus, it was the economic system, which was 
accountable for, not only prison labour, but for the gradual enslavement and degradation of all 
labour, that had to be dealt with before any solution of the prison labour problem or any 
permanent relief from its demoralizing influences could be in use.
110
 In the earlier days 
punishment was the only reason for imprisonment. Offenders against the ruling class had to 
serve the sentence in a prison cell, which not uncommonly was furnished with apparatus for 
torture. With the civilizing process came the idea of the reformation of the culprit.
111
 The 
inmates had to be set to work for their own good, no less than for the good of the state.
112
 It was 
at this point that the convict labour problem began and it gradually escalated from that time. Harr 
has argued that, while there might have been some provisional reforms of the immoral practice 
of prison labour usage for economic gains, it is still an unmitigated curse from which there can 
be no escape while an economic system endures in which labour, (that is to say the labourer, 
man, woman and child) is sold to the lowest bidder in the markets of the world.
113
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More than thirty years ago Professors Wines and Dwight, then Commissioners of the 
Prison Association of New York, delivered a report to the legislature of the state on prison 
industry in which they said: 
“Upon the whole it is our settled conviction that the contract system of convict labour, 
added to the system of political appointments, which necessarily involves a low grade of 
official qualification and constant changes in the prison staff, renders nugatory, to a great 
extent, the whole theory of our penitentiary system. Inspection may correct isolated abuses; 
philanthropy may relieve isolated cases of distress; and religion may affect isolated moral 
cures; but genuine, radical, comprehensive, systematic improvement is impossible.”114 
 
Lafer then added that it is as true now as it was then, considered in his most favorable light, the 
convict is a scourge to himself, a menace to society and a burden to industry, and whatever 
system of convict labour may be tried, it will ultimately fail in its purpose at reformation of the 
criminal or the relief of industry as long as thousands of “free labourers,” who have committed 
no crime, are unable to get work and make an honest living.
115
 A Commission which 
investigated the matter in Ohio in 1877 reported to the legislature as follows: 
“The contract system interferes in an undue manner with the honest industry of the state. It 
has been the cause of crippling the business of many of our manufacturers; it has been the 
cause of driving many of them out of business; it has been the cause of a large percentage 
of reductions which have taken place in the wages of our mechanics; it has been the cause 
of pauperizing a large portion of our labourers and increasing crime in a corresponding 
degree; it has been no benefit to the state; as a reformatory measure it has been a complete, 
total and miserable failure; it has hardened more criminals than any other cause; it has 
made total wrecks morally of thousands and thousands who would have been reclaimed 
from the paths of vice and crime under a proper system of prison management, but who 
have resigned their fate to a life of hopeless degradation; it has not a single commendable 
feature. Its tendency is pernicious in the extreme. In short, it is an insurmountable barrier in 
the way of the reformation of the unfortunates who are compelled to live and labour under 
its evil influences; it enables a class of men to get rich out of the crimes committed by 
others; it leaves upon the fair escutcheon of the state a relic of the very worst form of 
human slavery; it is a bone of ceaseless contention between the state and its mechanical 
and industrial interests; it is abhorred by all and respected by none except those, perhaps, 
who make profit and gain out of it. It should be tolerated no longer but abolished at 
once.”116 
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The factual challenge which faced America at that time was its industrial system and its effects 
upon labour. Prison labour was at the centre of these effects. The competitive system, which 
creates wage-slavery, throws thousands out of employment and reduces the wages of thousands 
more to the point of bare subsistence, made prison labour necessary and was its cause.
117
 The 
result was that prison labour was preferred to “free labour”.  The simple reason for this was that 
it was cheaper; yielded more profit to the people who bought, exploited and sold it. Furniss has 
argued that this had its limitations as the use of prison labour could be perceived as capitalist 
competition that thronged the streets with idle workers, capitalist production that reduced human 
labour to a commodity and ultimately to crime.
118
 In 1887, the US Congress for the first time 
attempted to outlaw the leasing of convict labour to private parties,
119
 but there was a backlash at 
the state level in the form of a refusal to house federal prisoners.
120
 Increasing pressure came 
from reformers and unionists as the nineteenth century closed. An attempt to use prison labour 
during a strike at the Tennessee Coal Company in 1891 ended with a surprising show of 
solidarity; mine workers “stormed the prisons, released the convicts, and burned the prison to the 
ground.”121 Certainly the miners were most interested in protecting their own jobs and rights, but 
the fact that they thought of the prisoners at all is significant.
122
 
What finally drove legislation restricting prison labour was the Great Depression and 
increasing fear that private jobs would be lost to cheaper convict labour. The 1935 Hawes-
Cooper Act outlawed inter-state trade in convict-made goods, making it a felony and a federal 
crime to traffic in them.
123
 In the same year, 1935, the US Congress banned the use of prison 
labour on federal contracts exceeding $10,000 through the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts 
Act.
124
 The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act placed limits on the purchase of prison-made 
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goods by the federal government.
125
 The 1940 Ashurst-Sumners Act also outlawed trade in 
goods produced by convicts. Subsection (b) of the Ashurst-Sumners Act exempted goods made 
in State prisons for use by any prison in any other state, or federal prison-made goods for use by 
any other federal prison.
126
 
Given these developments, industrial prisons proliferated during the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. Convict labour took various forms. Between 1910 and 1945 chain gangs were 
popular, as in most states legal provisions allowed some state and, more often, county convicts to 
work on public roads.
127
 Chain gangs were most common in the South. Wearing leg irons, 
convicts would work in small groups, linked together with long iron foot chains. But for the most 
part, prisoners in state systems worked in the new industrial prisons.
128
 Among the better-known 
and still operational institutions are San Quentin in California, Sing in New York, and the Illinois 
State Penitentiary at Statesville. Given the new emphasis on manufacturing and production, the 
prisons produced materials and goods needed by the military, the government, and the private 
sector. Demand for prison products had accelerated during World War I.
129
 
The income generated by inmate labour, however, was not sufficient to cover the rising 
costs of operating correctional facilities. Without independent oversight and monitoring, the 
convict labour system gradually degenerated into corruption and bribery. Moreover, private 
industry soon complained about being forced to compete with prison industries, which had a 
clear advantage due to the very low inmate wages.
130
 The emerging labour unions also opposed 
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cheap prison labour.
131
 The final blow to prison industries came with the Great Depression, when 
jobs were scarce or non-existent. Congress responded to the combined pressures of the economy, 
organized labour, and private interests by passing legislation that first curtailed and then 
prohibited convict labour.
132
 The passage of the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1940 effectively ended 
prison industries by prohibiting the inter-state transportion and sale of prison goods in states with 
laws proscribing them. Most states passed similar legislation prohibiting prison industries from 
competing with the private sector.
133
 
2 2 6 League of Nations Pact 
The League of Nations Pact came about after the First World War.
134
 In this Pact, member states 
committed themselves to guaranteeing and maintaining fair and humane working conditions in 
their own territories as well as in all countries to which their trade and industrial relationships 
extended.
135
 In the context of the League of Nations Pact, authors of the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) stated in the Preamble that: “The failure of any nation 
to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to 
improve the conditions in their own country.”136 The ILO had emerged at the end of the First 
World War as a single tripartite institution,
137
 made up of representatives of governments, trade 
unions and employers, with a mission to draw up labour regulations applicable to all states and 
the supplementary mission of checking implementation by each member state. 
 The International Economic Conference held in London in 1933 and organized by the 
League of Nations in response to the serious economic depression,
138
 should also be noted, as 
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well as many other events and declarations referring to the necessity of improving the living 
conditions of workers and of avoiding the introduction of elements of unfair competition, which 
could lead to difficulties in international trade. However no conclusive results were attained 
through the said Pact and Conference.  
 It must be observed that the challenges concerning the need to address labour violations 
either in the form of child labour or prison labour would not be the last set of challenges that 
would face the world in trade related matters. Forced labour was another form of violating labour 
standards for economic interests which became defined during World War I and World War II. A 
cursory look at this phenomenon will show just how the violation of labour standards in trade 
related matters has long been a deep rooted problem in the world. An analysis of two of the 
countries that relied on forced labour will best illustrate the above stated assertion. 
2 2 7  Forced labour in Nazi Germany 
The use of forced labour in Nazi Germany and throughout German-occupied Europe took place 
on an unprecedented scale.
139
 It was a vital part of the German economic exploitation of 
conquered territories. The Nazi Germans abducted approximately 12 million people from almost 
twenty European countries; about two thirds of whom came from Eastern Europe.
140
 Many 
workers died as a result of their living conditions, mistreatment, malnutrition, or became civilian 
casualties of war. At its peak the forced labourers comprised 20% of the German work force with 
about 15 million men and women being forced laborers at one point or another during World 
War I.
141
 
Hitler‟s policy of Lebensraum strongly emphasized the conquest of new lands in the East, 
known as Generalplan Ost, and the exploitation of these lands to provide cheap goods and labour 
to Germany.
142
 Even before the war, Nazi Germany maintained a supply of slave labour.
143
 This 
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practice started from the early days of labour camps of “undesirables” (German: unzuverlässige 
Elemente), such as the homeless, homosexuals, criminals, political dissidents, communists, Jews, 
and anyone whom the regime wanted out of the way.
144
 During World War II the Nazis operated 
several categories of labour camps for different categories of inmates.
145
 Prisoners in Nazi labour 
camps were worked to death on short rations and in bad conditions, or killed if they became 
unable to work.
146
 Many died as a direct result of forced labour under the Nazis.
147
 
The largest number of labour camps held civilians forcibly abducted in the occupied 
countries to provide labour in the German war industry, repair bombed railroads and bridges, or 
work on farms.
148
 Manual labour was a resource in high demand, as much of the work that today 
would be done with machines was still a manual affair in the 1930s and 1940s such as shoveling, 
material handling, machining, and many others. As the war progressed, the use of slave labour 
experienced massive growth. Prisoners of war and civilian undesirables were brought in from 
occupied territories. Millions of Jews, Slavs and other conquered peoples were used as slave 
labourers by German corporations, such as Thyssen, Krupp, IG Farben, and even the German 
subsidiaries of foreign firms, such as Fordwerke (a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company) and 
Adam Opel AG (a subsidiary of General Motors).
149
 Once the war had begun, the foreign 
subsidiaries were seized and nationalized by the Nazi-controlled German state, and work 
conditions there deteriorated as they did throughout German industry.
150
 About 12 million forced 
labourers, most of whom were Eastern Europeans, were employed in the German war economy 
inside Nazi Germany throughout the war.
151
 The German need for slave labour grew to the point, 
that even children were kidnapped to work in an operation called the Heu-Aktion.
152
 More than 
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2,000 German companies profited from slave labour during the Nazi era, including Deutsche 
Bank and Siemens.
153
 In 1944, German records listed 7.6 million foreign civilian workers and 
prisoners of war in the German territory, most of whom had been brought there by coercion.
154
 In 
this year, 1944, slave labour made up one quarter of Germany‟s entire work force, and the 
majority of German factories had a contingent of prisoners.
155
  
Not to be out done in the use of forced labour was Spain. So important an issue is the 
subject of forced labour in Spain‟s history that during recent years some research has been 
carried out to introduce Spanish historiography into the main discussions about the contemporary 
history of forced labour. This has led to the Spanish case of forced labour being compared with 
some other forms of forced labour in twentieth century Europe such as Nazi Germany. A brief 
historical analysis concerning the use of forced labour in Spain follows below. 
2 2 8 Forced labour in Spain 
The use of the forced labour system in Spain can only be understood by paying special attention 
to the economic rationale that led the state and private enterprises to pursue profits through this 
kind of labour abuse. Gonzalo provides a well weighted historical analysis of the use of forced 
labour in Spain. He addressed the interrelation between the two main purposes of forced labour 
in the history of Spain, the economic and the political, and also looked into the economic logic of 
that kind of punishment.
156
 Gonzalo took into account some of the most important elements in 
the configuration of labour markets and business strategies, such as the workforce supply-
demand relationship, the extraction of capital gains from the work, and the level of productivity 
of tasks carried out by forced labourers.
157
 In this way, Gonzalo attempted to insert the Spanish 
experience within the European discussions about the relationships between business enterprises 
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and fascist regimes, in which the deployment of forced labour has been one of the most 
important points of debate.
158
 
Gonzalo alludes to the fact that the historiography on the great forced labour system in 
fascist Europe, that of Nazi Germany, has focused on different questions, such as its role in 
shaping the labour market or the degree of willingness of enterprises to gain profit from forced 
labour.
159
 He states that: 
“While some historians…understand the deployment of forced labour within the changes 
in class relationships in the fascist regime before the war, and therefore as a structural 
measure for ensuring the new economic policy, some others…emphasise that the forced 
labour program can only be understood within the logic of the war economy, and thus as a 
dynamic and circumstantial measure, which goes beyond and is even contrary to the Nazi 
economic program. Focusing especially on ethnic policy…forced labour had a special 
place amongst the measures against the Jewish population from 1938 onwards, long before 
the extermination measures started in 1942.”160 
Gonzalo then proceeds to indicate that there is a debate concerning the degree of willingness 
shown by enterprises towards the deployment of forced labourers in European history.
161
 
According to Spoerer, German companies had very narrow margins to manoeuvre if they wanted 
to survive in a war context.
162
 This historian comments on the need for analyzing the strategies 
of German enterprises according to economic logic, mainly cost-benefits analysis, within a very 
special context.
163
 Hayes agrees with the need to deal with the complexity of the matter, but 
observes that most German businessmen “increased the need for such workers and worsened the 
conditions they were forced to suffer”.164 
Gonzalo highlights that another important question for economic historians concerns the 
profits involved in forced labour. Explaining his own experience of some months in a Penal 
Detachment, Albornoz pointed to this challenge when he stated:  
                                                          
 
158
 See Herbert “Forced Laborers in the Third Reich: an Overview” 2000 International Labor and Working-Class 
History 58. 
159
  Gonzalo 3. 
160
  Ibid 4. 
161
  Ibid. 
162
  See Spoerer “Motivations, contraintes et marges de manoeuvre des entreprises allemandes dans l‟emploi de 
travailleurs forcés pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale” 2005 Histoire, Économie & Société 4. 
163
  Ibid. 
164
 See Hayes “Industry under the Swastika” in James and Tanner (eds) Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in 
Europe (2002) 34. 
56 
 
“The forced labour of the prisoners represented a crude accumulation of capital for the 
construction companies of Francoism, (...) Business, then, at two points, the state and the 
companies, with a single payer: the prisoner”.165  
 
Moreover, as Gonzalo indicates, profits resulting from forced labour have been the subject of 
research for historians in some other countries, like Germany, and it is necessary to distinguish 
here between profits for private enterprises and profits for the state itself, or even for one of its 
administrations.
166
  
Gonzalo then advances the need to explain the way in which enterprises, and the state 
itself, obtained prisoners‟ labour in Spain.167 He proceeds to make reference to the first decree on 
forced labour, in May 1937 which became the first legal instrument to try to address the problem 
of forced labour in Spain.
168
 The decree was followed by the Workers‟ Battalions Rule passed in 
the same year of 1937.
169
 According to Gonzalo, these rules for prisoners of war were quite 
similar to those for imprisoned men and women, which were included in the order of the 
Ministry of Justice that created the Patronato de Redención de Penas por el Trabajo.
170
 In this 
order the breakdown of the wage mentioned in the decree of 1937 was maintained.
171
 The decree 
also regulated the use of prisoners by private enterprises; in this case the latter “would pay the 
whole wage to the National Prisons Service”.172 The latter should have taken responsibility for 
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the maintenance cost of the prisoners, the payment to the prisoners‟ families, and the remainder 
sent to the State Treasury.
173
 
Gonzalo then points out how easy it is to see that the State itself was the main beneficiary 
of that kind of repression, on occasions as an employer, and at other times by hiring out 
workers.
174
 In the first case, there is little doubt about the benefits provided by this kind of 
worker: although the state was obliged to cover some of the costs of maintaining the working 
prisoners (such as food, lodging and control, amongst other things), it is obvious that these costs 
were lower than what the state would have been obliged to pay in salaries for the work carried 
out.
175
 In the second case, the state rented out the workforce and obtained significant profits from 
this.
176
 Gonzalo then indicates that a calculation of the total amount of these profits is another 
goal for economic history, but thanks to some research that has already been published on the 
Basque mining industry of Spain, it is clear that the total profits for the state were between 50% 
and 60% of the wages paid by enterprises.
177
 
Gonzalo then indicates that the profit margin for private enterprises renting prisoners 
from the state was clearly lower, as these enterprises had to pay the minimum wage in their 
locality to the workers, (except for a part designated for the workers‟ maintenance, and a small 
part to be paid to them in hand).
178
 In any case, as Gonzalo contends, enterprises had some 
special ways for obtaining an extra profit from this kind of worker.
179
 One of them was to 
directly ignore the rules about that kind of payment.
180
 A clear example of this is the Madrid-
Zaragoza-Alicante railway company, which for many months did not comply with the regulation 
about payment for the renting of prisoners.
181
 It simply ignored this, and when it was required to 
pay, complaints began to be made.
182
 Besides this, Albornoz reminds us that in some cases 
companies paid lower wages to prisoners than to free labourers, “one third, or more, less than the 
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wage of a free worker”.183 Because of the good opportunities for increasing profits with forced 
labour, Albornoz remarks that this kind of capital accumulation can be regarded, in a certain 
way, as primitive.
184
 
Another way of increasing profits for all those who were managing forced labour (private 
enterprises, army officers or public administration workers) was the opportunity to earn quite a 
lot of money through corruption and the black market in food and clothing, the so-called 
“estraperlo”.185 In fact, the black market was an economic mechanism for capital accumulation 
in post-war Spain,
186
 and we must bear in mind that the reproduction costs of forced labourers 
represented a good opportunity for private businesses, especially for those administrators or 
companies more interested in obtaining quick private profits than in the efficiency of the tasks 
carried out by prisoners.
187
 It is therefore clear that the violation of labour rights for commercial 
interests was an ingrained practice in the pre-World War II era as it still is in the modern world, 
perhaps with some of the same manifestations. This is a clear indicator that history has a way of 
repeating itself. However, going back to the historical analysis, a solution had to be sought to 
address the issue of labour rights violations for commercial interests on an international level. 
The 20
th
 century would provide the first real opportunity to address labour rights violations for 
economic gains when attempts to link trade and labour issues through the Havana Charter were 
made.
188
 
 
2 3  POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS 
 
2 3 1 Havana Charter 
The idea of linking labour rights and trade was included in the Havana Charter of 1948 that was 
intended to embody the framework for a new world trading system. The Havana Charter 
emerged out of discussions for a “Charter for an International Trade Organisation (ITO)”, a UK-
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US proposal which was taken before the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(ECOSOC), which in turn called for a conference to establish the International Trade 
Organisation.
189
 Eighteen countries took part in the Preparatory Committee which met from 
October 1946 to March 1948 in Havana, hence the name.
190
 The Havana Charter was signed by 
fifty three countries and covered not only trade policy, but also employment and economic 
activity, amongst others.
191
 The Charter explicitly referred to labour issues. Article 7 of the ill-
fated Charter proclaimed that: 
  “1. The Members recognise that measures relating to employment must take fully into 
account the rights of workers under intergovernmental declarations, conventions and 
agreements. They recognise that all countries have a common interest in the achievement 
and maintenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the 
improvement of wages and conditions as productivity may permit. The members recognise 
that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in 
international trade, and accordingly each member shall take whatever action may be 
appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions in its territory. 
2. Members which are also members of the International Labour Organisation shall co-
operate with that organisation in giving effect to that understanding.”192 
 
The Havana Charter required members to also monitor for any anti-competitive practices which 
could affect trade and which could have international repercussions, placing an obligation on 
members to act in consequence, although it did not include any general obligation to adopt laws 
in defence of competition.
193
 However, mechanisms for cooperation were provided for. 
However, the Havana Charter was never adopted because of opposition in the US Congress.  
This meant that other avenues had to be sought to address the challenges of violations of labour 
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rights in trade related matters. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
194
 was the 
next such avenue. 
 
2 3 2  The GATT  
Established in the wake of World War II, the WTO‟s predecessor, the GATT was the third pillar 
of the Bretton Woods system, which included economic development loans through the World 
Bank and monetary stabilization via the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
195
 While the IMF 
and the World Bank date back to the original Bretton Woods Conference of June 1944, trade 
rules were first addressed in a 1946 meeting that set tariff levels and developed a draft charter for 
an International Trade Organization (ITO) that was presented at the 1948 United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana.
196
 John Maynard Keynes, the original 
architect of the Bretton Woods system, had hoped to develop worldwide trading rules that would 
avoid the destructive protectionism prevalent during the Great Depression, while preserving a 
commitment to full employment.
197
 However, this did not turn out to be an easy task. 
Undoubtedly there was great displeasure expressed by the developing countries towards the ITO 
Charter. Amongst the issues that caused great displeasure amongst these developing countries 
was the omission of development from the ITO Charter. Indeed, the developing countries‟ 
position towards the ITO and GATT had been advanced as totally against the manner in which 
international trade was regulated. Claire Wilcox, the Vice Chairperson of the US delegation at 
Havana was quoted as having said: 
“...some eight hundred amendments were presented; among them as many as two hundred 
that would have destroyed the very foundations of the enterprise...some of the proposals 
advanced in the name of economic development have to be seen to be believed.”198  
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The relevance of the above statement was to be observed when the US Department of State 
circulated its „Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment‟, which had been 
drafted during WWII, in collaboration with the UK.
199
 The proposals put forward by the US, 
which subsequently served as the basis for the ITO Charter, made no reference to development, 
or to the special circumstances which less developed countries faced.
200
 This reflected the US 
attitude that economic development was best left to the private sector and required no 
government interference.
201
 The US argued throughout the negotiations that: 
“…development was primarily a matter of private capital investment and that special 
measures to deal with this belonged elsewhere, not in the commercial policy rules of the 
international system”.202 
 
The insincerity of this arrangement, given the policies followed by the US during its own period 
of industrialization as already shown in this chapter, was not overlooked by developing 
countries. As noted in India‟s comments, under pressure exerted by countries of the British 
Empire: 
 “The UK made a half-hearted attempt to assert the right of undeveloped countries to apply 
tariffs „for a limited period under adequate safeguards for the protection of infant 
industries‟. The US, however, forgetful of its own history, was not prepared to concede 
even this limited right”.203  
 
It is submitted that by virtue of the statement made by India above, the developing countries 
sought the right to use the kinds of trade measures used by the industrialised countries during 
their own period of industrialization. It is in this context that the use of cheap labour as 
comparative advantage comes into play. India suggested that the high degree of economic 
development attained by certain countries had been in no small measure due to the use of tariffs 
and other regulatory devices; and it was only proper that the use of these instruments should not 
be denied to countries that have just started on the path of development.
204
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Brazil, supported by other developing countries, contended that the ITO should have as a 
central aim the „encouragement and promotion of the industrial and economic development of 
member countries, particularly of those whose development is less advanced‟.205 While the US 
and the UK had been busy discussing the shape of the proposed ITO between them, it was 
natural that they easily pushed aside the issue of economic development.
206
 As such, when the 
process began to involve more countries, especially developing countries, the issue of 
development could no longer be ignored. The resolution of the Economic and Social Council of 
the UN to hold a Conference on Trade and Employment, at which the Preparatory Committee 
would begin drafting the ITO Charter, followed closely the proposed resolution put forward by 
the US, except that it included a section, based on suggestions made by Colombia and Ecuador, 
calling for the Preparatory Committee „to take into account the special conditions which prevail 
in countries whose manufacturing industry is still in its initial stages of development, and the 
questions that arise in connection with commodities which are subject to special problems of 
adjustment in international markets‟.207  
Following this, an effort to include developing countries‟ views and aims was made. A key 
sticking point was the demand by the less developed countries to be able to afford protection to 
infant industries.
208
 Developing countries therefore sought the right to impose tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions to protect infant industries.
209
 While the industrialised countries were not 
entirely opposed to this, there was substantial disagreement on how such protection should be 
given.
210
 The US strongly opposed the use of quantitative restrictions, and argued that the most 
economically beneficial way of supporting infant industries was through the granting of 
subsidies to domestic producers.
211
 The less developed countries were unimpressed with this 
partly due to the hypocrisy of the argument, given the extensive use of tariffs and quantitative 
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restrictions by the industrialised countries during their own industrialization. The US argued in 
turn that the fact that industrialised countries had used poor economic policies in the past was not 
a good reason for developing countries to use them in the future. Wilcox said in her opening 
statement at the second plenary session of the London Conference:  
“It will doubtless be remarked, in the course of these proceedings, that the United States 
has not always practiced the gospel that it now presumes to preach. This I admit. But the 
fact that we have sinned in the past should not be taken to justify all of us in sinning in the 
future, to our mutual harm”.212  
 
Whether the above statement is a case of accepting what is right when it suits you is an 
interesting question. Sadly it came at a time when developing countries saw no benefit of 
improving labour standards simultaneously with their economic growth. However, the ITO was 
to be stillborn.
213
 The requisite number of states failed to ratify the Charter and so the GATT 
became the basis for the post World War II world trade system.
214
 When in 1950 the Truman 
administration realized that it lacked congressional support for the Charter‟s ratification, the ITO 
died.
215
 In its place the key trading nations adopted the earlier and more limited 1946 agreements 
and established the “provisional” GATT, pending a final transformation into some type of 
permanent treaty obligation.
216
 This temporary arrangement did not include any references to 
labour rights. The GATT in Article XX refers only to measures relating to products of prison 
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labour [Article XX(e)],
217
 measures necessary to protect public morals (Article XX(a)),
218
 and 
measures relating to human life or health [Article XX(b)].
219
 
It took longer than expected, 47 years, to convert the provisional GATT into a permanent 
WTO, whose structure and provisions are not significantly different from the original 1948 ITO, 
except that the primary employment promotion purpose of world trade became lost amid the free 
trade ideology popularized since then.
220
 The prominence of employment in the drafting of the 
Havana Charter would be lost in the creation of the WTO.
221
 Between 1946 and 1948, the start of 
the Cold War had closed what, in retrospect, was a very narrow window for postwar 
internationalism in the United States that included an activist role for government.
222
 GATT was 
far weaker than the proposed ITO, but even GATT was opposed by the American right as an 
infringement on American sovereignty.
223
  
The WTO was established on 1 January 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986–1994).224 It was formed from the GATT, which became 
one of the core agreements annexed to the Marrakech Agreement, the instrument establishing the 
WTO.
225
 None of the other WTO agreements concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round 
include labour related rights or obligations. The effects of the GATT are still felt and some 
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commentators have described the WTO as the one major international governance organisation 
that does not examine the impact of its policies upon the ability of member states to advance 
human rights.
226
 During the WTO‟s second-year review in late 1996 in Singapore, the United 
States actively sought to link labour rights with trade. However, this effort was blocked by a 
coalition of Third World nations (who saw the initiative as a form of protectionism) and the 
European Union (EU) [which was then dominated by conservative governments].
227
 
Nonetheless, the attempt put the US government on the side of the trade-labour linkage and 
forced WTO members to officially consider the issue of linkage for the first time. Even Sir Leon 
Brittain, the Thatcherite vice-president of the EU who actively opposed trade-labour linkage, was 
compelled by sister EU governments to affirm that “labour standards and other apparently 
domestic political issues are now the legitimate concern of the WTO because they are concerns 
of our constituents.”228  
When the WTO replaced GATT on January 1, 1995, all of the GATT rules and its 47 
years of precedents were folded into the WTO.
229
 Broader in scope than GATT, the WTO 
establishes rules of open trade in a variety of industries, including manufacturing, services, and 
agriculture, as well as intellectual property.
230
 A December 1997 agreement adds financial 
services and banking.
231
 While GATT relied solely on pressure and persuasion, the WTO has the 
power - through its trade policy review process - to pass judgment on domestic laws, regulations, 
and practices that affect trade.
232
 Although the WTO has not yet added basic labour rights to the 
list of fair trade practices subject to its rulings, decisions about how far the WTO can go to 
enforce labour rights may have to be reached in the future. 
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The deliberations leading up to the formation of the WTO did not take up the issue of 
labour rights until almost the last moment.
233
 Because the Reagan and Bush administrations in 
the US were uninterested, the issue did not receive attention until the fall of 1993, and it only 
became a factor then because, in order to win congressional support for WTO approval, the 
Clinton administration needed to regain labour support lost during the NAFTA debate.
234
 When 
the Clinton administration did finally raise the issue of labour rights and trade, the ensuing 
uproar among Third World delegations forced the issue to the sidelines.
235
 It did not become part 
of the agreement, but the signatories agreed to take up the matter in the future. This could be 
construed as either a victory or a defeat, and in fact it was both.
236
 Labour rights did not therefore 
become part of the WTO but the opportunity for tying labour rights to trade policy is significant. 
2 3 3  Lessons from the failed ITO 
The US for its part as a leading advocate for the inclusion of a social clause in multilateral trade 
agreements, has been branded an unreliable partner in multilateral trade by opponents as well as 
its allies concerning its approach to trade. It has generally been viewed as an arm-twisting nation 
which pursues only its interests in trade and not that of others, especially developing countries.
237
 
This has resulted in proposals for the inclusion of a social clause in multilateral trade being held 
with suspicion. For a nation such as the US, it may be argued that since its labour laws prohibit 
the use of child and prison labour, both sources of cheap labour, it has used the social clause 
argument as a tool to deny other countries whose legislation permits them the right to use such 
labour as their comparative advantage. Questions though may be directed at this view as the US 
                                                          
 
233
 See McCrudden and Davies “A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights” 2000 Journal of International 
Economic Law 43. 
234
  See Stirling “The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: Proposal for 
Additions at the World Trade Organization” 1996 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 
46. 
235
  Stirling 46. 
236
  Watchel 15. 
237
  The US has also been accussed of having been hostile to the GATT in the same manner as it was against the 
failed ITO. Jackson alluded to a “… history of hostility in the US Congress against GATT.” He further stated 
that, “[T]he enactment of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 shall not be construed to determine or 
indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the executive agreement known as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.” That the GATT survived was, according to Jackson, “…instructive because it 
tends to reflect that legal structures or institutions have less to do with the development of affairs than dimly 
understood political or economic forces, aided by efforts of dedicated men.” See Jackson The Jurisprudence of 
GATT & WTO (2000) 18. 
67 
 
which was behind the ITO was also part of its demise after its principals refused to ratify the ITO 
Charter on the basis that it weakened the protection of its foreign investments.
238
  
The historical analysis has also shown that developing countries strongly deny the need 
for including a social clause in international trade and regard internal structural rigidities in 
labour and product markets as the main factors behind unemployment.
239
 Developing countries 
fear that better compliance with core labour standards would negatively affect either their 
economic performance or their competitive position in world markets.
240
 Whether this argument 
has an economic rationale and is persuasive remains subject to so much debate as is the fear that 
developing countries with their cheap labour are flooding developed countries‟ markets. The 
challenges surrounding the levels of consensus about the social clause appear to undermine the 
important lessons which could be drawn from the failed ITO. However, Members of the 
international trading system may find it difficult to draw lessons from the failed ITO if they cling 
to their perceptions without objectively assessing the importance of a social clause in multilateral 
trade. It is submitted that the developmental benefits from international trade and globalisation 
would be enhanced only if there is a consensus between developed and developing countries on 
the inclusion of a social clause in multilateral trade agreements. 
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To attain such a consensus, it is necessary to establish whether there was anything 
commendable about the ITO‟s approach to a social clause. Such an analysis must take as its 
departure point the acknowledgement of the fact that international trade provides opportunities 
for sustained global economic growth and employment. The ITO could have had a plausible 
agenda of building a social market globally because it set out to create a balance between the full 
employment obligation in developed countries and the developmental needs of the 
underdeveloped nations.
241
 In that sense, the failed ITO might have carried profound ideas which 
have been ignored. One such key idea is the obvious view that the framework agreement of 
international trade cannot just be a system of pure commercial gain designed to advance the free 
trade principle at any cost.
242
 This idea makes perfect economic and policy sense. For instance, if 
economic growth were to freeze, few countries, if any, would accept the dictates of basic market 
logic to open their economies, regardless of the cost and despite the consequences.
243
 In that 
sense, a division of labour and regulation at the international level would be necessary. The 
Havana Charter offered such an arrangement. It sought to reshape the relationship between trade, 
development and employment in a manner which the GATT/WTO has failed to achieve. The 
GATT only had residues of the non-liberal characteristics that had resulted in the failure of  the 
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ITO as an organization with Article XX(e) being the only provision worth noting concerning the 
inclusion of a social clause in the legal framework of international trade.
244
 
The Havana Charter had an explicit provision that its members had the authority to adopt 
legal and binding interpretations of it. This was crucial because with this power, the ITO had the 
authority to establish its operations and further the objectives set out in its Charter. This would 
also allow it to grow and adapt to the changing international economy. This arrangement is 
lacking in the GATT/WTO system. It should now be necessary to establish the value of having 
an organization like the WTO which can only recommend compliance as opposed to the ITO 
whose Charter gave it such power to make legal and binding findings. Jackson once expressed 
the view that:  
“…in the case of the ITO, interpretation and dispute settlement decisions carried with them 
a binding treaty obligation even when its member states disagreed with a decision because 
it was unfavourable to their immediate interests. The penalty for non-compliance entailed 
sanctions, the principal one being suspension of trade concessions. By contrast, GATT had 
no such provision. It had no binding interpretative powers once the ITO was stillborn. In 
terms of international law setting norms, the GATT, unlike the ITO, had no requirement 
hence all countries had to use their dispute resolution procedure exclusively.”245  
 
                                                          
 
244
  See Trebilcock and Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2005) 572-573. Trebilcock and Howse 
observed that, “The reference to prison labour in GATT Article XX(e), as well as the fact that explicit language 
on labour rights was in the failed Havana Charter, arguably suggest that if GATT Article XX had been designed 
to encompass sanctions with respect to labour rights, explicit language would have been used to articulate such 
an exception.” In the absence of such an exception, human rights can be protected under the principle of public 
morality. According to Howse, this analysis is consistent with the WTO Appellate Body‟s interpretation of 
GATT Article XX(g) in the US Shrimp/Turtle case. See US-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products WT/DS58/R (15 May 1998). See also Howse “The Appellate Body Ruling in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: 
A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate” 2002 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 
491. See also Howse “Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but Not Quite Yet: India‟s Short Lived 
Challenge to Labour and Environmental Exceptions in the European Union‟s Generalized System of 
Preferences” 2003 American University International Law Review 1333. In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate 
Body interpreted that, “…the chapeau of Article XX provides a check against protectionist or other abusive 
implementation of trade bans for ostensible labour rights purposes. In determining whether the measures in 
question are applied so as to constitute arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or disguised restriction on 
international trade, the Appellate Body had to determine whether the labour rights situation in the particular 
countries in question has been singled out as especially grave or warranting particular attention by the 
international community.” In this case a sanctions-imposing state would justify singling out one target country 
and not including others where the labour rights situation is bad. This was the case with Burma when it was 
singled out by the US for violating ILO standards. If the Appellate Body can allow for such a scenario as 
outlined in the Shrimp/Turtle case then why should it be difficult to establish a trade-labour linkage in the WTO 
legal framework as envisaged by the ITO? 
245
  See Jackson The World Trading System: Law Policy of International Economic Relations (1989) 90.  
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The Havana Charter had also broken new ground because it permitted reference to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in some matters.
246
 Appeal to the ICJ was needed because in 
the words of Wilcox, the Vice-Chairperson of the US Delegation to the Havana Conference, “it 
provided for the development of a body of international law to govern trade relationships.”247 
Without the power of formal binding interpretation, the GATT‟s dispute settlement mechanism 
was and is voluntary and thus could be ignored largely without penalty thus making new legal 
norms difficult to establish.
248
 Under GATT rules, a contracting party was not obligated to accept 
an amendment which it opposed. For the developing countries of the world, the end of the ITO 
created a multitude of problems. It had provided a framework to stabilize the international price 
of primary commodities. It also saw the need for producers to work together to market primary 
products. In terms of investment rules, the pivotal idea of the Charter was that a new investment 
regime could only succeed on the condition that countries dismantle state-erected barriers and 
enforce a code regulating the restrictive practices of international business. Developmental 
inequalities were to be addressed within a non-liberal framework. This was all lost when the ITO 
failed. Resultantly, it has taken decades for the developing nations of the world to make 
economic and social planning the centre of their development agenda in international trade.  
The Havana Charter not only applied to governments but also to the actions of private 
firms whose restrictive business practices threatened to undermine the liberal goal of non-
discriminatory trade.
249
 The ITO contained a whole chapter on anti-competitive practices.
250
 In 
contrast, the GATT included none of that language.
251
 With the end of the ITO, GATT members 
opposed any steps for regulating intra-company trade, to set clear standards for multinationals or, 
in any way, to impose any obligations on international private actors.
252
 Led by the US and 
others, the GATT Contracting Parties decided not “to bring this subject under GATT” but only 
                                                          
 
246
  Ibid. 
247
  Ibid 93. See also Trebilcock 171. Trebilcock noted that: “The 1948 Havana Charter that was intended to embody 
the framework for a new trading system also declared that „members recognize that unfair labour conditions, 
particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade and accordingly each member shall 
take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.‟” 
248
 Jackson (1990) 93. 
249
 Ibid. 
250
 Ibid. 
251
 Ibid. 
252
  Jackson (1990) 212. 
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provide for limited consultations.
253
 Restrictive business practices were explicitly excluded from 
GATT procedures and were not a subject covered by its disputes mechanism.
254
 In short, only 
governments would be subject to international regulation, not multinational companies.
255
 This 
was contrary to the public objectives embodied in the ITO that private authority no less than state 
actors had to be accountable to international law.
256
 The GATT was to be silent on the 
monopolistic practices of powerful transnational actors, a key problem behind labour rights 
violations.
257
 The ITO championed the principle that countries had the responsibility to manage 
job loss when it occurred, along with the obligation to restructure their economies when business 
failures threatened to undermine the benefits from increased trade.
258
  
Whatever its shortcomings, the ITO which appeared as the practical expression of the full 
employment revolution in state practice internationally, could have been good in some way. It 
would have been a remarkable organization that would establish the idea of an integrated trade 
and employment organization, not an excessively specialized one like the WTO. Despite its short 
but significant existence, the disappearance of the ITO left a huge gap in the creation of the post-
war institutions of global governance concerning labour rights and other international standards. 
Without the ITO, there is no institutional place for labour standards neither in the GATT nor the 
WTO. In this sense, it may be proper to conclude as misguided, allegations that the ITO Charter 
was intended to favour the US and the UK. Instead, the GATT/WTO system without the social 
clause that the developed countries favour may just be the problem that developing countries 
have to deal with. 
Therefore, though it failed, the ITO may have had the potential to set the international 
trade agenda in the right direction. It also is crucial to observe that a critical analysis of the ITO 
could possibly provide a guide to the framework necessary to take the multilateral trade system 
forward, in the global era. Surely trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards of living as well as ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing real income. Trade must also ensure effective demand and development in the full use 
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of the resources of the world as well as expanding the production and exchange of goods. 
Assuming this line of thought, it can only be hoped that after a careful examination of the history 
of the unequal treatment of the rights of workers in comparison with the rights of employers and 
investors, a social clause may be incorporated in the legal framework of international trade in 
order to provide substantive protection of workers‟ rights. This may add a critical dimension to 
the economic growth sought by developing countries. 
2 4  CONCLUSION 
The aim of the historical analysis was to show that the idea of the inclusion of a social clause in 
multilateral trade agreements is not new or on the whole novel.
259
 The linkage between trade and 
labour standards has a very long history dating as far back as the 19
th
 century.
260
 However, it 
could be argued that what may be new are the calls to intuitionalize such a concept within the 
GATT/WTO framework by providing clearly for a social clause based upon a linkage between 
trade and labour rights. The basis of such an approach is the realisation that while becoming 
more substantial, the rights of workers are still not at par with the rights of capital under trade 
and economic agreements. This chapter has also shown that the issue of a social clause is not 
easy to address. The economic argument for the inclusion of a social clause has been used to 
suggest that low wages and labour standards in developing countries threaten the living standards 
of workers in developed countries. The moral argument asserts that low wages and labour 
standards violate the human rights of workers in developing countries. Advocates for the social 
clause regard it as a tool for curbing the social dumping of products made with lower labour 
standards, which in their opinion constitutes unfair competition. Those against the social clause 
criticize it as a form of non-tariff protectionist barrier by developed countries that are perceived 
by some as reluctant to allow developing countries to advance in economic terms. This issue is 
made more complex if one considers that industrialization as a process thrived on poor labour 
standards mainly related to forced, child and prison labour. 
This chapter attempted to provide a historical insight into the rationale behind calls for a 
social clause in the international trade system. A social clause would make it possible to restrict 
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or stop the importation or preferential importation of products originating in countries, industries, 
or firms, where labour conditions do not meet certain minimum labour standards such as 
avoiding the use of child, prison and forced labour. The mandatory element of a social clause 
would imply that all countries engaged in international trade have a legal obligation to observe 
certain workers‟ rights and also that this obligation should be enforceable through trade 
sanctions. The chapter has shown that this approach has not gone without a challenge. Labour 
rights have been largely argued to belong to the domestic labour law system and not in the 
international trade system. This has led to unending challenges in trying to link trade and labour 
rights with developing countries choosing to lower the standards in the interest of free trade. 
Professor Weiss of the University of Maryland School of Law has concluded that:  
“When a country starts out lacking adequate legislation to cover the substantive labour law 
areas or where there is legislation and it is weak and not up to international standards, a 
promise to effectively enforce that law, however binding, is not very meaningful, unless 
the promise is buttressed by one to implement an international labour law standard.”261 
Failure to address the issue of a social clause from an international perspective in view of the 
historical analysis may thus be tantamount to effectively permitting a race to the bottom. 
Globalization of the world economy has clearly led to choices concerning the location of 
production being increasingly determined by labour costs in sectors that produce labour-
intensive products. Since labour standards vary between countries, corporations simply side-step 
a country‟s domestic law and move to countries where labour standards are low.  As such 
countries have embarked on attracting trade with cheap labour. However, it may now be 
necessary to question whether lowering labour standards to attract investment is a viable 
economic choice for developing countries in the long run. Spain thrived on primitive economic 
practices involving the use of cheap labour, as did Nazi Germany, France, the US and the UK. 
Developing countries are eager to have a fair share of the cake but at whose expense? Is it not the 
appropriate time for developing countries to realize that exploiting their own workers, as a tool 
for the so called development, may result in unending economic disadvantage?  
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  See Weiss “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back or Vice Versa: Labour Rights Under Free Trade Agreements 
from NAFTA, through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America and Beyond” 2003 University of San Francisco Law 
Review 689.   
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From the historical analysis, one may further question whether a continuing deadlock in 
attempts to address the inclusion of the social clause in the multilateral trade system may not one 
day lead to the loss of public support for global trade. Some may view the deadlock not to be a 
refusal but rather a reflection of the existence of a genuine set of challenges too big to overcome. 
Issues such as the sovereignty and the differences in the levels of development of countries 
quickly come to mind. Indeed countries cannot be pushed into committing themselves into 
international arrangements which are not suitable to their own interests. However the world has 
become a global village with shared norms and values. It is in that context that the need to 
protect labour rights in trade has emerged as a global issue. 
 Even though it may appear as if the multilateral system cannot address this issue, 
members of the multilateral trade system have used regionalism to recognise labour rights in 
trade as will be shown in chapter five of this study. What is striking with this development is that 
the same members of the multilateral trade system are the signatories of regional trade 
agreements regardless of their levels of development. Even more striking is the fact that 
countries like China, which is regarded as a developing country, practice gross violations of core 
labour standards in other developing. This has resulted in an additional problem of the violation 
of core labour standards amongst developing countries themselves which may imply that 
sovereignty or development may not be the underlying challenge to the inclusion of a social 
clause in the international trade system. There could be other issues such as greed on the part of 
politicians in developing and developed countries, a factor which leaves one to ponder as to how 
a just, equitable and reasonable system of international trade may be achieved at a multilateral 
level.  
It may be submitted that at some point in history developing countries had to rely on a 
lowered compliance with labour standards as a comparative advantage and as the basis of their 
case for industrialization. However, this reliance on low labour standards as a comparative 
advantage suggests a need to adopt a new approach to labour practices that degrade workers, 
force them to work in unhealthy environments and condemn them to virtual wage slavery as well 
as poverty similar to what occurred in the European and North American industrialization and 
slave trade eras. Developing countries should consider a new approach to industrialization built 
on human capital and infrastructural development amongst other factors. Objectively analysed, 
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the multinational companies which invest in developing countries predominantly originate from 
western countries hence profits are likely to be remitted to their countries of origin whilst 
poverty worsens in developing countries. The next chapter will examine the relevance of human 
rights and the right to development agenda in advancing proposals to include a social clause in 
the WTO legal framework. It will analyze the role that human rights can play in the trade-labour 
linkage debate as well as the problems related to the application of the right to development as a 
human right in relation to the social clause debate. 
76 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Human Rights, the Right to Development and the Trade-labour Linkage Debate 
 
3 1  INTRODUCTION 
The significance of associating labour standards with trade has been debated since the concept of 
international cooperation for the promotion of those standards was first raised as far back as the 
Congress of Vienna and times before.
1
 Observing that both labour standards and trade sanctions 
are connected to the economy, there have been constant calls for the linking of labour and trade 
standards.
2
 History has already shown that the eras of slave trade and industrialization in which 
economic gains were prioritised over the rights of persons rendering labour services to the slave 
master and the industrialist respectively, were characterised by gross violations of the workers‟ 
rights.
3
 The end of slave trade and industrialization, with concerns over the protection of human 
rights being a central issue, did not see an end to the violation of workers‟ rights in trade-related 
matters.
4
 Instead, the non-industrialised countries took it upon themselves to argue for the 
lowering of labour standards in trade-related matters as a tool for industrialising just as the 
western countries did during their period of industrialisation.
5
  
                                                          
 
1
  See Cappuyns “Linking Labour Standards and Trade Sanctions: An Analysis of their Current Relationship” 1998 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 659. 
2
  See Monshipouri, Welch and Kennedy “Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global Responsibility: 
Problems and Possibilities” 2003 Human Rights Quarterly 967. 
3
  Apart from the slave trade and industrialisation era violations of workers rights, it is important to observe that 
has this been a longstanding concern with regard to trade with countries which have policies that are considered 
to violate basic human rights. Apartheid South Africa is a good example of a country which violated human 
rights to the extent that it was expelled from the multilateral trade system. See Lester, Mercurio and Davies 
World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (2012) 879. Lester et al observed that, as a result of 
violations of human rights in Apartheid South Africa there were “widespread boycotts of South Africa and of 
foreign companies doing business there.” Burma which was renamed Myanmar is another example of a country 
whose human rights violations record led to a complaint being filed against it with the WTO by the US. See 
Citizen “Public Citizen, Global Trade Watch, Massachusetts Burma Procurement Law Challenged at the WTO” 
http://www.citizen.org/trade/issues/burma/Articles.cfm?ID=11103 (accessed 21-11-2012). 
4
  The need to prevent the gross violation workers rights which characterised the slave trade and the 
industrialisation era of North America and the western countries has led to labour standards being often regarded 
as part of a broader set of human rights. See Hoekman and Kostecki The Political Economy of the World Trading 
System: The WTO and Beyond (2009) 629.  
5
   See Jackson The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (1997) 245. 
According to Jackson, developing countries argue that prohibiting their reliance on low labour standards as a 
competitive advantage would be tantamount to imposing upon them, “trade restrictive measures based on 
cultural and political considerations within large industrial countries.” Such an approach, in the opinion of 
developing countries would effectively be detrimental to their development objectives. Jackson‟s arguments are 
still plausible in the global era as developing countries still contend that a lowered compliance to labour 
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However, the attitude to labour rights as human rights in the aftermath of the atrocities of 
slave trade and the world wars had to change as labour rights had to be observed as a vital tool 
for aiding not only the development agenda of non-industrialised countries related their national 
economies but also the general welfare of their people. All this has to be addressed against the 
background of the conflict between the general ignorance of the impact of colonialism by the 
western world and the seemingly fatal resistance to the improved recognition of human rights by 
developing countries. Sadly, for developing countries, such an approach will have negative 
effects on the development of their own people than anywhere else in the world. This chapter 
will assess how the conception of labour rights as human rights impact on proposals to link 
labour standards to trade. It will show which labour rights ought to be recognised as human 
rights as not all labour rights fall under the umbrella of human rights. An analysis of whether the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) has a responsibility to observe human rights as the member 
states will also be carried out.
6
 Furthermore, the dimension brought in by the emergence of the 
right to development as a stand-alone human right will be analysed with a view to showing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
standards is their competitive advantage. See Trebilcock Understanding Trade Law (2011) 172. Trebilcock puts 
a distinction between the arguments for a trade-labour linkage and the human rights approach to a trade-labour 
linkage. He observed that: 
 “Several rationales for a trade policy-labour standards linkage have often been advanced. First, it is argued 
that it is unfair for firms and workers in developed countries to have to compete with firms and workers in 
developing countries where labour standards and labour costs are much lower, and hence risk losing market 
share and jobs to these countries. Second it is argued that this form of competition may lead to a race to the 
bottom, where countries will be induced to ratchet down their labour standards to the lowest common 
denominator, but at the end of this process of destructive competition end up with similar market shares (a 
form of Prisoner‟s Dilemma or collective action problem).  Third, core labour standards should be conceived 
of as basic human rights as reflected in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic Social and Cultural Rights. The first 
two rationales for a trade-policy-labour standards are problematic, in that they focus on social welfare in 
importing countries, rather than social welfare in exporting countries where the allegedly low labour 
standards should prevail...With respect to the third rationale for a trade policy-labour standards linkage, the 
focus is squarely on social welfare considerations in exporting countries,  rather than importing countries, and 
seems an entirely cogent basis for collective global action to ensure that core labour standards in all 
countries, conceived of as universal human rights... are respected.” 
In this case, it is important to note that the human rights approach could be beneficial to developing countries as 
they are usually exporters of raw materials in which case emphasis on developing a trade-labour linkage using 
the human rights approach would be to the benefit of their citizens. 
6
   See Trebilcock 173. The WTO might not be precluded from protecting human rights. Trebilcock observed that: 
“Basic universal human rights, while defying precise definition have increasingly come to be viewed as a 
fundamental element of customary international law, and to that extent they extend beyond particular treaty 
obligations, are viewed as Erga Omnes which are owed to the international community at large and hence are 
enforceable by all members of that community.” In this sense the WTO must recognise the need to protect 
human rights even if it is not a specialised institution for dealing with such rights. This argument could signify 
that space may have to be created for the protection of labour standards in trade within the WTO legal 
framework.  
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significance of protecting labour standards as dynamic tools for the advancing of developing 
countries. This will assist in determining whether the approach to calls for a social clause in the 
WTO is being approached with sensitivity to the history that shaped developed and developing 
countries or not.
7
 The chapter starts by analysing the place of labour rights in the human rights 
regime.  
 
3 2  LABOUR RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTEMPORARY HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stands as the formative text of the 
contemporary human rights system.
8
 The UDHR set a framework for the pursuit of human rights 
globally.
9
 It aimed at attaining a world in which the dignity and value of each human being was 
                                                          
 
7
  See Lester et al 883. Lester et al argue that: “In order to remain democratically acceptable, global integration law 
(e.g. in the WTO) must pursue not only „economic efficiency‟ and „social justice‟ as defined by human rights. 
Otherwise, citizens will rightly challenge the democratic and social legitimacy of integration law if it pursues 
economic welfare without regard to social human rights...” This view is not accepted by all though. See Alston 
“Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann” 2002 European 
Journal of International Law 815.  Alston was of the view that adopting human rights in the WTO legal 
framework would “have far-reaching consequences for the existing international human rights regime as well as 
for the balance of values reflected in the vast majority of existing constitutional orders. The most fundamental 
change would be that human rights would...become detached from their foundations in human dignity and would 
instead be viewed primarily as instrumental means for the achievement of economic policy objectives.” 
However, Lester et al have opined that rather than taking radical position concerning a trade policy-human rights 
linkage debate, “...it would seem to be more productive to pursue the debate over the appropriate relationship 
between trade and human rights in two directions. The first, which focuses on the ways in which the two separate 
bodies (in this case the WTO and ILO) can best be reconciled and made complementary to the greatest extent 
possible...(the „trade and...‟‟ debate)...The second approach is to begin a more sustained and critical debate that 
focuses upon Petersmann‟s agenda [which proposes that  the new opportunities for the worldwide enjoyment of 
human rights created by a global division of labour (such as additional economic resources, job opportunities, 
worldwide communication systems and access to new medicines and technologies) must be accompanied by the 
stronger legal protection of social human rights so as to limit abuses of deregulation (e.g. by international cartels, 
trade in drugs and arms, and trafficking in women and children), help vulnerable groups to adjust to change 
without violation of their human rights, and put pressure on the authoritarian governments to protect not only 
business interests but also the human rights of all their citizens] in a systematic and intellectually open way 
which acknowledges the underlying assumptions and imposes a high scholarly burden of proof on the 
proponents of the different positions.”  
8
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted on 10 December, 1948, and was intended to 
put in motion legal and cultural forces making it clear that the world community would no longer tolerate the 
atrocities that occurred in preceding decades and especially in the context of the holocaust. See Adams “From 
Statutory Right to Human Right: The Evolution and Current Status of Collective Bargaining” 2008 Just Labour: 
A Canadian Journal of Work and Society 49. 
9
   See Petersmann “Time for a United Nations „Global Compact‟ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
Worldwide Organisations: Lessons from European Integration” 2002 European Journal of International Law 
621.  Petersmann whilst calling for reconsideration of the Washington Consensus and for strengthening human 
rights in global integration law observed that: 
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valued and protected. Several matters affirmed to be human rights in the UDHR were important 
to the world of work and these included freedom of association, freedom from slavery, 
discrimination at work and child labour.
10
 The functional duty of sustaining human rights was 
entrusted to United Nations (UN) agencies. It is on that basis that the key duty to account for 
labour matters was given to the International Labour Organization (ILO).
11
 Founded after World 
War I as part of the League of Nations, the ILO was and still is a tripartite organization with 
representation from labour, business and governments.
12
 In acknowledgment of the principle that 
“lasting universal peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice,” the ILO 
embarked on establishing basic standards for all of the world‟s workers.13  
The ILO has now outlived both the League of Nations and the disturbances triggered by 
World War II. Its mission was reaffirmed in the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia which became 
part of the organization‟s constitution in 1946.14 The Declaration focused on a series of key 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) can be fully realised. The human rights obligations in the 
UN Charter and in the UDHR of 1948 were negotiated at the same time as the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 and the 1948 Havana Charter for 
an International Trade Organization. All these aimed at protecting liberty, non-discrimination, rule of law, 
social welfare and other human rights values through a rules-based international order and „specialized 
agencies‟ (Article 57 of the UN Charter) committed to the economic principle of „separation of policy 
instruments‟: 
 foreign policies were to coordinated in the UN so as to promote „sovereign equality of all its Members‟ 
[Article 2(1) of the UN Charter] and collective security; 
 liberalization of payments and monetary stability were collectively pursued through the rules and 
assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
 GATT and Havana Charter aimed at mutually beneficial liberalization of international trade 
investments; 
 development aid and policies were coordinated in the World; and  
 social laws and policies were promoted in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and other 
specialized agencies...” 
Petersmann makes an important observation to the effect that, “...apart from organisations such as the ILO, 
World Health Organisation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), human rights were not effectively integrated into the law of most worldwide organisations so as to 
facilitate functional international integration (such as liberalization of trade and payments)...Regional integration 
law, by contrast, has moved towards a different „integration paradigm‟ linking economic integration to 
constitutional guarantees of human rights, democracy and undistorted competition.”  
10 
 See Trebilcock 172. 
11
  See Valticos “The ILO: A Retrospective and Future View” 1996 International Labour Review 473-474. See also 
De la Cruz, Von Potobsky and Swepston The International Labor Organization, The International Standards 
System and Basic Human Rights (1996) 63. 
12
  See Article 7 of the ILO Constitution adopted in 1919. See also ILO “The ILO: What it is. What it does” 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@webdev/documents/publication/wcms_08236
4.pdf (accessed 18-10-2011). 
13
  See the ILO Constitution‟s preamble. 
 
80 
 
principles to embody the work of the ILO. These include: labour is not a commodity,
15
  freedom 
of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress,
16
 poverty anywhere 
constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere,
17
  the war against want needs to be carried on with 
unrelenting vigour within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in 
which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of 
governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the 
promotion of the common welfare,
18
 all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have 
the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of 
freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity,
19
 and to achieve these 
fundamental goals “effective international and national action” is necessary.20   
The 1944 Declaration also provided that it did not foresee its universal principles giving 
rise to uniform labour standards in all countries but expressly stated that they would “be 
determined with due regard to the stage of social and economic development reached by each 
people,” but that “their progressive application to peoples who are still dependent, as well as 
those who have already achieved self-government, is a matter of concern to the whole civilized 
world”.21 It is submitted that the wording of the 1944 Declaration might have been and may still 
be easily misconstrued as implying that even those labour rights which are protected as human 
rights cannot have a uniform minimum standard application in the world. However, this was 
clarified by the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work which 
sought to ensure the realization of the core labour rights by setting standard entitlements or a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14
  The Declaration of Philadelphia reaffirmed the traditional purposes of the ILO and then diverged in two 
innovative ways: the importance of human rights to social policy, and the need for international economic 
planning. See Duffy “Organizational Growth and Structure” 1972 International Organization 481.  With the end 
of the world war in sight, the Declaration of Philadelphia sought to adapt the guiding principles of the ILO “to 
the new realities and to the new aspirations aroused by the hopes for a better world.” See Sulkowski “The 
Competence of the International Labour Organization under the United Nations System” 1951 The American 
Journal of International Law 287. The Declaration of Philadelphia was adopted at the 26th Conference of the 
ILO in Philadelphia, United States of America. In 1946, when the ILO‟s constitution was being revised by the 
General Conference convened in Montreal, the Declaration of Philadelphia was annexed to the constitution and 
forms an integral part of it by virtue of Article 1. 
15
  ILO Declaration of Philadelphia Article 1(a). 
16
  Ibid, Article I (b). 
17
  Ibid, Article I (c). 
18
  Ibid, Article I (d). 
19
  Ibid, Article II (a). 
20
  Ibid, Article IV. See also Sulkowski 288. 
21
  Ibid, Article V. 
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floor set of rights that all States must conform to, irrespective of their level of development or 
location in the international economy. The seven fundamental Conventions embraced in the 1998 
Declaration, which re-iterates the thrust of the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration and the ILO 
Constitution, refer to freedom of association and collective bargaining,
22
 forced labour,
23
 non-
discrimination
24
 and minimum age,
25
 all of which affect specific rights entrenched in the human 
rights Covenants.  
By the time the UDHR was endorsed, the ILO‟s operational measures were well 
recognized and there appeared to be no need to alter them. The ILO‟s key instruments were and 
remain its conventions and recommendations.
26
 At the time of the proclamation of the UDHR, 
the ILO adopted a number of conventions and recommendations related to the issues provided 
for in the UDHR. For example, concerning human rights issues such as the freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, the ILO adopted important instruments such as Convention 
87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
27
 and Convention 
98 concerning The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining.
28
 As a result of its already 
established procedures, the ILO saw no need to reframe its work in the developing language of 
the growing international human rights community. It continued using its own ideas and terms 
and thereby became progressively divorced from the human rights community.
29
 As such, when 
human rights authorities spoke of the rights of individual people everywhere, the ILO spoke of 
the duties of states. Also, when the human rights community spoke of the disregard of individual 
human rights, the ILO spoke of failure to adhere to international standards.  
                                                          
 
22
  ILO Conventions 87 and 98. 
23
  ILO Conventions 29 and 105. 
24
   ILO Conventions 100 and 111. 
25
  ILO Convention 138. 
26
  Adams 49. Conventions are international treaties that, when ratified by states, generally become part of domestic 
law whilst recommendations mark a general consensus about the issues under consideration but one that has not 
reached the level to move to treaty status. 
27
  The Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize or Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention is an International Labour Organization 
Convention. It is one of the eight ILO fundamental conventions. It affirms the Declaration of Philadelphia and 
was adopted on the 9th of July 1948. 
28
  The Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain 
Collectively or Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention is an International Labour Organization 
Convention. It is one of eight ILO fundamental conventions just like the Convention concerning Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. It was adopted on the 1st of July 1949. 
29
  See Leary “The Paradox of Workers‟ Rights as Human Rights” in Compa, Lance and Diamond (eds) Human 
Rights, Labor Rights and International Trade (1996).  
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Whilst the ILO grew divorced from the human rights framework, the UDHR was by 
nature and content, too brief and non-binding as a text. As such, the international community had 
to create additional broad international instruments to give detail to its contents so as to make it 
influential. The result was the adoption of two covenants: the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR)
30
 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),
31
 which interestingly both made references to labour standards regardless of 
the fact that the ILO had grown increasingly divorced from human rights. The UDHR and the 
two fundamental covenants then became universally recognized as the International Bill of 
Rights.
32
 Upon its adoption in 1966, the ICESCR integrated labour rights which were wholly 
drafted more or less on the experience of the ILO.
33
 The labour rights integrated in the ICESCR 
include the right to work,
34
 just and favourable conditions of work,
35
 trade union rights, 
including the right to strike
36
 and right to social security, including social insurance.
37
 It also 
included the rights of the family,
38
 provision of an adequate standard of living,
39
 health
40
 and 
culture,
41
 which all contribute to the development of people in disadvantaged societies. This 
effectively meant that all labour standards included in the ICESCR were human rights.  
However, it is imperative for the purposes of this study to appreciate that not all ILO 
                                                          
 
30
  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966 and entered into force on the 23rd of March 1976. 
31
  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966 and entered into force on the 23rd of March 1976. 
32
  See Howard and Donnelly International Handbook of Human Rights (1987) 9. The International Bill of Human 
Rights is an informal name given to one General Assembly resolution and two international treaties established 
by the United Nations. It consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) with its two Optional Protocols and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
33
  ILO “Protecting Labour Rights as Human Rights : Present and Future of International Supervision” 2006 
Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the 80th anniversary of the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations  edited by Politakis  International Labour Office Geneva: 
ILO 4. 
34
  ICESCR, Article 6. 
35
  ICESCR, Article 7. 
36
  ICESCR, Article 8. 
37
  ICESCR, Article 9. 
38
  ICESCR, Article 10. 
39
   ICESCR, Article 11. 
40
  ICESCR, Article 12. 
41
  ICESCR, Article 15. 
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Conventions are covered by human rights Covenants. A number of them relate to domestic 
labour law matters, not expressly to human rights circumstances. The difference is significant as 
in non-human rights issues; States are free to alter their positions in view of future societal 
developments. This however cannot be the case with human rights standards because once a 
human right, always a human right.
42
 The core labour rights have proven to form the minimum 
baseline on which the labour rights can be regarded as human rights, hence, they are at the centre 
of interest in this study. As such when labour standards are referred to in the context of this 
study, it must be understood that such reference is only in respect of labour standards which 
amount to human rights and are universally applicable and not subject to the discretion of states 
in terms of implementation. Labour rights would not only be referred to in the above specified 
human rights instruments but they were also referred to by the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR).43  
Like ILO Conventions, the Covenants are international treaties. Initially, the cold war 
made it necessary to come up with the two already mentioned covenants on civil and political 
rights and economic, social and cultural rights rather than just one combined covenant.  The 
rationale behind this approach was the inescapable understanding that western capitalist 
democracies were prepared to commit not only in theory but also in practice to such issues as 
due process before the law, free elections and to trial by jury
44
 yet they were not as enthusiastic 
to recognize the right of all workers to a job or a livable wage or decent housing as required by 
the Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights.
45
 The eastern socialist countries took a 
contrary position, robustly supporting economic and social rights while being reluctant to 
embrace all of the trappings of western democracy.
46
 Although involved in the development of 
the Covenants, the ILO was uncomfortable with the division into categories and thus tried to 
dissociate itself from the ensuing controversy.
47
 As a result it became further distanced from the 
expanding human rights community. It is submitted that the position held by the western 
                                                          
 
42
  ILO “Protecting Labour Rights as Human Rights: Present and Future of International Supervision” 4. 
43
  See Article 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights which was adopted on the 27th of June 
1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986.  
44
  Adams 50. 
45
  Ibid. See also Article 7 of the ICCPR. 
46
  Adams 50. 
47
  See Swepston “Labour Rights and Human Rights,” Keynote Speech, Conference on Workers‟ Rights, Human 
Rights: Making the Connection, Toronto, 17 November 2007. 
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countries appears to be the trap into which the developing countries seem to be falling albeit in 
the wake of their noble cause to attain development. It appears that the obsession in trying to 
address colonial imbalances might have been taken to the extreme by developing countries, a 
feature which sadly comes at the expense of their peoples‟ welfare. The western countries stand 
to lose nothing as their development came at the expense of the cheap labour and gross violations 
of the rights of workers who came from developing countries as slaves. Developing countries on 
the other hand seem to have everything to lose as their people suffer double jeopardy in that their 
rights were violated as slaves and now they have to make do with lower levels of recognition of 
their labour rights as human rights by their own governments who continuously preach the 
gospel of anti-colonialism. It appears that lowering labour standards would be a priority in the 
pursuit of development yet little regard is given to the consequences of such an approach in the 
future.  
If one reflects upon the predicament of the poorly remunerated mine workers in informal 
mining sectors of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where workers slave in hazardous 
mines under very poor working conditions, without so much of reprimand from the DRC 
government, and  with so much influence being wielded by Western powers or at least the rebels 
they sponsor,
48
 it might be proper to conclude that western countries are the primary 
beneficiaries of lower labour standards in developing countries which are promoted by the 
developing countries themselves.
49
  Eric Kajemba, a Congolese civil society leader and mining 
expert commented on the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act, as follows: 
“Congolese mineral exports are down 90 percent due to a new rule requiring US 
companies to avoid indirectly financing rebel groups. John Prendergast, The Enough 
                                                          
 
48
  On July 21 2010, President Obama signed into effect the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. The Act sought to 
regulate the financial markets and make another economic crisis less likely. It sought to use transparency in trade 
as a vehicle to just economic practices. However, the Dodd-Frank law has added insult to the violation of 
workers‟ rights in mineral mines by slowing trade in minerals trade in the DRC a factor which has further 
hampered development in the country. 
49
  The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) released a report on 24 November 2010 on the situation of 
core labour standards in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The release was timed to coincide with the 
review of the trade policies of the DRC by the General Council of the WTO at the end of November. The report 
finds prevalent violations of all core international labour standards especially with regard to child and forced 
labour. Although legislation recognises the fundamental rights to form and join a union, collectively bargain and 
strike, the report finds that many so-called trade unions are actually organised by employers in an effort to 
discourage free trade unions from operating. Anti-union discrimination remains unpunished along with many 
other crimes against trade unions. The police and judiciary frequently make arbitrary use of their powers against 
trade unionists, and cover up the actions of investors and corrupt officials who breach the law.  
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Project, and Global Witness are directly responsible for this completely predictable havoc, 
as are the American legislators and industry personnel who took their testimony as gospel, 
let them write section 1502 of the legislation, and ignored dissenting voices in the debate 
over the minerals. We now have a situation in which the already tenuous economy of the 
eastern DRC is further deteriorating. Ordinary Congolese are suffering far more than the 
militias at whom this legislation was targeted. And I, for one, would like to know what the 
people who caused this problem are going to do about it.”50 
 
Clearly western countries, just like their African counterparts would thus be equally liable for 
trading in products that emanate from the gross violation of workers‟ rights.  
 The DRC is not the only country in this blend of self-inflicted and foreign-inflicted 
predicament. Another prime example of the so-called drive towards development at the expense 
of human rights can be seen in Zimbabwe. A country once the bread basket of Africa has now 
become a basket case. At the centre of its fall has been the attempt to redress colonial imbalances 
in the so called “Third Chimurenga economic war”51 which unfortunately has been characterized 
by gross human rights violations. Public servants in particular do not have a broader right to 
collective job action and can only do so with the concurrence of the Minister of Labour. They are 
also poorly paid yet diamonds from the country are being sold for billions of dollars on foreign 
markets, which in most instances are European markets. Such has been the state of human rights 
violations in the country that the introduction of the New Economic Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD),
52
 long before the “Third Chimurenga economic war”, was even 
regarded as a test case for Zimbabwe.
53
 For employees in the private sector who have the right to 
strike, the procedural requirements for striking are so demanding, as to defeat the whole purpose 
                                                          
 
50
  See Texas in Africa “The DRC Minerals Mess” http://texasinafrica.blogspot.com/2011/08/drc-minerals-
mess.html (accessed 30-10-2011). 
51
  See Chitiyo “Harvest of Tongues: Zimbabwe‟s “Third Chimurenga and the Making of an Agrarian Revolution” 
in Lee and Colvard (eds) Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa (2003) 159. The word 
Chimurenga refers to an uprising. The “chimurenga mythology” has become a core element of state survival and 
agrarian transformation. Chitiyo compares the Zimbabwean model, “a populist-coercive version of socio-
agrarian reform” which, for better or worse, has revolutionized the agricultural system, with the current South 
African model of “incrementalist, rationalist and linked to the global agenda of development as governance.” 
52
  The New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) is a programme of the African Union (AU) adopted in 
Abuja, Nigeria in 2001. NEPAD is a radically new intervention, spearheaded by African leaders to pursue new 
priorities and approaches to the political and socio-economic transformation of Africa. NEPAD‟s objective is to 
enhance Africa's growth, development and participation in the global economy. 
53
  The WTO, NEPAD and social clauses are all linked to the process of globalisation.  While the WTO is a key 
instrument in driving this process, NEPAD has been described as “Africa‟s response to globalisation”.  The 
proposed social clause in trade agreements is meant to ensure basic workers rights and to avoid a race to the 
bottom as far as labour standards in the global economy are concerned. 
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of collective job actions due to the attempts by the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic 
Front (ZANU PF)
54
 controlled government‟s attempts to thwart collective job actions which they 
see as protest actions that are anti-revolutionary. This approach to human rights by these 
developing countries may appear to call into question the sincerity of arguments for lowering 
labour standards at the expense of human rights on the basis that the former is central to their 
comparative advantage. Understanding core labour standards as fundamental human rights may 
perhaps assist in addressing ruling elites‟ resistance to change.  
3 3  THE ADVANCE OF CORE LABOUR STANDARDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
Due to the fact that the ILO chose to go alone rather than getting involved in the east-west debate 
over the separation of human rights into two groups, the ILO did not become a major participant 
in the developing human rights community and debate.
55
 The end of the Cold War in the early 
1990s however saw the UN funding a number of international conferences intended to profile the 
work of the ILO in the post-cold war period. In 1993 there was a summit on human rights in 
Vienna that issued the Vienna Declaration.
56
 In it, the international community restated its 
obligation to upholding the universality and indivisibility of human rights.
57
 The Vienna 
Declaration‟s Preamble states that: 
 “The World Conference on Human Rights, Considering that the promotion and protection 
of human rights is a matter of priority for the international community, and that the 
Conference affords a unique opportunity to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the 
international human rights system and of the machinery for the protection of human rights, 
                                                          
 
54
  The Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has been the ruling party in Zimbabwe since 
independence in 1980, led by Robert Mugabe, first as Prime Minister with the party simply known as ZANU, 
and then as President from 1988. In the 2008 parliamentary election the ZANU-PF lost sole control of parliament 
for the first time in party history, brokering a difficult power-sharing deal with the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). However the party still remains in control of most functions of the state due to its backing from 
the army. 
55
  Adams 50. 
56
  The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA) is a human rights declaration adopted by agreement 
at the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 in Vienna, Austria. The VDPA confirmed the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter. 
57
  Part I para 5 of the VDPA provides that, “All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of 
their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” The VDPA stresses that all human rights are of equivalent significance, pursuing to end the 
qualitative separation between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, which was 
pronounced during the Cold War era. 
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in order to enhance and thus promote a fuller observance of those rights, in a just and 
balanced manner…Invoking the spirit of our age and the realities of our time which call 
upon the peoples of the world and all States Members of the United Nations to rededicate 
themselves to the global task of promoting and protecting all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms so as to secure full and universal enjoyment of these rights.”58 
 
The Vienna Declaration also drew a straight link between respect for human rights, democracy 
and international development.
59
 Just about the same time when the Vienna Declaration was 
being adopted, an extensive number of civil organizations started to challenge the impact of 
globalization.
60
 Businesses were growing around the world, production was being found in 
countries distant from those in which the outcomes were promoted and financial markets were 
becoming gradually global. This is a feature of globalization that appears to dominate the trade 
relations between developing and developed countries in the present times. The Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was developing the rules that would lead to a 
liberalized trade regime that would be managed by the WTO which came into existence in 
1995.
61
 However, it is submitted that the outputs of international liberalization and trade growth 
were and still are not being impartially shared.
62
 No significant improvement in the quality of life 
                                                          
 
58
  VDPA preamble. 
59
  See Part I para 8 which states that “Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the 
people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all 
aspects of their lives. In the context of the above, the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms at the national and international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached. 
The international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world.” 
60
  Adams 50. 
61
  The Uruguay Round was the eighth round of Multilateral trade negotiations conducted within the framework of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), spanning from 1986-1994 and embracing 123 countries as 
“contracting parties”. The Round transformed the GATT into the World Trade Organization. The Round came 
into effect in 1995 and has been implemented over the period to 2000 (2004 in the case of developing country 
contracting parties) under the administrative direction of the newly created World Trade Organization (WTO). 
62
  The fact that several countries are placing little importance on a need to protect labour standards as human rights 
in trade (in the interest of economic gains) might explain the reluctance to acknowledge a trade-labour linkage in 
the WTO legal framework. See Trebilcock 173. Trebilcock considers the rationale for a “...trade-policy labour 
standards linkage...” whose “...focus is squarely on social welfare considerations in exporting countries, rather 
than importing countries...” as “...an entirely cogent basis for collective global action to ensure that core labour 
standards in all countries, are conceived as universal human rights...” However, Trebilcock argues that due to 
what he perceives as “the precise content of several of the core labour standards” and “what forms of child 
labour are unacceptable” with many forms of “violations of core labour standards” occurring in “non-traded 
goods sectors (e.g. use of child labour)” there would be “...no defensible case for privileging core labour 
standards over other basic international human rights such as freedom from genocide, torture, arbitrary arrest or 
detention without trial, or racial or gender discrimination.” Trebilcock‟s arguments whilst plausible to a certain 
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of those who are less well-off, if any at all, can be noticed in the so called developing countries.
63
 
It comes as no surprise when one reaction to the non-improvement in the quality of people‟s 
lives is a drive to make observance of core labour rights a conventional feature of globalization.
64
  
The proposal to make States‟ membership to the WTO dependent on their respect for 
human rights thus naturally flowed from the need to improve people‟s lives in the world.65 It 
therefore was not surprising that as far back as the UN‟s 1995 Summit on Social Development,66 
core labour rights, including freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, were overwhelmingly re-stated to be basic human rights. Reinstating its attachment 
with the international human rights community, the ILO contributed robustly in the work of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
extent might not be a true reflection of reality in developing countries. There is no dispute as regards the content 
of what constitutes core labour standards. Lester et al plausibly observe that: “The fact that core labour standards 
are human rights is uncontroversial; no Member State voted against the ILO Declaration when it was put forth at 
the 86th Session of the General Conference of the ILO in June, 1998. The ILO Declaration itself acknowledges 
core labour standards have a special status within the international labour law hierarchy in that core labour 
standards are imposed upon ILO Members by them simply being Members of the organisation. Thus, Member 
States that have not ratified the relevant conventions are nevertheless bound to promote and realize the basic 
principles concerning...core labour standards.” See Lester et al 878. Furthermore, child labour violations in 
African countries such as the DRC (where detention and torture are rife) and Malawi, as chapter 7 of this study 
will establish are taking place in traded sectors as opposed to non-traded sectors. In South Africa, the violation of 
farmworkers‟ and miners‟ rights as chapter six of this study will reveal, are taking place in trade-related sectors. 
It could be argued that protecting core labour standards as human rights in trade could also have objectives of 
addressing concerns on torture, detention, racial or gender discrimination to the extent that fall within the scope 
of a trade-labour dispute.  
63
  See Davis and Trebilcock “Legal Reforms and Development” 2001 Third World Quarterly 23. 
64
  See Lester et al 879.  Lester et al argue that: “As human rights, the core labour standards are worthy of inclusion 
as a GATT-protected norm. By viewing core labour standards as human rights and not merely as an attempt to 
level the playing field, the case for the WTO incorporating the rights and correspondingly playing a role in their 
enforcement becomes clear for at least two reasons.  First, when viewed as basic human rights, core labour 
standards can be seen to be promoting human freedom of choice. Such freedom of choice is entirely consistent 
with a liberal trading regime that seeks to ensure other human freedoms, particularly the right of individuals to 
engage in market transactions without discrimination on the basis of the country of origin...Second, the human 
rights approach shows that imposing trade restrictions on products manufactured in a manner that fails to comply 
with universally acknowledged human rights is not an economic regulation per se, but rather a form of social 
regulation driven by the fundamental premise that human rights are universal and indivisible. Viewed in this 
manner, it becomes clear that the enforcement of human rights is not merely a convenient opportunity to engage 
in protectionism, but an obligation to respect, protect and fulfill their responsibilities under international human 
rights treaties, including the ILO Declaration.” See also Trebilcock and Howse The Regulation of International 
Trade (2005) 581. Trebilcock and Howse observe that linking trade to core labour standards (as human rights) 
will not impose a discriminatory set of conditions on WTO Members‟ exercise of their trading rights. Instead, 
compliance with core labour standards as human rights would be something they are all ready committed to 
doing in as much as they are Members of the ILO and signatories of the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
65
  See Tsogas Labour Regulation in a Global Economy (2001) 129. 
66
  The World Summit for Social Development was held in March 1995 in Copenhagen, Denmark. At this summit, 
governments reached a new agreement on the need to put people at the centre of development. The Social 
Summit was the biggest meeting ever of world leaders at that time. It vowed to make the conquest of poverty, the 
goal of full employment and the fostering of social integration overriding objectives of development. 
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Summit on Social Development. When the Summit ended, governments adopted the 
Copenhagen Declaration, the Ten Commitments and the Programme of Action of the World 
Summit for Social Development.
67
 
In 1996, a year after the World Summit for Social Development, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) provisionally thought over and abandoned the suggestion of including a 
“social clause” in its multilateral trade instruments.  The basis of its decision was a plea of its 
lack of ability to judge nations on that criterion and passed the stick to the ILO.
68
 The outcome of 
this approach was that the ILO at its annual conference in 1998, approved the adoption of the 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work already alluded to in this chapter. 
Due to the fact that representatives at the annual conference were drawn not only from states but 
also organized labour and employer organizations, the 1998 Declaration represented an 
international labour-management state compact about the human rights nature of core labour 
rights including aspects of labour such as collective bargaining.
69
 
The Secretary General of the United Nations proclaimed the introduction of the Global 
Compact with international business, two years after the 1998 Declaration.
70
 The Global 
Compact challenged corporations to pledge amongst other things the respect for and work 
towards the full implementation of a set of labour standards.
71
 However, the Global Compact did 
                                                          
 
67
  See the United Nations Report of the World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 6-12 March 1995 4. 
The commitments are as follows: Create an economic, political, social, cultural and legal environment that will 
enable people to achieve social development;  eradicate absolute poverty by a target date to be set by each 
country; support full employment as a basic policy goal;  promote social integration based on the enhancement 
and protection of all human rights; achieve equality and equity between women and men; attain universal and 
equitable access to education and primary health care; accelerate the development of Africa and the least 
developed countries; ensure that structural adjustment programmes include social development goals; increase 
resources allocated to social development and strengthen cooperation for social development through the UN. 
68
  Tsogas 130. 
69
  See Bellace “The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” 2001 International Journal of 
Comparative Labor Law and Industrial Relations 269-270. In the context of the Declaration collective 
bargaining was clearly declared to be equivalent in stature and concern with employment equity, and freedom 
from child and forced labour. 
70
  The Global Compact was first announced by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in an address to The 
World Economic Forum on January 31, 1999, and was officially launched at UN Headquarters in New York on 
July 26, 2000. The United Nations Global Compact is a United Nations initiative to encourage businesses 
worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on their implementation. The 
Global Compact is a principles-based framework for businesses, stating ten principles in the areas of human 
rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. Under the Global Compact, companies are brought together 
with UN agencies, labour groups and civil society. 
71
  The labour standards were drawn explicitly from the ILO Declaration. Business had to uphold the following 
labour standards: Principle 3, the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
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not bind firms legally,
72
 although the number of corporations that have vowed to respect and 
work toward the full implementation of a set of labour standards has gone up to over three 
thousand.
73
 This has resulted in the formal acceptance of the right of workers to organize without 
interference and for their organizations to be recognized for the purpose of bargaining 
collectively a feature of labour practice which has now become a global norm.
74
 
In 2004, the need to strengthen the influence of the international code of acceptable 
corporate conduct concerning human rights resulted in a Sub-commission
75
 of the UN‟s Human 
Rights Council (then Human Rights Commission) issuing the UN Norms.
76
 The document on 
UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Companies and other Business Enterprises 
with regard to Human Rights stipulated what were, in the Sub-commission‟s expert view, the 
international human rights duties of business. It claimed that corporations had legal 
responsibilities to respect and conform to human rights standards to which business retorted that 
it was not the police and could not be expected to fulfill the functions of the state.
77
 Reacting to 
the debate, the UN Secretary General appointed a Special Rapporteur to consult extensively with 
all those concerned with the subject and to offer recommendations for resolving the controversy.  
Ruggie has specified that an interim report confirmed that the Commission had been 
“doctrinally excessive” in its statements regarding the legal responsibilities of business.78  In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
bargaining; Principle 4, the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;  Principle 5, the effective 
abolition of child labour; and  Principle 6, the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. 
72
  The Global Compact reflected a formal, moral commitment to behave in accord with core labour standards 
including respect for the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively without interference. See Human 
Rights Watch “A Strange Case: Violations of Workers‟ Freedom of Association in the United States by 
European Multinational Corporations” 2010 http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bhr0910web_0.pdf 
(accessed 27-10-2011). 
73
  Ibid. 
74
  Ibid. 
75
  The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (before 1999, known as the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) was a think tank of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights. It was wound up in late August, 2006. With the dissolution of the 
Commission on Human Rights and its replacement by the Human Rights Council in 2006, responsibility for the 
Sub-Commission passed from the former to the latter. On 30 June 2006 the Council resolved to extend the Sub-
Commission‟s mandate on an exceptional one-year basis and subject to the Council's subsequent review. The 
Sub-Commission met for the final time in August 2006; among the recommendations it adopted at that session 
was one for the creation of a Human Rights Consultative Committee as a standing body to assist the Human 
Rights Council. 
76
  Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). 
77
  See Kinley and Chambers “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law” 2006 Human Rights Law Review 447. 
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conducting further analysis on the subject, Ruggie developed a framework that comprises three 
key principles namely: the state‟s duty to protect against human rights abuses by business; the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and effective access to remedies.
79
 This 
framework does not go as far as the UN Norms in establishing the obligations of business for 
human rights but it does make clear that business assume any responsibility other than 
compliance with law.
80
 Unfortunately, Ruggie‟s framework left the legal obligations of business 
uncertain. However, what stands clear at this point is that whatever the technical legal exposure 
of business ought to be, there is a rapidly strengthening global social norm that expects business 
to take some responsibility for human rights.
81
 
Specific examples of recognising labour rights as human rights come in the form of 
upholding the right to collective bargaining that would materialize through conforming to the 
conduct norms drafted by the ILO and its committees. In 2006, the demands on business became 
greater than before when the World Bank‟s commercial lending division, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC),
82
 issued a set of guidelines that it would apply to corporate 
applicants for development loans.
83
 The guidelines stipulate that for a corporate to qualify for a 
commercial loan, such corporate “will not discourage workers from organizing and bargaining 
collectively.”84 This IFC standard resultantly became part of the Equator Principles, a policy 
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generally sanctioned by international lending institutions around the world.
85
 As such, in order to 
obtain a development loan, adherence to the new policy has fast become a practical requirement. 
If this norm was to be incorporated in the WTO multilateral trade instruments, the large majority 
of international trading firms would almost certainly fail the test because discouraging workers 
from organizing is a common practice in the world.
86
  
Note worthy attempts to promote the rights of workers as human rights can be traced to 
countries such as the US and Canada. In the US, the desire to promote knowledge, understanding 
and respect for core labour rights as human rights saw the emergence of the Society for the 
Promotion of Human Rights in Employment in the year 1997.
87
 The Society swiftly drew 
hundreds of labour relations specialists to advance their mission. In 2000 US-based Human 
Rights Watch commissioned a study of the state of US labour law and practice from an 
international human rights perspective and found the country sadly wanting.
88
 That report has 
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had a significant impact in increasing American labour‟s human rights awareness with regard to 
collective bargaining and with moving the human rights and labour movements closer together.
89
  
In Canada, the National Union of Public and General Employees joined with the United 
Food and Commercial Workers to promote the message of workers‟ rights as human rights.90 
They were soon joined by the Canadian Teachers‟ Federation and the Canadian Police 
Association. This is the international and recent local environment in which the Supreme Court 
of Canada delivered its 2007 decision constitutionalising the right to bargain collectively.
91
 As 
the Court noted its decision “may properly be seen as the culmination of a historical movement 
towards the recognition of a procedural right to collective bargaining.” Although the Court made 
that statement primarily in reference to historical developments in Canada, it is equally, if not 
more accurate with respect to global developments which may inform the calls for a social clause 
in the WTO. 
 
3 4  WHY USE A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO ENGAGING THE TRADE-
LABOUR LINKAGE DEBATE 
 
There has been increasing discussions among development actors and agencies about a rights-
based move towards development. However what this approach precisely entails remains a 
matter of debate requiring clarity. Eyben
92
 and Ferguson
93
 viewed the approach as being deeply 
rooted in human rights legislation. The approach is unique and holds the potential of re-
politicising areas of development that have become domesticated as they have been 
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mainstreamed by dominant organizations such as the World Bank. On the contrary, Uvin
94
  
advocates that the contemporary rights-based development proposals need to be viewed with a 
fair measure of concern. The Rights-based approach, according to Uvin, has become the most 
modern development fashion item to be seen; and fears that it is being used to dress up the same 
old development in what may amount to the Emperor‟s New Clothes.95 Uvin‟s proposal appears 
to be one of the central arguments to the resistance of including a social clause in the WTO 
arrangement by developing countries. However, it is imperative to assess the significance of the 
human rights concept of development in view of all the underlying perspectives concerning the 
subject. This will allow an informed view on the debate and arrest any fears of human rights 
being used as a tool to undermine the developing states‟ development agenda especially where 
trade is involved. 
3 4 1  The significance of the human rights approach to development 
To establish the desirability of a social clause in the WTO through the recognition of core labour 
rights as human rights, an analysis of justifications for the use of human rights in development 
may be necessary. According to authorities in the field of development studies, the reasons for 
the importance of human rights in development can be put into three groups: normative, 
pragmatic and ethical. The normative justification is that rights put values and politics at the very 
heart of development practice. Hausermann argues that what is distinctive about a human rights 
approach to development is that it works by setting out a vision of what ought to be: that is, it 
provides a powerful normative framework to orient development cooperation.
96
 In doing so, she 
suggests, it brings an ethical and moral dimension to development assistance, one that by 
implication has been lacking.
97
 Through specifying a set of globally accepted standards, 
supported by international law, it offers a firm foundation for people to make claims on their 
states and for holding states to account for their duties to improve the access of their citizens to 
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the realisation of their rights.
98
 Critics support this argument by comparing a rights-based 
approach with other approaches to development such as the needs-based approach. While a 
needs-based approach centres on obtaining additional capital for service delivery to marginalised 
groups, a rights-based approach requires that the existing capital must be shared more equally, 
and assists the marginalised people to assert their rights to existing resources, thus making the 
procedure openly political.
99
  
Fundamentally different end products inspire the two approaches. Rights are based on 
legal obligations and in some cases ethical obligations that have a strong foundation in human 
dignity even though they are only in the process of evolving into legal obligations but needs can 
be met out of charitable objectives.
100
 Critics refer to differences between the normative strength 
of a rights-based approach and utilitarian-driven approaches
101
 such as low cost-high impact 
project approach and cost-benefit analysis. A rights-based approach is prone to give precedence 
to severe or gross types of rights violations even if these affect only a small number of people, 
while these other approaches would recommend a basis for justifying a focus on less severe 
types of violations that affect a larger number of people.
102
  
Practical justification for the use of a rights-based approach to development also exists. 
Ferguson contends that to talk in terms of rights is in itself a “vehicle for increasing the 
accountability of government organisations to their citizens and consequently increasing the 
likelihood that policy measures will be implemented in practice”.103 Equally, for global actors 
such as the WTO keen on giving meaning to rights outside the traditional confines of state 
responsibility, the construction of a rights-based-approach in the development framework 
presents an opportunity to make non-state actors liable for human rights abuses.
104
 The Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in its Draft Guidelines for a Human Rights 
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Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, puts across this wider idea of liability to human rights 
protection as follows: 
“Perhaps the most important source of added value in the human rights approach is the 
emphasis it places on the accountability of policymakers and other actors whose actions 
have an impact on the rights of people. Rights imply duties, and duties demand 
accountability.”105  
 
Furthermore, under international law, the State is the principal duty-bearer with respect to the 
human rights of the people living within its jurisdiction.
106
 However, the international 
community at large also has a responsibility to help realize universal human rights.
107
 Thus, 
monitoring and accountability procedures must not only extend to States, but also to global 
actors such as the donor community, intergovernmental organizations, international Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Transnational Companies (TNCs), whose actions bear 
upon the enjoyment of human rights in any country.
108
  
A rights-based approach can also provide a chance to reflect further largely on the 
supremacy dynamics inherent in the practice of international development and on questions of 
ethics. As Eyben and Ramanathan
109
  argue, to talk of rights is to talk about power and the 
obligations of those engaged in development assistance. At the centre of such an approach, they 
contend, is an impetus to actors involved in development to engage submissively with issues of 
power.
110
 Gaventa sums up the issue by advancing the notion that rights-based approaches to 
development can work both to sharpen the political edges of participation in the wake of the 
instrumentalism produced by mainstreaming, and to make critical linkages between participation, 
accountability and citizenship.
111
  
3 4 2  The conflicting viewpoints to adopting a rights-based approach to development 
Several discussions concerning the rights-based approach to development rely on the use of 
legislative instruments in development and on the effectiveness of a normative framework that 
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has its foundation in international covenants and conventions.
112
 It is submitted that while many 
would admit that what is essentially being advanced as rights-based approach is not in itself 
noticeably different to what those working in development have been doing all along,
113
 there is 
also a view that lending these practices the support of internationally agreed legislation does 
change the way in which they come to be viewed by development agencies and national 
governments.
114
 It may be argued that the rights-based approach may act as a means of validating 
a more developmental yet drastic approach to development.  However, while the rights-based 
approach to development may present an important arrangement for development actors that may 
help address neo-liberal instrumentalism notions such as “participation”115 and 
“empowerment”116, bringing into play remote international human rights standards also present 
their own problems. 
 An example of such a problem is that most underprivileged people have little access to 
the establishments that may put their rights into effect, and the interface between different legal 
systems governing their access to entitlements makes the process of recognising and claiming 
rights complex.
117
 The lack of acknowledgement by advocates of the rights-based approach of 
the wide range of strategies, tactics and institutions through which people frame and make rights 
claims outside of formal legal instruments and institutions is highlighted by the critique leveled 
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at the rights-based approach by the Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa (SLSA) team.
118
 
Farrington points out other more pragmatic reasons for remaining suspicious of what this 
approach would actually be able to accomplish, arguing that finite financial resources demand 
the establishment of priorities, which in turn undermines the principle of indivisibility, and 
highlights the dilemma of dealing with competing rights.
119
 
 These differences of perspective turn on different views of the role of law, and 
legislative instruments, in development, a theme which is an important dimension of the debate 
on human rights and development in respect of which a point of caution is necessary.
120
 Whilst 
official policy statements and professions of intent provide some material with which to analyse 
the normative positions of development agencies and actors on what a rights-based approach 
consists of and its links to previous approaches such as participation, there is a limit to how much 
any such generalisation can make sense of the politics of development policy and practice.
121
  
A number of organizations declare their commitment to human rights, although most of 
their practices remain completely unchanged by nice-sounding policies structured on the basis of 
development opposed principles that stay supremacist in practice. Others may have no official 
policy, yet individuals within them or particular country programmes are able to carry out work 
that is informed by broadly similar principles to those articulated within the rights discourse 
without ever calling what they are doing rights-based.
122
 Others still may selectively adopt some 
elements of the rights discourse, turning it to suit their own purposes: this is, after all, a discourse 
that offers almost everyone what they might be looking for.
123
 Therefore due care and diligence 
will be exercised about drawing any hard and fast conclusions about the normative influence of 
rights in what remains a shifting and contested terrain, even within the agencies that have the 
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most assertive declarations of support for such an approach, a factor to which this study is 
sensitive.
124
 
3 5  THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHTS-BASED ADVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT 
That which is now referred to as the rights-based move towards development has a fairly current 
record in the discourse of global development organizations, rising in the post-Cold War era in 
the early 1990s, and gaining force in the build up to the Copenhagen Summit on Social 
Development.
125
  However, a number of the principles articulated as part of the approach 
adopted at the summit are not recent.
126
 They have been a feature of efforts for self-definition 
and for social justice long before the discussion of rights went global in the post-World War II 
period.
127
 It is submitted that it is indeed odd to reflect on the structuring of contemporary rights 
discussions given these precursors. It certainly is of key significance to place the contemporary 
rights talk in history, as many fears and promises which originate from the pronunciation of a 
rights-based approach to development ought to be considered as growing from long-lasting ties 
between the states, powers and institutions that are drawn into the present rights discussions. 
3 5 1  Anti-colonialism struggles and rights 
Whilst discussions of rights in development may be recent among international organizations, as 
already indicated in this work, the real  moves towards the recognition of social, economic and 
cultural, as well as civil and political, rights has been characteristic of the political setting in 
several developing countries particularly in Africa, for a long time. The discussion about rights 
was, and still is, a crucial element of struggle and freedom movements in developing countries; 
nationalist and anti-colonial movements framed their demands for self-rule in terms of the 
everyday constraints that colonial administrations imposed not just on their liberty, but on their 
livelihoods.
128
 In the context of this background, Manji argues that: 
“The struggle for independence in Africa was thus informed, at the base, by the experience 
of struggles against oppression and brutal exploitation experienced in everyday life. These 
struggles constituted the emergence of a tradition of struggles for rights which was organic 
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to and informed by the specific histories and experiences of those involved . . . The concept 
of rights was . . . forged in the fires of anti-imperialist struggles. It was informed by the 
need to overthrow all forms (not just colonial) of oppression and exploitation, not by 
constructs which had either been embodied in the UDHR or imported into Africa by those 
nationalist leaders who had spent periods in exile or study in the imperial homeland.”129 
 
Manji further contends that it was in the process of such struggles that rights were developed and 
became the foundation for battles for social justice.
130
 In giving credibility to Manji‟s arguments, 
making reference to events in which the consciousness of injustice led to uprisings in the 
colonial era and showed the general view the struggle for rights, would be of great significance.  
Examples of such events are the mobilisation of anti-colonial forces in Zimbabwe‟s Chimurenga 
wars,
131
 the rebellions of Kikuyu women in colonial Kenya,
132
 the Aba Women‟s War in 
Nigeria
133
 and last but not least the non-violent direct actions led by Gandhi in India.
134
 Manji 
went on to assert that the state‟s introduction of the concept of development resulted in the social 
energy generated during popular uprisings wasting away as the state took over, codifying rights 
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in the unrecognized country of Rhodesia (latterly Zimbabwe 
Rhodesia). The conflict pitted three forces against one another: on one side was the Rhodesian government, 
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in “laws and constitutions whose relevance or application was determined by the self-
proclaimed, and increasingly unaccountable, guardians of the State”.135  
The change from rights to development, Manji proceeded to argue, accelerated the de-
politicisation of poverty. The result was the transformation of the structures that had come out to 
organise around basic rights into development institutions.
136
 It may be rightfully submitted that 
the contemporary rights-based approach to development disregards this history. It undoubtedly 
shows no substantial link with its politicised history. It is apparent that limited consideration 
tends to be given to the fact that the politicized history situates relationships between the 
colonised and colonising countries into a somewhat difficult position. However, there are other 
facets of this history that are important to remember. The colonial project was irregular and 
conflicting.  It was not a faultless procedure of extraction and domination. Spaces were opened 
through its inconsistencies for specific social groups, for instance women, to gain access to new 
opportunities and realise new rights that traditional society did not recognise. This gave birth to 
innovative substantial opportunities for certain excluded groups. The irony of the ways 
instrumentalist involvement was aggressively changed by people into something that they could 
make use of in securing freedoms has significant modern character.
137
 It is from this angle that 
the calls for recognising core labour rights in the WTO must be advanced. 
3 5 1 1  The right to development and demands for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) 
From the colonial era to the period after World War II in which development started to be 
expressed as a scheme with the element of international collaboration, development and human 
rights were regarded as detached concepts. The concept of development was the territory of 
economists and human rights the field of lawyers and activists.
138
 However, the admission of 
newly independent nations into the United Nations in the 1960s and 1970s prompted the initial 
efforts to link the two fields.
139
 The ICESCR offered a vital starting point for a number of 
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proposals led by developing countries one of whose outcomes was the Declaration on the Right 
to Development (DRD). The proclamation of the DRD was a landmark development in years of 
efforts by developing countries within the UN to force transformations that would lead to a 
NIEO in the interest of poor countries.
140
 The Declaration is non-binding, and may be perceived 
as a diluted adaptation of the drastic restructuring measures sought by the developing countries 
behind the NIEO. Even so, the NIEO to a certain extent does reflect a few of the radical politics 
of that era.
141
  
Relating to differences between developed and developing countries the NIEO advocates 
for the joint commitment of all states to generate a just and equitable global setting for the 
recognition of the right to development. It highlights a shared responsibility of all states to 
remove obstacles such as unfair trade rules and the debt burden, in actual fact pointing a critical 
finger at the developed countries for not applying themselves sufficiently or at least fairly to this 
cause. This has resulted in the developed countries‟ resistance to the NIEO reflected in the voting 
outline on the resolution adopting the NIEO declaration which clearly illustrates this developed-
developing country divide. Even if eight developed countries voted in favour of adopting the 
declaration, this number fell considerably when a later resolution attempted to propose a 
comprehensive plan of action to put the Right to Development into practice.
142
 The resolution 
called on states to build world food security, resolve the debt burden, eliminate trade barriers, 
promote monetary stability and enhance scientific and technical cooperation.
143
  
In the domain of global human rights practice an insistent measure of resistance over the 
course of the late 1980s and 1990s to the types of rights that were seen as development concerns 
like shelter, water and food continued. Opposition to economic and social rights by developed 
countries, especially the US was observed as having its roots in the Cold War.
144
 The position 
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  Ibid. 
141
  For example, instead of limiting itself to a conservative consideration of rights as being about state-citizen 
relations, it places an emphasis on the global dimension.  
142
  See Resolution 41/133 of 4 December 1986. This second resolution called for international cooperation aimed at 
stable and sustained economic growth and increased concessional assistance to developing countries. 
143
 See Brownlie “The Human Right to Development” 1989 Human Rights Unit Occasional Paper November 
London: Commonwealth Secretariat 12. The industrial countries rejected these proposals because they saw them 
as the imposition of one-sided obligations, and an invasion into what should be, according to them, the 
discretionary or voluntary field of development assistance, where spelling out precise obligations is anathema.  
144
  Ibid. 
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transformed in the aftermath of the Cold War.
145
 However, social and economic rights 
continually meet a predominantly US-led degree of doubt as to their status as rights. 
Conventional western-based human rights NGOs only started to work on social and economic 
rights since the mid-1990s with the human rights movement tending to stay distant from matters 
of economic and social justice.
146
 The current talk on rights-based moves inside global 
development spheres shows a slight consciousness of the former struggles around the Right to 
Development. The absence of the Right to Development from the rights glossary of international 
development actors is explained partly by a deliberate effort to steer clear of the controversies 
raised by its reference to global inequalities.
147
 It is these crucial issues which, when addressed, 
may contribute positively to the attitudes of developing countries towards the advancement of 
human rights and in particular the introduction of core labour rights in the WTO. As it stands 
continual denials by the developed countries of the impact of colonialism and its negative effect 
on developing countries will see the further deterioration of human rights conditions in the 
later.
148
  
3 6  THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 
The Senegalese Jurist, Keba M‟baye, became the first person to advance the idea of the Right to 
Development (RTD) in the year 1972.
149
 The RTD‟s first legal acknowledgment was given in the 
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights,150 and was later on integrated into the 
global human rights framework through the adoption in 1986 of the Declaration on the DRD by 
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  The rule of the indivisible, interdependent and non-hierarchical nature of rights has become the norm since the 
1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna. 
146
  Mainstream human rights groups such as Amnesty International did not get into the language of „“rights-based 
approach” to development‟ until 2001/2. See Amnesty International Speech at World Social Forum, Porto Alegre 
2002. 
147
 The Department for International Development (DFID) for instance makes no reference to the Right to 
Development in either of its two White Papers (DFID 1997; 2000a) and only a passing reference in the Target 
Strategy Paper on rights (2001). The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office specifically advised proponents of 
a rights-based approach within the UK DFID to exclude any reference to the declaration. DFID makes it quite 
clear that it does not ground its approach to development assistance in the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development, and that its assistance is based on a moral, not legal, obligation to alleviate poverty. 
148
  See Alfred “Colonialism and State Dependency”2009 Journal of Aboriginal Health 43. 
149
  See M‟Baye “Le Droit au Developpement comme un Droit de L‟Homme” 1972 Human Rights Journal Revue 
Des Droits de L‟Homme 503,515. In a lecture at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, in 
1972, M‟Baye asserted that it was a right belonging to all men, as every man has a right to live and a right to live 
better. 
150
  See Article 22 of the African Charter. 
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the United Nations General Assembly. The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
(VDPA),
151
 the 2000 Millennium Declaration,
152
 and most recently, the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action
153
 reaffirmed the RTD as a universal and inalienable human right. The 
United Nations Declaration on Right to Development defines the RTD as: 
 “…an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realized.”154 
 
The VDPA reaffirms the right to development, which is regarded as contentious by some human 
rights scholars and UN member states.
155
 As provided for in the DRD, the human person is the 
primary beneficiary of development. Certainly, states must assist each other in ensuring 
development and removing impediments to development.
156
 The international community ought 
to encourage an efficient global collaboration for the recognition of the right to development and 
the eradication of barriers to development.
157
 Long-term advancement towards the application of 
the right to development needs efficient development policies at the national level, as well as 
equitable economic relations and a favourable economic environment at the international 
level.
158
 
3 6 1  Trade and development 
Currently, the membership of the WTO stands at around one hundred and fifty three members 
with almost two thirds of the membership being developing countries, transition economy 
                                                          
 
151
  VDPA paragraph 10 reaffirms “the right to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to 
Development, as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights.” 
152
  UN General Assembly, The Millennium Declaration, in pursuance of UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2 of 
8 September 2000 paragraph 11 states: “We are committed to making the right to development a reality for 
everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want.” 
153
 The Durban Declaration recalls the commitment of the Millennium Declaration “to make the right to 
development a reality for everyone” in Paragraph 19 and affirms “the solemn commitment of all states to 
promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, all human rights, economic, social, cultural, 
civil and political, including the right to development, as a fundamental factor in the prevention and elimination 
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.” See also paragraph 78. 
154
  Article 1, Declaration on the Right to Development by the UN General Assembly, Resolution 41/128 of 1986. 
155
  Part I para 9 reaffirms that least developed countries committed to the process of democratization and economic 
reforms, many of which are in Africa, should be supported by the international community in order to succeed in 
their transition to democracy and economic development.  
156
  See Article 22 of the African Charter. 
157
  See Article 22 of the African Charter. 
158
 Part I para 11 goes on to state: “The right to development should be fulfilled so as to meet equitably the 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations...” 
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countries or recognized as least developed country members.
159
 This increased participation of 
developing countries has led to the discussion of the issue of trade and development. Over the 
last few years it has become uncommon, indeed almost impossible, to conduct a discussion on 
any one of the diverse aspects of the law and practice of the WTO without at least token 
reference being made to its development dimension.
160
 No one policy can set in motion the 
complex process of economic development, but trade is considered one important component of 
any development policy.
161
 The UN has proclaimed the existence of the human right to 
development.
162
 Yet the problem that persists is that this right is defined so vaguely that it stands 
only as an obligation on the States and inter-governmental organizations to work within the 
scope of their authority to combat poverty and misery in disadvantaged countries.
163
  There is a 
common ground between this human right to development and WTO initiatives concerning 
developing countries. The WTO Agreement
164
 sets out the facilitation of development as its 
objective,
165
 and the first WTO Ministerial Conference addressed the importance of integrating 
developing countries into the multilateral trading system by assisting with their economic 
development. The Doha Round also includes a development agenda that addresses key issues of 
trade and development, such as debt and finance, trade and transfer of technology, technical 
cooperation and special and differential treatment for developing countries.
166
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 See Footer “Developing Country Practice in the matter of WTO Dispute Settlement” 2001 Journal of World 
Trade 55. 
160
  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations April 15 1994. 
161
  At the first session of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, Secretary General Raol 
Prebisch presented a report that first broached the idea that preferential trade tariff rates were a key to economic 
development in the “Third World”. 
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  UN General Assembly, UN Declaration on the Right to Development in pursuance of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 41/128, 1986, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 2542, 2586 and 2626. See also UN General 
Assembly Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development UN 
document E/CN 4/1999/WG 18/2 1999. 
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  See Bunn “The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law” 2000 American University 
International Law Review 1425. 
164
 See WTO The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (15 April 1994) 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (accessed 25/10/2011). 
165
  See the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (15 April 1994) states 
in relevant part, “Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development”. 
166
  WTO, Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001). 
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In 1995, when the WTO was established, a vast new body of trade law was introduced 
opening a trading system that is the only „multilateral‟ trading system and is the main source of 
international trade law and policy. Prior to the establishment of the WTO regime, the 1947 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was in place. Developing countries played 
only a small role in the foundation of the GATT as only ten of the original twenty-three GATT 
contracting parties were in this category.
167
 Development was seen by the drafters of GATT as 
primarily a national process which would require state intervention, state planning and state 
financing. The principles of tariff reductions, non-discrimination and reciprocity in the GATT 
were conceived on the presumption that the world is essentially homogenous composed of 
countries of equal strength and comparable economic development, yet the real world of 
international trade composed of countries with varying and diverse levels of economic 
development and vast differences in economic and social systems.
168
 The developed countries 
enshrined as inviolable the principle of non-discriminatory (Most Favoured Nation) tariff 
agreements and proceeded to the even more widespread use of non-discriminatory non-tariff 
barriers, which principally affect the developing countries.
169
 A brief discussion of some of the 
principles aimed at attaining development in developing countries follows. 
3 6 1 1 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle 
The basic rationale for MFN is that if every country observes this principle, all countries will 
benefit in the long run through the resulting more efficient use of resources.
170
 Developing 
countries felt, over the course of the years, that they could not compete for export markets on an 
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  The ten original developing countries GATT Contracting Parties were Brazil, Burma, China, Ceylon, Chile, 
Cuba, India, Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon. In the first few years of the GATT China, Lebanon and Syria 
withdrew from GATT. 
168
  When GATT was established in 1947, 11 of the original 23 Contracting Parties would have been considered 
developing countries. 
169
  This principle was enshrined in Article I of the GATT. 
170
  See Article 1 of the GATT. The MFN principle is a non-discrimination provision. It appears to forbid a specially 
favourable treatment by one trading party to another. The concept is one of equal treatment to another party 
which is most favoured. See also Jackson The World Trading System: Law and Policy of the International 
Economic Relations (1997) 157 and Trebilcock and Howse World Trade Organization (2005) 78. According to 
the International Law Commission, MFN Clause, „Text of Draft Articles on Most-Favoured Nation Clause‟ 1978 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 27 “under a most- favoured- nation clause the beneficiary State 
acquires, for itself or for the benefit of persons or things in a determined relationship with it, only those rights 
which fall within the limits of the subject- matter of the clause.” 
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equal basis with developed countries.
171
 However, the MFN principle is viewed as an 
impediment to a trade-labour linkage proposal in that, it provides for a non-discriminatory access 
to export markets, irrespective of the level of development of the exporting country.
172
 The 
developing countries successfully demanded for the provision of differential treatment to ensure 
that the world trading system responds to the particular needs of the developing countries.  
3 6 1 2 Enabling clause 
In the year 1964 a rival organization of sorts called United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) was formed. It is UNCTAD‟s existence that made GATT start with an 
array of initiatives. Therefore a ten-year waiver allowing for preferential rates applicable to 
imports from developing countries only, and then the Enabling Clause were introduced. Giving 
in to the demand made by the developing countries to support them in their development GATT 
members, in 1979, enacted the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause).
173
 The 
Enabling Clause suspended the GATT‟s general Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rule and allows 
developed country members to give differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
countries.
174
 The mechanism for this treatment is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
under which developed countries offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products 
originating in developing countries.
175
 Another point to be noted is that the Enabling Clause 
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  See Trebilcock and Howse 571.  
172
  See Trebilcock 175.  Trebilcock observed that: “Trade sanctions raise difficult questions under the GATT/WTO 
system as it currently exists. For example, conditioning MFN treatment on adherence to core labour standards is 
likely to raise questions as to whether this form of conditionality violates the requirement of „unconditional‟ 
extension of MFN treatment to all GATT/WTO members under Article I of the GATT...In the event that trade 
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  See World Trade Organization “Differential and More Favourable Treatment: Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries” WTO Doc No L/4903 (Nov 28, 1979) 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling_e.pdf. (accessed 25-10-2011). 
174
  See Stamberger “The Legality of Conditional Preferences to Developing Countries under the GATT Enabling 
Clause” 2003 Chicago Journal of International Law 607. 
175
  See the GATT Enabling Clause P2 (a). 
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provided for the principle of Graduation
176
 wherein these preferences will be withdrawn in a 
situation where the developing countries make good progress. Thus, successfully developing 
economies would be subject to the same rights and obligations of the multilateral trading system 
as industrialized countries. Yet this system has its own flaws which cannot be ignored.
177
 Firstly 
the program is discretionary and therefore lays down no standard on the basis of which the 
quantum of preference can be decided. Secondly this preference can be revoked at any point in 
time.
178
 Thirdly the Enabling Clause enables developed countries to provide preferences for 
developing countries, but it does not obligate them to do so.
179
 
3 6 1 3 GATT Article XXXVII 
The GATT‟s Article XXXVII sets out the provisions on Trade and Development. These 
provisions provide an array of measures and commitments by the developed countries and the 
WTO for assisting developing countries in economic development. Yet these provisions are not 
obligatory in nature. Article XXXVII creates an exception for “compelling reasons”, including 
legal reasons, for fulfillment of commitments by developed countries, thus reducing their 
effectiveness as countries might enact laws which would hinder the implementation of 
commitments. In view of these few and inadequate measures to attain development in the 
GATT/WTO, different platforms had to be used to address the development issue. Thus in a 
series of GATT/WTO rounds and meetings, the issue of development was battled with. The key 
meetings are discussed below. 
3 6 1 4 GATT/WTO Rounds and Meetings 
The Uruguay Round during the 1980s also left its mark on special treatment. The effects are 
visible above all in the results of the Round, concluded in 1995 with the establishment of the 
WTO. Around 76 developing countries participated in the round which altered the reciprocity 
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  See GATT Contracting Parties, Decision on “Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries”, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903), Enabling Clause, para 
7, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm. (accessed 26-10-2011). 
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  See Karasik “Securing the Peace Dividend in the Middle East: Amending GATT Article XXIV to Allow 
Sectoral Preferences in Free Trade Areas”1997 Michigan Journal of International Law 527. 
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  See Nogueras and Martinez “Human Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal 
and Legitimacy Problems” 2001 Columbia Journal of European Law 307. 
179
  See Lee “Facilitating Development in the World Trade Organization: A Proposal for the Council for Trade and 
Development and the Agreement on Development Facilitation” 2006 Asper Review of International Business 
and Trade Law 177. 
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component of special and differential treatment (S & D) in two ways. First, the countries 
negotiating in the round adopted a new single-undertaking approach under which prospective 
WTO members had to agree to virtually all WTO disciplines.
180
 Second, the system shifted to 
limited non-reciprocity of implementation. Developing countries lost the option of maintaining 
different levels of obligation and instead were granted additional periods of time to adjust to the 
burdens of fully-implemented WTO obligations.
181
 Also where permanent exceptions are given, 
the number of beneficiary developing countries is often too limited, for example, where 
exemptions are allowed in subsidy rules to permit export subsidies, only a handful of Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) benefit from this exemption on a permanent basis.
182
 
At the first WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Singapore in 1996 the importance of 
integration of LDCs into the multilateral trading system was reiterated. The Members adopted an 
Action Plan for the LDCs. In the follow-up process several industrialized and developing 
countries expanded existing preferences for LDCs or introduced new specific LDC preferences 
and preferential agreements which include the Arms Initiative of the EU and the extended Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act of the USA (AGOA).
183
 The 1998 Geneva Ministerial Conference 
carried forward the Singapore issues; however no new initiative or policy statement for LDCs 
was entertained. The failure to put forward effective means of implementing special treatment 
policies at the Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999 led to the same becoming crucial issues 
at the Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001. Paragraph 44 of the Ministerial 
Declaration provides for reviewing the special treatment policies and for effective 
implementation.
184
 Of approximately 100 issues raised by developing countries, forty issues 
were adopted in Doha concerning various WTO Agreements. Special emphasis was laid on 
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  The single-undertaking approach did not include plurilateral disciplines in Annex IV to the WTO Agreement, 
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Special and Differential Treatment” 2004 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 291. 
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  See Fukasaku “Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries: Does it help those who help 
themselves?” 2000 United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research Working 
Paper 197. 
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  Lee 177. 
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  See Thomas “Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries” 2005 Global Issue Papers 15 
http://boell-latinoamerica.org/download_en/SDT_en.pdf (20-10-2011). 
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  “We therefore agree that all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational” WTO Ministerial Declaration, 
Doha 2001 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. 
(accessed 28-10-2011). 
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implementation issues, S & D treatment provisions especially in trade negotiations, technical 
cooperation and capacity building. The unsuccessful Cancun Ministerial Conference
185
 attempted 
to carry forward the Doha Development Agenda. Its major areas of focus included allowance of 
access to essential medicines for the countries which do not have the capacity to manufacture 
drugs crucial for addressing public health crises, and also make use of compulsory licensing 
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement and parallel imports.
186
 With all the above mentioned 
attempts at recognising development in the WTO being made with little success, questions had to 
be raised about the attitude of the organisation to human rights as a key component of 
development.  A discussion of the WTO and human rights will therefore be necessary to show 
that the WTO has an even greater role to play in human rights protection and development than it 
currently perceives. 
3 7  THE WTO AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
After World War II, a number of policymakers sought to entrench human rights rules in trade 
agreements. As already indicated in earlier chapters, the outline treaty for the failed International 
Trade Organization (ITO) was the first trade agreement to embrace clear labour rights objectives. 
The ITO was the closest legal mechanism by which labour rights could have been recognized as 
human rights in the framework of international trade as the proposals were then discarded by its 
signatories after the US Congress declined to vote on putting into practice this piece of 
legislation.
187
  In the aftermath of the failure of the ITO, trade was then administered by the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which presided over only measures like tariffs 
and quotas. The GATT unlike the ITO had no precise declaration of its recognition of human 
rights. This is a feature that was to extend to the WTO which came into effect in 1995, after eight 
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  See Stokes “The Culture Clash at Cancun” 2003 National Journal 2890. The fifth WTO ministerial conference 
was held in September 2003 in Cancun. The Cancun Conference collapsed because of internal squabbles and 
irreconcilable philosophical differences between the developed countries and the developing countries. These 
differences included the huge agricultural subsidies to farmers in the rich countries and the inclusion of the 
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verge of a complete collapse. At this time, the WTO member countries are polarized into two main blocks, the 
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186
 The general impression would be that the WTO sees itself as having no central role in recognizing human rights 
as vital development instruments, regardless of the fact that the right to development is a fundamental human 
right in itself. See the World Trade Organization Annual Report (2004) 3-5 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep04_e.pdf. (accessed 29/10/2011). 
187
  See Diebold “The End of the I.T.O.” 1952 Essays in International Finance 37. 
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years of difficult consultations. The global community formed the WTO to oversee trade affairs 
among member states that use the organisation to negotiate a reduction in multilateral trade 
barriers and to resolve disagreements concerning guiding principles that one or more states may 
observe as distorting trade.  
Having inherited the legacy of the GATT after the failed ITO, WTO rules make no 
explicit mention of human rights, regardless of the inescapable view that one of the 
organisation‟s key objectives is to improve human welfare. Being an institution of negative 
regulation, the WTO rules offer little direction on what governments ought to do in promoting 
human rights as they work to develop trade.
188
 It came as no surprise that when the WTO was 
formed, member states became progressively more disturbed with the slow movement of 
multinational trade negotiations in the sphere of human rights. The result was the advent of the 
practice of negotiating bilateral or regional trade agreements, including free trade agreements in 
which human rights provisions were included.
189
  
This has seen the WTO coming under more and more criticism from human rights 
supporters for the negative impact of its activities on the human rights condition in several 
countries, in particular developing countries, a feature which stalls development.
190
  While not all 
criticism directed to the WTO can be demonstrated, it cannot be refuted that globalization and 
economic liberalism in general and trade liberalization in particular do not only have 
constructive effects on the enjoyment of human rights. As a matter of fact, numerous linkages 
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  See Bartels “Trade and Human Rights” in Wolfrum et al 2009 Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law 
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Foes.” Annual Memorial Silver Lecture Colombia University 
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Economic Prosperity (2004) 646. 
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exist between trade rules and human rights, of which trade liberalization and the implementation 
of WTO rules could produce negative impacts on the human rights conditions in a country by 
impeding human rights policies of WTO members.
191
  The relation between global financial law 
and human rights has been scrutinized in a series of reports
192
 produced by UN human rights 
establishments, under the support of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
193
   
The reports assessed the results of different areas covered by the WTO, such as the 
liberalization of trade in services, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS),
194
 trade in agricultural products, and investment liberalization on the 
human rights situation within WTO members. Zagel contends that while it is without doubt that 
the liberalization of international trade has improved economic development, the reports showed 
that trade liberalization can have harmful effects on the economic and social well-being of the 
population in a country, which influences the enjoyment of their human rights in general.
195
  It is 
submitted that these harmful effects arise mainly because states disregard their human rights 
obligations when implementing trade rules. What must come to the fore is that the shortcomings 
of human rights protection by the WTO are of exacting magnitude in developing countries, but 
are also present in developed countries.  
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Commission decision 2002/105 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14) (2003). 
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  See the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 15 April 1994. 
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  Zagel 335-336. 
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The negative effects can be traced in many areas aside from the subject of labour which 
forms the basis of this study. These include the adverse effects on the right to health caused by 
the TRIPS rules that need patent protection for medicines, making the products more expensive 
and therefore limiting access to inexpensive medicines.
196
  In addition, it is possible that the 
liberalization of services envisaged by the present General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)
197
 negotiations involves a negative impact on essentially economic, social and cultural 
rights.
198
  It is now common knowledge that many international organizations have acted and are 
still acting in response to human rights impact assessments leading them to develop widespread 
practice to improve their human rights accountability, yet the WTO an organisation seen as a key 
driver of human welfare is yet to do so.  
The UN framework has a far-reaching consideration on the impact on human rights of 
sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.
199
  However since 1997 when the then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan put human rights at the heart of the UN and initiated a human 
rights conventional procedure throughout the entire organization and its functions,
200
  many UN 
organizations have developed models for incorporating human rights into their activities.
201
  
With this background, ECOSOC went on to start a thriving discourse with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which led to the institutions starting to incorporate 
human rights features in their structural adjustment programmes so as to satisfy the reasonable 
condemnation on the negative impact of their programmes, which were only aimed at economic 
gains and had mainly disregarded the social and human rights circumstances within their target 
                                                          
 
196
 See UN ECOSOC Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights Report of the High Commissioner 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13) (2001). 
197
  See General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 15 April 1994. 
198
  See UN ECOSOC, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human 
Rights. Report of the High Commissioner (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9) (2002). A practical example given in this 
report would be the privatization of health care, education, or water supply leading to the problem that many 
people cannot afford those services any more. 
199
 See CESCR General Comment No. 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; UN ECOSOC, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment 
of Human Rights. Working Paper prepared by Marc Bossuyt (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33) (2000). 
200
 See UN Secretary-General, Renewing the United Nations: A Proposal for Reform (A/51/950) (1997); UN 
Secretary-General, We, the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (A/54/2000) (2000); UN 
General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration (UNGA Resolution 55/2 of 18 September 2000). 
201
 See Frankovits “Mainstreaming Human Rights: The Human-Rights Based Approach and the United Nations 
System” 2005. 
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countries.
202
  The possibility of review was created by setting up the World Bank Inspection 
Panel.
203
  
Regionally, the European Union (EU) has been an important model for progressively 
integrating human rights into its activities, though it may be argued that this is largely attributed 
to Europe‟s level of development. While in its early years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
did not feel any need to consider human rights in its judgments, it took note of human rights as 
being relevant for the European Community (EC) as part of the general principles of Community 
law for the first time in 1969.
204
  Thereafter, the ECJ established a remarkable human rights case-
law, and save for a number of non-binding human rights declarations, human rights are now 
protected in the primary law of the EU.
205
  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union is the most recent and most inclusive document to recognise human rights,
206
 and was 
referred to in the Court‟s case-law before it even had the status of a binding instrument.207 In 
addition, the EU has been integrating human rights features into its activities through numerous 
mainstreaming actions.
208
   
Regardless of the attempts being made by other institutions, the WTO has been quite 
reluctant to deal with human rights aspects of its work. It has remained adamant that it is a trade 
and not a human rights organization, and argued that human rights issues should be handled by 
other competent organizations.
209
  It is submitted that the WTO‟s major role is to offer a medium 
for trade negotiations, implementing trade rules and settling trade disputes,
210
  and that the WTO 
organs possess only a few official powers to make binding pronouncements, with decisions 
                                                          
 
202
  See Suzuki “Responsibility of International Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral 
Development Banks” 2005 Michigan Journal of International Law 177. See also Darrow Between Light and 
Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law (2003) 53. 
203
  See Orakhelashvili “The World Bank Inspection Panel in Context: Institutional Aspects of the Accountability of 
International Organizations” 2005 International Organizations Law Review 57. 
204
  See the case of Erich Stauder v City of Ulm-Sozialamt 1969 EC R 419. See also Rosas “The Sources of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Structural Overview” in Bergsmo and Eide (eds) Human Rights 
and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of Asbjorn Eide (2003) 719. 
205
  See Articles 6 (1), 7 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union. See also Articles 13, 136, and 177 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. 
206
 The Charter was proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 and enshrined as Part II in the Draft European 
Constitution. See also the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 2003 C 169/1) (18 July 2003). 
207
  See the case of JCB Service v Commission 2004 EC R II-49 paras 1 and 36.  
208
 See De Schutter “Mainstreaming Human Rights in the European Union” in Alston and De Schutter (eds) 
Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU: The Contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency (2005) 43. 
209
  See paragraph IV of the WTO Ministerial Council, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996. 
210
 See Article III of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization of 15 April 1994. 
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adopted by consensus, giving each member the ability, in theory, to block decisions.
211
  
Moreover, in contrast to decisions and acts of other international organizations, WTO rules and 
decisions do not have any direct effect for individuals, but are directed to the members, which 
are obliged to implement them in their national legal orders.
212
  The WTO seems of late to have 
become aware that it cannot just overlook the human rights debate and since 2003, a WTO 
delegate has taken part in the annual meetings of ECOSOC and the international financial 
institutions.
213
  The first informal discussion took place through an unofficial visit of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt, to the WTO Secretariat.
214
   
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the current WTO Director General Pascal Lamy has 
proclaimed that there is a new „Geneva Consensus‟ to „humanize globalization‟ and that the 
WTO will play its part towards that undertaking.
215
  Accordingly, it is the purpose of this study 
to examine ways in which to address the exclusion of core labour rights as fundamental human 
rights from the WTO instruments.   
3 7 1  The legal basis for the WTO’s human rights commitments  
Since the WTO is a global organization with an almost worldwide membership,
216
 it is necessary 
to look at existing human rights instruments and obligations at a universal level to determine the 
relevant substantive human rights standard for WTO accountability.
217
  A list of substantive 
human rights is protected in the UDHR. The substantive rights enclosed in the UDHR were 
codified and vested with a monitoring mechanism in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, instruments 
which give essence to the human rights provisions in the UN Charter.
218
  
                                                          
 
211
  See Article IX of the WTO Agreement. 
212
  Zagel 339. 
213
  UN ECOSOC, Summary by the President of the Economic and Social Council of the Special High-Level 
Meeting of the Council with the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization New York 
document A/58/77 – E/2003/62 of 9 May 2003. 
214
 UN ECOSOC, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health Report of the Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt. Addendum: 
Mission to the World Trade Organization document E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 of 2004. 
215
  See the speech by Pascal Lamy given in Santiago de Chile on 30 January 2006, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl16_e.htm. (accessed 25/102011). 
216
 The WTO has an estimated over 153 Members and with 29 states involved in accession negotiations. 
217
 Article 1 (3), Article 55 (c) and Article 56 of the UN Charter oblige all UN member States to cooperate 
internationally to promote respect for and observance of human rights. 
218
  See Tomuschat Human Rights. Between Idealism and Realism (2003) 31. 
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Regardless of the separation of the human rights list into two covenants, a holistic human 
rights notion exists today, where the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of all human rights is recognised in international law,
219
  and implementing 
obligations are regarded as principally the same for all UN member states.
220
  The substantive 
rights protected in the UDHR and the two UN Covenants are barely disputed by any state.
221
  
Apart from the prospect of making reservations
222
 and suspending human rights in a state of 
emergency,
223
 most human rights
224
 are subject to limitations. Limitation clauses are contained in 
all human rights instruments,
225
 the intent of which is to allow the limiting of an individual‟s 
rights, where this is necessary for the protection of certain plainly identified public policy 
interests or for the protection of the rights of other individuals.
226
  Limitation clauses allow states 
to impose restrictions, if the unlimited enjoyment of a right would lead to absurd results or if 
rights would clash with each other or other interests of the state.
227
   
In spite of all the potential to limit human rights, there is, however, a set of minimum 
core responsibilities protected in each substantive human right that states must respect, ensure 
and protect under any conditions.
228
  This minimum benchmark, which cannot be eliminated, 
                                                          
 
219
  UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2 (1); UN General Assembly, 
Declaration on the Right to Development, Articles 1 (1) and 6; International Conference on Human Rights, 
Proclamation of Teheran, para. 2; UN General Assembly, UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development 
para 2 (b); UVDPA paras I.1, I.5 and I.10; International Commission of Jurists, The Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights para 1  and Tomuschat 
81. 
220
  Ibid, Chapter II.B. General Implementing Obligations and Chapter II.C. Obligation to Prevent Human Rights 
Violations and to Provide Remedies. 
221
 Zagel 341. The general recognition of these rights must, however, be seen in the light of the wide-ranging 
possibilities for states to limit the substantive content of their human rights obligations. 
222
  See ICCPR General Comment No. 24, which outlines a number of reservations that would be null and void, as 
they contradict the object and purpose of the covenant. 
223
  See Article 4 of the ICCPR. However, there are a number of non-derogable rights, such as in Article 4(1) of the 
ICCPR, and the ICESCR General Comment No. 15 para 40 as well as General Comment No. 14 para 47. 
224
  Exceptions are a few absolute human rights, such as the prohibition of torture Article 7 of the ICCPR and the 
freedom of thought and consciousness Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
225
  See Articles 4, 5, 12 (3), 14 (1), 18 (3), 19 (3), 21, 22 (2), and 25 of the ICCPR; and Articles 4, 8, 29 and 30 of 
the UDHR. 
226
 See Quinn “The Nature and Scope of State Parties‟ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” 1987 Human Rights Quarterly 194. 
227
  See Article 5 of the ICCPR, Article 5 of the ICESCR and Article 30 of the UDHR. For example, freedom of 
association can be restricted to protect national security; freedom of speech is limited by the right to privacy and 
personal integrity of another person, the criterion for balancing the scope of both rights being the principle of 
proportionality. 
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derogated from or otherwise limited, must be guaranteed regardless of the flexibilities that are 
provided for in the human rights concept as such.
229
  The essence of the right must not be 
jeopardized; otherwise the covenant would be largely deprived of its raison d‟être‟.230  Ignoring 
of the minimum core obligations in any case results in the infringement of human rights.
231
  
To establish whether substantive human rights standards are relevant in a WTO 
framework, it is essential to establish to what degree the WTO and its members are bound by 
international human rights law.
232
  Most WTO members have ratified at least one of either the 
two UN Covenants
233
 or the specialized UN human rights treaties,
234
 and are thus bound by those 
treaty obligations when acting in the WTO. In order to be relevant for the remaining WTO 
Members and the WTO as an international organization, human rights must form part of general 
international law in that they must constitute customary international law or general principles of 
law.
235
  To determine the customary international law nature of human rights, it is essential to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
228
  See the ICESCR General Comment No. 3 para 10 and ICCPR General Comment No. 31 para 6. See also 
International Commission of Jurists, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, para 9 and the International Commission of Jurists, The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para 47. 
229
  See Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR; see also ICESCR General Comment No. 3, para 10. The available resources 
that allow for flexible implementation of economic, social and cultural rights are no excuse for not enabling 
those rights. 
230
  See the UDHR Article 30. This limit is also contained in Article 4 of the ICESCR, which requires all restrictions 
to be „compatible with the nature of the right‟. 
231
  See the International Commission of Jurists, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, para 8. 
232
  See UN Charter, Article 1 (3) and Article 55. Most WTO members are bound to observe human rights by 
international treaty obligations and all WTO members, except the European Communities, Hong-Kong and 
Chinese Taipei are UN member States as well, and thus recognize the UDHR and are bound by the general 
obligation to promote respect for and protection of human rights. 
233
  The only exceptions of WTO Members not having signed or ratified any of the two covenants are Antigua and 
Barbuda, Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Fiji, Malaysia, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Papua New Guinea, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and United Arab Emirates. 
234
  The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1577 UNTS 3 of 20 November 1989 is ratified by all WTO 
Members except the US while the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) 1249 UNTS 13 of 18 December 1979 is ratified by all WTO Members save for Qatar, 
Tanzania and the US. 
235
  Many scholars state that the rights enshrined in the UDHR, or at least parts of it, constitute customary 
international law without providing detailed evidence for this statement. This is supported by a number of 
authors, although many of them do not make the effort to examine the statement in detail. See for example 
Salcedo “Human Rights, Universal Declaration” in Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(1948) 925; Eide The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (1992) 6; Hannum “The Status of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law” 1995 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 289 as well as Sands and Bowett Law of International Institutions (2001) 
458.  
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determine whether there is supporting state practice and opinio iuris.
236
  In practice, both 
elements are not always given equal weight when establishing whether a rule forms part of 
customary international law.
237
   
It is difficult in most instances to differentiate between state practice and opinio iuris,
238
  
since judgments or unilateral declarations do not only amount to state practice, but also amount 
to opinio iuris to a certain extent.
239
  Valid state practice that also articulates an opinio iuris 
would be national constitutions and laws recognizing human rights, national court judgments, 
unilateral declarations of politicians and other state agents,
240
  or demonstrations against human 
rights abuses happening in other countries,
241
  and acts of state practice that provide ample 
evidence that states consider themselves to be bound by substantive human rights principles.
242
  
Also, the UDHR is acknowledged by UN member States that are not parties to any UN human 
rights conventions as basis for defining human rights abuses in the human rights monitoring 
procedures founded on ECOSOC Resolutions 1503 and 1235.
243
  Subsequent to the approach of 
the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, in which the ICJ acknowledged that soft law instruments such as 
the Friendly Relations Declaration
244
  or the CSCE Helsinki Declaration
245
  create a 
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  See Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 26 June 1945. See also ICJ 20 February 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case, Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany 
v Netherlands 1969 ICJ Reports 3 para 71. 
237
  See the ICJ 27 June 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, Nicaragua v 
United States of America 1986 ICJ Reports 14 para 183. In this case, the ICJ established that the prohibition of 
the use of force is customary international law. The court basically ignored state practice, and based its 
conclusions merely on the examination of opinio iuris. 
238
 See Simma and Alston “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Ius Cogens and General Principles” 1992 
Australian Yearbook of International Law 88. 
239
  Tomuschat 34. 
240
  See the ICJ 20 December 1974, Nuclear Tests Cases, Australia v France, New Zealand v France 1974 ICJ 
Reports 252 and 456. 
241
  Zagel 344. 
242
  Ibid. 
243
  Tomuschat 117. 
244
  On 24 October 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations (Res. 2625 (XXV)), setting out, and expanding upon, seven principles in Sect. 1: (1) „The principle that 
States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations‟; (2) „The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered‟; (3) „The principle concerning the 
duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter‟; (4) 
„The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter‟; (5) „The principle of equal 
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manifestation of opinio iuris that is adequate to found the prevention of the use of force as 
customary international law,
246
 a sizeable number of soft law instruments, together with the 
UDHR, the Vienna Declaration and the UN Millennium Declaration,
247
  that have been accepted 
by the majority of states, must be recognised as expression of the opinio iuris of states 
concerning the acknowledgement of substantive human rights.
248
   
Criticism is levelled to the customary international law nature of human rights to the 
effect that a number of genuine human rights abuses that impede the reality of regular state 
practice exist. Remarkably, the customary international law nature of the prohibition of the use 
of force, as well as the rules of the law of war as codified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are 
never disputed, although there is as much contradictory state practice through factual breaches, 
as in the field of human rights.
249
  An argument against this construction is that in nearly all 
cases of human rights abuses there are either efforts of the responsible state to rationalize the 
conduct, which demonstrates that there is consciousness for prevailing human rights 
responsibilities, or to obscure the conduct, being conscious of its unlawfulness.
250
  Such 
explanatory justification by the perpetrators means that there is opinio iuris that the actual 
behaviour is a breach of existing human rights obligations. One may argue that the WTO as a 
„persistent objector‟251 is not bound by international human rights law. The WTO does not deny 
the reality of human rights, or the applicability to its activities, but it simply contends that human 
rights are not appropriate to the WTO framework or denies that its purpose is to protect human 
rights.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rights and self-determination of peoples‟; (6) „The principle of sovereign equality of States‟; and (7) „The 
principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter‟. 
245
  The Helsinki Final Act, Helsinki Accords or Helsinki Declaration was the final act of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki, Finland, during July and August 1, 1975. Thirty-five states, 
including the USA, Canada, and all European states except Albania and Andorra, signed the declaration in an 
attempt to improve relations between the Communist bloc and the West. The Act‟s “Declaration on Principles 
Guiding Relations between Participating States” (also known as “The Decalogue”) enumerated the following 10 
points: I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty II. Refraining from the threat or use of 
force III. Inviolability of frontiers IV. Territorial integrity of States V. Peaceful settlement of disputes VI. Non-
intervention in internal affairs VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion or belief VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples IX. Co-operation 
among States X. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law. 
246
  Nicaragua v United States of America para 188. 
247
  See the UN Millennium Declaration (UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2 of 18 September 2000). 
248
 Zagel 345. 
249
  Ibid 346. 
250
 Tomuscat 34. 
251
  See the ICJ 18 December 1951 Fisheries Case, United Kingdom v Norway 1951 ICJ Reports 116 131. 
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3 8  CONCLUSION 
A strong case for upholding labour rights as human rights and for their subsequent inclusion in 
the WTO framework exists.
252
 The normative weight associated with human rights discourse in 
liberal democratic societies has made it a popular political tool for social movements looking to 
press towards development while the same cannot be said of illiberal societies.
253
 Although the 
world has been impressed by the rapid economic development of countries such as China, there 
is usually no allusion to the millions of ordinary people, mostly workers and peasants, who are 
unable to take advantage of this economic boom because it takes place at their expense. Human 
rights literature generally does not mention labour rights or, if a link is drawn, the reference is 
normally to “labour rights and human rights”.254 The underlying assumption created is that 
labour rights are not included under human rights.
255
 However, this chapter has shown that 
labour rights are indeed a form of human rights to which effort must be applied by the 
international community to ensure respect for these rights in particularly in trade-related matters. 
Clearly all substantive human rights are ideally of importance in the WTO framework.
256
 
If WTO activities negatively affect such rights, those activities should accordingly constitute 
human rights violations.
257
 Therefore, in the case of real conflicts between trade rules and human 
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  Trebilcock 172. See also Petersmann 621 and Trebilcock and Howse 578. 
253
  Lester et al 883-884. 
254
  See Lester et al 878. Lester et al argue that, “With such a high ratification rate and widespread endorsement 
within the broader human rights system, core labour standards do not simply constitute rights that belong to 
workers, but rather constitute rights that belong to individuals as human beings.”  
255
  Core labour standards are recognised in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR which are human rights instruments. 
This implies that core labour standards form part of the international human rights framework and must be 
protected as such. 
256
  See Trebilcock and Howse 572.  A trade-human rights linkage is of greater significance to the extent that efforts 
have been made to ascertain  whether Article XX(a) of the GATT which permits otherwise GATT-inconsistent 
measures necessary to protect public morals might be invoked to justify trade sanctions against products that 
involve the use of child labour or the denial of workers‟ basic rights. In the case of United States-Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services WT/DS285/R, November 10 2004 para 
6.461, the WTO Panel suggested that, “each WTO Member has considerable discretion to determine what 
practices would violate the morale code of the community.” Trebilcock and Howse plausibly conclude that, 
“Based on the panels‟ differential reasoning as to the content of public morals, there is no reason why the content 
of „public morals‟ could not extend to beliefs of the importing country concerning the wrongfulness of 
consuming products produced in a context-either corporate or national-where basic labour rights are not 
respected.” Trebilcock and Howse also noted that the WTO Panel based on dictionary definitions found that, “... 
„public morals‟ concerned the interests of „the community or nation as a whole‟. The nation here is of the 
broadness and generality of the interest concerned, and thus a fortiori the interests of the global community as 
reflected in human rights treaties of erga omnes partes character, would be encompassed by „public morals‟.” 
257
 Article 2 (2) of the ICESCR. See also the ICESCR General Comment No. 13 para 6 (b) and para 57; ICESCR 
General Comment No. 14, paras 6 (b) and 35. For example the right to education or health being affected by 
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rights obligations, the WTO must admit that it is bound to apply the appropriate human rights 
rules and standards, a practice that can be inferred from the position of the WTO in relation to 
international law in general and other specific non-economic concerns.
258
 In general, the WTO 
sees itself as being bound by international law
259
 and the dispute settlement institutions apply 
other sources of international law as a source of interpretation,
260
 in addition to recognizing the 
importance of, for instance, environmental protection in its case-law.  
Therefore, it must perhaps be considered that at least the principle of non-discrimination 
and the minimum core obligations of all human rights, which cannot be derogated from, 
suspended, or otherwise limited constitute part of customary international law that must be 
observed by all WTO members, irrespective of whether they are parties to any human rights 
treaties, and by the WTO as an international organization.
261
 The next chapter sets out a 
theoretical and/or conceptual framework for understanding the trade-labour linkage debate 
within the WTO. The chapter examines legal debates concerning the trade-labour linkage debate.  
The chapter will also explore the debates with respect to the exclusion of the social clause in 
international trade on the basis of its presumed threat to developing nations‟ comparative 
advantage.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
GATS rules if poorer individuals cannot afford schools or health care anymore due to the liberalization of 
educational services, thus leading to discriminatory treatment of parts of the population in relation to those 
rights. 
258
 See the WTO Appellate Body Report regarding environmental protection adopted on 20 May 1996, United 
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2 and WT/DS4 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (accessed 25-10-2011). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Evidence on the Prospects of a Trade-labour Linkage 
 
4 1  INTRODUCTION 
The basis for free trade is the certainty of gaining profits from trade. Economists agree that there 
are gains from trade.
1
 However, in the global era, free trade has increasingly come under heavy 
criticism for its continual association with a lowered compliance with core labour standards, 
mostly, in the interest of quick but short term economic gains especially in developing 
countries.
2
 The appalling conditions of employment under which products for trade are being 
produced such as very long working hours, low wages, dangerous workplaces where 
discrimination and intimidation from the employer and oppression from the state are the rule 
rather than the exception, are fast becoming a cause for concern.
3
 It is therefore not unusual to 
hear skeptics of free trade contending that arguments in favour of free trade and in particular the 
concept of comparative advantage may have been valid in the early 19
th
 century but not in 
today‟s globalized world.4  
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  See Samuelson Economics (1980) 651. Samuelson who was a prominent economist proposed that: “...there is 
essentially only one argument for free trade or freer trade, but it is an exceedingly powerful one, namely: Free 
trade promotes a mutually profitable division of labour, greatly enhances the potential real national product of all 
nations and makes possible higher standards of living all over the globe.” the preamble of the 1947 GATT began 
with a preamble which includes phrases that suggest developmental goals such as, “raising standards of living” 
and “expanding...exchange of goods.” See Jackson The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations (1997) 12. See also World Trade Organisation (WTO) “The Causes of Trade” 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr08-2c_e.pdf (accessed 21-12-2011). 
2
  See Lester, Mercurio and Davies World Trade Law: Texts, Materials and Commentary (2012) 26. Lester et al 
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protection to give their companies time to catch up with those who were more advanced (and they furthermore 
contend that today‟s developed countries are acting badly by trying to take away from poor countries the tools 
they themselves used to develop). These arguments form the basis of the trade-labour linkage debate with 
developing countries insisting on low labour standards as their comparative advantage.” See also Imade “The 
Two Faces of Globalization: Impoverishment or Prosperity?” 
http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v3.1/01_imade.html (accessed 30-01-2012). 
3
  Ibid 27. 
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Developing countries argue that low labour standards are their comparative advantage in 
trade.
5
 They strengthen their argument by making reference to the industrialisation process in the 
Western countries which heavily relied on cheap labour premised on the gross disregard of 
workers‟ rights.6 The disregard of the rights of slaves from developing countries might not have 
impacted negatively on development in the Western countries at that time as it did to developing 
countries. In the global era, workers in developing countries are again the subject of poor 
observance of workers‟ core labour rights as were their ancestors.7 These workers have greatly 
contributed to trade and the profits accruing thereof, yet their development has remained 
minimal.
8
 Could this be a sign that developing countries are taking a wrong approach to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4
  See Lester et al 26. Lester et al observe that whilst the theory of comparative advantage is regarded by some as 
a, “...fine theory...a country‟s comparative advantage is not always something that it is born with (although in 
some cases, such as proximity to natural resources, it is). Rather some kinds of comparative advantage can be 
created. For example efficient production techniques can be learned through practice. In essence the view is that 
protection can give „infant industries‟ time to learn how to operate efficiently, to catch up with established 
competitors.” The point in Lester et al‟s argument is that protectionism can be a plausible strategy to 
development depending on the circumstances prevailing and informing trade in a country.   
5
  See Howse “The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers‟ Rights” 1999 The Journal of Small 
and Emerging Business Law 2. 
6
  See Lo and Jacobson “Human Rights from Field to Fork: Improving Labor Conditions for Food- sector Workers 
by Organizing across Boundaries” http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/racethmulglocon.5.1.61 (accessed 30-01-
2012).  
7
  The use of low labour standards is supported by some economists regardless of its immediate impact on the 
workers in developing countries. Lester et al  observe that some economists contend that: “It is...unquestionably 
correct that developing countries need to be allowed to use instruments which help them overcome the many 
obstacles of backwardness and, especially...the absence of knowledge of what to do-and how to do it-that is an 
essential characteristic of that backwardness. They may use them unwisely from time to time. But they have 
sometimes worked. Sovereign governments should be allowed to take such actions-and if necessary learn from 
their mistakes.”  See Lester et al 43. There is also the view that regardless of the low labour standards and 
productivity characteristic of developing countries, developed countries are largely hypocritical in their treatment 
of developing countries. Lester et al note that developed countries, “...call on developing countries to adjust, 
liberalize and respond to market forces. But this is not advice that the high-income countries themselves adopt. 
Instead, high income-countries force the developing countries to take greater account of their own concerns than 
they themselves do of developing-country concerns.” See Lester et al 44. Furthermore, whilst global markets 
could be good for developing countries, “...the rules according to which they are being asked to play the game 
are often not. Caught between WTO agreements, World Bank structures, IMF conditions, and the need to 
maintain the confidence of financial markets, developing countries are increasingly deprived of the room to 
devise their own paths out of poverty.” See Lester et al 35. It would thus be asked whether the protection of core 
labour standards is also affected by the crisis which the developing countries find themselves in which has led to 
questions as to whether such countries will ever advance. Perhaps it might be time developing countries devised 
their own approach to development which is suitable to them and their people. 
8
  There is overwhelming evidence on the relationship between productivity and wages. This relationship takes into 
account the level of development of the countries. The poor compliance with core labour standards in developing 
countries might be suggestive of inferior productivity levels as compared to high-income countries. See Wolf 
“Traumatized by Trade” in Wolf (ed) Why Globalization Works (2004). He notes that: “...one can be confident 
that the relationship between real wages and productivity per worker will hold: either real wages and 
124 
 
development? Considering the significant role that labour and trade play in ensuring economic 
gains for the world in general as well as the development of Third World countries and their 
people in particular, it is important to analyse legal and economic theories and empirical 
evidence related to trade practices in order to deal with the controversial issue of either including 
or excluding labour standards from multilateral trade agreements. It is crucial to address the 
question whether a lowered compliance with labour standards must be acknowledged as a 
competitive or comparative advantage in human rights driven global era, and if at all it is, to 
whom.
9
 Ascertaining whether such an approach is productive or counter productive may inform 
developing countries of a dynamic route to industrialisation or development.
10
 
This chapter will undertake an evaluation of the importance of legal and economic theories 
and empirical evidence to today‟s global trading environment. Since most trade models are 
designed to answer questions as to what goods countries trade in and why, the main focus of this 
chapter will be on the causes of trade and how patterns of trade are related to compliance or non-
compliance with core labour standards by global trade partners. Such an approach may give 
guidance on whether there is need for an effective regulation of core labour standards in 
multilateral trade agreements or not. According to Van Liemt, the rationale behind incorporating 
a social clause in multilateral trade would be to: 
“...promote fair competition between developing country exporters by ensuring that those 
who respect minimum labour standards are not penalized for their efforts to promote social 
development. For another, it would enable working people to benefit from increased trade. 
Without such a clause increased international competition might lead to a „destructive 
downward spiral in the conditions of work and life of working people all over the world‟. 
Worse, Western countries would be collaborating in the exploitation of workers in Third 
World countries if they failed to press for the adoption of universal minimum labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
productivity per worker will rise slowly for a long time or real wages rise rapidly and so will productivity per 
worker.” 
9
  See Chartes and Mercurio “A Call for an Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Labour: Why and How the 
WTO Should Play a Role in Upholding Core Labour Standards” 2012 North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation 672. Chartes and Mercurio have argued that: “...any comparative advantage 
gained by non-compliance with theses standards (core labour standards) is not an advantage that should be 
shielded or trumped by liberalized trade.” Chartes and Mercurio‟s argument could be deemed radical by 
economists and developing countries as their remarks could be regarded as protectionist. However, should a 
human rights approach be taken in interpreting Chartes and Mercurio‟s argument, proposals for a trade-labour 
linkage in multilateral trade could be viewed as pro-developmental. 
10
  See Lester et al 69. It is accepted that developing countries have particular vulnerabilities and special structural 
difficulties which they are facing in the global era. This calls for innovative and systematic methods to reduce 
developing countries‟ vulnerabilities. Perhaps a trade-labour linkage could be one such route to driving forward 
the development agenda of developing countries.  
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standards. Finally, it is argued that, without a social clause, the pressure for increased 
protectionism would be much harder to resist.”11 
 
Van Liemt‟s view may perhaps assist developing countries to realise that a social clause could be 
a necessary tool to advancing their people‟s interests. However, for one to be able to understand 
how the economic theoretical and empirical evidence relate to labour and trade standards there is 
a need to first appreciate the existing arguments in respect of proposals for a trade-labour 
linkage.  
4 2  KEY ARGUMENTS IN THE TRADE-LABOUR LINKAGE DEBATE 
The proposal for making rights to trade conditional on the promotion of labour standards is one 
that currently stimulates a great deal of disagreement in the global era.
12
 There are so many 
views concerning the issue whether or not to include a social clause in multilateral trade 
agreements. Strong disagreements relating to interpretation and adaptation of a social clause into 
an enforceable trade principle amongst trade partners exist. Such disagreements have been 
advanced on the basis of constant differences in opinions held by developed and developing 
countries. The differences are largely attributed to the differences in the levels of development of 
countries in the world.  
The most notable justifications for linking trade practices to core labour standards have 
been given as the need to avoid social dumping as well as attaining fairness in trade.
13
 This 
would ensure that no partner in a trade agreement obtains competitive or comparative advantage 
from inadequate labour standards.
14
 This view is generally viewed by developing countries as 
part of a western agenda for protectionism.
15
 So prevalent amongst developing countries is the 
view that low labour standards are a competitive advantage that the violation of labour standards 
is now a common feature in trade practices amongst developing countries themselves. Fast 
                                                          
 
11
  See Van Liemt “Minimum Labour Standards and International Trade: Would a Social Clause Work?” 1989 
International Labour Review 434. 
12
  See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) “Trade, Employment and Labour 
Standards: A Study of Core Workers‟ Rights and International Trade Organisation” 
http://www.economia.unimore.it/naghavi_alireza/LIT-OECD-Labor.pdf (accessed 30-01-2012). 
13
  See Tsogas “Labour Standards in International Trade Agreements: An Assessment of the Arguments” 1999 The 
Journal of Human Resource Management 354. 
14
  Ibid. See also Adams and Turner “The Social Dimension of Freer Trade” in Cook and Katz (eds) Regional 
Integration and Industrial Relations in North America (1994) 82.  
15
  See Van Roozendaal Trade Unions and Global Governance: The Debate on a Social Clause (2002) 219. 
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developing countries like China consider lax labour standards as being a central component of 
their trade practices. In January 2012, there were reports of alleged violations of workers‟ rights 
in Chinese-run businesses in Zimbabwe.
16
 A Human Rights Watch report published in 
November 2011 also documented cases of gross violations of labour standards at Chinese-run 
copper mines in Zambia resulting in growing hostility and distrust in Chinese trade practices.
17
  
In South Africa, members of the Newcastle Chinese Chamber of Commerce (NCCC) 
threatened to retrench unskilled workers, shut down factories and relocate to Swaziland and 
Lesotho if a resolution to force clothing factories to comply with the applicable minimum wage 
within 16 months was implemented.
18
 The chairman of the NCCC said the minimum wage, 
which was expected to increase to R336 a week by the end of March before rising to R465 by the 
end of the year 2011 and then topping R516 by April 2012, was not sustainable for members of 
the Chamber.
19
 The Chinese stance comes on the backdrop of the obvious fact that workers in 
the clothing factories are already among the lowest paid workers at the entry level in South 
Africa. It has also been observed that China brings expatriate labour force into countries in which 
they operate with such workers being subjected to the same violations of labour standards as 
locals in the interest of trade gains.
20
 This development shows that the trade-labour linkage 
debate is not only an issue between developed and developing countries but also amongst 
developing countries themselves. This may be a worrisome development as low labour standards 
may be naively referred to as a competitive or comparative advantage by developing countries. 
This may escalate into quick but short lived gains for developing countries with a likelihood of 
potential disappointment in their efforts to industrialise as this chapter will show. 
                                                          
 
16
 See Smith “Workers Blast Chinese Labour Practices” http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-6838-
Workers+blast+Chinese+labour+practices/news.aspx (accessed 03-01-2012). In a recent case reported on the 3
rd
 
of January 2012 in Zimbabwe, Smith makes reference to the gross violation of workers‟ rights by the Chinese. 
Ironically, China is one of the leading so-called developing countries who strongly resist the recognition of a 
social clause in trade agreements. Smith‟s report indicates that the Chinese work in cahoots with „corrupt‟ 
government officials who benefit at the expense of the workers‟ suffering. 
17
  See Human Rights Watch “You‟ll be Fired if You Refuse: Labour Abuses in Zambia‟s Chinese State-owned 
Copper Mines” http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zambia1111ForWebUpload.pdf (accessed 03-11-
2011). In the report, it is stated that, “Trade unions in Zambia have called for action... There are alarming, 
shocking human rights abuses in firms operated by the Chinese. There is empirical evidence... The Chinese are 
physically abusing the workers. They are psychologically terrorising the workers”. 
18
  See Enslin-Payne and Khanyile “Chinese Threaten Job Cuts” http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-
news/chinese-threaten-job-cuts-1.1014358 (accessed 03-11-2011). 
19
  Ibid.  
20
  ILO Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety (1998) 24.9. 
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Perhaps it is time for the world to accept that profit maximisation in trade at the expense 
of workers‟ rights as human rights is now an outdated concept which is not consistent with the 
dominant values of a global era. There might be a need for a change in trade rules as profiteering 
may no longer be considered as the only central economic concept but human and technological 
development too.
21
 It is hoped that such a development may work in the best interests of 
developing countries in their quest to industrialise. The improvement in the recognition of 
workers‟ rights and education levels must be the ideal key contributors to driving the growth 
path of businesses and resulting development in underdeveloped countries.
22
 This approach is 
called the human motivation view
23
 which, as this study contends, is deeply lacking in 
developing countries.  
The human motivation view explains the effects of business owners‟ reaction to the 
performance of their businesses. According to Benzing and Chu, the social and psychological 
motive can significantly influence growth-seeking behaviour and therefore growth of the 
business.
24
 Burke and Hopkins believe that organisations that learn faster on how to implement 
human development will be able to adapt quicker to the changes in the global era and thus avoid 
the economic evolutionary weeding-out process.
25
  
Assuming that developing countries view the promotion of core labour standards as a key 
concept to human motivation, as would the rest of the world, would this not contribute to an 
advanced approach to the need to include a social clause in multilateral trade? The rationale for 
posing this question is that there are studies which have shown that a considerable relationship 
exists between the promotion of workers‟ interests and productivity in businesses. The studies 
sought to establish how workers‟ training impacted on productivity. Batt established that high-
involvement practices such as autonomy, team collaboration, and training tended to reduce 
                                                          
 
21
  See Gilley and Macunich Beyond the Learning Organisation (2000) 142. According to Gilley and Maycunich, 
forces such as globalisation, technological innovation, changing consumer preferences and deregulation are 
thought to be responsible for change initiatives. 
22
  Ibid. 
23
  See Maslow “A Theory of Human Motivation” 1943 Psychological Review 370. Maslow indicated that man is a 
perpetually wanting animal. Thwarting, actual or imminent, of man‟s basic needs provides a psychological threat 
that leads to psychopathy a factor which impacts negatively on development. 
24
  See Benzig and Chu “A Comparison of the Motivations of Small Business Owners in Africa” 2009 Journal of 
Small Business and Enterprise Development 11. 
25
  See Burke and Hopkins Investment in the Education and Training of Adults (2000) 5. 
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employee turnover, resulting in an increase in productivity.
26
 In supporting Batt‟s findings, 
Bradley, Petrescu and Simmons have argued that untrained workers change jobs more often than 
trained workers, a factor which hinders growth.
27
 Mudor and Tookson have also established that 
an increase in high-performance work practices resulted in a decrease in turnover.
28
 Interestingly, 
the concept of low labour standards being a comparative or competitive advantage relies on 
cheap and unskilled labour with little emphasis being placed on their educational development. 
This raises questions as to how development in underdeveloped countries will be attained and 
when. 
 Further analysis of the concept of training at the workplace shows that training programs 
are often targeted because employee turnover is generally higher during times of economic 
uncertainty.
29
 Mudor and Tookson have argued that even in good times, organisations must 
decide how much to invest in employee training, balancing the benefits of increased productivity 
against the costs of training.
30
 An organization with untrained or poorly trained employees runs 
significantly more risk of accidents and injuries, costing the company more money in 
compensation of workers.
31
 Oloyede has argued that human assets grow and increase in value 
and hence by maintaining as well as upgrading employees‟ skills, not only will there be increases 
in productivity but also in commitment and levels of motivation.
32
 Shadare has indicated that 
multinational firms in Nigeria had invested heavily in human resource development programmes 
                                                          
 
26
  See Batt “Managing Customer Services: HR Practices, Quit Rates and Sales Growth” 2002 Academy 
Management Journal 56. 
27
  See Bradley, Petrescu and Simmons “The Impacts of Human Resource Management Practices and Pay 
Inequality on Workers‟ Job Satisfaction” Paper presented at the Western Economic Association 79th Annual 
Conference Vancouver 2004 47. 
28
  See Mudor and Tookson “Conceptual Framework on the Relationship between Human Resource Management 
Practises, Job Satisfaction and Turnover” 2011 Journal of Economics and Behavioural Studies 43. 
29
  Ibid.  
30
  Ibid. 
31
  Mudor and Tookson 43. 
32
  See Oloyede “Diversity in Workers Empowerment for Competitive Advantage in Work Organisation” Paper 
Presented at the National Workshop on Human Resource Development Organized by the Nigeria Institute of 
Personnel Management 2005 38. See also Lester et al 38. Lester et al observed that apart from human capital 
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from a developing country).” 
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to develop their workers‟ talents and skills and had significantly impacted positively on 
employee performance levels as well as organizational productivity.
33
  
Assuming that the same approach is used in addressing the protection of workers‟ in 
trade, would there be economic growth in developing countries? With little interest, if any, being 
channeled towards the protection of workers in trade related matters as much impetus is being 
placed on quick profiteering which pays little regard to the future, it is doubtful if Oloyede and 
Shadare‟ views will be a reality for most developing countries. It is unquestionable that the ethos 
behind trading is to make economic gains but it must also be accepted that this concept must not 
be cast in stone. It is necessary to create a balance between trade and the development of 
countries as well as their people. Supporters of the trade-labour linkage agenda argue that the 
emergence of an increasingly integrated world economy requires an integrated world labour 
market, based on universally applied minimum standards.
34
 Failure to reach this minimum 
standard, they argue, would lead either to a general down-scaling of labour conditions or to 
major job losses in the industrialised countries.
35
 This view may be justified by closely 
monitoring developments surrounding the current Great Recession
36
 and the related economic 
cycles that have impacted the world in the aftermath of the recession.
37
 Almunia et al
38
 have 
compared the severity of the Great Recession with the Great Depression of 1929.
39
 They argued 
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  See Shadare “Influence of Workers‟ Training Programmes on Conflict Reduction in Industrial Organisations in 
Nigeria” 2010 African Journal of Business Management 12. 
34
  Tsogas 354. 
35
  Sengenberger “Restructuring at the Global Level: The Role of International Labour Standards” in Sengenberger 
and Campbell (eds) Creating Economic Opportunities: The Role of Labour Standards in Industrial Restructuring 
(1994) 395. 
36
  WTO and ILO Making Globalisation Socially Sustainable (2011) 85. The origins of the financial crisis lay with 
the excessive expansion of credit by financial institutions in some countries in the 1990s and early part of this 
century. Due to the growth of complex financial derivatives and the global extension of capital markets, it 
became difficult for governments, regulators and the banks themselves to measure the underlying risks 
associated with their loan books. Fears that some institutions were holding large amounts of bad debt led to a 
collapse in the supply of credit as financial institutions tried to rebuild their balance sheets. To remain solvent, 
some had to be recapitalized by their governments jeopardizing public finances. The financial crisis led to a rapid 
contraction of demand.  
37
  Ibid. There was a sharp reduction in the availability of trade finance. Banks and suppliers reported that lack of 
finance was the second major cause of the collapse in trade. However, trade finance recovered rapidly, partly as 
a result of the US$ 250 billion additional financing announced at the April 2009 G20 meeting. 
38
 See Almunia, Benetrix, Eichengreen, O‟Rourke and Rua From Great Depression to Great Credit Crisis: 
Similarities, Differences and Lessons (2009) 15. 
39
  Ibid 20. 
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that trade flows fell faster in the Great Recession than they did during the Great Depression.
40
 
The declines in trade across countries were more coordinated that by the end of 2008, more than 
90 per cent of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
had experienced a decline in trade exceeding 10 per cent.
41
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the ILO indicate that employers in different 
countries have responded in a variety of ways to a fall in product demand.
42
 This has depended 
on the nature of employment contracts, human capital investment, the existing policy 
environment and any changes introduced specifically to combat the recession.
43
 Employees‟ 
responses have also depended on the nature of their contracts, joint investment in human capital 
and on their valuation of the next best alternative to employment.
44
 The simple conclusion from 
the WTO and ILO perspective is that the lesser the value that is attached to a worker, the lesser 
the options that are available to such a worker to cushion them from the hardships associated 
with globalisation.
45
 Elsby et al have argued that a rapid fall in employment in the United States 
(US) during 2009 was associated with a surge in productivity, causing a breakdown of Okun‟s 
Law.
46
 In economics, Okun‟s law is an empirically observed relationship relating unemployment 
to losses in a country‟s production.47  
The “gap version” in Okun‟s law states that for every 1% increase in the unemployment 
rate, a country‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be roughly 2% lower than its potential 
GDP.
48
 The breakdown of Okun‟s law is consistent with firms using recessions as an opportunity 
to enhance efficiency but is clearly not consistent with the view that productivity is procyclical.
49
 
Bauer and Shenk argue that in eight of the last nine global economic downturns, US productivity 
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  See Knotek “How Useful Is Okun‟s Law” 2007 Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Fourth 
Quarter 73. 
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See also Koenders and Rogerson “Organisational Dynamics over the Business Cycle: A View on Jobless 
Recoveries” 2005 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 555. 
131 
 
fell due to labour-hoarding behaviour by firms.
50
 Reich suggests that a possible explanation of 
the very rapid decline in employment is that the willingness of US employers to accumulate 
labour has fallen.
51
 During the downturn, employers were shedding workers more rapidly than 
reducing their output, leading to short-term productivity gains.
52
 At the same time, investment 
was falling, limiting the potential for further productivity growth.
53
 Is the experience in the US a 
classical example of what developing countries are likely to face if they do not seriously revise 
their policies concerning their attitude to workers‟ rights and interests in trade-related matters?  
Opponents of a trade-labour linkage argue that low labour standards do not necessarily 
translate into low wages and even if they did, competitiveness does not necessarily depend on 
low wages or weak labour standards.
54
 If low labour standards are indeed the source of any 
competitive advantage, then they should be correlated with low labour costs.
55
 Bhagwati 
contends that raising labour standards in some cases would only imply minor increases in labour 
costs and thus in total production costs.
56
 The ILO has reported that as far as workers‟ safety 
standards are concerned, a stricter observance of existing regulations or the introduction of more 
stringent labour standards may indeed lead to cost savings, contrary to the views held by those 
who resist the inclusion of a social clause in multilateral trade agreements.
57
 In this connection, 
the ILO noted that: 
“In fact, one needs to consider not only the cost of repairs to installations and equipment, 
financial compensation to the worker involved and/or the necessity of providing benefits in 
kind in the form of medical care or medicines, but also more indirect burdens such as 
possible disruptions in supply or low capacity utilization due to workers‟ absence, also the 
necessity to retrain replacement employees and the possibility that a firm with a bad 
reputation for safety may become unable to attract good and productive employees.”58 
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Implementing labour standards in trade would thus not be merely regarded as an economic issue 
but also a concept having important cultural and social implications that need to be taken into 
careful consideration. It is necessary to discuss some of the issues raised by opponents of a trade-
labour linkage which may have an effect on the cultural and social structure of any country to 
establish whether the inclusion of a social clause in multilateral trade agreements is justified or 
not.  
4 2 1  A trade-labour linkage is self-defeating or inconsequential 
The anti-protectionist argument advanced by opponents of a trade-labour-linkage includes the 
claim that a trade-labour linkage will either be insignificant or that it will go wrong and have the 
opposite of its intended effect of improving the social levels of underprivileged persons in the 
world.
59
 Whilst acknowledging that a trade-labour linkage is well intentioned, this group 
nevertheless proceeds to argue that it will hurt those it is meant to help.
60
 They also argue that 
countries will opportunistically misuse the possibilities for restricting imports provided by a 
trade-labour linkage in order to protect their domestic producers and harm those in other 
countries.
61
 In particular, influential interests such as labour unions and employers in some 
industries in developed countries would benefit from reduced competition from countries with 
low-cost labour and therefore press for such opportunistic misuse.
62
 The resultant effect would 
be that opportunities to trade available to poor countries will diminish.
63
 Furthermore, this group 
contends that the world trading system will gradually become subordinated to powerful interests, 
and gains from trade will contract.
64
 The trade-labour linkage agenda will be used as an excuse 
to limit the access of developing country exporters to developed country markets through the 
imposition of tariffs or quotas or impose cost-raising improvements to labour standards that will 
diminish the income of developing countries, since they will reduce their gains from trade by 
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interfering with the basis of those gains, namely the reallocation of production according to 
comparative advantage.
65
 
The opponents of a trade-labour linkage also argue that it will have an insignificant effect 
on the living standards and working conditions of most workers because of its limited reach.
66
 
They argue that a trade-labour linkage will only affect export-producing sectors, which may 
account for only a small fraction of the labour force in most developing countries.
67
 They also 
believe that a trade-labour linkage is likely to have a negligible or negative impact on the 
working conditions, employment, and wages of many workers in export production.
68
 Such a 
development will thus allegedly most likely drive bad practices in export oriented production out 
of sight rather than out of existence.
69
 
Opponents of a trade-labour linkage argue that the imposition of labour standards will 
cause a reduction of employment.
70
 As a result, the living conditions of displaced workers would 
worsen since they will either become unemployed or will be employed in sectors with 
employment conditions that are no better and possibly worse than those they formerly enjoyed.
71
 
Also, a trade-labour linkage as the opponents proceed to argue could increase relative 
inequalities in working conditions or in command over resources, creating a “labour 
aristocracy”.72 This may be undesirable under certain interpretations of the objective.73 In 
particular, it will be undesirable according to those views which hold that the level of advantage 
is directly or indirectly influenced by the extent of inequalities for example, in working 
conditions or command over resources.
74
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Lastly, opponents of the trade-labour linkage have also argued that introducing labour 
standards in trade reduces the advantages of individuals by impeding them from entering into 
contracts through which they expect to enhance their wellbeing.
75
 For example, Srinivasan has 
argued that: 
“Parents would allow their children to be employed in their own economic enterprise or as 
wage workers only if, given their market and non-market constraints, family welfare is 
enhanced by the use of children‟s time in such employment rather than in other activities, 
including being in school. Thus proscription of such labour, if strictly enforced without 
compensation, would lower family welfare of those who are already desperately poor.”76  
 
What is lacking though from this view is what the impact of low labour standards would do in 
future to developing countries. For now, people in developing countries are clinging to the little 
that is there but is that little sustainable into the future? Could we say that the current situation is 
an indication of the complexity of the issue at hand or the existence of other underlying issues? 
Possible answers to this question will be given later in this chapter. The opponents of a trade-
labour linkage also advance another argument to the effect that a trade-labour linkage proposal is 
an inferior means of achieving the goals it aims to achieve.  
4 2 2  Trade-labour linkage as an inferior means of protecting labour standards 
It is sometimes argued that there are superior means of achieving the goals of a trade-labour 
linkage.
77
 Such arguments do not entail a denial that a trade-labour linkage may achieve its 
objectives but rather involve an insistence that there are other, better means of achieving them.
78
 
In particular, opponents of a trade-labour linkage claim that alternative approaches perform at 
least as well as linkage in promoting the ultimate ends of improved labour standards and 
improved levels of advantage for the globally less privileged.
79
 Examples of alternative 
approaches include moral persuasion to bring about voluntary compliance with ILO standards.
80
 
Critics of a trade-labour linkage claim that they and other trade-labour linkage opponents are 
concerned with the promotion of two distinct objectives which are, maximizing the gains from 
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trade and reducing disadvantage by promoting improved labour standards as well as higher 
employment.
81
  
The best approach for achieving these goals, they contend, would be to dedicate an 
independent institution to pursue each one of them.
82
 They argue that, at the international level, 
the concerns of workers are best served by promoting them through an independent agency, such 
as the ILO, rather than by confusing the mandate of the WTO which is presently charged with 
fostering the growth of world output through trade by charging it additionally with promoting 
labour standards.
83
 However, this approach does not address how instances of the overlapping 
functions of these two institutions will be dealt with. The approach ignores the fact that the ILO 
lacks jurisdiction in trade matters. It also ignores the fact that the WTO has been instrumental in 
environmental and agricultural issues related to trade.
84
 The WTO environment is not static. It 
has development as one of its key agendas. Labour standards are a key feature of trade practices 
and are crucial to the development of any society. In that sense, the WTO in the global context 
may assume a role concerning labour matters as it has done in agricultural and environmental 
issues. In the global era, it must be borne in mind that organisations are fast becoming 
multidisciplinary with the WTO not being an exception. The existence of a joint WTO and ILO 
Committee to try and address challenges posed by globalisation bears testimony to this 
contention.
85
 Opponents of a trade-labour linkage also argue that a social clause could lead to an 
unfair distribution of burdens.  
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4 2 3  Trade-labour linkage and unfair distribution of burdens 
As already noted in this chapter, opponents of a trade-labour linkage argue that a loss of jobs 
caused by the imposition of labour standards in trade is likely to harm most those persons who 
are most in need, such as poor children, women, and men.
86
 It is bad that less advantaged persons 
throughout the world, those that a trade-labour linkage is intended to help will disproportionately 
bear the burdens imposed by such linkage.
87
 The imposition of labour standards is likely to 
create a loss of livelihood and perhaps even of lives in developing countries, while consumers in 
developed countries will likely experience only a relatively small increase in prices.
88
 
Opponents of a trade-labour linkage also argue that such a linkage would arbitrarily and 
unfairly target only some of the sectors and firms in developing countries that practice poor 
labour standards.
89
 In particular, only export producing firms belonging to the formal sector and 
therefore effectively subject to state regulation will be directly targeted, despite others being 
equally or more guilty of seriously objectionable labour practices.
90
 It is argued that the so-called 
violations of labour standards may occur for morally justified reasons, in which case penalizing 
violators of labour standards would be unfair.
91
 In particular, employers who violate labour 
standards are in fact offering exploited workers the opportunity to improve their life 
circumstances.
92
 Given the difficult background conditions faced by these workers, it is alleged 
that employers act well by offering them work, and deserve credit rather than punishment.
93
 It 
has been suggested in this vein that labour standards violations may be morally justified because 
such violations may enable some agent to fulfill moral obligations to other agents or that it may 
help him or her further other ends which he or she has reason to value.
94
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For example, by being inattentive to labour standards an employer may be able to hire 
more employees than otherwise, or realize profits which ultimately generate benefits for poorer 
persons, by enabling voluntary transfers to such persons to be increased or by augmenting the 
demand for domestic goods and services produced by employing such persons.
95
 Disregard for 
labour standards could also enable an employer to increase the amount of goods produced.
96
 The 
employer may be able to pursue other ends that he or she has reason to value, such as providing 
his or her children with a sound education.
97
 It may be argued that an employer can plead some 
justification for his or her indifference to labour standards if the good that is produced by that 
indifference is significant.
98
 In practice, the regrettable necessity to “do bad in order to do well” 
may arise due to competitive pressures.
99
 A factory owner in a developing country, for example, 
may be compelled to disregard labour standards in order to compete effectively with other firms 
that do the same.
100
 Moral dilemmas of this kind are prevalent in the contemporary world, and 
are frequently unavoidable.
101
 However it is necessary to address whether such moral dilemmas 
are suitable for the future economic growth of developing countries and if not what course of 
action must be taken to address these dilemmas. Another argument advanced by opponents of a 
trade-labour linkage is that it is politically imperialistic and context-blind.  
4 2 4  Trade-labour linkage is politically imperialistic and context-blind 
There are two senses in which it is widely argued that a trade-labour linkage is context-blind. 
First, opponents of a trade-labour linkage argue that it ostensibly prevents a country from 
choosing policies that appropriately reflect its level of development.
102
 Such a view would mean 
that the urgency of improving the living standards of people in poor countries requires that 
priority be given to rapid development, even though this may lead to the violation of labour 
standards.
103
 The narrower objective of promoting basic labour standards for those who are 
employed will in this case allegedly conflict with the broader objective of improving the level of 
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advantage of less advantaged persons more generally.
104
 The implicit premise of the argument is 
that the gain in attaining the latter objective justifies the loss in not attaining the former.
105
 
Although regrettable, such violations would thus be viewed as a necessary evil. 
 Two distinct reasons are offered by opponents of a trade-labour linkage for prioritizing 
development over promotion of labour standards. First, the premature imposition of labour 
standards can act as an obstacle to the development process.
106
 It may even be that development 
can only take place through the „violation‟ of „labour standards.‟107 The fact that even so-called 
„basic‟ labour standards were widely violated in factories during the European industrial 
revolution is well known.
108
 Second, the importance that is attached by the citizens of a country 
to labour standards may change as their country develops.
109
 Fulfilment of labour standards may 
be a “luxury good,” for which the intensity of the preference increases with income.110 It is 
asserted that to fail to respect the preferences that individuals have for themselves is to act 
paternalistically, imposing the preferences of the currently rich on those who are currently 
poor.
111
 It is claimed that endorsing universal human rights is wholly compatible with insisting 
that the weight attached to the improvement of labour standards relative to other goals such as 
the fulfilment of other rights, or the improvement of aggregate welfare should vary with 
context.
112
 Such critics claim that whereas opponents of a trade-labour linkage are context-
sensitive proponents of human rights, proponents of a trade-labour linkage are (at best) context 
insensitive proponents of human rights and (at worst) context-insensitive proponents of 
satisfying the preferences of the rich.
113
  
Another sense in which a trade-labour linkage is said to be context-insensitive is that it is 
a form of cultural imperialism. It is alleged to unfairly impose a moral vision that is specific to a 
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single cultural sphere.
114
 It is asserted that even when stated at a high level of generality, any set 
of purportedly “basic” labour standards, such as the „core‟ labour standards defined by the ILO, 
is culturally specific.
115
 This objection challenges the very idea that there is a universally binding 
set of standards, since by definition such standards are not culturally specific. 
It is argued that these standards are influential merely because great importance is 
attached to them in the developed countries, many of which happen to share a specific cultural 
tradition.
116
 Such critics claim that there is no universally acceptable rationale that can be 
provided for any given set of basic labour standards, nor is it possible to develop an “overlapping 
consensus” among different parties who might be imagined to have distinct rationales for 
accepting these standards in favour of accepting such standards.
117
 Even if it is agreed that there 
are some basic standards, stated in an adequately general way, that are universally relevant, these 
must be defined further in order to be practically applied.
118
 But this further step cannot be taken; 
it is therefore maintained, without appealing to the preconceptions and priorities of a specific 
culture.
119
 Detailed interpretations of standards are thus likely to conflict.
120
 Indeed, it is 
sometimes asserted that the practices that constitute so-called “violations of labour standards” are 
in fact sometimes an integral part of traditional family and work life in certain societies.
121
 It is 
suggested, for example, that “child labour” can offer a humane and effective form of teaching 
and apprenticeship.
122
 The imposition of „basic labour standards‟ in such a situation is alleged 
therefore to amount to nothing less than cultural imperialism.
123
  
 Lastly, it is argued that linkage is a form of political imperialism. State sovereignty 
guarantees the right of the citizens of a country to choose their domestic institutions and policies, 
including the organization of work and production.
124
 It is argued that linkage significantly limits 
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such rights and is therefore a violation of state sovereignty.
125
 Whether these arguments are 
justifiable or not is a matter which an analysis of theoretical views and empirical evidence 
advanced on the subject may address. As has been observed, most of the arguments made by 
opponents of a trade-labour linkage relate to labour standards giving a competitive or 
comparative advantage to poor countries. The arguments also centre on the concept of a social 
clause being part of a protectionist agenda of western countries. 
  
4 3  ECONOMIC THEORIES CONCERNING LABOUR MARKET FUNCTIONS AND 
TRADE 
 
4 3 1  Comparative advantage 
Opponents of a trade-labour linkage have largely centred most of their arguments on the view 
that low labour standards are a source of comparative advantage for developing countries. The 
theory of comparative advantage was first advanced by Ricardo in 1817.
126
 In illustrating the 
concept of comparative advantage, Ricardo used the example of England and Portugal.  Portugal 
could produce both wine and cloth with less labour than England could produce the same 
goods.
127
 However the relative costs of producing wine and cloth were different in Portugal and 
England.
128
 England found it very hard to produce wine, and only moderately difficult to produce 
cloth.
129
 In Portugal, both products were easy to produce. Therefore, Ricardo concluded that 
while it was cheaper to produce cloth in Portugal than England, it was cheaper still for Portugal 
to produce excess wine, and trade that for English cloth.
130
 Conversely, England could also 
benefit from this trade because the cost for producing cloth did not change but it could get wine 
at a lower price, closer to the cost of cloth.
131
 The conclusion drawn was that each country could 
gain by specializing in the good where it has comparative advantage, and trading that good for 
the other.
132
 Ricardo explicitly based his argument on an assumed immobility of capital and 
stated that: 
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“ ... if capital freely flowed towards those countries where it could be most profitably 
employed, there could be no difference in the rate of profit, and no other difference in the 
real or labour price of commodities, than the additional quantity of labour required to 
convey them to the various markets where they were to be sold.”133  
However, from a development economics perspective, the theory of comparative advantage, and 
the deduction that nations should specialize, has been subject to some criticism.
134
 Such criticism 
has been necessitated by the formulation of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) theory 
of development economics.
135
 The ISI has been applied to many developing countries of the 
world, especially in Latin America, where it was implemented with the intention of such 
countries becoming more self-sufficient and less vulnerable by creating jobs and relying less on 
other nations.
136
 The ISI is based primarily on the internal market.
137
 It works by having the state 
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leading economic development through nationalization, subsidization of vital industries 
including agriculture, power generation, increased taxation to fund development programmes 
and a highly protectionist trade policy.
138
 Even though ISI is a development theory, its political 
implementation and theoretical rationale are rooted in trade theory.
139
 It has been argued that all 
or virtually all nations that have industrialized have followed the ISI.
140
  
Korean economist Chang has argued, based on economic history, that all major 
developed countries, including the United Kingdom (UK), used interventionist economic policies 
to promote industrialization.
141
 They protected their national companies until they had reached a 
level of development in which they were able to compete in the global market, after which those 
countries adopted free market discourses.
142
 These free market discourses were directed at other 
countries to achieve two objectives, open their markets to foreign products and prevent them 
from adopting the same development strategies that led to the developed nations‟ 
industrialization.
143
 Chang then criticized the comparative advantage principle, contending that it 
may have helped developed countries to maintain relatively advanced technology and industry 
compared to developing countries.
144
 Chang has argued that all major developed countries used 
interventionist, protectionist economic policies in order to get rich and then tried to forbid other 
countries from doing the same.
145
 Chang asserts that premature free trade has been one of the 
fundamental obstacles to the alleviation of poverty in the developing world.
146
 Asian countries 
such as South Korea, Japan and China have utilized protectionist economic policies in their 
economic development. However, most developing countries have not realized this. They have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
136
  See Baer “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations”1972 
Latin American Research Review 95. 
137
  Ibid. 
138
  Ibid. 
139
  Ibid. 
140
 Baer 96. 
141
 See Chang Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (2002) 31. 
142
  Baer 96. 
143
  Baer 96. 
144
  Chang 32. 
145
  Ibid. Chang makes the following statement: “For example, according to the comparative advantage principle, 
developing countries with a comparative advantage in agriculture should continue to specialize in agriculture and 
import high-technology widgets from developed countries with a comparative advantage in high technology. In 
the long run, developing countries would lag behind developed countries, and polarization of wealth would set 
in.” 
146
  Ibid. 
143 
 
resisted the ISI as they want to follow the western countries‟ path to industrialization including 
the violation of the core labour standards of their workers which may not be profitable as this 
chapter will show. 
 
 
The major unifying basis of the ISI can thus be described as an attempt to reduce foreign 
dependency of a country‟s economy through local production of industrialized products, whether 
through national or foreign investment, for domestic or foreign consumption.
147
 It should be 
noted, as well, that import substitution does not mean import elimination due to the fact that as a 
country industrializes, it begins to import other kinds of goods which become necessary for its 
industry, such as petroleum, chemicals, and the raw materials it may lack.
148
 The real objective 
of import substitution is therefore not to eliminate trade but to lift it to a higher stage, that of 
exporting value-added products, not as susceptible to economic fluctuations as raw materials, 
according to the Singer and Prebisch thesis.
149
  
The Singer and Prebisch thesis provides that specialization in primary commodities, 
combined with a relatively slow rate of technical progress in the primary sector and an adverse 
trend in the commodity terms of trade, had caused developing economies to lag behind the 
industrialized world.
150
 Reference to the views of Singer and Prebisch has been necessitated by 
development economists who have long debated whether developing countries should be as 
specialized as they are in the production and export of primary commodities for trade 
purposes.
151
 They rested their case on three facts: first, that developing countries were indeed 
highly specialized in the production and export of primary commodities; second, that technical 
progress was concentrated mainly in industry; and third, that the relative price of primary 
commodities relative to manufactures had fallen steadily since the late 19th Century.
152
 Together 
these facts suggested that, because of their specialization in primary commodities, developing 
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countries had obtained little benefit from industrial technical progress, either directly, through 
higher productivity, or indirectly, through improved terms of trade.
153
 
The major advantages claimed for ISI include increases in domestic employment 
(reducing dependence on labour non-intensive industries such as raw resource extraction and 
export); resilience in the face of global economic shocks (such as recessions and depressions); 
less long-distance transportation of goods (and concomitant fuel consumption and greenhouse 
gas and other emissions).
154
 However, a disadvantage claimed for the ISI is that the industries 
that it creates are inefficient and obsolete as they are not exposed to internationally competitive 
industries, which constitute their rivals, and that the focus on industrial development 
impoverishes local commodity producers, who are primarily rural.
155
 To address the limitations 
of the ISI and comparative advantage theories, the absolute advantage theory was developed. 
The economist Paul Craig Roberts notes that the comparative advantage principles 
developed by Ricardo do not hold where the factors of production are internationally mobile.
156
 
Limitations to the theory may exist if there is a single kind of utility.
157
 Yet the human need for 
food and shelter already indicates that multiple utilities are present in human desire.
158
 The 
moment the model expands from one good to multiple goods, the absolute may turn to a 
comparative advantage.
159
 The opportunity cost of a forgone tax base may outweigh perceived 
gains, especially where the presence of artificial currency pegs and manipulations distort trade.
160
 
Much has been written since Ricardo‟s comparative advantage theory was advanced as 
commerce has evolved and cross-border trade has become more complicated. Today trade policy 
tends to focus more on free mobility of capital in a globalized world.
161
 Some scholars, notably 
Herman Daly, an American ecological economist and professor at the School of Public Policy of 
the University of Maryland, have voiced concern over the applicability of Ricardo‟s theory of 
comparative advantage in light of the increase in the mobility of capital: “International trade 
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(governed by comparative advantage) becomes, with the introduction of free capital mobility, 
interregional trade (governed by absolute advantage)”.162  
4 3 2  Absolute advantage 
In economics, the principle of absolute advantage refers to the ability of a party (an individual, or 
firm, or country) to produce more of a good or service than competitors, using the same amount 
of resources.
163
 Adam Smith first described the principle of absolute advantage in the context of 
international trade, using labour as the only input.
164
 Since absolute advantage is determined by a 
simple comparison of labour productivities, it is possible for a party not to have absolute 
advantage in anything;
165
 in that case, according to the theory of absolute advantage, no trade 
will occur with the other party.
166
 It can be contrasted with the concept of comparative advantage 
which refers to the ability to produce a particular good at a lower opportunity cost. 
Adam Smith has argued that it was impossible for all nations to become rich 
simultaneously by following mercantilism because the export of one nation is another nation‟s 
import and instead stated that all nations would gain simultaneously if they practiced free trade 
and specialized in accordance with their absolute advantage.
167
 Adam Smith also stated that the 
wealth of nations depended upon the goods and services available to their citizens, rather than 
their gold reserves.
168
 While there are possible gains from trade with absolute advantage, the 
gains may not be mutually beneficial.
169
 Comparative advantage is the concept that focuses on 
the range of possible mutually beneficial exchanges.
170
 However, as already indicated in this 
chapter, the theory of comparative advantage has its limitations. An attempt to address these 
limitations apart from resulting in the ISI and absolute advantage theories also led to the 
formulation of the competitive advantage theory. 
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4 3 3  Competitive advantage 
Competitive advantage is based on the theory that seeks to address some of the criticisms of the 
idea of a comparative advantage.
171
 Michael Porter proposed the theory in 1985. The competitive 
advantage theory suggests that states and businesses should pursue policies that create high-
quality goods that can be sold at high prices in the market.
172
 Porter emphasizes productivity 
growth as the focus of national strategies.
173
 Competitive advantage rests on the notion that 
cheap labour is ubiquitous and natural resources are not necessary for a good economy.
174
 On the 
other hand, the comparative advantage theory could lead countries to specialize in exporting 
primary goods and raw materials that trap countries in low-wage economies due to terms of 
trade.
175
 Competitive advantage attempts to correct this by stressing maximizing scale economies 
in goods and services that garner premium prices.
176
 
Competitive advantage occurs when an organization acquires or develops an attribute or 
combination of attributes that allows it to outperform its competitors.
177
 These attributes can 
include access to natural resources, such as high grade ores or inexpensive power, or access to 
highly trained and skilled personnel or human resources.
178
 The term competitive advantage is 
the ability gained through attributes and resources to perform at a higher level than others in the 
same industry or market.
179
 The study of such advantage has attracted profound research interest 
due to contemporary issues regarding superior performance levels of firms in the present 
competitive market conditions. A firm is said to have a competitive advantage when it is 
implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or 
potential player.
180
 Successfully implemented strategies will lift a firm to superior performance 
by providing the firm with competitive advantage to outperform current or potential players.
181
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To gain competitive advantage the business strategy of a firm manipulates the various resources 
over which it has direct control and these resources have the ability to generate competitive 
advantage.
182
 Superior performance outcomes and superiority in production resources reflects 
competitive advantage.
183
 
The above writings signify competitive advantage as the ability to stay ahead of present 
or potential competition, thus superior performance reached through competitive advantage will 
ensure market leadership.
184
 Also, it provides the understanding that resources held by a firm and 
the business strategy employed will have a profound impact on generating competitive 
advantage.
185
 Business strategy is the tool that manipulates the resources and creates competitive 
advantage hence viable business strategy may not be adequate unless it possesses control over 
unique resources that have the ability to create such a unique advantage.
186
 Summarizing the 
view points, competitive advantage is a key determinant of superior performance and it will 
ensure survival as well as prominent placing in the market. Superior performance being the 
ultimate desired goal of a firm, competitive advantage becomes the foundation highlighting the 
significant importance of developing the same.
187
 
The analysis of the competitive advantage theory thus leaves the critical question of 
whether or not low labour standards can give a competitive advantage. Tsogas established that 
there is no empirical evidence either refuting or proving that lax workers‟ rights lead to a 
competitive advantage.
188
 As far back as 1996, an OECD report made a critical assessment of the 
possible impact of differences in labour rights on international trade and foreign investment 
flows.
189
 The conclusion of this exercise was that it is impossible to prove the existence of an 
empirical link between labour standards and overall trade performance or foreign investment.
190
 
Tsogas in view of this conclusion stated that: 
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“Contrary to what is thought by those who subscribe to the unfair competition view, failure 
to observe core labour standards can hamper a country‟s economic efficiency and the 
growth of its exports. Exploitation of labour and discrimination in employment are liable to 
perpetuate an inefficient economic situation over the long term. Child labour exploitation, 
for example, hinders the development of human capital and thus retards productivity gains. 
Discrimination in employment results in situations in which certain workers are not 
employed in the positions where they would be most productive. And the lack of freedom 
of association undoubtedly makes it more difficult to introduce modern methods of human-
resource management and generates an unstable social climate which does not encourage 
productive investment. It follows, therefore, that countries with low standards can 
strengthen them without having an adverse impact on their long-term economic 
development.”191 
 
Tsogas‟ conclusion seems to suggest that the protection of labour standards in trade related 
matters poses no harm to any country, developing or developed.  
Another argument that has been advanced concerning the trade-labour linkage debate is 
that of the correlation between lax labour standards and low wages. Assuming a correlation 
between lax labour standards and low wages could be established, Tsogas notes that 
competitiveness does not at all depend solely on low wages. Tsogas observed the following: 
“Much of the difference in wages is simply the result of differences in labour productivity, 
in turn resulting from differences in educational standards, availability and reliability of 
infrastructure, communication services, technology....”192 
 
The issue of wages is clearly a critical point of conflict concerning the debate over a social 
clause in multilateral trade. This is why countries like China vehemently resist the inclusion of a 
social clause in trade. Developing countries‟ governments view low wages as being a legitimate 
comparative advantage.
193
 However, Tsogas indicates that: 
“...proponents of a trade-labour linkage claim that it is not low wages that create unfair 
trade. It is the combination of low wages and possibly other poor working conditions such 
as unhealthy and dangerous working environments, with high productivity...coupled with 
the suppression of basic worker rights...by authoritarian regimes that create cut-throat 
competition.”194 
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In 1985, Zachary observed that,  
“It is not countries in general that are to be blamed but rather actions and policies 
generated by Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and local political and economic elites; 
they acknowledge that countries do not trade, firms do.”195  
If the views held by Tsogas and Zachary are accepted as correct, it may be proper to conclude 
that the resistance to a social clause is a planned agenda by a few world elites among whom are 
leaders of developing countries. Perhaps the benefits they receive are far greater than the genuine 
interests to develop their countries and resultantly ensure the social protection of their peoples.
196
  
Clearly problems emanating from trade and related to labour standards are not exclusive 
to developing countries. There is undisputed evidence that trade is a source of unemployment 
and declining wages, particularly for low-skilled young males in developed countries.
197
 It may 
therefore not be prudent for developing countries to resist measures which will in the long run 
develop their communities in favour of trade practices which will give them a few dollars today 
but economic downturns and aggravated poverty tomorrow. The views of the neo-
Institutionalists and neo-Keynesian economists support this assertion.  
4 3 4 Neo-institutionalist and neo-Keynesian economists 
The neo-Institutionalist and Neo-Keynesian economists regard labour standards as a critical tool 
which may influence the social progress of development rather than promoting lax labour 
standards.
198
 They emphasize the importance of structural and historical developments as well as 
government mediation in the labour-relation processes.
199
 Banuri indicates that: 
“...the objective of government policy is neither to promote economic growth, not create a 
free market, nor to protect some interests and destroy others, nor even to plan or run the 
entire economy. Rather the objective is to create an environment in which people (or 
groups) who need to cooperate with each other despite mutually conflicting or 
incompatible interests can forge credible and enforceable compromises with each other. It 
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means the management of conflict, not the elimination of conflict, and not even the 
postponement of conflict.”200 
 
Hezernberg also commented concerning the role of a government in developing the levels of 
protection of labour standards. He stated that: 
“Labour standards do not inevitably improve as a reflection of individual preferences when 
income grows. Instead, organized political action is often necessary to bring about 
substantial changes in labour market rules and outcomes. In most OECD countries, for 
example, expanded worker rights and social welfare policy emerged following the 
strengthening of the labour movement after depression.”201 
 
The neo-Institutionalist also addressed the issue of whether low wages promote development. 
They sought to address the issue of whether low labour costs as a result of low wages and sub-
standard conditions of employment help in the creation of jobs in developing countries. 
Advocates for the trade-labour linkage debate observe that the majority of workers in developing 
countries working in export-oriented firms were employed in unskilled jobs.
202
 In such sectors, 
employers do not provide any training and offer no upward mobility possibilities.
203
 Oloyede and 
Shadare, as already discussed in this chapter, established the significance of education and on the 
job training on the future development of businesses and countries. Tsogas notes that cheap 
unskilled labour can be easily replaced or complemented when production requirements 
increase.
204
 Subsistence wages are inadequate for savings and often are below or near the poverty 
datum line.
205
 Could such a scenario lead to any form of development? 
In 2012, South Africa approved the entry wage in the clothing industry in the Western 
Cape at a miserly R700 in a bid to compete with China for the production of clothing and to 
ensure employment creation. This amount is way below the poverty datum line. It brings into 
mind the developments in the 1990s in Indonesia when Nike shoe-manufacturing company 
employed more than thirty thousand workers in Jakarta to produce athletics shoes for export to 
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the US and elsewhere.
206
 In 1994, the minimum wage of $2.25 for the workers remained 20% 
below the poverty datum line for the country. Labour activists tried to address this matter but 
could not succeed as Indonesia is a country where human rights violations of labour activists are 
all too frequent.
207
 The perpetrator of such violence upon labour activists and workers in 
developing countries is always the government through its state instruments such as the police.
208
 
This raises a crucial question of how much the developing countries benefit from labour 
violations in trade to the extent of silencing any critics of such a practice. It should be 
acknowledged that most trade practices in developing countries are implemented by 
multinational companies. As such, it would also be proper to enquire whether foreign direct 
investment and factories such as the Nike in Indonesia do benefit developing countries in 
anyway.  
 Tsogas notes that proponents of a trade-labour linkage indicate that machinery, 
technology, most raw material and know-how are imported.
209
 Profits are in most instances 
repatriated, often tax-free.
210
 Tsogas also raised an important observation: 
“Corporations can easily move out when labour costs become cheaper somewhere else and 
the incentives better. What remains for the country is „a-few-dollars-a-day‟ wages for the 
impoverished, unskilled workers but big profits for the local political and economic elites: 
the sweat-shop owners and subcontractors of the TNCs, the latter‟s host country managers, 
the corrupt authorities and the bribed politicians, and company or government trade 
unionists (if they exist).”211 
 
The above clearly indicates that violations of labour standards in trade might not be wholly 
beneficial to developing countries after all. If anything, it maybe the western countries from 
which the multinational companies originate who benefit from the repatriated profits. China has 
shown South Africa that if lax labour standards are not made a primary feature of trade, they will 
relocate to other desperate developing countries such as Lesotho and Swaziland which are eager 
to subject their people to sub-minimum wages in order to subdue unrest over demands for jobs. 
Most of this joblessness would have come up as a result of poor government policies concerning 
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job creation and alleviation of poverty. In most instances, the abuse of state funds may be at the 
centre of such a crisis. It is no wonder that countries such as Zimbabwe have come up with the 
nationalization legislation, a key feature of the ISI, to try to protect their national resources and 
to ensure that trade benefits Zimbabweans and not western countries. However, the careless 
over-reliance on the Chinese in their Look-East Policy may just undo all their good intentions as 
the Chinese have a poor record of protecting labour standards and have questionable trade 
practices as has already been alluded to in this chapter. There have been calls for South Africa to 
follow suit, albeit in a different way from the chaotic and haphazard approach to a noble cause, 
which was taken by Zimbabwe.  
As already indicated, most developing countries resisted the ISI, which could have been 
their ideal tool to industrialization as opposed to the violation of labour standards in trade 
practices. The ISI was advanced to disprove the theory of the comparative advantage. Perhaps 
such an approach would ensure that developing countries such as Nigeria do not have western 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund dictating to them how 
they should use their natural resources at the expense of their people. Developing countries may 
soon realize that the exclusion of a social clause in trade actually works to the best interest of the 
western countries than they think it is to them. However, free traders and neo-classical 
economists do not seem to agree with the neo-institutionalist and neo-Keynesian economists.  
4 3 5  Free traders and neo-classical economists 
Like developing countries, neo-classical economists and free traders believe that people should 
just have employment regardless of the levels of wages or other labour standards.
212
 They 
believe in the self-regulatory mechanism of free markets.
213
 Interestingly though, Fields notes 
that a pre-condition for the free traders and neo-classical economists‟ theory is the achievement 
of a minimalist list of conditions in the labour relations process such as prohibition of slavery 
and employment of children, freedom of association and relatively safe working conditions.
214
 
After which, Fields believes that labour standards might then be best gauged in terms of labour 
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market outcomes.
215
 This view appears to suggest that the protection of labour standards in trade 
may not after all be resisted. What could be a challenge is how it is done. Fields cited the 
economies of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan as possible examples to follow as they 
indirectly promote labour standards on the basis of employment creation made possible by their 
growing economies.
216
  
 The general argument is that once full employment is attained, increased demand for 
scarce labour would lead to the bidding-up of wages. Fields commented that: 
“To those who judge labour standards by process, the lack of collective bargaining and 
protective labour legislation would appear as an abuse of labour standards which is getting 
no better in the course of economic growth. But to others who are more outcomes oriented, 
the attainment of full employment and the creation of new jobs at substantially higher rates 
of pay than those workers had been able to earn before is a sign that labour standards are 
improving. Abuse of labour standards is in the eye of the beholder.”217 
 
It may be questionable however if Fields‟ perception is applied to Southern African economies 
whose economic growth is so minimal that unemployment will be the norm in future than 
employment would be.
218
 Also, the theory assumes that increased demand for scarce labour 
which would lead to bidding-up of wages is contingent upon full employment. The challenge 
with developing countries, especially those in Southern Africa, is that most of those working in 
export related industries are unskilled workers who are untrained and not marketable in anyway. 
Their skills are unlikely to be on demand at anytime as cheap labour is almost everywhere and is 
easily accessible. This implies that full employment is unlikely to be achieved in developing 
countries. As such, a different approach other than the one proposed by free traders would be 
ideal.  
4 3 6  Child labour and economic development 
The use of child labour has been viewed as culturally specific. It is not strange to observe that in 
Africa where there is endemic poverty, the use of child labour is regarded as necessary for the 
                                                          
 
215
  Ibid. 
216
  See Fields “Employment, Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Seven Small Economies” 1984 The 
Economic Journal 74. 
217
  Fields 31. 
218
 See United Nations “World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012” http://www.un.org/../2012wesp_prerel.pdf 
(accessed 21-11-2012). 
154 
 
development of the child.
219
 Poor regions such as Southern Africa have many children working 
in the agriculture sector in order to assist their impoverished families.
220
 Opponents of the trade-
labour linkage debate argue that children and their families in developing countries are 
regrettably too poor to afford not going to work.
221
 The entire family would be worse off if 
children did not work.
222
  Such an argument seems to be the basis of the argument that people in 
developing countries are too poor to be able to afford human rights protection in the manner in 
which the western countries do.
223
 In fact the arguments advanced in relation to the use of child 
labour emanate from the perception that even western countries industrialized in part through the 
use of child labour. In this connection, Nichols stated that: 
“We know of no case where a nation developed a modern manufacturing sector without 
first going through the sweat-shop phase. How long ago was it that children could be found 
working in the textile factories of Lowell, Massachusetts, of Manchester, England, or 
Osaka, Japan? Should the developing economies of today be any different? If child labour 
is a necessary evil of industrialization, then a nation should be judged on how quickly it 
passes through this phase.”224 
 
Tsogas notes that child labour is an unpleasant, yet natural stage in the process of capitalist 
accumulation.
225
 The reason for this is that there is a dilemma between child labour or having 
impoverished children and families.
226
 A fascinating observation was made by The Economist, 
which:  
“...drew the line between legal rights over terms of employment and slavery, child labour 
and the rights of assembly and free speech, which, unlike the former, are not freely 
modified as circumstances: „You do not need to be rich to outlaw slavery or grant the 
rights of free speech and assembly; education is costly, but curbing the cruelest sorts of 
child labour is widely affordable‟”.227 
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The above quotation may just signify that the so called dilemma between child labour or 
impoverished children and families is not authentic or serves only the purposes of those who 
benefit economically from such exploitation. Tsogas seemingly puts finality to the issue of using 
child labour by stating that: 
“...the economies of countries that use child labour will suffer. Employment of children 
depresses wages, which in turn hinders increases in productivity that could stimulate 
economic growth. Good national education policies and enforced prohibition of child 
labour are not only justifiable but also make good economic sense. Countries that have 
experienced rapid economic development, such as East Asian NICs, have not allowed child 
labour. Sound economic development and employment of children simply do not go 
together. Moreover, child labour is not necessarily inexpensive labour. Economizing on 
wages and working conditions is not the only means of achieving competitiveness. 
Productivity improvement and treatment of employees as valuable assets rather than as 
replaceable factors of production enhance long-term competitiveness and sustainable 
growth.”228 
 
Developing countries seem to have lost sight of creating a balance between long term and short 
term gains due to their need to address colonial imbalances. Perhaps it is time for them to realize 
that the past will not change but the future can. 
4 4  THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC THEORIES IN THE GLOBAL ERA 
The WTO and ILO have observed that empirical evidence taking the link between trade and 
employment seriously is still relatively scarce, certainly if compared to the large body of 
evidence examining how trade affects relative or absolute wages.
229
 On the positive side, 
however, both the WTO and ILO correctly observe that given that the theoretical developments 
are relatively recent, the empirical evidence is as well.
230
 Dutt et al have examined the link 
between trade protection and unemployment rates using cross-country data for 90 countries over 
the period 1985-2004.
231
 Their empirical estimation was based on a theoretical model with 
search-induced unemployment embedded in a Heckscher-Ohlin
232
 or Ricardian setting.
233
 The 
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theoretical prediction for the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that in a relatively capital-abundant 
country, trade liberalization leads to increases in unemployment, while employment should 
increase in a relatively labour-abundant country.
234
 In the Ricardian model, trade openness and 
unemployment are negatively related.
235
 The empirical analysis is particularly interesting 
because the authors attempt to distinguish short and long run effects of increasing trade on 
unemployment. Their evidence shows that trade liberalization is associated with decreases in 
unemployment; hence, there is a positive long-run relationship between trade and employment. 
However what they do not address is whether such relationship between trade and employment 
results in an improved protection of workers‟ rights in trade related matters. They also do not 
address why their findings are not consistent with the situation prevailing in developing 
countries. 
An insight into the relationship between trade openness and the protection of workers‟ 
rights may be observed in how trade openness affects workers‟ wages. Greater openness to 
international trade raises the sensitivity of labour demand to changes in domestic or foreign 
wages, that is, the wage elasticity of labour demand.
236
 This sensitivity of employment to both 
domestic and foreign wage movements is further increased as global supply chains become more 
developed.
237
 According to Anderson and Gascon, “disaggregating the value chain has allowed 
US business to substitute cheaper foreign labour, increasing firms‟ own price elasticity of 
demand for labour, raising the volatility of wages and employment, which increases worker 
insecurity”.238 There have been very few estimates of the relationship between trade openness 
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and the wage elasticity of labour demand.
239
 Slaughter studied manufacturering enterprises in the 
US over the period 1960-91 and found that the labour demand elasticity rose for US production 
workers (a proxy for lower-skilled workers) and not for non-production workers over this 
period.
240
 The demand for production workers rose most in those sectors with the greatest 
increases in offshoring,
241
 as well as those with more technical change in the form of more 
computer-related investment. Scheve and Slaughter found that foreign direct investment is the 
key aspect of globalization that raises the elasticity of labour demand.
242
 In a study of outward 
foreign direct investment by firms in the UK, Scheve and Slaughter found that more foreign 
investment was associated with higher labour-demand elasticity, and more volatility of wages 
and employment.
243
 
The WTO and ILO have also observed that the higher elasticity of labour demand can have 
an indirect effect on wage formation, since it enhances the threat effect, whereby the mere threat 
by companies to move production overseas influences wage demands.
244
 This development has 
already been noted concerning the labour practices of China in South Africa in the Newcastle 
area in 2011.  Freeman commented that:  
“It isn‟t even necessary that the West import the toys. The threat to import them or to move 
plants to less-developed countries to produce toys may suffice to force low skilled 
westerners to take a cut in pay to maintain employment. In this situation, the open 
economy can cause lower pay for low-skilled westerners even without trade.”245 
A few researchers have explored the importance of firms‟ threats to move production abroad on 
the bargaining power and demands of labour, with the issue receiving considerable attention by 
theorists, but undergoing little empirical analysis.
246
 Choi looked at detailed sectoral data on 
outward foreign direct investment by US manufacturers and found that increased outward 
investment was associated with lower wage premiums for union members during the period 1983 
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to 1996.
247
 Bronfenbrenner and Luce, studying the US between 1993 and 1999, focussed more 
narrowly on unionization campaigns as opposed to wages.
248
 They found that a firm‟s mobility 
did raise the credibility of the threat to move production offshore and that this influenced union 
elections, with unionization drives having a much lower rate of success in firms with a credible 
threat of mobility than in those considered immobile.
249
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and of communist governments throughout Eastern 
Europe and East Asia, the capitalist turn of communist China‟s (and Viet Nam‟s) economic 
planning, and even the opening and liberalization of India‟s economy, have all served to expand 
global productive capacity, international trade, foreign investment and international 
subcontracting.
250
 Freeman has characterized these developments as “the great doubling” of the 
world capitalist system‟s labour force, as it had added 1.3 billion people to the pool of labour 
seeking work under competitive conditions.
251
 Such labour supply expansion alone, Freeman 
argues, is enough to dampen wage growth in the rest of the world, including in the industrialized 
countries.
252
 Glyn puts an even finer point on this, noting that: “Increasing opportunities for 
capital to shift production overseas has given a huge bargaining advantage to employers in most 
of the OECD.”253 Glyn notes that national income has fallen in many industrialized nations.254  
The WTO and ILO then pose the question as to whether or not the rise in offshoring 
played a significant role in this. Reference was made to a number of recent papers which have 
tried to address the question of trade and the labour (or profit) share at the aggregate or industry 
level, and they have generally found globalization to be associated with a decline in labour‟s 
share of income.
255
 Milberg and Winkler found that offshoring is significantly and negatively 
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associated with movements in the labour share of value added in thirty-five US manufacturing 
and service sectors over the period 1998 to 2006.
256
 Harrison studied the relation between trade 
openness and the functional distribution across a large number of developing countries and found 
that openness is generally associated with a lower labour share of national income.
257
 Harrison 
concludes that “rising trade shares and exchange rate crises reduce labour‟s share while capital 
controls and government spending increase labour‟s share”.258 Guscina finds globalization 
(measured by trade openness, and the share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in GDP) to be 
associated with a lower labour share.
259
 The effect of trade openness was especially strong from 
1985 to 2000. Guscina describes the effects of technological change and globalization as 
contributing to a new (lower) equilibrium level of the labour share in the industrialized world.
260
 
As a result, low-skilled workers were found to be more sceptical about globalization and trade 
liberalization than workers with higher skills.
261
 
The fears of unskilled workers are justified by the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism. The 
Stolper-Samuelson mechanism suggests that increased relative demand for skilled labour in 
countries abundant with skilled labour occurs as a result of shifts in the relative demand for 
skilled labour across industries.
262
 Labour-intensive industries using skilled labour expand and 
those using unskilled labour contract, with all industries employing an increasing share of less-
skilled labour.
263
 However, the employment shifts across industries have not been sufficiently 
large to account for the large increase in wage inequality.
264
 Most of the observed increase in 
demand for educated labour in countries such as the US is driven by increased relative demand 
for skilled labour within industries.
265
 For example, the wage and employment share of skilled 
workers increased in virtually all industries during the 1980s and 1990s in the US, including the 
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non-traded sectors, which is at odds with the Hecksher-Ohlin mechanism.
266
 There is also 
evidence of a within-industry shift in the relative demand for skilled workers for several OECD 
countries.
267
  
In addition, studies have documented that, contrary to the predictions of the simple 
Hecksher-Ohlin model, many developing countries that liberalized their trade during the 1980s 
and 1990s also observed an increase, rather than a decrease, in wage inequality between 
education groups.
268
 Some developing countries such as Colombia and Mexico tended to protect 
industries employing unskilled labour intensively, so tariff-induced price declines would be 
expected to be largest in those sectors.
269
 As a result, the observed increase in wage inequality 
was in principle consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism.
270
 However, as in the 
developed economies, the increased relative demand for skilled labour in many developing 
countries was predominantly driven by increase in the relative demand for skilled labour within 
industries rather than across industries.
271
 Krugma has recently suggested that international trade 
accounts for a larger share of the growth in wage inequality in the United States in the 1990s and 
2000s because of the rapid increase in the share of imports coming from low-wage countries 
such as China and India during this period.
272
 
All developing countries appear to have become more “globalized”.273 They have phased 
out remaining quantitative restrictions on imports, slashed tariffs, encouraged direct foreign 
investment and exports and, in many cases, opened up to cross-border financial flows.
274
 So it is 
natural to think that globalization has played an important behind-the-scenes role in driving the 
patterns of structural change.
275
 However, it is also clear that this role could not have been a 
direct, straightforward one.
276
 First, some countries (mostly in Asia) have continued to 
experience rapid, productivity-enhancing structural change, while others (mainly in Latin 
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America and sub-Saharan Africa) have begun to experience productivity-reducing structural 
change.
277
 A common external environment cannot explain such large differences.
278
 Second, as 
important as agriculture, mining and manufacturing are, a large part, perhaps a majority, of jobs 
are still provided by non-tradable service industries.
279
 So whatever contribution globalization 
has made, it must depend heavily on local circumstances, choices made by domestic policy-
makers and domestic growth strategies.
280
  
Import competition has caused many industries to contract and release labour to less-
productive activities, such as agriculture and the informal sector.
281
 One important difference 
among countries may be the degree to which they are able to manage such downsides.
282
 A 
notable feature of Asian-style globalization is that it has had a two-track nature: many import-
competing activities have continued to receive support while new, export-oriented activities were 
spawned.
283
 For example, until the mid-1990s, China had liberalized its trade regime at the 
margin only.
284
 Firms in special economic zones (SEZs) operated under free-trade rules, while 
domestic firms still operated behind high trade barriers.
285
 State enterprises still continue to 
receive substantial support. In an earlier period, the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei 
pushed their firms onto world markets by subsidizing them heavily, and delayed import 
liberalization until domestic firms could stand on their feet.
286
 Strategies of this sort have the 
advantage, from the current perspective, of ensuring that labour remains employed in firms that 
might otherwise be decimated by import competition.
287
 Such firms may not be the most 
efficient in the economy, but they often provide jobs at productivity levels that exceed their 
employees‟ next-best alternative (that is, agriculture or the informal sector).288 
A related issue concerns the real exchange rate. Countries in Latin America and sub- 
Saharan Africa have typically liberalized in the context of overvalued currencies, driven either 
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by disinflationary monetary policies or by large foreign aid inflows.
289
 Over-valuation squeezes 
tradable industries further, damaging especially the more modern ones in manufacturing that 
operate on tight profit margins.
290
 Asian countries, by contrast, have often targeted competitive 
real exchange rates with the express purpose of promoting their tradable industries.
291
 Empirical 
evidence on the role played by the real exchange rate in promoting desirable structural change 
does exist. Globalization promotes specialization according to comparative advantage.
292
 Here 
there is another potentially important difference among countries. Some countries, many in Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa, are well-endowed with natural resources and primary 
products.
293
 In these economies, opening up to the world economy reduces incentives to 
diversify towards modern manufactures and reinforces traditional specialization patterns.
294
  
Some primary sectors such as mining do operate at very high levels of labour 
productivity.
295
 As such in economies with a comparative advantage in natural resources, the 
positive contribution of structural change associated with participation in international markets to 
be limited is expected.
296
 Asian countries, most of which are well endowed with labour but not 
natural resources, have a natural advantage here.
297
 The rate at which structural change in the 
direction of modern activities takes place can also be influenced by the ease of entry and exit into 
industry and by the flexibility of labour markets.
298
 Intersectoral re-allocation within 
manufacturing industries is slowed down by entry barriers.
299
 When employment conditions are 
perceived as “rigid”, say because of firing costs that are too high, firms are likely to respond to 
new opportunities by upgrading plant and equipment (capital deepening) rather than by hiring 
new workers.
300
 This slows down the transition of workers to modern economic activities.
301
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There is a very strong and negative association between a country‟s reliance on primary 
products and the rate at which structural change contributes to growth.
302
 Countries that 
specialize in primary products are at a distinct disadvantage.
303
 Agriculture‟s share in 
employment now becomes statistically significant.
304
 This indicates the presence of conditional 
convergence: conditional on not having a strong comparative advantage in primary products, but 
starting out with a large countryside of surplus workers does help.
305
 Once the comparative 
advantage indicator is entered, the co-efficients on regional models are slashed and they are no 
longer statistically significant.
306
 In other words, comparative advantage and the initial 
agricultural share can jointly fully explain the large differences in average performance across 
regions.
307
 Countries that do well are those that start out with a lot of workers in agriculture but 
do not have a strong comparative advantage in primary products.
308
 That most Asian countries fit 
this characterization explains the Asian difference highlighted above.
309
 Developing countries 
such as those in the Southern African region might do well to follow the holistic approach to 
development followed by the Asians. Greater care though must be placed on not rushing to 
follow the current Chinese trade practices where labour standards are involved. However, what 
must be embraced is the notion that industrialisation goes beyond the reliance on poor labour 
standards as a competitive advantage but is determined by holistic national policies that 
complement free trade to ensure development. 
4 5  LEGAL THEORIES AND THE TRADE-LABOUR LINKAGE PROPOSALS  
As already alluded to in this chapter, developing countries view proposals to establish linkages 
between trade and social policies as part of developed countries‟ protectionist agenda whereas 
developed countries regard such an approach as a mechanism for improving the social welfare of 
citizens of developing countries and of the world by avoiding a race to the bottom.
310
 This 
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divergence in opinions has not undermined the long-standing concern regarding the potential 
negative effects of trade with countries which have policies that are considered to violate basic 
human rights.
311
 Whilst it may be argued that there are many different understandings of what 
constitute human rights, such concerns are not implausible.
312
 One such concern is founded on a 
need to protect workers from economic exploitation. Social reformers in the first half of the 19th 
century at the early stages of the Industrial revolution were the first to promote a trade policy-
labour standards linkage in attempts to protect workers from economic exploitation and 
redistribute economic gains.
313
 The social reformers‟ proposals resulted in the argument that 
workers‟ rights, to the extent that they are conceived of as basic human rights, should be 
protected in trade.
314
 Workers‟ rights which have increasingly come to be viewed as a 
fundamental element of customary international law are known as core labour standards.
315
  
 The fact that core labour standards are human rights is uncontroversial.
316
 This could be 
regarded as implying that if core labour standards are human rights then there is a need to protect 
them by way of incorporation into the legal framework of the WTO.
317
 The basis of such a 
proposal could rest in the argument that the collective supply of public goods, such as the global 
division of labour, may not be politically feasible without comprehensive package deals 
including solitary responses to market failures and redistributive justice.
318
 Liberal trade rules 
must be supplemented by competition and social rules promoting fair opportunities and the 
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equitable distribution of gains from trade.
319
 This conceptual framework would thus require that 
global trade integration law must pursue not only economic efficiency but also democratic 
legitimacy and social justice as defined by human rights.
320
 To achieve the universal recognition 
and legal protection of inalienable human rights at national, regional and global levels, there 
might be a need to develop a new human rights culture and a citizen-oriented national and 
international constitutional framework different from the power-oriented, state-centred 
conceptions of traditional international law.
321
 This proposition is underpinned by the 
understanding that human rights are: 
 “…distinct from…constitutional rights, or rights of democratic citizenship, or from other 
kinds of rights that belong to certain kinds of political institutions, both individualist and 
associationist…They are a special class of universal application and hardly controversial in 
their general intention. They are part of a reasonable law of peoples and specify limits on 
the domestic institutions required of all peoples by that law. In this sense they specify the 
outer boundary of admissible domestic law of societies in good standing in a just society of 
peoples. They have these three roles: 1) They are a necessary condition of a regime‟s 
legitimacy and of its legal order; 2) By being in place, they are also sufficient to exclude 
justified and forceful intention by other peoples, say by economic sanctions, or in grave 
cases, by military force; and 3) They set a limit on pluralism among peoples.”322 
 
A conceptual framework that considers liberal trade rules supplemented by competition and 
social rules promoting fair opportunities and the equitable distribution of gains from trade is 
substantiated by proposals for establishing a trade policy-labour standards linkage within the 
legal framework of the WTO. It is submitted that such a linkage is complex and controversial.
323
 
Julius Nyerere, the late former president of Tanzania once argued that, “Universal social 
principles are possible; but universal social standards are not.”324  According to Nyerere: 
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 “When you have…cultural and resource diversity, on what basis is a „universal‟ standard 
to be worked out, and who is to decide on it? The assumption is that what we have in mind 
is the universalisation of Western concepts and standards. But why? Those concepts and 
standards are based on Western history and Western, on high (and rapidly changing) 
technology, and on levels of personal and communal consumption which are not universal 
now and which the world‟s resources cannot sustain on a global basis.”325 
 
Whether Nyerere‟s opinions are plausible can only be evaluated through an analysis of legal 
theories which could qualify or nullify proposals for a global approach to protecting core labour 
standards in trade.
326
 
4 5 1  Utilitarian Theory 
Utilitarianism is a normative ethical theory that places the locus of right and wrong solely on the 
outcomes of choosing one action or policy over other actions or policies.
327
 As such, it moves 
beyond the scope of one‟s own interests and takes into account the interests of others.328 There 
are many kinds of utilitarianism but Bentham‟s classical utilitarianism theory is commonly used. 
Bentham‟s Principle of Utility: 
“1) Recognizes the fundamental role of pain and pleasure in human life; 2) approves or 
disapproves of an action on the basis of the amount of pain or pleasure brought about i.e, 
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consequences; 3) equates good with pleasure and evil with pain; and 4) asserts that 
pleasure and pain are capable of quantification (and hence „measure‟).”329  
In measuring pleasure and pain, Bentham introduces the following criteria: intensity, duration, 
certainty (or uncertainty), and its nearness (or fairness).
330
 He also includes its “fecundity” (will 
more of the same follow?) and its “purity” (its pleasure will not be followed by pain and vice 
versa).
331
 In considering actions that affect numbers of people, they must also account for its 
extent.
332
 Mill adjusted the more hedonistic tendencies in Bentham‟s philosophy by emphasizing:  
“(1) It is not the quantity of pleasure, but the quality of happiness that is central to 
utilitarianism, (2) the calculus is unreasonable-qualities cannot be quantified (there is a 
distinction between „higher‟ and „lower‟ pleasures), and (3) utilitarianism refers to “the 
Greatest Happiness Principle” it seeks to promote the capability of achieving happiness 
(higher pleasures) for the most amount of people (this is its “extent”).” 333 
 
The principle of utility can be applied to either particular actions or general rules. The former is 
called “act-utilitarianism”334 and the latter is called “rule-utilitarianism.”335 With act-
utilitarianism, the principle of utility is applied directly to each alternative act in a situation of 
choice.
336
 The right act is then defined as the one which brings about the best results (or the least 
amount of bad results).
337
 This view which points to the difficulty of attaining a full knowledge 
and certainty of the consequences of our actions nevertheless forms a basis of criticism since it is 
possible to justify immoral acts using act-utilitarianism.
338
 For example it would be plausible to 
end a regional war by torturing children whose fathers are rebel soldiers in order to compel them 
to reveal the hide outs of the fathers. It would also be plausible to reject a trade-labour linkage 
and opt for the continued violation of workers‟ rights in the interest of maximising short-term 
gains from trade. It would thus be imperative to question whether or not it is the right action to 
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exclude a social clause from the WTO legal framework in the interest of maximising short-term 
economic gains. It must further be established as to whether or not doing so would promote the 
achievement of happiness for the majority of people in the world. It would appear that the 
miserable majority of workers in the world would prefer a trade-labour linkage as opposed to the 
capitalists and some political leaders who prefer a trade regime which does not emphasise the 
need to protect workers‟ interests as this study will argue.  
As regards rule-utilitarianism, the principle of utility is used to determine the validity of rules 
of conduct (moral principles).
339
 A rule like promise-keeping is established by looking at the 
consequences of a world in which people broke promises at will and a world in which promises 
were binding.
340
 Right and wrong are then defined as following or breaking those rules.
341
 This 
would imply that if countries commit themselves to protecting human rights in international law, 
they must fulfil such an obligation to the best extents possible without advancing any excuses 
(such as their levels of development or otherwise). This could lead to the incorporation of core 
labour standards as human rights into the WTO legal framework. Critics of this position point 
out that if the rules take into account more and more exceptions, rule-utilitarianism collapses into 
act-utilitarianism.
342
  
More general criticisms of this view are that it is possible to generate “unjust rules” 
according to the principle of utility.
343
 For example, slavery might be right if it led to an overall 
achievement of cultivated happiness at the expense of some mistreated individuals.
344
 The 
utilitarian theory allows decisions, that when made, can be contradictory in nature.
345
 If breaking 
a law would result in greater satisfaction, should the law be broken? If so there would be no 
purpose or value of any law. If one finds satisfaction by his own twisted or cruel morals, should 
such individual be allowed to act in such a way? If the answer to these questions is no, it might 
be plausible to argue that a social clause might be necessary in regulating international trade 
practices, especially where the violation of core labour standards is concerned. 
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4 5 2  Natural Law Theory 
Natural law, or the law of nature (lex naturalis), is a system of law that is purportedly determined 
by nature, and thus universal.
346
 It is a law or body of laws that derives from nature and is 
believed to be binding upon human actions apart from or in conjunction with laws established by 
human authority.
347
 Classically, natural law refers to the use of reason to analyze human nature 
(both social and personal) and deduce binding rules of moral behavior.
348
 Natural law is 
contrasted with the positive law (meaning “man-made law,” not “good law”) of a given political 
community, society, or nation-state, and thus serves as a standard by which to evaluate the said 
positive law.
349
 According to natural law theory, which holds that morality is a function of 
human nature and reason, valid moral principles can be discovered by looking at the nature of 
humanity in society.
350
 
Theories of natural law are reflective critical accounts of the constitutive aspects of the 
well-being and fulfilment of human persons and the communities they form.
351
 The propositions 
that pick out fundamental aspects of human flourishing are directive (that is, prescriptive) in 
humanity‟s thinking about what to do and refrain from doing (practical reason).352 They are, or 
provide, more than merely instrumental reasons for action and self-restraint.
353
 When these 
foundational principles of practical reflection are taken together (that is, integrally), they entail 
norms that may exclude certain options and require other options in situations of morally 
significant choosing.
354
 Natural law theories, then, propose to identify principles of right action 
(moral principles) specifying the first and most general principle of morality, namely, that one 
should choose and act in ways that are compatible with a will towards integral human 
fulfilment.
355
 Among these principles is a respect for the rights people possess simply by virtue 
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of their humanity, rights which, as a matter of justice, others are bound to respect and 
governments are bound not only to respect but, to the extent possible, also to protect.
356
 
The law of nations (ius gentium) provides that travellers may carry on trade so long as 
they do no harm to the citizens; and second, in the same way it can be proved that this is lawful 
in divine law.
357
 Therefore any human enactment (lex) which prohibited such treatment would 
indubitably be unreasonable.
358
 James argues that a liberal international economic order (the 
result of market-led globalisation) cannot rest, simply or even mainly, on “utilitarian” or “realist” 
foundations.
359
 Utilitarianism, at its crude “economistic” extreme, holds that the material 
prosperity globalisation generates is ample justification and political realism stresses the 
framework of power relations that keeps an open, peaceful international order in place.
360
 But 
these arguments invite an anti-globalisation backlash, for material prosperity is not enough 
(“Man does not live on bread alone”), and globalisation is in any case rigged in favour of big 
powers (so its detractors believe).
361
 Missing is a defence of a liberal international economic 
order grounded in ideas and shared values, relating the processes of globalisation and the 
institutions of international order to the fundamentals of, inter alia, property rights, individual 
freedom and individual dignity.
362
 James further argues that the natural-law tradition is the right 
framework for such an undertaking, and that it should lead all the way to policy inferences for 
today and tomorrow.
363
 
The policy inferences could start with an investigation of the idea of the theory of labour 
law as a tool for social engineering subject to reason. One could start by making efficiency or 
welfare considerations, in order to justify rules that address market failures caused by transaction 
costs and asymmetric information, problems arising in the governance of contracts of 
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employment such as coercion and opportunism, and more generally the desirability of promoting 
productive efficiency and competitiveness through a well coordinated and flexible division of 
labour.
364
 From this perspective Collins argues that: 
“…labour law addresses the idiosyncratic problems that arise in relation to contracts of 
employment through a mixture of special contract law and market regulation. The other 
predominant strand of justification for labour law appeals to considerations of a fair 
distribution of wealth, power, and other goods in a society. On this view, the principal aim 
of labour law is to steer towards a particular conception of social justice, such as a more 
egalitarian society, and the norms of labour law are required primarily for the instrumental 
purpose of securing that goal. This second strand of justification tends to support the 
practice of collective bargaining and the imposition of basic labour standards such as a 
minimum wage, because these interventions in the labour market are calculated to improve 
the position of poorer and weaker members of the society.”365 
However, these justifications for labour law are evidently vulnerable to critiques that question 
whether the goals justify the means used in labour law. The problem is that the efficiency-based 
justifications for labour law can be deployed in ways that propose the dismantling of most of the 
special rules for employment.
366
 At the same time, the social justice justifications for labour law 
have been challenged both on the ground that they lack merit and for the reason that, even if they 
possess some worthwhile aims, these goals should be pursued through other, less intrusive, 
governmental measures involving taxation and expenditure on welfare, leaving the market free to 
maximize the wealth of a society as a whole.
367
 Combining this two-pronged critique of 
traditional justifications for labour law, it seems possible to justify the elimination of labour law 
altogether and to replace it with a general freedom of contract regime.
368
 One can, of course, take 
issue with this sort of conclusion as workers are already the weaker party to the employment 
relationship and require more protection at law.  
Using a different economic analysis and a more complex conception of social justice than 
welfare maximization, one can produce a different outcome that justifies quite an elaborate 
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labour law system.
369
 For example, a combination of an appreciation of the persistence of certain 
kinds of market failures in the labour market combined with the insights of behavioural 
economics that individuals do not make rational assessments of risks in contracting can lead to 
justifications for fairly detailed mandatory protections for workers.
370
 Even such efficiency-
based theories remain vulnerable to the further charge from the New Right
371
 of excessive 
paternalism: employers and workers are adults and should be permitted to fashion their contracts 
according to their preferences, whether or not they invariably reach the most efficient 
outcomes.
372
 It could be better, on this anti-paternalist view, to permit the market to experiment, 
than to attempt to regulate these arrangements on the basis of imperfect information.
373
 Such 
challenges to the existence of labour law based upon considerations of efficiency and welfare are 
not merely theoretical. Legal regimes steer markets or capitalist societies through many legal 
measures designed to protect their economic institutions and mechanisms.
374
 Not only does the 
law vindicate private property rights and contractual agreements, it also ensures that the 
competitive market cannot be subverted by participants through anti-competitive measures.
375
 
Regardless of the challenges in understanding the theory of natural in social and 
economic matters, natural law thinking has occupied an all-encompassing role in the realms of 
ethics, politics and law.
376
 It has formed an important weapon in political and legal ideology.
377
 
Essentially it has afforded moral justification for existing social and economic systems and their 
legal systems.
378
 By arguing what is, the law is based on a higher law dictated by reason and so 
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is also what law ought to be.
379
 Natural law is thus a rational foundation for moral judgement. 
Could natural law then be the theoretical basis upon which a trade-labour linkage could be 
founded? This question remains controversial. However, an analysis of other legal theories may 
indicate whether there is a legal rationale for establishing a trade-labour linkage to improve the 
welfare of workers in the world using natural law as its basis. 
4 5 3  Sociology of Law 
Sociology of law constitutes an immense field of study embracing all aspects of the relations and 
interactions between law and society.
380
 Sociological jurists tend to espouse relativism and reject 
the belief of naturalism that an ultimate theory of values can be found.
381
 They see reality as 
socially constructed with no natural guide to the solution of many conflicts.
382
 The sociologist of 
law approaches law from the view point of society and its diverse forms of social control.
383
 
Sociological jurists also believe in the importance of harnessing the techniques of the social 
sciences, as well as the knowledge culled from sociological research, towards the formulation of 
a more effective science of law.
384
  
Max Weber was the first to develop a systematic sociology of law.
385
 His discussion of 
the relationship between law and capitalism is interesting. Weber was not prepared to explain 
law as in any way determined by economic forces but as relatively autonomous.
386
 Though 
influenced by economic forces, the law also influences economic and other processes in the 
society.
387
 Weber was of the opinion that economic situations do not automatically give birth to 
new legal forms but merely provide the opportunity for the spread of legal technique if it is 
invented.
388
 For example, Weber showed how modern rational capitalism needed not just a 
technical means of production but also a calculable legal system.
389
 He argued that the modern 
capitalist enterprise rests primarily on calculation and presupposes a legal and administrative 
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system whose functioning can be rationally predicted.
390
 Using England as a case study, Weber 
realised how it provided him with some proof of the non-determinant role of economic factors in 
the development of law.
391
 On his part, Pound argued that a sociological jurist: 
“…holds that legal institutions and doctrines are instruments of a specialised form of social 
control, capable of being improved with reference to their ends by conscious, intelligent 
effort. He thinks of a process of social engineering, which in one way or another is a 
problem of all the social sciences. In sociological jurisprudence it is a special problem of 
achieving this engineering task by means of the legal order…It is treated as a problem of 
jurisprudence, and yet in its larger aspects as not merely a problem of that science. Law in 
all its senses is studied as a specialized phase of what in a larger view is a science of 
history.”392 
Karl Marx also advanced his theory of sociology. He produced an elaborate theory of how 
society progresses from its ancient tribal roots to feudal society and then to industrial and 
commercial society.
393
 Marx argued that the means of producing livelihood determines the 
nature of society.
394
 In market theory, Marx argued that specialisation and division of labour is 
an unambiguous good as it leads to greater efficiency, and hence to the production of more goods 
that are better and cheaper.
395
 Marx acknowledged that advantage, but argued that: 
“…the division of labour inevitably leads to the exploitation of some groups by others. He 
thought that the process would lead to the concentration of property and capital in an ever 
smaller group, at the expense of an ever larger population of propertyless and exploited 
workers…called the proletariat. This would lead to „alienation‟ of the latter group and to 
class conflict.”396  
Marx‟s observations mirror the developments between the employer and employee in the global 
era. The ever enlarging gap between the rich and the poor has led to tensions between the two 
classes with industrial actions being a common feature of the workplace. However, Marx rightly 
observed that: 
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“The law of a society changes to reflect the ways in which people produce the means of 
their livelihood. Every social system has a base and a superstructure. The economic 
relations constitute that base of the society. Law, state and the popular consciousness 
(understanding) of the base constitute the superstructure. The base and the superstructure 
are inter-dependent. The base gives rise to the superstructure and the superstructure 
protects and reinforces the base. The superstructure changes to reflect the changes in the 
base…the emergence of industrial and commercial modes of production brings about 
further dramatic changes in the law, state and beliefs. The whole system of law, including 
contract and property law and labour law, is adapted to facilitate commerce and 
industry.”397 
From Marx‟s argument, it could be argued that the economic performance of a society 
determines how the law protects its people. If there was to be an increase in the economic output 
of a society, then the protection levels of the law to the people should improve. What happens if 
this does not occur, with profits continually remaining in the hands of a few capitalists? Marx 
had a simple answer to this question. The capitalist society would inevitably come to an end. 
Marx predicted that, “The concentration of capital in an ever diminishing class would worsen the 
condition of the proletariat to the point at which they would naturally rise in revolt, overthrow 
the capitalist state and establish a dictatorship of the workers. The dictatorship would be 
transitory…would abolish capitalism and class divisions, and bring about a communist 
society…”398 Marx‟s views are plausible if one considers the conflict between the capitalists and 
workers in the modern world. 
 Marx‟s views are however contradicted by social anthropologists who argue that Marx‟s 
top down “law as domination” view hardly fits the modern democracy.399 Law making is viewed 
as a messy process with outcomes determined by the interplay of interest group politics, often 
against the interests of the ruling elites.
400
 Ratnapala argues that, “In conceiving the role of law 
purely in terms of enforcement of capitalist economic relations, Marx overlooked the law‟s value 
in facilitating cooperation within and across classes.”401 However, it is important to observe that 
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whilst Marx‟s views regarding the alienation of the proletariat did not occur in the industrialised 
democracies since their workers became property owners and shareholders and the welfare state 
taxed capital and profits and distributed wealth,
402
 the same cannot be said of workers in 
developing countries. Marx‟s views appear to be plausible regarding the developments currently 
unfolding in developing countries. This might be indicative of the need to establish if the law is 
in order, with the objective of attaining solidarity in a society. Establishing whether the law is in 
order can only be achieved if one knows what the law means. Durkheim understood the broad 
view of law as referring to a rule of sanctioned conduct.
403
 He viewed sanctions as changing 
according: 
“…to the importance of the rule within the community-the place the rule holds in the 
public consciousness. Laws can be classified according to the nature of sanctions. There 
are two types of sanctions: repressive and restitutive. Repressive sanctions are meant not to 
inflict suffering but to restore the parties to the position that they were in before the 
unlawful act was committed. Restitutive sanctions are characteristic of civil law, including 
commercial law, procedural law, administrative law and constitutional law.”404  
 
The position established from Durkheim‟s view according to Ratnapala is that, “The type of law 
in a society is the indicator of the type of social solidarity. The type of sanction is the indicator of 
the type of law.”405  If the law is a tool to achieve social solidarity through bringing people 
together in a diverse society much as to create a technologically advanced society, then there 
might be need to have laws that ensure a balance of interests between employers and employees. 
Durkheim concludes that:  
“Traders want their customers to prosper so that they can remain in business. This then is 
the bond or solidarity between producers and consumers…We are thus led to consider the 
division of labour in a new light. In this instance, the economic services that it can render 
are picayune compared to the moral effect that it produces, and its true function is to create 
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in two or more persons a feeling of solidarity. In whatever manner the result is obtained, its 
aim is to cause coherence among friends and to stamp them with its seal.”406  
Perhaps the views of the sociologists of law could be crucial in balancing the interests of 
business and that of workers regarding gains from trade. If not such a balance could be achieved 
through the distributive justice theory. 
4 5 4  Distributive Justice Theory 
The chasm between the rich and the poor has become unfathomable.
407
 The aim of distributive 
justice is to bring about and maintain a just distribution of benefits and burdens in society.
408
 
Campbell has argued that, “…it remains illuminating to say that justice has to do with the 
distribution amongst persons of benefits and burdens, these being loosely defined so as to cover 
any desirable or undesirable experience.”409 Distributive justice is also known as social justice 
because the duty of bringing about a just distribution is thought to be a social obligation.
410
 The 
starting point of most social justice theories is the proposition that all persons should share 
equally the benefits and burdens in society with any departure from the principle of material 
equality having to be justified.
411
 Hayek argued that: 
“There is no reason why in a free society government should not assure to all protection 
against severe deprivation in the form of a minimum income, or a floor below which 
nobody needed to descend. To enter into such an insurance against extreme misfortune 
may well be in the interest of all; or it may be felt to be a clear moral duty of all to assist, 
within the organised community, those who cannot help themselves.”412 
Distributive justice is a far reaching goal which aims at reordering economic relations to achieve 
a just distribution of all benefits and burdens in society.
413
 Rawls articulated his conception of 
distributive justice as demanding: 
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“1) The maximisation of liberty, subject only to such constraints as are essential for the 
protection of liberty itself; 2) equality for all, both in the basic liberties of social life and 
also in distribution of all other forms of social goods, subject only to the exception that 
inequalities may be permitted if they produce the greatest possible benefit for those least 
well off in a given scheme of inequality (the difference principle); and 3) „fair equality of 
opportunity‟ and elimination of all inequalities of opportunity based on birth or wealth.”414 
Rawls‟s conception of distributive justice must not be misconstrued with utilitarianism. Freeman 
observed that Rawls‟s theory differs from utilitarianism in three significant ways in that: 
“First, utilitarians can accept inequalities, social arrangements in which some benefit at the 
expense of others, provided the benefits (or pleasures) exceed the costs (or pains), so that 
the outcome is the maximisation of overall welfare level („the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number‟). This may be thought unjust. Secondly, while utilitarians defend liberty 
and political rights, they have no objection to limiting liberty or restricting political rights, 
provided doing so would promote greater wellbeing. Rawls‟s first principle (the equal 
maximum liberty principle) means that there are some rights such as the right to freedom 
of speech and association which every system must respect. Such rights may not be 
sacrificed to increase aggregate welfare level. Rawls‟s conception of benefits is different 
from utilitarianism, which is concerned with welfare. Rawls by contrast, defines benefits in 
terms of „primary goods‟ liberty and opportunity, income and wealth and the bases of self-
respect. These need not be considered desirable in themselves but they give persons the 
opportunities rationally to further their own autonomy.”415  
However, it must be established whether existing international economic law can be used to 
bridge this chasm and implement the socio-economic policies implicit in the distributive justice 
theory. It must be questioned whether distributive justice can occur under the current 
international economic order. It must also be established whether neoliberalism can be relied 
upon to produce distributive justice. As a United Nations study explained, global wealth is 
distributed so that the richest two per cent of adult individuals in the world own half of all global 
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wealth.
416
 While the number of people living in poverty has increased by almost 100 million, 
there are more billionaires than ever before.
417
  
It might be plausible to argue that in the current state of international economic law (in 
particular WTO law), distributive justice might not occur as it is clearly not one of the objectives 
of international economic law. The reason for this view is that just as capitalist states shaped 
international law in the 1920s, and colonialism shaped early international conceptions of 
sovereignty, today neoliberal ideology shapes the institutions, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the WTO.
418
 These institutions, whose policies collectively 
account for international economic law, arose post-World War II.
419
 In fact, the World Bank was 
established by those who met at Bretton Woods in 1944 to finance reconstruction in Europe after 
World War II.
420
 In 1960, the International Development Association (IDA) was established 
within the World Bank to focus on the needs of the poorest states.
421
 Although that objective was 
expressly defined, it is clear that distributive justice has never been the focus of international 
economic law. Rather, international economic law, operating through the institutions of the IMF 
and the WTO, has focused more on trade.
422
 The premise behind this fixation on trade is that 
boosting economic growth through trade is key to reducing poverty and inequality.
423
 This 
premise, however, has been criticized as the self-serving ideology of the developed states.
424
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According to Escobar, liberal ideology has shaped development discourse for its own purpose 
beginning with the “discovery” of poverty after World War II.425  
4 5 5  Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics 
The great appeal of law and economics has been its use of a coherent theory of human decision 
making, rational choice theory,
426
 to examine legal rules and institutions.
427
 Law and economics 
can be defined as the application of economic theory primarily microeconomics and the basic 
concepts of welfare economics-to examine the formation, structure, processes, and economic 
impact of law and legal institutions.
428
 The law and economics movement is an attempt to place 
economic theory alongside of or in place of the legal and political theory that presently informs 
law; to place efficiency alongside of or in place of the concepts of justice and/or fairness that 
presently help fashion legal rules and doctrines.
429
  
The law and economics theory is important to the social clause construction if it is 
considered that the law and economics tradition has often taken a position which is largely 
hostile to labour market regulation.
430
 There appeared to be a consensus developed by business 
according to which the solution to rigidities caused by labour law lay in deregulation of the 
labour market.
431
 However, the law and economic theory has been rediscovering some of the 
benefits of market regulation.
432
 A sophisticated view of contract suggests that in unregulated 
markets, there are significant barriers to both static and dynamic efficiency in situations of 
repeated or long-term exchange.
433
 In particular, where workers invest in firm-specific skills, an 
appropriate incentive structure should incorporate a degree of protection of the employee against 
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arbitrary treatment by management and some guarantee of continuing employment.
434
 Such a 
view implies that the issue of regulation versus deregulation cannot be decided a priori, but 
requires instead a more detailed empirical analysis of the sources of transaction cost and of 
impediments to contractual cooperation.
435
 This new labour market theory has the potential to 
influence public policy at an important juncture in the debate over labour flexibility and the 
future of the welfare state.
436
  
4 6  CONCLUSION 
The reliance on low labour standards as competitive or comparative advantage has been one of 
the central problems hindering the inclusion of a social clause in the multilateral trade 
agreements of the WTO.
437
 Developing countries have been steadfast over the years in 
maintaining that low labour standards give them an advantage in trade.
438
 They have even relied 
on the historical evidence of the use of cheap labour under poor conditions during the 
industrialization process in western countries. The developing countries have viewed any 
attempts to link trade with labour standards as part of a protectionist agenda which is not in the 
best interests of their countries. However, theories of law and economics as well as empirical 
studies have shown that there is no evidence which demonstrates that low labour standards give a 
country competitive advantage.
439
 If anything, empirical evidence reveals that the reliance on 
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low labour standards to enhance trade gains usually leads to little short-term profits and future 
economic failure. This chapter‟s objective was not to entirely dismiss the developing countries‟ 
reliance upon low labour standards as their comparative advantage but to point out that there are 
flaws to the comparative advantage theory which developing countries should not ignore. Such 
shortfalls as this chapter established could reverse the intended gains of employing low labour 
standards as a comparative advantage in the global era so much that developing countries would 
have to establish a balance between cheap labour and the need to adjust to new models for 
development which improve the welfare of their workers.
440
 Could this lack of knowledge and 
detailed research into the real benefits of the comparative advantage theory be the reason why 
developing countries are struggling to industrialise?  
Theoretical studies of infant industry and Keynesian economics refute the efficacy of the 
theory of comparative advantage.
441
 Comparative advantage has also been opposed by 
mercantilism and economic nationalism theorists who argued that while a country may initially 
be comparatively disadvantaged in a given industry, such as Japanese cars in the 1950s, countries 
should shelter and invest in such industries until they become globally competitive.
442
 They have 
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also argued that comparative advantage, as stated, is a static theory which does not account for 
the possibility of advantage changing through investment or economic development, and 
therefore does not provide guidance for long-term economic development.
443
 This perhaps is the 
reason why developing countries continue to struggle in their industrialization attempts. It 
appears as if the more they lower labour standards, the deeper they sink into the grave of 
economic failure. This might just be a reminder that having politicians pocketing a few dollars at 
the expense of the masses when TNCs are fast exhausting the mineral and human resources of 
these developing countries may not be a wise idea. Much of the money generated from the trade 
practices of TNCs does not often go to the governments of developing countries but to the 
countries of origin of the TNCs. So who is benefiting from low labour standards? 
Is it may be time for developing countries, especially poor countries in regions such as 
Southern Africa, to reconsider their approach to the trade labour-linkage debate? The theoretical 
and empirical evidence seems to suggest so.
444
 This chapter has shown that those who argue 
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“...the level of investment per se is of overriding importance (to any country) can be strongly contested”. 
Easterly in justifying his view observed that, “...both Nigeria and Hong Kong increased their physical capital 
stock per worker by over 250 per cent over the period 1960 to 1985.” The results of the investments in the two 
countries were different as, “Nigeria‟s output per worker rose by 12 per cent from 1960 to 1985, while Hong 
Kong‟s rose by 328 per cent.” See Lester et al 43.  What must be learnt from Easterly‟s argument is that, 
countries must not only invest but must measure the returns to their investments. Whilst the benefits for 
developing countries (as producers) are potentially high, it must be appreciated that free trade, on its own, 
regardless of the circumstances, will not generate rapid growth. There is need for macro-economic stability, good 
governance and higher investment in human and physical resources.  Governments must also work to ensure the 
profitability of exports with expanding their capacity for trade. Such a development is likely to improve the 
general welfare of their citizens.  
443
  These views as already alluded to in this chapter have been echoed by Lowenfeld, who whilst avoiding 
dismissing the relevance of the theory of comparative advantage in the contemporary world, exposes its inability 
to address issues such a market rates. See Lowenfeld 7-8. 
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against a trade-labour linkage do not dispute its usefulness but believe that there should be other 
methods employed until developing countries industrialize. It is worth questioning whether such 
is the appropriate route to development that is productive for developing countries. Already free 
trade has resulted in a fall of wages instead of the anticipated rise.
445
 The next chapter will 
undertake an analysis of the incorporation of social clauses in regional trade agreements. It will 
show that the principles envisaged in incorporating a social clause in the multilateral trade 
agreements is working in the regional system. Perhaps the integration of a social clause into 
regional trade agreements justifies the outcomes of the theoretical and empirical studies 
discussed in this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
444
  See Chartes and Mercurio 672. Chartes and Mercurio have argued that, “the imposition of fundamental worker 
rights can be pursued without necessarily injuring a nation‟s capacity to effectively export and trade with the 
world system. Furthermore, evidence suggests that many developing countries have (in taking a myopic view of 
a trade-labour linkage issue) completely ignored the benefits that acceptance of universal labour standards could 
bring and the correlative role that acceptance could play in the expansion of the world market...any comparative 
advantage gained by non-compliance with these standards is not advantage that should be shielded or trumped by 
liberalized trade.” 
445
  See WTO Understanding the WTO (2005) 8-13. It is not clear why trade in some developing countries should be 
related to low labour standards (including wages). The multilateral trading system has contributed significantly 
to economic growth, according to the WTO. If international trade can play a significant role in promoting 
economic development and the alleviation of poverty, why are developing countries (in particular African 
countries) not developing? Perhaps it could be a combination of poor policy options and pressure to implement 
policies which do not benefit them exerted by the international community. However it must be questioned 
whether developing countries do not have a choice to take their own decisions as sovereign nations. In all 
likelihood they do. Maybe they need to spend time in researching on policies which are suitable with their levels 
of development without dismissing initiatives such as a trade-labour linkage in multilateral trade. The spillovers 
of such arrangements could be of benefit to developing countries.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Incorporation of Social Clauses in Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements 
 
5 1  INTRODUCTION 
A lack of agreement within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) concerning the need to 
incorporate a social clause in the multilateral trade system has led to the adoption of other 
systems of addressing violations of core labour standards in international trade.
1
 Proposals to 
incorporate social clauses in trade negotiations receiving support from trade unions with 
employers opposing it have been part of the difference of opinion,
2
 whilst in an identical way, 
developed countries have been and are supporting the insertion of social clauses in trade 
agreements whereas the majority of developing countries led by fast developing countries such 
as China and India are against them.
3
 This difference in opinion has resulted in countries that are 
proponents of a trade-labour linkage in the international trade system resorting to unilateral, 
bilateral or regional trade agreements to include social clauses in their trade agreements.
4
  
Leading the agenda in favour of establishing a unilateral system of trade legislation as 
well as bilateral and regional trade agreements which contain a social clause has been the United 
States of America (US).
5
 The response to the US approach has been fairly positive as several 
countries in the world, developed or developing, have adopted the US model of incorporating a 
social clause when formulating their own bilateral or regional trade agreements.
6
 The US started 
the practice of including a social clause in its unilateral trade legislation in 1983 through a law on 
preferential trade and tax benefits with respect to Caribbean countries.
7
 This was followed in 
1984 by regulations known as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).
8
 In 1991, the US 
                                                          
 
1
  See Grandi “Trade and Labour: What is at Stake for Developing and Developed Countries?” 2011 Trade 
Negotiations Insights 10. 
2
  Grandi 10. 
3
  Ibid. 
4
  See Kolben “Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade 
and Labour Regimes” 2007 Harvard International Law Journal 213. 
5
  Kolben 213. 
6
  Ibid. 
7
  See the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983. 
8
  See Grandi “Trade Agreements and their Relation to Labour Standards: The Current Situation” 2009 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 7. The GSPs are guidelines developed by 
individual developed countries whose application is meant for the exclusive benefit of developing countries. 
GSPs are thus unilateral and not reciprocal. See also Kolben 2007 Harvard International Law Journal 213. 
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also passed a law on Preferential Trade in relation to Andean countries
9
 which had as its 
objective, the recognition of core labour standards in trade practices between the US and the 
Andean countries. The rationale for such legislation was that in order for a signatory country to 
be entitled to benefits originating from a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), such country had to 
initially comply with internationally recognised labour rights namely, prohibition of all forced or 
obligatory labour,
10
 the right to organise and collective bargaining,
11
 the right to association,
12
 
minimum age for employment of children
13
 and minimum working conditions in relation to 
minimum wage,
14
 working hours,
15
 health and occupational safety.
16
  
 This chapter seeks to explore the proposal for incorporating social clauses into unilateral, 
bilateral and regional trade systems. Possibly, this approach could be important in driving 
forward efforts to strengthen proposals for incorporating a social clause into the multilateral 
trade system of the WTO or equally for rejecting such proposals. Emphasis will be placed on the 
legal mechanisms employed in dealing with parties to unilateral, bilateral or regional trade 
arrangements which do not comply with core labour standards as envisaged in the FTAs. The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has a defined legal mechanism in this 
regard, will be critically analysed as regards its dispute resolution mechanism. Such legal 
mechanisms and the resultant case law emanating from the implementation of the North 
American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), may possibly assist in addressing how 
the uniform recognition of core labour standards could be achieved in a world with unequal trade 
partners and where the possibility of sanctions is involved.  
If in practice, the inclusion of a social clause in bilateral or regional trade agreements is 
regarded as a functional legal mechanism for both developed and developing countries, it could 
form the basis for developing such a legal mechanism into a universally applicable instrument 
whose framework emanates from the bilateral or regional trade system. It is essential to observe 
that most of the developed and developing countries which have been entering into the bilateral 
                                                          
 
9
  See the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991. The Andean countries are Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. 
10
  ILO Conventions 29 and 182. 
11
  ILO Conventions 98 and 154. 
12
  ILO Convention 87. 
13
  ILO Convention 138. 
14
  ILO Convention 131. 
15
  ILO Convention C001. 
16
  ILO Conventions 155, 161 and 187. 
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and regional trade arrangements to be analysed in this chapter, are members of the WTO. This 
chapter will thus attempt to provide answers relating to the key question of why, regardless of 
their inequalities, developed and developing countries are entering into bilateral and regional 
trade agreements which are modeled after the WTO multilateral trade system, when the WTO 
cannot achieve the same objective. The difficulties faced in including a social clause in the 
bilateral and regional trade agreements will also be assessed and weighed against their 
advantages. The chapter begins with an analysis of the inclusion of social clauses in the 
unilateral trade legislation system of the US. 
 
5 2  THE US UNILATERAL TRADE LEGISLATION SYSTEM  
The US has developed a wide range of unilateral trade legislation that specifies special trade 
benefits and other economic incentives to developing countries which comply with specified 
labour requirements in their trade practices.
17
 The US unilateral trade legislation system has in 
turn led to the drafting of GSPs
18
. The GSPs, as Compa and Vogt observed, have since become 
the main unilateral conditionality arrangement in US trade legislation for trading with developing 
countries.
19
 The GSP legislation requires that for a country to be selected as a beneficiary, the US 
President should initially ascertain whether or not such a country is taking the necessary steps to 
give its workers internationally recognised workers rights.
20
 Should the US President consider 
that a country is doing so, the US may then extend special tariff reductions above and beyond the 
standard Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff levels agreed to in the WTO.
21
  
                                                          
 
17
  See section 2191(a) of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which governs loans granted by the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation and the so called “301 Legislation” in section 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) which 
designates violations of workers‟ rights as a form of unfair trade practice. 
18
  Kolben 2007 Harvard International Law Journal 213. 
19
  See Compa and Vogt “Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20 Year Review” 2001 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 199.  
20
 19 United States Code (USC) section 2462(c)(7) (2000). See also 19 USC section 2467(4) (2000 and 
Supplementary of 2002) which define internationally recognized worker rights as including the right of 
association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
compulsory labour, a minimum age for the employment of children, and a prohibition on the worst forms of 
child labour and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational 
safety and health.” 
21
  This approach may be problematic in the current global era as there are now debates on whether MFN clauses in 
bilateral trade agreements include only substantive rules or procedural rules of protection as well. See McClure 
and Smith “Most Favoured Nation Clauses-No favoured View on how they should be Interpreted” 
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It is questionable whether such an approach may be properly viewed as being transparent 
for the incorporation of a social clause in the multilateral trade system. As a matter of fact, one 
may regard it as being somewhat illegal by nature. It is especially doubtful whether a sole 
President, regardless of whether he is advised or not, would reach a decision which is not 
politically motivated. This could present a flaw in the US GSP system. However, it is important 
to observe that the US‟s GSP arrangement does not follow after the WTO MFN principles and is 
a different approach from the latter which usually considers differential tariff treatment between 
WTO members illegal.
22
 Also, the US is not the only country that uses the GSP system to 
promote the recognition of core labour standards in trade practices. The European Union (EU) 
has also included labour standards as conditionality in its own GSP system.
23
 The EU GSP 
system is nevertheless different from the US GSP system. The EU GSP system requires that the 
beneficiary country must apply for special incentives with the European Council determining if 
the applicant complies with the requirements of the EU GSP system whereas the US GSP 
requires that the President decides on the eligibility of a beneficiary country.
24
 Whilst these 
systems are in place, it is important to establish their value. There appears to be some uncertainty 
concerning the efficiency of GSP systems in upholding core labour standards in trade practices. 
A fair measure of debate on the issue exists. A discussion of some of the criticisms advanced 
against the GSP systems follows. 
5 2 1  Analysis of the US and EU GSP arrangements  
The US GSP system, according to Kolben, has had little impact, if any at all, in improving 
workers‟ rights in Central America.25 Frundt had also argued that the results of the use of the US 
GSP system in protecting core labour standards had not been overwhelming at all.
26
 Frundt and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/07/25/most-favoured-nation-clauses-%E2%80%93-no-favoured-
view-on-how-they-should-be-interpreted/ (accessed 02-02-2012). 
22
  See Article 1 of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
23
  See Article 9(1)(a) of the EU Council Regulation 980/2005, Applying a Scheme of Generalized Tariff 
Preferences, 2005 O.J. (L169) 1. The EU GSP system however is slightly different from the US GSP system in 
that it creates an incentive program for beneficiary countries that grants additional tariff incentives, called 
“special incentives” if the country intended to benefit has ratified and implemented a list of specified human and 
labour rights conventions as provided for in Annexure III part A of the EU Council Regulation. 
24
  See Article 10(1) and (2) of the EU Council Regulation. 
25
  Kolben 2007 Harvard International Law Journal 214. 
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Kolben‟s views are strengthened by the results of attempts made to try and address Workers‟ 
Rights Petitions filed under the US GSP system in 2005 where ten were denied after review, one 
was decided, and one was afforded further review.
27
 Compa and Vogt had also observed that 
there had only been one hundred US GSP labour rights petitions filed from the time of the 
inception of the US GSP system in relation to core labour standards and trade practices.
28
 Of the 
one hundred, thirteen were suspended, while seventeen were placed on temporary extension with 
continuing review.
29
  
Special mention is also made of the US-Bangladesh case of the year 2000 when the US 
attempted to compel Bangladesh to authorize collective bargaining and trade unions in its Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) whereas both had been made unlawful by the Bangladesh 
government.
30
 The US threatened to withdraw GSP benefits from Bangladesh if it did not 
authorize collective bargaining and trade unions in its EPZs.
31
 Despite the demands from the US, 
Bangladesh rejected the former‟s proposals to make any alterations to its laws until 2004, when it 
finally passed a law providing for transitional Workers Representation and Welfare Committees, 
which did not have full collective bargaining rights.
32
 Even though collective bargaining rights 
were granted,
33
 the ILO found that workers in Bangladesh‟s EPZs were deprived of a range of 
other freedoms that are inherent in the right of freedom of association.
34
 Furthermore, the 
operation of the transitional Workers Representation and Welfare Committees was extremely 
difficult, with reports that the EPZ officials prohibited members of these Committees from 
meeting with outside unions or with Committees at other factories, and that they intimidated and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
26
  See Frundt Trade Conditions and Labor Rights (2001) 100. Frundt argues, for example, that pressure from GSP 
petitions helped El Salvador effect some positive changes in the labour code, but that it made little difference in 
enforcement.  
27
  Office of the US “Trade Representative, Results of the 2005 Annual Review of the Generalized System of 
Preferences”http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Development/Preference_Programs/GSP/asset_upload_file909_9
601.pdf. (accessed 22-01-2012). 
28
  Compa and Vogt 208. 
29
  Compa and Vogt 209. 
30
  Kolben 214. 
31
  Ibid. 
32
  See the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Workers‟ Associations and Industrial Relations Act 
(BEPZWAIRA) No. 23 of 2004. 
33
  See Article 45 of the BEPZWAIRA. 
34
  ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations “Individual Observation 
Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention 1948 (No. 87) 
Bangladesh (ratification: 1972) (2006)” http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/gbe/ceacr2006.htm. (accessed 25-02-2012). 
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abused workers attempting to elect Workers Representation and Welfare Committees.
35
 
Strangely, in spite of this ongoing problem, which the US made a particular attempt to address 
with Bangladesh, the US did not withdraw the GSP privilege from Bangladesh and is yet to do 
so, which is evidence of double standards on the part of the US.
36
 
It is also important to observe that the enforcement of the labour provisions in the US 
GSP system is entirely optional on the part of the implementing country.
37
 The implication of 
this observation is that determinations in respect of the US GSP system are founded primarily on 
political grounds rather than on the merits of an individual case or on any conception of due 
process.
38
 The probable result of such an arrangement is that in a political climate where labour 
rights promotion is not a priority, GSP petitions will be given little or no hearing at all.
39
 To 
illustrate a case in point, the American Federation of Labour and Confederation of Industrial 
Organizations (AFLCIO)
40
 appealed to the US Trade Representative (USTR)
41
 to hold the 
Democratic Republic of China liable for engaging in unfair trade practices, because of its lack of 
enforcement of internationally recognized core labour rights.
42
 This was the second appeal in as 
many years after the first one had been rejected by the Executive branch without so much as an 
investigation, on the basis that initiating an investigation would not further the US 
administration‟s efforts to improve workers‟ rights in China.43 Regardless of these negative 
developments, there is a positive case of US GSP operation in the form of the Dominican 
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  See section 6 of the US Department of State Bangladesh: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005. 
36
  Kolben 2007 Harvard International Law Journal 215. 
37
  Ibid. 
38
  Compa and Vogt 235. 
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  Kolben 215. 
40
  See Kaminski “What Labor Wants” 2009 Wall Street Journal. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), commonly AFLCIO, is a national trade union center, the largest 
federation of unions in the US, made up of 56 national and international unions, together representing more than 
11 million workers, as of June 2008.  It was formed in 1955 when the AFL and the CIO merged after a long 
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41
  See Masterson International Trademarks and Copyright: Enforcement and Management (2004) 18. The Office 
of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is the United States government agency responsible for 
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42
 See Section 301 Petition of American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations  
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/china_petition.pdf. (accessed 28-02-2012). 
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Republic in which US GSP demands assisted in influencing unions organizing, which led to 
higher wages and higher labour standards for workers in the Dominican Republic.
44
  
 The EU GSP system, like the US GSP system, is also totally discretionary on the part of 
the implementing country.
45
 The determinations are also grounded more on political grounds 
than they are on the merits of an individual case or on any conception of due process as is the 
case with the US GSP system.
46
 However, Compa and Vogt argue that the EU‟s GSP system is 
entirely discriminatory in its implementation.
47
 Even a country like Colombia, mentioned by 
human rights organizations and the ILO as being one of the countries in which basic labour and 
human rights are largely violated,
48
 is one of the present beneficiaries of the EU GSP system.
49
  
The GSP determinations are in general biased, with the aim and incorporation of labour 
provisions in domestic trade legislation not being subject to negotiation between the 
implementing country and the beneficiary.
50
 This deficiency in terms of the lack of a negotiated 
practice that is rooted in consent is especially challenging if an impartial application of a social 
clause in trade is to be accomplished in line with the goals of enhanced, sustainable labour rights 
enforcement adapted to the needs of a specific country‟s state of affairs.51 It is elements such as 
the lack of consultation and negotiation that usually prompt disapproval from developing 
countries,
52
 in the framework of the WTO.
53
 India has unsuccessfully challenged the legality of 
such legislation in the WTO.
54
 Regardless of the challenges faced in unilateral trade legislation 
concerning the social clause, it is still important to note that unilateral trade legislation is 
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distinctively centred on changes made by countries in incorporating certain labour and human 
rights conventions and standards into national law, and then ascertaining whether or not they are 
being enforced.
55
 Such a restricted focus on state action, mostly in the context of low 
enforcement countries with poor regulatory ability, is not optimal.
56
  
As Kolben observed, unilateral legislative approaches to trade and labour linkage are, too 
fixed, like other methods of linkage, on state enforcement of labour law; unsuccessful in 
engaging the beneficiary states in a significant participatory course of action; are not very useful 
in significant development of working conditions; and usually fall short of achieving material 
advancement in labour rights enforcement by states.
57
 However, the challenges faced in 
implementing the GSP system in relation to labour rights and trade cannot be regarded as the end 
of all proposals to incorporate a social clause in trade agreements. Developed on the basis of the 
US GSP system has been the possibility of including trade sanctions in bilateral or regional trade 
agreements. The US has also been enthusiastically promoting the inclusion of labour agreements 
in its trade negotiations, a legal mechanism which is discussed below.  
5 3  BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Bilateral and regional trade agreements have materialized into a genuine legal option for linking 
core labour standards to trade practices. Bilateral and regional trade agreements can be defined 
as contracts between two or more countries (in respect of the later), usually but not necessarily in 
close geographical proximity.
58
 The US has included labour rights provisions in most, if not all, 
of its negotiated bilateral and regional trade agreements.
59
 The agreements rely on the so called 
“State Action-State Sanctions Model”, as against focusing on the governments‟ enforcement of 
labour law to protect core labour standards in trade practices.
60
 The “State Action-State 
Sanctions Model” has been implemented in the NAFTA entered into by Canada, Mexico and the 
US, through a side agreement called the NAALC.
61
 The NAALC appears to have laid down the 
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framework for labour rights conditionality in future trade agreements by instituting the so called 
“enforce-your-own-labour-law-model”.62 An analysis of the NAALC follows. 
5 3 1 The NAALC 
The NAALC provides signatory countries with a comprehensive system of filing grievances with 
country contact points to claim that a signatory country has failed in enforcing its own domestic 
labour law.
63
 Although each country consents to ensuring that its labour laws and regulations 
afford high labour standards,
64
 and strives to develop those standards,
65
 the dispute resolution 
process will possibly be regarded as only addressing a very limited issue of whether or not a 
country is enforcing its own domestic labour law in the areas of occupational safety and health, 
child labour, and minimum wage laws.
66
 In trying to describe the manner in which the NAALC 
operates, Verge stated that: 
“Parties to the NAALC brought to the agreement labour regulation systems that had 
developed out of their respective national traditions. These systems had both civil law and 
common law backgrounds. Constitutional differences prevented legislative jurisdiction 
from being as centralized in Canada as in the other two nations, and made the effects of 
international treaties felt less directly than in those countries. The NAALC accepted these 
national labour regulatory systems with their respective peculiarities, did not question 
potential comparative advantages that could derive from them, and relied on their effective 
enforcement and development based on the expected contribution from trinational free 
trade. As was the case with NAFTA, it did not guarantee transboundary mobility of 
workers.”67 
 
The NAALC provides for collaboration amongst the Parties to the agreement to ensure that the 
economic possibilities presented by NAFTA convert into human resources development, better 
working conditions and higher standards of living in their particular countries.
68
 The safeguard of 
workers‟ fundamental rights is presented as an element of the high productivity economy that the 
countries which are party to the NAALC are seeking.
69
 This clarifies the relevance of two 
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fundamental obligations assumed by the signatories: to make constant efforts to advance labour 
law and find ways to “provide for high labour standards, consistent with high quality and 
productivity workplaces”,70 on the one hand, and to “promote compliance with and effectively 
enforce its labour law”,71 on the other, whilst giving due observance to their legislative and 
jurisdictional independence.
72
 The basis for the contemplated labour law is fairly comprehensive 
and matches generally with the eleven labour principles protected in the NAALC.
73
  
Part Two of the NAALC lays out the countries‟ obligations. At first, the NAALC 
presents a broad scope of the countries‟ obligations. It provides that whilst confirming “full 
respect for each country‟s constitution,” in this case their autonomy, each country “shall ensure 
that its labour laws and regulations provide for high labour standards, consistent with high 
quality and productivity workplaces, and continue to strive to improve those standards in that 
light.”74 Other provisions of the NAALC outline the administrative or governmental processes of 
upholding conformity with and in effect implementing domestic labour law
75
; the necessity to 
permit persons with a legally acknowledged interest the right to use administrative, quasi-
judicial, judicial or labour tribunals for the enforcement of labour law
76
; the essential procedural 
assurances that these bodies have to make available
77
 and the wide-ranging obligations 
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conditional on the publication and dissemination of national standards linked to the contents of 
the NAALC.
78
  
Part Three of the NAALC entitled “Commission for Labour Cooperation,” sets up the 
different institutions for the operation of the NAALC, both at the trinational level and in each of 
the countries. The Commission for Labour Cooperation, first and foremost, is the principal body 
to take note of in the NAALC.
79
 It is made up partly of a governing body, the Council, which 
consists of the NAALC Parties‟ labour ministers.80 This Council generally has the duty to 
oversee the operation of the NAALC and establishing priorities for cooperative action, 
facilitating country-to-country discussions and attending to issues and disputes concerning the 
interpretation and enforcement of the NAALC, and promoting the generation of comparable data 
on labour standards and labour market indicators.
81
  
Also incorporated in the Commission for Labour Cooperation is a Secretariat, which aids 
the Council in executing its obligations and is led by an Executive Director.
82
 A cooperation 
centre called a National Administrative Office (NAO) should also be set up by each of the 
countries that is party to the NAALC, at the level of its central government, to sustain relations 
with the NAOs of the other parties and the Commission‟s Secretariat.83 Each NAO is mandated 
to provide for the submission and receipt, and regularly issue a record of public communications 
on labour law taking place in another country‟s territory84 and must re-evaluate the issues raised 
in the public communications, accordingly.
85
 The establishment of National Advisory 
Committees (NACs) is also provided for by the NAALC.
86
 The NACs consist of private labour-
related bodies and representatives of central and local governments, to give advice to the 
NAALC Parties concerning the operation and progress of the NAALC.
87
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Also in the NAALC is a “Cooperative Consultations and Evaluations” provision found in 
Part Four. The Cooperative Consultations and Evaluations provision initially establishes the 
NAALC Parties‟ general obligation which is to undertake to agree on the interpretation and 
implementation of the NAALC and endeavouring to resolve any issue that may impinge on its 
processes through co-operation and consultations.
88
 As a result, consultations may be done 
amongst the NAOs in relation to the other country‟s labour law, its management or labour 
market state of affairs.
89
 A similar approach is taken with regards to ministerial consultations 
about any subject in the scope of the NAALC.
90
 Should the subject remain undecided after 
ministerial consultations, a study and recommendations from an Evaluation Committee of 
Experts (ECE) established specifically for this reason, may be used.
91
 This non-adversarial 
external intervention might be used at least in regard to “patterns of practice” by one of the 
parties concerning any of the eleven labour principles in the NAALC aside from those associated 
with freedom of association, the right to bargaining collectively or to strike, or certain other 
conditions.
92
 The NAALC also stipulates the rules of procedure for the ECEs.
93
 
Dispute Resolution is dealt with in Part Five of the NAALC. Regrettably, the NAALC‟s 
dispute resolution only deals with the enforcement of a country‟s occupational safety and health, 
the employment of minors or minimum wage legislation and regulations as already pointed out 
in this chapter.
94
 A country which is signatory to the NAALC can call for consultations with the 
country pointed out by the ECE‟s report subsequent to its appearance before the Council.95 The 
countries will then pursue a joint and reasonable resolution of their dispute.
96
 Should this not 
succeed, one of the countries may then ask for the intercession of the Council.
97
 Assuming that 
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the countries fail again at this level to reach an agreement, an arbitral panel will be set up under 
extremely specific conditions and procedures, by a two-thirds vote.
98
  
In the event that the arbitral panel maintains that there is a “persistent pattern of failure by 
the Party complained against” subsequent to the study,99 the countries can consent to pursue a 
satisfactory plan of action which usually goes along with the findings and recommendations of 
the arbitral panel which may establish a plan of action if none is available.
100
 An inability to 
implement the findings and recommendations of the arbitral panel could lead to a monetary 
enforcement assessment by the arbitral panel, which, as per the directives of the Council, should 
be used in improving or enhancing labour law enforcement in the country complained against.
101
 
Inability to pay the monetary enforcement assessment can then result in the complaining 
countries suspending the application of the NAALC‟s benefits up to an amount equal to the 
monetary enforcement assessment, except in the case of Canada, in which the execution of the 
resolution of the arbitral panel will be imposed through an order of a national court of competent 
jurisdiction.
102
 
Part Six of the NAALC contains several general provisions, such as those excluding the 
application of the labour law of one country in the territory of another
103
 and the right of action 
under the domestic law of any country against another country that acted in a manner contrary to 
the NAALC,
104
 as well as other definitions. The NAALC‟s Part Seven then sets out various final 
provisions, including the entry into force of the agreement on the 1st of January 1994, the 
possibility of other countries acceding to the agreement or for any country to withdraw from the 
agreement upon six months‟ written notice, and the official character of the texts of the NAALC 
in French, English and Spanish. Lastly, Annexure 46 of the NAALC establishes the extent to 
which the agreement gives rise to public communications and provides for modes of cooperative 
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consultations and evaluations, as well as for the resolution of disputes against Canada, or at its 
request, with regard to the scope of central or provincial government participation in the 
agreement.  
5 3 2  The Legal Context of the Countries which are Signatories to the NAALC 
The frameworks of labour law in each of the three countries which are signatories to the NAALC 
are unique in a number of areas, a feature which highly influences both the adoption and 
enforcement of legislation in these countries.
105
 Some of the principal areas of difference are 
discussed below.  
 
5 3 2 1 Disparities in the labour market regulatory framework in countries that are parties to 
the NAALC  
In the US, the moment the working environment is held to be linked with interstate trade, 
jurisdiction automatically rests with the federal government.
106
 At this point, the federal 
government‟s legislation supersedes, if need be, state legislation which might have been 
applicable up to that instant.
107
 Federal law‟s application is reliant, in principle, on a federal 
order that is different at both the administrative and judicial stages.
108
 On the other hand in 
Mexico, the Mexican Constitution confers on the Federal Congress special power to legislate in 
the area of labour.
109
 Nonetheless, the implementation of labour law is left to the authorities of 
Mexico‟s thirty-one States, apart from instances when a specific number of major economic 
sectors such as the petrochemical industry or the railway system are concerned.
110
  
A different state of affairs from that presented by the US and Mexico exists in Canada. 
The power to legislate in the field of labour is delegated to Canada‟s ten provinces111 although 
the central Parliament, at the national level, maintains its exclusive jurisdiction in cases where 
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federal enterprises are concerned.
112
 The key economic areas in Canada, such as interprovincial 
and international transport, broadcasting as well as banking all have their own administrative and 
legal regulatory bodies in the labour area. Such a constitutional separation of administrative and 
legislative jurisdiction in the labour field meant that NAALC signatories had to consider the 
involvement of provincial authorities in the application of the NAALC in Canada.
113
 Ordinary 
tribunals in Canada however retain a general power to intervene in labour matters, at both the 
federal and provincial levels, to the extent that the legislature has not granted authority to a 
specific body that it has formed.
114
 
The legal context in which labour law is implemented under the NAALC differs from one 
nation to another.
115
 In practice, such a phenomenon generates considerable and well recognized 
disparities in the relative value given to the different sources of law, legislation, judicial 
authority, doctrine and, in general, in the spirit in which the law is applied.
116
 Mexico is 
governed through the principle of civil law tradition,
117
 while in both the US
118
 and Canada,
119
 
common law reigns.
 There is however an exception as regards one of Canada‟s provinces, 
Quebec, where civil law applies to issues of private law.
120
 For this reason, the degree of judicial 
interference when faced with interpretation challenges concerning the text of a piece of 
legislation may, depending on the circumstances, be established in an extra liberal manner in one 
system, more often than not in the common law system, than in another.
121
 
The national systems also do not give the same treatment to international labour law. The 
dualist position of Canadian law could allow it to easily embrace international labour standards 
in the sense that its international obligations are binding on domestic law no more than to the 
                                                          
 
112
  See sections 91, 93(4), 94, 100, 106 and 132 of the Constitution Act of Canada 1867. 
113
  See annexure 46 of the NAALC. 
114
  See annexure 46 of the NAALC. For a brief summary of jurisdictions in the labour area in each of the three 
countries, see also a study of the Washington Commission for Labour Cooperation “Labour relations law in 
North America” 2000 36 (Canada), 110 (Mexico) and 182 (US). 
115
  See Washington Commission for Labour Cooperation “Labour Relations Law in North America” 39 (Canada), 
113 (Mexico) and 183 (US). 
116
  See Collins “„A Considerable Surgical Operation‟: Article lll, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal 
Courts” 2010 Duke Law Journal 291. 
117
  See Vargas “Mexico and its Legal System” http://www.llrx.com/mexicolegalsystem.htm (accessed 01-03-2012). 
118
  See Lieberman Milestones! 200 Years of American Law: Milestones in Our Legal History (1976) 16. 
119
  See Canadian Department of Justice “Where Our Legal System Comes From: The Common-Law Tradition” 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/just/03.html (accessed 01-03-2012). 
120
  See the Civil Code of Quebec 1865. 
121
  See the Washington Commission for Labour Cooperation 39 (Canada), 113 (Mexico), and 183 (US). 
200 
 
degree that the competent federal or provincial legislator translates this obligation into national 
law by legislating accordingly.
122
 On the other hand, in the US, if the international law to be 
adopted is self-executing, depending on the tribunal, it will supersede the constitutional or 
legislative State law and co-exist with legislative federal law, but will be subject to the federal 
constitutional law.
123
 In the case of Mexico, there appears to be a consensus to the effect that 
international law co-exists on the same footing with federal legislation.
124
 Nevertheless, there are 
some uncertainties concerning the resolution of conflicts between the two types of 
mechanisms.
125
 In practice, these general variations expose the likelihood of a disproportionate 
domestic scope for an international obligation adopted by the US, Canada and Mexico.
126
 To a 
large extent, the disparities in the national situations with respect to international labour law are 
evidently directly correlated to the same countries‟ conduct in relation to the NAALC as a form 
of international law.
127
  
As a result, the obligation assumed by each of the signatory countries to the NAALC to 
promote compliance with and effectively enforce its “labour law”128 objectively refers to a given 
set of national “laws and regulations”.129 This does not however stop the said set of laws and 
regulations from being given a wider or narrower interpretation insofar as, in its own judicial 
system, the country in question recognizes a certain creative contribution to the jurisprudence 
from its tribunals, as well as an effect in its domestic law of the international commitments it 
undertakes through treaties.
130
 Concerning legislated national law in the US, Canada and 
Mexico, they accepted it at the time of the agreement as a useful system of labour law in each 
relevant jurisdiction.
131
 This does not stop the domestic labour laws from assuming a distinctive 
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approach to different labour facets, whether it is legislation governing collective labour relations 
or legislation directly establishing labour conditions based on the pertinent social and political 
history.
132
 
5 4  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NAALC 
Focusing on the application of domestic labour laws, the NAALC was not well received by US 
and Canadian trade unions.
133
 Such a development is largely credited to the fact that the NAALC 
does not provide for a central body charged with correcting violations of labour standards.
134
 
Moreover, the NAALC‟s sanctions only assure respect for laws relating to child labour, health 
and safety at work and minimum wage.
135
 In essence, these are the only labour matters in the 
agreement that can be brought before the arbitration panel. Issues related to collective bargaining 
can only be subject to ministerial consultation.
136
 Regardless of this criticism, the Confederation 
of Mexican Workers appeared content with the NAALC since the agreement observes national 
sovereignty.
137
 However, it is fascinating to note that although there have been a number of cases 
of co-operative consultations under the NAALC provisions, hardly any cases have gone further 
than the ECE level,
138
 let alone coming before the arbitration panel.
139
 To get an in-depth 
understanding of the effectiveness of the NAALC it is necessary to study its dispute resolution 
process and the cases that have been with dealt under its system. 
5 4 1  The NAALC dispute resolution procedure 
As already indicated in this chapter, the scope of the dispute resolution mechanism and process 
in the NAALC is extremely limited. The NAALC‟s dispute resolution procedure deals only with 
a specific set of labour principles which relate to the technical labour standards concerning 
occupational safety and health, employment security, the employment of minors and the 
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minimum wage.
140
 The scope of the questions dealt with the dispute resolution process is also 
not as wide. The questions must only relate to a “persistent pattern of failure” by a Party to 
“effectively enforce” one of the standards.141 The question must also be “trade-related” and be 
“covered by mutually recognized labour laws”.142 This debatable process begins with efforts to 
resolve the dispute in accordance with the common intention of the NAALC.
143
 After, the ECE 
submits its final report to the Council, any Party may, in writing, request a round of consultations 
with the Party complained against.
144
  
A third Party may also participate in these consultations.
145
 Then, “the Parties involved in 
the consultations will do their utmost to reach a mutually satisfactory solution by means of 
consultations”.146 If the Parties fail to achieve a settlement within sixty days or any other 
mutually agreed deadline, any of the Parties may in writing request an extraordinary session of 
the Council, which will, if necessary, call on experts or the conciliation or mediation machinery 
to help them “reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute”.147 If the case cannot be 
resolved within sixty days of the Council meeting, one of the Parties may request this body to 
call for the convening of an arbitral panel.
148
 
There are some special considerations when convening an arbitration panel. First of all, it 
is difficult to explain the limits of its material or substantive jurisdiction.
149
 Insofar as the first 
three labour principles are excluded,
150
 the observations made with regard to their exclusion from 
the scope of the preceding intervention of the ECE apply here as well.
151
 As for the additional 
exclusion of the technical labour standards, such as the general prohibition of forced labour; 
different minimum employment standards with the exception of the minimum wage; the 
elimination of discrimination in employment; equal pay for men and women; prevention of 
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occupational injuries and illnesses; compensation for these conditions, and protection of migrant 
workers, their importance is obvious, either from a humanistic perspective, because of their 
effects on workers‟ conditions or in terms of the healthy competition that should prevail in 
trinational trade exchanges. It should be added that the signatories to the NAALC were careful to 
specify that the inclusion of the employment of minors within the jurisdiction of arbitration did 
not include the establishment of labour standards and minimum wage in this respect.
152
 
The NAALC signatories also specified that “a Party has not failed to effectively enforce 
its occupational safety and health, child labour or minimum wage technical labour standards” 
when the action or inaction by agencies or officials “reflects a reasonable exercise of their 
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters; or 
results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of other labour 
matters determined to have higher priorities”.153 Chronologically, the arbitration stage does not 
follow immediately after the initial ministerial consultations; it is reached only after the 
intervention of an ECE, and of the other consultation stages that follow it, unless one of the 
Parties requests it, and after all the related deadlines have run out.
154
 The dispute resolution 
procedures differ in this respect from those of NAFTA and the Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation,
155
 which allow for more immediate access to the arbitration stage.
156
  
The same is true of the general procedural rules of the FTA signed by the US and Jordan 
in 2000, which also apply to its labour component.
157
 The establishing of a special panel requires 
a two-thirds vote by the members of the Council.
158
 In practice, this means it requires the 
cooperation of the third Party to support the request of the requesting Party.
159
 The outcome of 
the request thus depends on political considerations on the part of this third Party (which will not 
be insensitive to the attitude that the Party complained against might take to it in similar 
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circumstances).
160
 The fact that, after several years of applying the NAALC, not a single 
controversy is yet likely to arise and that, if it did, there are a number of opportunities for the 
Parties to settle it before deciding to set up a panel, reduces the utility here of a detailed 
reiteration of the relatively numerous and long provisions of the NAALC concerning the 
intervention of an arbitration panel.
161
  
An arbitration panel consists of five members.
162
 The NAALC stipulates that the Council 
shall establish a roster of up to forty-five individuals who are willing and able to serve as 
panelists.
163
 These persons must meet the requirements of independence, knowledge and 
appropriate experience.
164
 They are appointed by consensus for a period of three years.
165
 
Individuals shall be eligible for a given panel only if they have not previously intervened in the 
case as a member of an ECE, or as a conciliator, mediator or expert at the request of the Council; 
they must also have no personal or affiliated interest in the dispute.
166
 The NAALC sets out the 
procedure for selecting the chair in the event the Parties fail to agree.
167
 The Council must 
establish model rules of procedure for arbitration.
168
 A third Party may participate in the 
arbitration process,
169
 and the arbitration panel may also consult experts.
170
 Within one hundred 
and eighty days following the appointment of its final member, the arbitration panel presents a 
preliminary report to the Parties.
171
 In the event it determines there has been a failure on the part 
of the Party complained against in connection with the subject of the arbitration, it makes 
recommendations to resolve the conflict and normally recommends that the Party adopt and 
implement an action plan “sufficient to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement”.172  
The report may also contain observations from one of the disputing Parties, which could 
lead the arbitration panel to reconsider its report. Individual members of the arbitration panel 
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may furnish separate opinions on matters not unanimously agreed.
173
 Within sixty days after the 
presentation of the preliminary report, the arbitration panel shall issue a final report, unless the 
contending parties decide otherwise.
174
 The Parties transmit the final report to the Council in a 
confidential manner within fifteen days of receiving the report, and the Council publishes it 
within the next five days.
175
 If the arbitration panel finds that there has been a pattern of failure, 
the Parties may agree on a plan of action that is mutually satisfactory, which normally shall 
conform to the recommendations of the arbitration panel, and report this outcome to the 
Secretariat and the Council.
176
 If these steps are not taken within sixty days of the release of the 
final report, the arbitration panel, reconvened at the request of any of the contesting Parties, shall 
approve an action plan proposed by the Party complained against or an alternative one.
177
 
The arbitration panel may also meet again at the request of a contesting Party if, in its 
opinion, the Party complained against is not fully implementing the mandatory plan.
178
 If the 
arbitration panel is convinced that this is the case, it imposes a monetary assessment for non-
enforcement.
179
 This monetary assessment shall not exceed a percentage (0.007%) of the total 
trade of goods between the Parties during the last year for which information is available.
180
 The 
amount assessed takes various considerations into account, particularly the duration of the 
pattern of failure by the Party, the resources available to it, and its efforts to start correcting the 
pattern of failure since publication of the final report.
181
 The payment of the assessment does not 
release the Party from the obligation to comply with the action plan.
182
 The Party deposits the 
assessment in a fund established by the Council to “improve or enhance the labour law 
enforcement in the Party complained against, consistent with its law”.183 Thus, unlike a fine, the 
assessment lacks any punitive purposes. In fact, the assessment benefits the Party that paid it, 
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since it serves to enhance the enforcement of its labour law, consistent with its law.
184
 The 
NAALC does not, however, provide for a method of monitoring the legitimacy of the final 
disposition of the funds by the Party that disbursed them. 
If a Party fails to pay the monetary assessment within one hundred and eighty days 
following the decision of the panel, the complaining Party or Parties may suspend “the 
application to the Party complained against of NAFTA benefits to an amount no greater than that 
sufficient to collect the monetary enforcement assessment”.185 At this ultimate stage, the 
systematic failure to apply a technical labour standard produces a penalty that is directly tied to 
transnational trade.
186
 However, this is not the case with Canada, since this country has rejected 
any trade sanctions against it.
187
 In this case, compliance with the action and payment of the 
monetary assessment are ensured by a court order issued by the domestic court seized of the 
dispute.
188
 
The efficiency of the monetary judgment in assuring the enforcement of the national 
labour law is not certain. The extent and diversity of steps that must be passed through before 
attaining access to it makes the result far from definite. Should this point be attained, one may 
query whether the methods of compulsion used have the potential to engender the approach of 
collaboration and consultation that should normally control the carrying out of the NAALC. It is 
furthermore important that one of the later labour cooperation agreements attached to a trade 
liberalization agreement, the April 2001 Costa Rica-Canada agreement, specifically disqualified 
resort to fines or any measure affecting trade to implement conformity with the conclusions and 
recommendations of the arbitration panel. Under the Costa Rica-Canada agreement, the 
complaining Party is entitled to take reasonable and appropriate measures to encourage the other 
Party to remedy that persistent pattern, in keeping with the panel‟s determinations and 
recommendation. As a result, diverse types of constructive actions can be foreseen.  
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5 4 2 Free Trade Agreements that have included the social clause 
 
5 4 2 1 US-Cambodia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
The first agreement to incorporate labour rights concerns into its framework was the US-
Cambodian Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement,
189
 which provided a quota incentive to Cambodia 
if its garment industry working conditions were found to “substantially comply” with the 
Cambodian Labour Code and, by extension, international labour law.
190
 Notably, the focus 
changed from state-level enforcement to an assessment of firm-level and industry-level 
compliance.
191
 There had to be prior certification by the ILO of compliance with basic labour 
standards.
192
 Initially there was some debate as to whether the ILO could accede to such requests 
but doubts were finally dispelled when the ILO agreed to participate in the project, an indicator 
that the ILO could also be willing to assist in the implementation of a social clause in trade 
agreements.
193
 The US-Cambodia agreement signified a short-lived break in the State Action-
State Sanctions approach of the NAALC.
194
 However, the State Action-State Sanctions model of 
the NAALC was to be implemented in a free trade agreement that the US signed with Jordan a 
few months after the US-Cambodia agreement.
195
 
5 4 2 2 US-Jordan FTA 
In the US-Jordan agreement, labour matters were dealt with through an additional clause, 
appearing for the first time as a commitment to respect the 1998 ILO Declaration and equally as 
a commitment that national legislation would include such principles and protect them by 
domestic legislative means.
196
 The labour rights language, though not strong, was directly 
incorporated into the body of the agreement
197
 requiring the parties to strive to ensure that ILO 
core principles and internationally recognized labour rights were incorporated into domestic 
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law.
198
 Moreover, in language that was to become a model for future agreements, the US-Jordan 
FTA stated that, “a Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labour laws, through a sustained 
or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties”.199 The 
parties, however, would still retain “the right to exercise discretion” in their regulatory and 
enforcement decisions.
200
  
Ultimately, the US-Jordan FTA provided that all its labour and environmental provisions 
be subject to the same dispute settlement procedures as commercial disputes,
201
 but this equal 
dispute settlement provision would be diluted in future agreements.
202
 A non-derogation clause 
was introduced.
203
 However, the most important point of principle achieved by the US in the US-
Jordan agreement was to submit labour matters to the same dispute settlement procedures as 
those negotiated for trade questions.
204
 The relationship between labour standards and trade 
liberalisation thereafter gained considerable importance as a result of the US Trade Promotion 
Act.
205
  
5 4 2 2 1 The US Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (BTPAA) 
The US BTPAA contains provisions requiring that labour rights protections be negotiated into 
trade agreements.
206
 The core of the US BTPAA, as it relates to trade negotiations over labour 
issues, is its prescribed objectives, which are divided into two categories. First, there are “overall 
objectives,” which are to (a) promote respect of “core worker rights and the rights of children 
consistent with core labour standards of the ILO”;207 (b) “seek provisions in trade agreements 
under which parties...strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded 
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in domestic...labour laws as an encouragement for trade”;208 and (c) “promote universal 
ratification of ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour.”209 Second, there are principal negotiating 
objectives. It is important to note that it is only these objectives that may be subject to equivalent 
dispute settlement procedures and remedies.
210
 Some of these objectives are to (a) “ensure that a 
party to a trade agreement does not fail to effectively enforce its labour laws, through a sustained 
or recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade”;211 (b) recognize that parties 
have the right to exercise discretion with respect to labour law enforcement and regulation;
212
 
and, in a provision often overlooked by analysts, (c) “strengthen the capacity of US trading 
partners to promote respect for core labour standards.”213   
The final set of directives, albeit weaker ones than the overall and principal negotiating 
objectives, is the “promotion of certain priorities.”214 In this case, the regulatory capacity-
building intention of the legislation, first expressed in the principal objectives, is reaffirmed. The 
section provides the following:  
“In order to address and maintain US competitiveness in the global economy the President 
shall (1) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to 
strengthen the capacity...to promote respect for core labour standards... and (2) direct the 
Secretary of Labour to consult with any country seeking a trade agreement with the US 
concerning that country‟s labour laws and provide technical assistance if needed.”215  
 
The primary approach, therefore, of the US BTPAA is a State Action-State Sanctions Model that 
requires, as the only enforceable standard, that parties not fail to enforce their domestic labour 
law as an encouragement for trade.
216
 However, there is also a secondary objective to build state 
capacity to promote respect for core labour standards.
217
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Regardless of Grandi‟s view that the US BTPAA was of considerable importance to the 
relationship between labour standards and trade liberalisation,
218
 Weiss regarded it as “...a step or 
two back from the so-called „gold standard‟ of the Jordan model”.219 It is important to note that 
before the promulgation of the US BTPAA, there had been extensive evidence of a strong 
resistance from a number of sectors which were not desirous to open the US‟s economy and 
rejected trade liberalisation as well as free movement of capital.
220
 The American Federation of 
Labour and Confederation of Industrial Organisations, which is the largest trade union 
organisation in the US, strongly objected to the initiatives of the US BTPAA, fearing negative 
consequences for US workers, especially regarding their employment and working conditions.
221
 
However through the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
222
 system, a new programme was 
established up to help people affected in their employment as a consequence of trade 
liberalisation.
223
 It was this new development that led to Congressmen of the US consenting to 
the promulgation of the US BTPAA. At the same time as setting up consultation and bilateral 
cooperation mechanisms for protecting workers‟ rights in each country with which the US has 
free trade agreements, the US BTPAA required that the labour impact of the future agreements in 
the territory of the US must be researched and the results made available to the public.
224
 It was 
on that basis that negotiations on labour questions took place in the context of the US-Chile 
FTA. 
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5 4 2 3 The incorporation of social clauses by Chile in FTAs 
The experience of Chile concerning issues of linking trade and labour is one worth noting. Chile 
has been able to include a social clause in its trade agreements with both developed and 
developing countries.
225
 The outcomes for Chile have been positive with best practices having 
been learnt across the most diverse fields.
226
 The following are some of the FTAs which Chile 
has entered into which include a social clause: 
5 4 2 3 1 US-Chile FTA 
The US-Chile FTA displays an alternative model of including labour matters in trade 
agreements.
227
 Under the US-Chile FTA, the most important obligation requires a Party‟s 
compliance with its own domestic labour legislation.
228
 This is the only commitment in the FTA 
for which an inability to fulfil would lead to the convening of an arbitration panel. The principle 
of sovereignty is explicitly safeguarded with respect to the modification of domestic legislation 
and determination of supervisory regimes for labour matters by the administration.
229
 Respect for 
the autonomy of both Parties‟ judicial branches is also recognised in that the provisions of the 
US-Chile FTA do not allow decisions by the courts to be revised or re-opened in the light of 
provisions of the treaty.
230
 The US and Chile in the FTA also reaffirmed their commitments to 
the ILO.
231
 The protection of labour standards in national legislation is not supposed to be 
weakened or reduced in the interest of trade according to the US-Chile FTA.  
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 If a dispute were to occur between the US and Chile concerning the protection of labour 
standards in one country, a dispute settlement mechanism is provided for.
232
 If an arbitration 
panel is set up and preliminary as well as final reports have been drawn up stating that one of the 
parties has not complied with its obligations under Article 18. 2(1)(a), the parties can reach an 
agreement within forty-five days of receiving the final report. Should the parties not be able to 
reach an agreement within forty-five days or if they have reached an agreement but the 
complaining Party feels that the agreement has not been complied with, the aggrieved Party may 
request that a new arbitration panel be set up and that it should impose a monetary compensation 
on the other Party.
233
 The compensation must be paid in equal quarterly quarters beginning sixty 
days after notification of the relevant decision.
234
 
 If the assessment is not paid within the time limit, the complaining Party can adopt other 
appropriate steps to collect the assessment or otherwise secure compliance.
235
 Such other steps 
may include the suspension of tariff benefits by the complaining Party, under the US-Chile 
Agreement, as a means necessary to collect the assessment.
236
 However, in doing so, the 
complaining Party must avoid unduly affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute.
237
 If 
the Party being complained against feels that it is now complying with its obligations in terms of 
the US-Chile Agreement, it can at anytime request that the arbitration panel be convened to 
revoke the suspension of benefits or cancel the monetary assessments.
238
 
5 4 2 3 2 Chile-European Union Association Agreement 
The Agreement between Chile and the European Union contains a number of provisions on 
cooperation in the field of labour. The Agreement indicates a clear objective of promoting social 
development,
239
 and a requirement that Parties to the Agreement must give special priority to 
respect for fundamental social rights.
240
 There is also emphasis on the importance of social 
                                                          
 
232
  See the US-Chile FTA Chapter 22 and Article 22.16. 
233
  See the US-Chile FTA Article 22. 16(2). The maximum assessment amounts to 15 million US dollars. 
234
  See the US-Chile FTA Article 22. 16(2). 
235
  See the US-Chile FTA Article 22. 16(2). 
236
  See the US-Chile FTA Article 22.16(4).  
237
 See the US-Chile FTA Article 22. 16.5. 
238
 See the US-Chile FTA Article 22.17. 
239
  See the Chile-European Association Agreement Part III Article 16 1(b). 
240
  Under the heading V of the Chile-European Association Agreement titled “Cooperation in Social Matters”, the 
Parties deal with social matters in Articles 43, 44 and 45. In Article 43, parties recognise that they must promote 
213 
 
development.
241
 Chile and the European Union (EU) undertook to give priority to job creation 
and respect for fundamental social rights, promoting ILO conventions relating to freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining and non-discrimination, abolition of forced 
labour and child labour, and equal treatment between men and women.
242
 This Agreement also 
includes obligations concerning the participation of civil society in consultations on cooperation 
in various areas of the Agreement.
243
 
5 4 2 3 3 Chile and China FTA 
Chile has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Labour Cooperation and Social 
Security with China.
244
 The MoU requires both parties to commit themselves to carrying out 
activities in respect of employment, decent work, labour legislation, work inspection, 
improvement of working conditions and worker training, globalisation and its impact on 
employment, the working environment, labour relations and social security. Not much though 
can be learnt from this Agreement as it centres only on exchange of information and experiences, 
visits, events such as seminars and workshops, and meetings of specialists. To date much 
emphasis has been placed in the field of social security with Chinese authorities meeting their 
Chile counterparts on a number of visits to Chile. However, that labour aspects of the MoU have 
not been given much emphasis, thus bringing into question the commitment of the Chinese to 
improving labour rights in trade practices.  
5 4 2 4 European Union (EU) 
The inclusion of a social clause in the EU has as its basis the need to promote lasting and 
balanced social and economic progress.
245
 The EU Treaty states that its objectives consist in: 
“...the harmonious and balanced development of economic activity, sustainable non-
inflationary growth, which should respect the environment, a high degree of convergence 
in the behaviour of their economies, a high level of employment and social protection, 
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improvement in the level and quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity 
between member States.”246 
 
The ideology behind the EU‟s inclusion of a social clause in its treaties on trade related matters, 
has thus not been limited to EU members‟ interests. It has been applied in the EU‟s relations with 
developing countries on a unilateral level.
247
 Emphasis was placed on the protection of workers‟ 
rights by developing countries who wanted to benefit from the EU GSP system in the following 
areas: elimination of all forms of forced or obligatory labour,
248
 liberty of association and 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining,
249
 elimination of discrimination with 
regards to employment and profession
250
 and the elimination of child labour.
251
 The EU has also 
entered into association agreements in which the social clause has been included to protect 
labour standards in trade related matters. The first of such agreements is the Cotonou 
Agreement.
252
 The Parties to the Cotonou Agreement re-affirm their commitment to 
internationally recognised fundamental labour standards, as defined in the relevant ILO 
conventions.
253
 
 The EU also entered into another association agreement called the EU-CARIFORUM 
Agreement.
254
 In the introductory section of the EU-CARIFORUM Agreement, one of its key 
objectives is given as the following: 
“...the necessity of promoting social and economic progress for its citizens in harmony 
with sustainable development, and respecting fundamental labour rights in accordance with 
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the commitments they have undertaken under the auspices of the International labour 
Organisation...”255 
 
The EU-CARIFORUM Agreement deals with various social issues key among them being the 
reiterated commitment to comply with fundamental labour standards recognised at the 
international level, as laid down in the ILO Conventions and in their commitments to the ILO.
256
 
Parties to this agreement must also: 
 “...recognise the beneficial role that core labour standards can have on economic 
efficiency, innovation and productivity, and they highlight the value of greater policy 
coherence between trade policies, on the one hand, and employment and social policies on 
the other.”257  
 
Furthermore, the Parties to the Agreement included a provision referring to “...the benefits of 
commerce in fair and ethical trade products and the importance of facilitating such commerce 
between them”.258 As such, fair and ethical trade could be read to imply trade in products 
obtained from fair labour practices. Anything short of that would possibly amount to unfair and 
unethical trade. Another key provision to this Agreement relates to the drafting of countries‟ own 
regulations and policies in accordance with their social development priorities. The Agreement 
binds them to guarantee that: 
“...their own social and labour regulation and policies provide for and encourage high 
levels of social and labour standards consistent with the internationally recognised labour 
rights...and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and policies.”259 
 
Whilst no definition is given in the Agreement of what high levels of social and labour standards 
are, it may be inferred that reference is being made to the ILO standards. Also, concerning the 
levels of protection, Article 193 gives guidance by laying down that: 
“...the Parties agree not to encourage trade or foreign direct investment to enhance or 
maintain competitive advantage by: 
a) lowering the level of protection provided by domestic social and labour legislation: 
b) derogating from, or failing to apply such legislation and standards”.260 
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In principle, the Agreement recognises the importance of establishing policies for social 
cohesion and measures to encourage decent work at the regional level.
261
 However, unlike the 
NAALC, the EU-CARIFORUM Agreement does not contain guarantees for the due process of 
law.
262
 It also does not contain provisions guaranteeing access to administrative or judicial 
procedures for the interested Parties.
263
 Article 195 of the Agreement emphasizes: 
“...the importance of monitoring and assessing the operation of the Agreement on decent 
work and other areas of sustainable development through their respective participative 
processes and institutions, as well as those set up in the Agreement”.264 
 
As such, Article 195 requires that Parties to the Agreement mutually consult with each other to 
address social questions raised concerning the implementation of the Agreement. The 
Agreement‟s dispute settlement procedures explicitly exclude the adoption or trade sanctions in 
the event of a failure to comply with the EU-CARIFORUM Agreement regulations.
265
 This is in 
stark contrast with the NAALC which advocates for a penalty or sanctions in the event of non-
compliance.  
 The EU-CARIFORUM Agreement however does allow the parties to consult with the 
ILO if they need to establish the best practices in a particular case, assuming there would be a 
dispute or the parties seek to avoid a dispute. Article 195.3 provides that: 
“On any issue covered by Articles 191 to 194 the Parties may agree to seek advice from the 
ILO on best practice, the use of effective policy tools for addressing trade related social 
challenges such as labour market adjustment, as well as the identification of any obstacles 
that might impede the effective implementation of core labour standards”.266 
 
As regards the interpretation of Articles 191 to 194 of the Agreement, Article 195.4 provides 
that:  
“A party may request consultations with the other party on matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of Articles 191 to 194. The consultations shall not exceed 
three months. In the context of this procedure, any Party may independently seek advice 
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from the ILO. In this case, the limit for the period for consultations is extended by a further 
period of three months”.267 
 
Assuming that the consultations have failed, “any Party to the consultations may request that a 
Committee of Experts be convened to examine such a matter”.268 Within three months of being 
set up, the Committee of Experts, made up of three members with specialist knowledge, will 
present a report to the Parties involved in the matter.
269
 It is however important to observe that on 
the possibility of applying consultation and mediation procedures concerning labour matters 
emanating from the Agreement, there may be an exception to the effect that no labour matter 
goes to the review panel without referral to the ILO.
270
 Also, the Agreement allows room for the 
possibility of referring a matter to a mediator to resolve a dispute.
271
 Where a matter has been 
referred to a review panel, the panel will present a provisional report which will consist of a 
descriptive section, a verification section and conclusions.
272
 Notification of the findings must 
then be made within one hundred and fifty days from the nomination of the panel.
273
  
5 4 3  Have the Bilateral and Regional agreements been effective? 
The best way to establish the effectiveness of bilateral and regional FTAs in observing core 
labour standards is to analyse some of the cases in which disputes have been filed by one Party 
against the other. A number of such cases exist, mostly under the NAALC dispute resolution 
system. This study will now look at some of these cases. 
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5 4 3 1 Analysis of cases heard under the NAALC 
Through public communications
274
 and ministerial consultations,
275
 a significant number of 
important cases which could assist in assessing the efficiency of the NAALC have been dealt 
with.
276
 The ministerial consultations and public communications are applicable in respect to all 
matters dealing with the eleven labour principles set out in NAALC.
277
 Any dispute with a 
question relating to the adequacy of the administrative or governmental measures to implement 
labour law can be dealt with through public communications or ministerial consultations.
278
 
Equally, issues relating to the existence of appropriate administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial 
recourses regarding them,
279
 procedural guarantees linked to the exercise of such recourses,
280
 
and accessibility and public dissemination of this same legislation,
281
 can also be handled with 
through public communications or ministerial consultations. 
Compa has argued that the public communications filed created an awakening period, 
related to the initial complaints of a Party‟s failure to value any of the obligations set in the 
NAALC.
282
 Verge has made a detailed and highly valuable analysis of some of the cases handled 
by the NAOs concerning the NAALC.
283
 Starting with the cases of Honeywell
284
 and General 
Electric,
285
 the US NAO sought to address the matter of workers who were dismissed whilst 
trying to establish a union that was not affiliated to the leading Mexican union in the 
maquiladoras
286
 owned by multi-national companies. In dealing with this matter, the US NAO 
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confined itself to the view that the dismissals corresponded with a phase of union movements in 
Mexico.
287
 They then concluded that since the dismissed workers had received compensation in 
return for renouncing their right to seek a judicial reinstatement, the workers no longer had a 
justifiable action at law as their consent to compensation was consistent with Mexican labour 
law.
288
 The US NAO then planned for co-operative information activities on freedom of 
association with the participation of the Mexican and Canadian NAOs, without so much 
considering the option of proposing for ministerial consultations.
289
  
However, in the Sony
290
 case, the US NAO took a more distinct approach as opposed to 
the approach it took in the Honeywell and the General Electric cases. The Sony case background 
was in the main related to that of the Honeywell and General Electric cases. It was built on the 
consideration of a number of specified problems like: 
“...the allegations of dismissals and discriminatory acts against workers which the US 
NAO found reasonable; the uncertain economic situation of workers who want to initiate 
reinstatement procedures; contradictory evidence of police violence, with the cooperation 
of the employer, against workers involved in an allegedly illegal strike; and the unjustified 
rejection of the union‟s registration, which deprived it of the legal status needed to bargain 
collectively; doubts about the impartiality of the tribunal that adopted the decision; 
presence of the employer during a vote by show of hands to elect union delegates; denying 
union members access to the union‟s by-laws and the collective agreement.”291  
 
The set of facts in the Sony case prompted the US NAO to instigate a program of tri-national 
cooperative activities on the protection of workers dismissed for union activities, to which was 
added the issue of procedural guarantees applicable to the internal administration of unions.
292
 
Furthermore, a study of the labour tribunals involved in the issue of dismissals related to union 
activity was done by the US NAO and which also recommended ministerial consultations on the 
usefulness of the law that protects freedom of association and the right to organize in Mexico.
293
 
The ministerial consultations then led to public seminars on national procedures for recognizing 
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unions and a study which was done by independent experts on Mexican law on union registration 
as well a string of meetings between Mexican officials and the parties involved in the application 
for union registration.
294
 The Sony case attained reputation as the first real prospect for a truly tri-
national investigation of significant aspects of Mexican law dealing with the first NAALC 
principle and its enforcement.
295
  
In the years that followed, the public communications dealt with issues pertaining to 
freedom of association and the right to organize, and to administrative and legal intervention in 
the same areas. This occasionally presented the chance to investigate particular characteristics of 
Mexican law, but in most instances restated, without doubt and with exactness, the problems 
faced in the Honeywell and General Electric cases which the US NAO had previously 
handled.
296
 Therefore, in 1996, the US NAO in the Presca Union
297
 case once again looked at 
the question of the scope of the international conventions ratified by Mexico within its domestic 
law. In particular, the Presca Union case wanted to address the scope of coverage given to ILO 
convention on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention,
298
 in view of the existence of a Mexican law imposing a single union in the civil 
service,
299
 on which the labour tribunal relied to make it difficult for another trade union to 
register. Realising the magnitude of the challenge at hand, the US NAO recommended 
ministerial consultations as regards the difficulty of admitting international law in domestic law, 
an issue which then became the subject of a tripartite seminar of experts.
300
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The US NAO was to later handle a series of cases relating to the violation of workers‟ 
right to the freedom of association or collective job actions. The first of such cases was held in 
1998. It was the case of Aerovias de Mexico,
301
 in which the US NAO declined to mediate with 
respect to an alleged infringement of the right to strike ensuing from a governmental call to end a 
strike on an airline.
302
 In the Han Young case, the US NAO dealt with the rejection of a labour 
tribunal to register a union established to substitute a union affiliated to a confederation linked to 
the government at the time, a rejection which was based upon the employer submission of a 
collective agreement signed with the latter union, without the workers‟ knowledge.303 The 
Echlin
304
 case dealt with an apparent case of violence which occurred in the course of a non-
secret vote, under the auspices of the labour tribunal, during a similar inter-union conflict as was 
the state of affairs in the Han Young case. The US NAO‟s review of these two these cases led to 
an inter-ministerial agreement in May 2000 which required that: the Mexican government was to 
maintain the implementation a system to register collective agreements in accordance with 
domestic law and to endorse the awareness of their existence in a range of workplaces as well as 
setting up a system for secret union affiliation balloting, including a list of the members entitled 
to vote.
305
  
In addition, a public seminar on the different general and specific facets of the freedom of 
association was to be organized in the region where the developments in the two cases existed 
with a trilateral seminar on the composition and operation of Mexican labour tribunals acting 
primarily in the area of union representation also being conducted.
306
 However, the US NAO was 
not the only committee to handle the Echlin case. The Canadian NAO also had the chance to deal 
with the case in 1998.
307
 The Canadian NAO recommended ministerial consultations concerning 
the areas of the enforcement of Mexican law governing the expulsion of a union member, the 
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fairness of Mexican labour tribunals, the distribution of union bylaws and the collective contract 
as well as the way to declare the integrity and accuracy of the union allegiance vote.
308
  
In July 2000, the US NAO, in the TAESA-Flight Attendants
309
 case, yet again 
recommended ministerial consultations after noting, once more, the utilization of a non-secret 
vote and acts of coercion in opposition to the attempts of a craft union to replace a general union. 
A similar set of facts was to be found in the Duro Bag
310
 case in which the US NAO had to deal 
with another refusal to hold a secret and neutral union loyalty vote. The US NAO was not the 
only committee to handle matters of the infringements in workers‟ collective bargaining and 
freedoms of association rights. The Mexican NAO was also presented with an issue of protecting 
the freedom of association and the right to organize, in the Sprint
311
 case. In this case, the 
Mexican NAO recommended ministerial consultations with the objective of spelling out the need 
to protect workers‟ rights to organize in the event of unexpected closures of industrial units. The 
ministerial consultations became the subject of a public seminar and a study published by the 
Commission on this issue.
312
  
In the Labour Policy Association
313
 case, the Canadian NAO temporarily refused to 
preside over a communication submitted with a somewhat particular intention by Parties with 
specific business interests. At time of this case, Canadian labour law matters had only related to 
the first two principles of the NAALC
314
 which had only been the subject of only two 
communications in 1998, before the US NAO. The first communication was that of the Mac- 
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Donald
315
 case which had to do with the closure of a company in the context of union organizing 
in Quebec. This communication also raised the issue of the length of the union recognition 
procedure under Quebec law. However, after being initially accepted, the communication was 
then withdrawn by its instigators, who appeared to have been content with the fact that Quebec 
was going to review the law governing collective labour relations. The second communication 
was that of the Rural Route Mail Couriers
316
 case which dealt with the fact that rural mail 
couriers had not been protected by the federal law governing collective labour relations. The US 
NAO simply refused to review the issue in depth. 
After all of the initial cases had appeared to deal with the first two principles of the 
NAALC, the 1997 Pregnancy Testing
317
  case brought before the US NAO was to expand the 
field of investigation to other labour principles. As a result, the case is predominantly significant, 
unlike the Sony case which focused on the area of freedom of association which falls within the 
first two principles of the NAALC. The case dealt with the principle of the elimination of 
employment discrimination,
318
 to condemn the practice of carrying out pregnancy tests in a 
number of Northern Mexican maquiladoras. The tests led to businesses rejecting to hire pregnant 
women. Instead they began to offer pregnant women incentives to leave their jobs so that the 
companies will not have to pay maternity leave. The affected women also contended that they 
had no faith in the ability of the labour authorities‟ capacity to correct such ill-treatment.319  
After a hearing, the US NAO acknowledged the existence of problems in attaining 
contact with the authorities in such conditions; denounced the pressures wield upon the pregnant 
workers, but indicated that it was not in a position to rule on the illegality of the pregnancy tests 
with respect to Mexican law or to rule on the refusal to hire pregnant women.
320
 The US NAO 
then recommended ministerial consultations to ascertain the degree of the protection given by 
Mexican law with respect to sexual discrimination against pregnant women and its enforcement 
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by the authorities in question.
321
 The ministerial consultations provided an opportunity for tri-
national cooperative activities on the issue, including information activities for the workers and a 
tri-national public conference.
322
  
In the same year, the previously mentioned Han Young and Echlin cases raised, beside 
the difficulties associated with freedom of association, various failures to enforce Mexican law 
on occupational safety and health.
323
 As such, in the latter case, the US NAO noted, among other 
things, the insufficiency of both the fines and the labour inspection.
324
 The subsequent 
ministerial consultations prescribed information exchanges between Mexican and US officials on 
those aspects of the enforcement of the laws relating to occupational safety and health, and 
relating to the handling of hazardous substances, protective gear and the role of union 
management occupational safety and health committees.
325
 They were also to establish a 
program to disseminate information in the workplace.
326
  
In the Auto Trim case of 2000, the US NAO, in connection with a communication related 
to safety and occupational health and to compensation in cases of occupational injuries and 
illnesses,
327
 again noted deficiencies in the labour inspection and the administration‟s lack of 
response to the complainants, and recommended ministerial consultations on the matter.
328
 The 
Echlin case submitted in 1998 to the Canadian NAO had addressed both principles 9 and 10 of 
the NAALC.
329
 After a hearing, the US NAO noted, in particular, that contrary to Article 3 of the 
NAALC, the workers in question did not have, in accordance with Mexican law, easy access to 
material safety data sheets, and that there was inadequate labeling of the latter and a lack of 
appropriate protective equipment for exposed workers.
330
 It recommended ministerial 
consultations on these issues, and on labour inspection, and the beginning of a cooperative 
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dialogue between the Canadian labour minister and his Mexican counterpart about protection 
against occupational injuries caused by handling asbestos.
331
  
As for US law, four communications filed with the Mexican NAO in 1998 similarly 
extended the field of intervention to other labour principles. Thus, after the treatment of the 
herein referred to cases of Solec, Apple Industry and De Coster Egg Farm, the different 
cooperative activities stipulated in the joint ministerial declaration were to address not only 
freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively, but also minimum employment 
standards,
332
 elimination of employment discrimination,
333
 prevention of occupational injuries 
and illnesses and compensation in these cases,
334
 and protection of migrant workers
335
. The 
Mexican NAO‟s prior review of these cases revealed various failures to enforce US law in these 
areas, particularly in companies using Mexican agricultural workers.  
These difficulties associated with migrant agricultural workers, which were revealed for 
the first time in the Industria de la Manzana
336
 case, were the object of an additional case in 
1998. In the Yale Law School
337
 case, the enforcement of minimum US employment standards 
was compromised by an administrative practice of labour inspectors disclosing information to 
the Immigration Service of any violation of immigration law by persons seeking to secure the 
minimum wage or respect for other minimum labour standards.
338
 An agreement between the 
respective labour ministers put an end to that practice, which would necessarily have a dissuasive 
effect on those seeking to have the labour laws enforced.
339
  
All this activity originated by the communications presented to the NAOs resulted, 
initially, in the identification of the most critical points in the enforcement of the labour law of 
the countries in question, as well as not only making these difficulties known to the 
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governmental authorities of the three countries, but also revealing them to public gaze.
340
 This 
was true, to take Mexico as an example, with respect to the impartiality of some labour tribunals 
because of their composition; the difficulties obtaining union registration in the presence of a 
rival union signatory of a secret collective agreement; union procedures for applying a unionized 
shop provision in a collective agreement; the practice of non-secret balloting on union affiliation; 
the precarious situation of pregnant workers in the maquiladoras; and inadequate occupational 
safety and health inspections.
341
  
In the US, the difficulty of enforcing legislation related to the various labour principles in 
the case of migrant workers became evident.
342
 Such knowledge of the reality of the enforcement 
of national labour laws, which was not methodically established before the NAALC, is a 
prerequisite to the quest for the cooperative relations contemplated in this instrument.
343
 As a 
matter of fact, it is even possible to credit the public communications with some immediate 
positive results: for example, in Mexico, the commitment of the federal labour department to set 
up a public registry of collective agreements, as a result of the ministerial consultations carried 
out in the Echlin case; the assessment of a large fine for a violation of the law on safety and 
occupation health, the day after the presentation of the communication in the Han Young case; a 
certain influence of the NAALC perhaps in the development of a new labour policy by this 
country‟s previous federal government.344  
In the case of the US, it might be proper to mention a simplified guide to labour law for 
migrant workers and the suppression of the administrative practice of informing on foreign 
workers with immigration irregularities, following the Yale Law School communication.
345
 On 
the other hand, it must be admitted that the NAOs have been ineffective in other cases.
346
 Thus, 
the existence of a mechanism in the US national law to appeal the first level decisions of labour 
tribunals is not a satisfactory response to the operating deficiencies at this first level with regard 
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to article 5 of NAALC,
347
 as the Pesca Union case revealed.
348
 The recommendation for 
ministerial consultations is sometimes formulated in exceedingly general terms.
349
 Thus, the 
Mexican NAO typically requested that the review of the questions raised be continued at the 
ministerial level. The US NAO for its part was even more general in the formulation of its 
recommendation in the TAESA Flight Attendants case.
350
 In particular, the recurrent nature of 
some of the difficulties might introduce some doubt about the efficacy, in the long run, of the 
intervention, in particular, of ministerial consultations and related activities.
351
  
Thus, it can be observed throughout the years that a certain similarity in the kind of 
obstacles to the exercise of freedom of association mentioned in the first communications related 
to Mexico, including the Sony case, and those found in 1997 communications, such as the Han 
Young and Echlin cases, and in TAESA-Flight Attendants in 1999, have been faced when trying 
to implement the NAALC.
352
 Depending on the cases, it was a question of violence associated 
with a union affiliation vote or, at least, the lack of a secret ballot in an appropriate place.
353
 A 
failure to reinstate illegally fired workers was also present in the first cases, and three years later 
in the Echlin case.
354
 On the one hand, it may be argued that the size and complexity of the 
Mexican economy and the multiplicity of workplaces involved can explain the lack of an 
immediate corrective effect and the same is true of Canada and, to a much greater extent, the 
US.
355
  
However, this practical view of things is not enough to dismiss doubts about the 
effectiveness of the measures adopted following ministerial consultations, which are themselves 
a response to communications reiterating difficulties of the same kind.
356
 As a matter of fact, in 
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the case of Duro Bag, questions were raised concerning the effectiveness of the unity, if any, 
between the Mexican and US ministers of labour pursuant to the Han Young and Echlin cases, 
with respect to the establishment of balloting procedures for union affiliation votes.
357
 The 
Mexican and US ministers of labour did not refer the Duro Bag case to the ECE. The 
establishment of an ECE could have helped throw a light, one that was external to and 
independent of the Parties, on the precise scope of national law, particularly with respect to the 
corresponding international labour law, following the ministerial consultations.
358
 The case of 
discrimination against pregnant workers would have lent itself to this, but so far no recourse has 
been made to the ECE, nor was it in the other cases.  
International labour law has been evoked in connection with the study of some of the 
communications. In some cases, it was examined vis-à-vis its possible scope if integrated into 
national law. The legal solutions differ in this respect from one Party to the other, and even 
within a single country, based on some schools of thought, as was shown in particular by the 
symposium of experts organized pursuant to the recommendations in connection with the Pesca 
Union case.
359
 Thus, with respect to Mexico, the US NAO had already mentioned the fact that 
this country had ratified the ILO Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize Convention in its report on the Sony case and assumed that the contents of 
this convention had become part of Mexican labour law.
360
 The Canadian NAO did the same in 
its 1998 report on the union component of the Echlin case.
361
 It assumed a similar integration 
into Mexican law of the content of the other international instruments to which this country had 
adhered.
362
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For its part, the Mexican NAO, in its report,
363
 simply mentioned the fact that the US had 
not ratified ILO Convention 87.
364
 In certain other reports, all involving Mexico, references to 
international law become more detailed. The US NAO‟s report in the Pesca Union case, in 
which the issue was the legislated imposition of a union monopoly in the public service, led the 
US NAO to take into account previous recommendations of the ILO‟s Freedom of Association 
Committee with respect to this same problem, in the specific case of Mexico, as well as the more 
general position of that same body‟s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations on the subject.
365
 Similarly, in the Echlin report, the US NAO took into 
account the general positions of these bodies on the issue of union monopolies and the 
enforcement of the clauses on union security in collective agreements, with respect to ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association.
366
  
Mexico has ratified only the first of these conventions, but, as pointed out by the US 
NAO, it is bound, as a member of the ILO, by the ILO‟s Declaration of Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and its follow up of 1998.
367
 Likewise, in the communication related to 
discrimination against pregnant workers, it noted that the ILO Committee of Experts considered 
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy fits in well with the understanding of sexual 
discrimination, but that there were no specific statutes about the legality of pregnancy tests in 
relation to ILO Convention 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect to Employment and 
Occupation.
368
 The same was true, it also noted, for the interpretation of the UN Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
369
 Finally, in the Echlin case, 
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both the American and Canadian NAOs reviewed the contents of the ILO Conventions in the 
area of occupational safety and health ratified by Mexico and the attendant recommendations.
370
  
From these various actions of the NAOs, one can infer that international labour law, even 
in the absence of any express reference in the NAALC, has been, in those cases where it is 
appropriate, one of the elements taken into account in formulating the recommendation for 
ministerial consultations, either with the objective of clarifying the scope of national law or of 
more directly monitoring its enforcement.
371
 However, it should be noted that, so far, all the 
cases that are significant in this sense have involved Mexico, a country, unlike Canada, with a 
monistic constitutional system that makes any treaty ratified by this nation an integral part of its 
domestic legal system.
372
 Finally, as was illustrated by the Pesca Union case, it can happen that a 
NAO is called upon to offer an opinion, in the case of such a country, on the enforcement of the 
national law in which a component of international origin in this case, ILO Convention 87 has 
already been the object of intervention by international bodies with respect to the behaviour of 
this same country.
373
  
In 2005 in the case of Federación de Trabajadores Vanguardia Obrera de la 
Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (FTVO-CROC), with support from the 
US Labour Education in the Americas Project and the Washington Office on Latin America,
374
 
the US Office of Trade and Labour Affairs had to deal with allegations that the Government of 
Mexico failed to fulfil its obligation to effectively enforce its labour laws in connection with 
freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, 
and the right to strike.
375
 The submission further alleged that the Mexican government did not 
effectively enforce its laws by failing to conduct required on-site inspections to detect and 
remedy labour law violations concerning forced labour, child labour, minimum employment 
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standards, employment discrimination, and occupational safety and health.
376
 The submission 
further alleged that the Mexican government had failed to effectively ensure that administrative 
and labour tribunal proceedings related to collective bargaining and the right to strike were fair, 
equitable, and transparent which violated the requirements of the NAALC.
377
 The US OTLA 
found that: 
 “While the FTVO-CROC did not always follow proper legal procedures in seeking to 
represent interested workers..., the Mexican labour authorities‟ handling of the process 
revealed several problematic aspects with the administrative procedures that allow for the 
registration of collective bargaining agreements and the exercise of collective bargaining 
rights. Areas of concern include reliance on technical grounds to reject union petitions 
seeking collective bargaining rights, unwarranted delays resulting from ineffective 
communication between federal and state labour authorities, and a general lack of 
transparency as to how Mexican labour law recognizes unions and collective bargaining 
agreements. The Government of Mexico failed to conduct periodic inspections at ... between 
1998 and 2005, as required by Mexico‟s Federal Labour Law. As a result, labour law 
violations may have gone unchecked for several years, as evidenced by violations that were 
found when four Extraordinary Inspections were conducted by Mexican authorities in May 
2005.”378 
 
In October 2011, the Canadian NAO received a submission by 80 unions from across North 
America, including several Canadian unions which alleged that the Government of Mexico had 
failed to meet its obligations under the NAALC.
379
 Specifically, the complainants alleged that 
through its actions surrounding the events in 2009 at Luz y Fuerza del Centro, a state-owned 
electricity company, the Mexican government had violated the basic labour rights of the 
Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (the Mexican Union of Electrical Workers) and its 
members.
380
 In 2009, the complainants had argued that: 
 “...the Mexican government has consistently disregarded its obligation to enforce, at a bare 
minimum, its own labour laws under the NAALC. Permitting the Mexican government to 
act in this manner will undermine the NAALC‟s aim of ensuring that increased economic 
integration does not lead to a corresponding decrease in labour standards. As such, the 
Petitioners request that the US Office of Trade and Labour Affairs Implementation 
(“OTLA”), following its investigation, recommend ministerial consultations regarding the 
Mexican government‟s failure to respect its own labour and health and safety laws as 
                                                          
 
376
  See US OTLA 2005-03. 
377
  See Article 5 of the NAALC. 
378
  See US OTLA 2005-03. 
379
 Can-NAO 2011-1. 
380
 Ibid. 
232 
 
provided for under Article 22 of the NAALC. If these steps cannot be obtained as a result 
of ministerial consultations, the Petitioners request that the United States request the 
establishment of an arbitral panel in accordance with Article 29 of the NAALC.”381 
 
The case was yet to be finalized at the time of writing this work. This raises the question of 
whether the NAALC has been effective in protecting workers‟ rights in trade. Results of studies 
evaluating the NAALC have been mixed. Those who claim relative success of the NAALC 
acknowledge some weaknesses but stress its potential within the context of trade agreements and 
conclude that it represents an important shift from agreements such as the GATT, which 
characterize any regulations addressing labour, health and the environment as trade barriers.
382
 
Those who claim mixed results measure the NAALC‟s effectiveness against the constraints 
inherent in a compromised agreement. They argue that the value of increased attention to labour 
rights violations and heightened cross-border solidarity whilst acknowledging the need for 
improvements.
383
 Some warn against unrealistic expectations of international bodies given that 
respect for sovereignty is a fundamental NAALC principle.
384
 They advocate against abandoning 
the NAALC process and for creative uses of the NAALC as a tool in a broader strategy that 
combines cross-border solidarity, legal, media, lobbying and organizing efforts.
385
  
On the other end hand, there are those who believe that the NAALC is inherently flawed 
and therefore “designed to fail.”386 While some attribute minor gains to use of the NAALC, they 
claim that the NAALC incorrectly presumes that current labour standards are sufficient rather 
than harmonizing them upwards or aligning them with the NAALC‟s eleven principles.387 Others 
cite the NAALC‟s inability to address violations of fundamental worker rights to organize, 
bargain and strike as a basic flaw, the length of the process, and its inaccessibility to workers. 
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The analysis in this study leaves one question as to whether the inclusion of the social 
clause in the unilateral, bilateral and regional trade instruments is the right approach to protecting 
labour violations in trade practices in the world. Like the still-born attempts at linkage in the 
WTO, and like the unilateral trade and labour provisions described above, bilateral and regional 
linkage regimes have not been as effective as they could be at improving working conditions, 
protecting workers‟ rights, or compelling states to improve their labour law enforcement. Many 
critics of the trade and labour approaches adopted in the NAALC, the BTPAA and the FTAs 
have focused on what they claim are structural deficiencies in the design of these agreements, 
particularly the weakness of the enforce-your-own-labour-law standard
388
 and what they believe 
are, in practice, non-equivalent dispute settlement procedures and remedies that violate what they 
claim is required in the US BTPAA.
389
 These critiques might be compelling for those who 
advocate a strict State Action-State Sanctions Model in which the primary objective is to create 
sufficient economic incentives for States to strengthen their labour laws and enforcement 
regimes.
390
  
Kolben suggests that in fact, these labour rights provisions have been ineffective, at least 
in part, because they are so overly linked to a State Action-State Sanctions Model, particularly in 
the context of trading partners with low regulatory capacity. The relative ineffectiveness of 
NAALC is illustrative.
391
 Weiss also noted that the NAALC system, although initially holding 
out promise to some, has largely failed to live up to the expectations of its initial proponents, as 
there have been few constructive resolutions of labour rights problems through the NAALC 
procedures.
392
 While at least in the NAALC some of the preliminary procedures, known as 
public communications, were initiated, albeit to little effect, the complaint procedures negotiated 
in agreements post-NAALC have not been utilized at all.
393
 Indeed, the US and its trading 
partners have not, thus far, initiated any complaints under the labour rights provisions of any 
trade agreement; given the limitation that only governments may initiate complaints, and not 
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third parties, political realities suggest that it is highly unlikely that parties to a trade agreement 
will choose to initiate them because few countries would be interested in encouraging similar 
claims against themselves.
394
  
To demonstrate, an expose by the National Labour Committee, a US based advocacy 
group, claimed that there were widespread and systematic violations of Jordanian and 
international labour law in Jordan‟s garment factories.395 The report described 90 to 120 hour 
work weeks, confiscation of foreign workers‟ passports, and other serious abuses. Yet despite the 
labour provisions in the US Jordan FTA, which were partly responsible for creating an apparel 
industry in Jordan in the first place, no complaint has been brought by the United States under 
the US Jordan FTA.
396
 This is not to say, of course, that labour rights provisions are completely 
irrelevant in effecting changes in workers‟ rights and labour law enforcement.  
Another criticism of the bilateral or regional approach to a social clause is its reliance on 
domestic labour regulation. Contemporary studies appear to indicate that the protection of core 
labour standards through domestic laws may no longer be sufficient in the global era. Harpur 
contends that effective regulation has three essential components.
397
 First, the law must develop 
standards; second, there must be sufficient monitoring of compliance to detect non-compliance; 
and third, there must be some form of motivation to avoid non-compliance.
398
 The growth in 
international trade has created significant challenges for all three of these stages.
399
 The 
traditional regulatory model involves a law, state inspectors and legal sanctions for non-
compliance.
400
 One of the largest challenges for the state is how to adequately monitor 
compliance.
401
 Countries like the US and China have literally tens of millions of workplaces.
402
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It now is impossible for the state to monitor the activities in every workplace without the support 
of non-state actors.
403
 
New governance scholars have observed the limitations with the reliance upon the 
regulatory state and have proposed transforming government into a series of public and private 
networked relations.
404
 New governance models include non-state stakeholders in a participatory 
and collaborative process to develop more effective regulatory responses.
405
 Accordingly the 
focus of new governance regulation is not state control, but expanding the regulatory pie to 
improved regulatory responses.
406
 New governance interventions still retain the threat of 
punishment. Rather than focusing upon large state interventions, new governance focuses upon 
de-centred regulation and regulatory nodes.
407
 This form of regulation has been proposed and 
adopted in a range of areas including labour laws
408
 and environmental laws.
409
  
One of the benefits of private regulations is that they can encourage the state to develop 
enforceable public regulations.
410
 The creation of these public regulations can have a positive or 
negative result.
411
 If the public vehicle increases monitoring and enforcement, clearly this is 
positive.
412
 There is, however, a risk that the state intervention prevents the private regulatory 
model from operating without replacing it with an effective public regulation.
413
 The act of 
turning private institutions and practices into state sanctioned institutions and practices may alter 
the nature of the private vehicles.
414
 Some private enforcement vehicles are effective precisely 
because they are not state controlled.
415
 To maximize the potential from both public and private 
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enforcement the integrative linkage model has been developed.
416
 Integrative linkage focuses on 
maximizing the regulatory outcome and tailors the combination of public and private institutions 
and practices in each case.
417
 Arguably integrative linkage can assist countries with poor labour 
rights records, where there is public and private resistance to change, to better develop public 
regulatory models. Kolben observes that the 
“...interplay of private regulatory regimes and regulatory capacity in developing states has 
not been tested sufficiently in the literature to date and that the assumption surrounding the 
connection between integrative linkage and improved regulation is conjectural.”418 
 
However, regardless of the challenges faced in bilateral and regional approaches to incorporating 
a social clause in trade practices, important changes do occur in domestic labour law in the 
course of trade negotiations. Oman promised to alter its labour laws in response to US Congress 
threats not to ratify a trade agreement with them.
419
 Also, as the Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) countries were aware, it would have been even more difficult for US 
Congress to ratify the CAFTA agreement had they not reformed their labour laws in the 
process.
420
 However, the real question to ask is, is it necessary to use such forms of coercion? 
More appropriate solutions must be sought to protect labour standards in trade related practices 
otherwise the US approach may justify the allegations of protectionism leveled by developing 
countries against developed countries. 
5 5  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the use of a social clause in unilateral trade systems and in bilateral 
and regional FTAs. There are clear lessons to be learnt from this analysis. The first one is that the 
fundamental reasons of why states sometimes do not succeed to enforce their labour laws or 
come up with efficient regulatory systems are frequently complicated, and structurally 
embedded. In some instances, it is not just a simple want of will-power that can be solved by the 
appropriate tariff incentive or sanction in a trade agreement otherwise the State Action-State 
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Sanctions Model may be easily applied. For developing countries, the State Action-State 
Sanctions Model presents challenges especially where penalty fees are imposed for the violation 
of labour standards in trade practices. A penalty fee of fifteen to twenty million dollars, even if it 
is meant to improve that country‟s labour standards, may just be too high as such an amount may 
just be a sizeable amount in the budget of poor developing countries. It undoubtedly will force 
developing countries to resist trade-labour linkage proposals.  
Furthermore, the regulatory failure in developing countries, as already alluded to in 
chapter four, frequently takes place due to a perceived lack of will by government elites, 
business owners and managers to enforce labour law. These mentioned parties may be benefiting 
from poor labour standards, hence they will offer resistance in implementing labour regulations. 
Again this context renders the State Action-State Sanctions Model problematic, as creating tariff 
based incentives or sanctions to compel state enforcement of labour law in trade practices may 
simply not be enough. The NAALC and other modern approaches to a trade-labour linkage 
appear to favour the use of the State Action-State Sanctions Model. This method is likely to 
remain largely ineffective in improving respect of workers‟ rights and enforcing domestic or 
international labour law. It does not focus on the key issue of inequality amongst member states 
of the WTO. It assumes a uniform application of sanctions and the protection of core labour 
standards by unequal trade partners. This approach will not be fully effective in implementation.  
The ideal solution for the acceptance of the inclusion of a social clause in trade will likely 
lie in a legal arrangement that recognises the inequality of countries in the world and possibly 
allows such countries to assume a balanced yet progressive recognition of core labour standards 
in trade practices. Unfortunately, there has never been a model for a social clause that has been 
drafted with an eye on the developing countries. The models that are in existence are lop sided 
and usually reflect the views of developed countries. This study seeks to propose a balanced 
model of incorporating a social clause in trade agreements as focusing on state action in 
developing countries with poor regulatory capacity appears might just be ill-advised.  
Another lesson to note is that even super-powers such as the US have been reluctant to 
prefer sanctions against developing countries such as Bangladesh with the likely reason being 
that the US itself does not wish to start a race to protect labour rights for the fear that other 
countries will engage in retaliatory labour rights complaint actions against it. This view may be 
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true when applied in respect of other developed countries in the world. Again this suggests that 
whatever legal mechanism is used in incorporating a social clause in trade practices must not 
infringe on the sovereignty of another country.  
As such, it may be concluded that, whilst bilateral and regional trade and labour 
arrangements have also relied heavily on the State Action-State Sanctions Model which has not 
been entirely successful, they still have the potential to offer substantial hope for developing a 
successful and novel trade and labour linkage regime in the globalised world. It is evident that 
the NAALC‟s dispute resolution system has not brought the intended success story of the State 
Action-State Sanctions Model. Where sanctions have not been applied, not much has been 
achieved through moral persuasion. It is also clear that developing countries are not entirely 
objected to the inclusion of a social clause in trade as they appear to be entering into FTAs or 
regional agreements which include social clauses. This may be an indication that a new but 
integrative approach to an effective social clause model is now required. Such a model ought to 
be sensitive to the inequalities existing between developed and developing countries. 
The next chapter will thus take a closer analysis of how the trade-labour linkage debate 
has affected one of the poorest regions in the world, Southern Africa, with a view to showing 
what an efficient social clause in trade must be sensitive to. Southern Africa has its own version 
of a social clause in its regional agreement with no sanctions involved in the protection of labour 
standards in general. An analysis of how this legal system operates and the challenges or 
successes faced may be useful in formulating an inclusive legal solution for an appropriate trade-
labour linkage model in multilateral trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
Trade Agreements and the Social Clause: A Southern African Perspective (Part 1) 
 
6 1  INTRODUCTION 
World trade is regulated by international trade agreements on multilateral, regional and bilateral 
levels.
1
 These legally binding and enforceable agreements go beyond mere trade regulations and 
have repercussions for various “non-trade” issues such as environment, employment or human 
rights.
2
 It is such repercussions for employment and human rights that have prompted debates 
over the inclusion of a social clause in the multilateral trade regulatory system of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). Such debates are crucial for a region like Southern Africa, which is 
easily one of the poorest regions in the world
3
 with a prevalence of high levels of poverty which 
continuously diminish the quality of lives of its poor inhabitants.
4
 Amongst the impoverished 
people in the region are workers who, like half of Africa‟s population, live on less than one 
United States dollar (USD) a day.
5
 This is a cause for concern in a world which is supposed to be 
driven by a desire to afford human rights protection to all the world‟s citizens.6  
This chapter will advance the argument that should core labour standards continue to be 
excluded from the WTO trade system, which in itself is a key driver of world economies, poverty 
cycles such as the one in Southern Africa could possibly remain unbroken effectively rendering 
it almost impossible for people in the region and other developing regions of the world to escape 
the poverty trap.
7
 Improving the protection of core labour standards in trade might be a central 
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and useful part of this dynamic especially if it is considered that one of the key issues that have 
been closely linked to the high levels of poverty in the region is the employment conditions of 
workers. In particular, employment sectors related to trade or foreign direct investment have 
raised questions as to why the conditions of workers in these sectors continue to decline into 
poverty whereas the companies that employ them continue to make huge profits.
8
  
As the first part of two chapters focused on to Southern Africa and the social clause, this 
chapter starts with an insight into the general perspective of what informs debates of a social 
clause in the region. Of significance, the chapter will undertake a detailed analysis of the debates 
on the social clause in South Africa, a country which has been regarded as having the most 
progressive labour laws in the region yet it appears to be facing challenges of its own concerning 
the trade-labour linkage. The purpose of this approach is to provide a basis for analyzing the 
issues surrounding the social clause in the region as a whole in the next chapter, which is the 
second part of the Southern African perspective. South Africa‟s case shows how globalization 
has exposed workers, their employment and wages to the dynamics of the international economy 
and global competition.
9
 This could assist in understanding the dynamics shaping the social 
clause debate in the region. However, before delving into the South African situation, a short 
background to the social clause in the region will be given to assist one develop a clear 
understanding of the issues informing the trade-labour linkage debate amongst Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries. 
6 2  SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE SOCIAL CLAUSE 
Since the inception of the WTO, the trade-labour linkage debate has been one of the 
most polarized issues in the world.
10
 In 1999, Wilkinson noted that low and middle income 
developing countries were opposed to the inclusion of core labour standards into multilateral 
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trade agreements.
11
 Their general contention was that a social clause has the North-South 
(developed to developing country) view of competitiveness as its basis.
12
 This perception 
remains at the centre of the case against the inclusion of a social clause in multilateral trade 
agreements. Southern Africa has been confronted with proposals to link trade practices to core 
labour standards but most of the countries in the region have not received the proposals very well 
as divided views concerning the debate exist. In general, the views have been divided on the 
basis of how countries in the region recognise core labour standards in their national labour 
legislations and in practice. Only South Africa initially appeared to have had a positive approach 
to proposals for linking core labour standards to trade immediately after the end of the apartheid 
era, a position which is now debatable.  
Most of the countries in Southern Africa have not been cooperative concerning the need 
to embrace the calls to include a social clause in trade as this and the next chapter will show. 
Regardless of the opposition, opinions on the contentious trade-labour linkage proposal appear to 
be changing with the emergence of new developments impacting on trade due to globalisation.
13
 
Differences in opinions between developed and developing countries
14
 could perhaps be the 
reason why it might have been easy for developing countries to oppose the inclusion of a social 
clause in the trade negotiations of the WTO out of fears of protectionism by developed countries. 
It also could be the reason why developing countries‟ evidently unanimous North-South 
perception has not been subjected to close scrutiny regarding its validity. In the present day 
world, the debate whether or not to incorporate a social clause within the framework of the WTO 
is no longer just a North-South competition view but also a South-South (developing to 
developing country) competition view. The rise of the South-South competition view of a social 
clause in the WTO has largely been attributed to the emergence of China as a key competitor in 
world trade.
15
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China‟s increased exports to developing countries appear to have offered a platform to 
review the issues surrounding the trade-labour linkage debate.
16
 Lin contends that this is due in 
part to the fact that differences between the relative factor endowments of different categories of 
developing countries could now become significant,
17
 a development which might force some 
developing countries like South Africa to realize that supporting a trade-labour linkage could be 
a way to protect both their own industries and their export markets from threats such as the one 
posed by China.
18
 Ironically the potential use of labour standards for protectionist purposes is at 
the centre of the North-South debate on the social clause. Labour standards, it has been argued, 
must not be used for protectionist purposes.
19
 However, as far back as 2003, Chan and Ross 
observed that China had a remarkably inferior labour rights record which poses a threat to core 
labour standards‟ protection in developing countries.20  This situation still prevails and is 
arguably one of the threats to developing countries‟ growth. It is also important to realise that 
China is not the only party guilty of violating core labour standards in trade through its 
companies. This and the next chapter will show that other private actors in pursuit of economic 
gains contribute to the violation of core labour standards in trade. 
If one also considers the position of developing countries whose development strategy is 
oriented to the building of export platforms, where components are assembled and exported, the 
China factor becomes even more significant
21
 as the former‟s development strategy can be 
affected with respect to third markets.
22
 This export displacement is best illustrated by the case of 
Mexico, a country which, like South Africa, enjoys a comparative advantage in labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
139 and Polgreen and French “China is in Africa Both Benefactor and Competitor” In The New York Times of 20 
August 2007. 
16
  Marima “Outrage over Brutal Chinese Labour Practices” Independent 12 April 2012. The Article notes that, “By 
2009 roughly six years after adopting a more aggressive expansionist policy, Sino-Africa trade stood at about 
US$90 billion, surpassing US and European markets which at the time were battling a global recession”. 
17
  See Lin “New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development” 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/Kuznets/lin-110301.pdf (accessed 12-06-2012). 
18
  Van den Cate “The Impact of International Trade on Less Developed Countries” 2009 Business Intelligence 
Journal 119. 
19
  See WTO “Understanding the WTO: Cross-cutting and New Issues” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm (accessed 12-06-2012). 
20
  Chan and Ross “Racing to the Bottom: International Trade without a Social Clause” 2003 Third World Quarterly 
1013. 
21
  See WTO “Understanding the WTO: The Organization. Members and Observers” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed 12-06-2012). 
22
  See WTO “Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed 12-06-2012). 
243 
 
intensive goods in comparison to developed countries.
23
 Mexico has seen a sharp drop in exports 
to the United States (US) in a number of labour-intensive industries coupled with a significant 
decrease in the number of maquiladoras
24
 from 3590 in 2000 to 2810 in 2006.
25
  From 
occupying the first place in knit clothes exports above the US during the nineties, Mexico 
has become the fourth source after China, Vietnam and Honduras as of 2007.
26
 Apart from the 
negative impact that Chinese trade practices have had on the development strategies of some 
developing countries, lowered transaction costs can also affect the middle-income 
developing countries through import competition.
27
 This is the case for South Africa, where 
Chinese imports are perceived as a threat to the national textile industry
28
 and where, according 
to WTO statistics, imports of apparel grew by 500% from 2002 to 2006.
29
 Such export and the 
import pressures could set off renewed pressure for protection from the affected production 
sectors.
30
 This argument is also at the centre of the Wal-Mart-Mass-Mart merger in South Africa, 
an issue discussed later in this chapter. This study will attempt to determine whether or not 
labour standards can provide that protection. 
An analysis of the current developments surrounding the trade-labour linkage debate in 
Southern Africa will be done against the background of the above highlighted issues concerning 
the social clause. It must be understood that Southern Africa like other regional blocs has an 
interesting integration process which groups together the Southern African States in what is 
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known as the SADC.
31
 The SADC was founded in 1992 and is an association agreement with 
broad political and development aims, rather than a trade agreement, although it includes a trade 
component through its SADC Protocol on Trade.
32
 SADC also has a tripartite commission for 
labour and social affairs.
33
 Regardless of this arrangement, the developments in the individual 
countries clearly show that a regional approach to the trade-labour linkage in Southern Africa, 
whilst it is applauded, might be exerting little or no impact on the protection of core labour 
standards in trade. This could be a sign that regionalism, especially of the developing countries, 
might be fraught with a lot of challenges which render some of the “well meaning” legal 
structures redundant. The Director of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, Trudi 
Hartzenberg, whilst commenting on the possibility of achieving the Tripartite African Free Trade 
Area (TAFTA)
34
 by 2017 was extremely cautious due to a number of factors, including the 
continued existence of failed states across Africa. Hartzenberg said: 
“Even if you take SADC, which is one of the more developed organisations, it is 
experiencing a crisis related to the development of its legal and institutional infrastructure-
the effective suspension of the SADC tribunal leaves member states and private parties 
without a forum to seek redress on matters pertaining to the SADC treaty and protocols.”35  
 
Perhaps the developments in the individual countries could be a reflection of the position 
adopted at the regional level concerning a trade-labour linkage, which in turn would suggest that 
something beyond regionalism may be required to address such a challenge. Furthermore, the 
exclusion of a clear social clause in the proposed TAFTA might be a sign that developing 
countries are not willing to change their stance on incorporating core labour standards into 
multilateral trade agreements.
36
 Sadly, the omission of a social clause in the TAFTA 
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accommodates the model of labour violations being used by Chinese firms and other private 
actors. Such approaches are being endorsed by many African governments a development which 
sets a dangerous precedent for a continent expected to become the new centre of global growth 
led by BRICS.
37
 The regrettable part is that global growth could be driven by Africa with little or 
no benefit to the African people and the continent itself. Cocoran has noted that: 
 “The development of trade between African states has increasingly become a priority for 
the African Union because of its member states‟ inability to tackle widespread poverty, 
despite annual economic growth rates above 5 per cent in many member states over the 
past decade. Although African economic growth slowed in 2009 due to the global 
recession, regional gross domestic product (GDP) was well above rates posted in countries 
in Europe and the US. By 2010, the continent had bounced back with the GDP doubling to 
5.4 per cent that year…”38  
 
Cocoran‟s observations are reflected by the data in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Total exports from SADC, 2000-2010 
 
 2000 2005 2010 
 USD billion USD billion USD billion 
World 52.2 102.1 170.3 
 % % % 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SADC 12.6 9.7 10.9 
Rest of Africa 2.4 3.1 3.2 
Eropean Union 37.9 34.0 23.0 
Other high income 
OECD 
27.9 29.2 26.4 
BRICS 7.8 13.0 28.8 
Rest of the World 11.3 11.0 7.7 
Source: UNCTADStat. 
 
In spite of this success, South African President, Jacob Zuma, was quick to point out that less 
than 10 per cent of Africa‟s trade is between its states and that boosting trade amongst African 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
repeat same mistake of excluding a social clause in trade agreements which arguably will hamper development 
in Africa. 
37
  BRICS is the title of an association of leading emerging economies, arising out of the inclusion of South Africa 
into the BRIC group in 2010. As of 2012, the group‟s five members are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. 
38
  Corcoran “Major Challenges remain for African Free Trade Area” quoted in the Irish Times edition of 13 
February 2012. See also an Article in the Zambia Daily Mail “Clear Obstacles to Intra-Africa Trade” Zambia 
Daily Mail 22 March 2012. 
246 
 
states should be a priority as a way to further develop the continent.
39
 This statement clearly 
signifies the importance of the TAFTA, hence, one would question why core labour standards 
were excluded from its framework even though the Agreement has as one of its objectives, the 
adoption and implementation of policies in all sectors of economic and social life that promote 
and consolidate an equitable society and social justice.
40
 Labour standards could easily have 
fallen into this category as cooperation in other areas in terms of the agreement excludes core 
labour standards but surprisingly includes the environment which is one of the issues that has 
been argued of late to be linked with trade.
41
 
Trade has a direct impact on the quantity and quality of employment.
42
 The interactions 
between labour, trade and social policies have been analyzed and acknowledged in the jointly 
conducted ILO/WTO study on trade and employment.
43
 This is a factor which the majority of 
African countries have downplayed with most of the countries strongly against proposals for 
linking trade with labour at the multilateral level. However, this has not precluded the SADC 
member states from developing a Social Charter which has as one of its key objectives 
facilitating the establishment and harmonisation of social security systems and generation of 
incomes.
44
 The Social Charter also seeks to promote the development and harmonisation of 
legal, economic and social policies and programmes, which contribute to the creation of 
productive employment opportunities and generation of incomes, in member states.
45
 It also 
seeks to harmonise regulations relating to health and safety standards at work places across the 
region
46
 and promote the development of institutional capacities as well as vocational and 
technical skills in the region.
47
  
The Social Charter gives the responsibility to create an enabling environment in order to 
realize the objectives mentioned to the Governments in the region. This is a key aspect of this 
study as the developments in the Southern African countries will show the attitude of the 
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Governments towards protecting core labour standards relative to attaining economic gains. It 
will question whether or not the same governments would then be willing to recognise and 
protect core labour standards in other regional integration arrangements. An analysis of these 
issues will assist in assessing the impact of the Social Charter in the region and in establishing 
whether or not it can address the violation of core labour standards in trade agreements. Equally 
it could assist in establishing whether or not African governments are able to abide by their own 
agreements, a factor which will assist in addressing the genuineness of the resistance to a social 
clause in the WTO on the basis of the North-South perception. This is made all the more 
important when one considers that the Social Charter:  
“…embodies the recognition by governments, employers and workers in the region of the 
universality and indivisibility of basic human rights proclaimed in instruments such as the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples‟ Rights, the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, the 
Philadelphia Declaration and other relevant international instruments”.48    
 
Article 4 of the Social Charter provides that member states shall create an enabling environment 
consistent with International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions on freedom of 
association,
49
 the right to organise and collective bargaining.
50
 It thus can be argued that the 
Social Charter also aims at protecting core labour standards in the region. Accordingly, trade 
related violations of core labour standards can be analysed in terms of the Social Charter. This 
leads to the issue whether or not the Social Charter has been useful in advancing efforts to 
improve core labour standards‟ recognition in the region. The answer is derived from 
developments currently unfolding in individual Southern African countries. 
6 2 1  South Africa 
The debate on the social clause in South Africa was addressed by the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) during the nineties with the debate appearing to have had a more 
public dimension.
51
 Organized labour, the employers‟ associations and the government 
participated in consultations during the nineties and came to a framework agreement on the 
                                                          
 
48
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  See ILO Convention 87. 
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51
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issue.
52
 In its submissions to the South African Parliament, COSATU vigorously defended 
the incorporation of a social clause involving sanctions into free trade agreements in several 
resolutions and proposed the incorporation of a social clause into the European Union-South 
Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
53
 as well as the Trade Protocol of the 
SADC.
54
 COSATU also advocated for the elimination of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in 
the neighbouring countries and addressed the “race to the bottom” phenomenon.55 
Simultaneously, COSATU expressed fear of possible protectionist uses of labour standards by 
the G-7 countries.
56
 In 2005, COSATU confirmed its support for the inclusion of a social clause 
in the WTO,
57
 a position which now starkly contrasts with the views of some current members of 
the South African government on the issue. Its textile affiliate, the South African Clothing and 
Textile Workers‟ Union (SACTWU), has underscored the labour standards argument in its 
position concerning Chinese imports.
58
   
The main avenue through which COSATU attempted to translate its social clause 
proposal into policy was the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), 
a social dialogue organ formed after apartheid on the advice of the ILO and whose composition 
and functions were prescribed in the NEDLAC Act of 1994.
59
 At NEDLAC it was agreed that 
political, substantive and technical difficulties involved in promoting universal respect for labour 
standards called for a creative and multi-faceted strategy.
60
 NEDLAC 
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incorporates representatives from labour, business associations, the South African government 
and the community.
61
 They are appointed by the corresponding minister upon a nomination by 
the relevant organizations.
62
  It has four chambers, among which is a Trade and Industry one, 
which shares with the other  chambers the tasks of concluding agreements, considering changes 
to social and economic policy (which includes trade) before they are discussed in Parliament, 
and promoting coordinated policies, among others.
63
   
Trade policy is implemented in South Africa by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), which receives input from both NEDLAC and other ministries and agencies. NEDLAC 
labour and business representatives have been part of the South African delegations to the WTO 
Ministerial Conferences on at least two occasions: Seattle and Hong Kong.
64
  Even though the 
DTI has not externalized any opinion on the trade-labour issue aside from the WTO statements, 
the Trade and Industry Chamber of NEDLAC, of which the Trade Minister is a member, served 
as a forum for discussions on the social clause between 1995 and 1996.
65
 Labour representatives, 
backed by business, proposed the inclusion of a social clause in all South Africa‟s bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements.
66
 NEDLAC‟s Executive Council reached agreement on a 
landmark framework which, for the first time, linked South Africa‟s trade relationships with the 
promotion of human rights and, in particular, workers‟ rights.67 Central to the social-clause 
framework was the fact that it was viewed as not being a barrier to trade but rather a mechanism 
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to engage South Africa‟s trading partners in a dialogue linking human rights with trade.68 The 
then NEDLAC Executive Director Jayendra Naidoo once said: 
“The social-clause framework negotiated by business, labour and government delegates at 
NEDLAC reaffirms the principle that economic growth and development must be 
underpinned by a commitment to social justice, including respect for universally 
recognised labour standards. The danger is that with the liberalisation of world trade and 
the globalistaion of the world economy, workers‟ rights will be downgraded to 
requirements below the basic acceptable levels. The principles underlying the social-clause 
framework mean that South Africa will champion a move to improving the rights and 
conditions of workers worldwide.”69 
 
In implementing the social-clause framework, South Africa ratified the core ILO Conventions 
which relate to labour standards. Naidoo at that time stated that: 
“Two of the Conventions (freedom of association and the protection of the right to 
organise) have already been ratified by government, and NEDLAC has recommended that 
three others (relating to forced labour, the abolition of forced labour, and discrimination) 
be ratified during the 1996 parliamentary session.”70 
 
The second phase of the social clause framework adoption for South Africa required that it enter 
into memorandums of understanding with its trading partners which would commit both parties 
to ratifying, upholding and promoting the ILO‟s Conventions on trade union rights, collective 
bargaining, and fair employment practices.
71
 Regional initiatives to promote the framework 
agreement also began with the issue being put on the agenda of the Labour and Employment 
Commission of the SADC, and by utilizing the Social Charter in Southern Africa to promote 
workers‟ rights.72  
However, consensus on the importance of a social clause in trade in South Africa is fast 
decreasing. NEDLAC‟s 2005 Annual Report stated that the Trade and Industry Chamber did 
not manage to achieve a common position on the social clause.
73
  In August 2011, the South 
African cabinet had to rush to dismiss speculation that South Africa‟s rigid labour legislation 
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might be eased in the interest of job creation following pronouncements on the matter from 
Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and Minister in the Presidency Trevor Manuel. The two 
ministers were of the opinion that labour standards in the country must be relaxed to create more 
jobs a view which goes against the spirit of a social clause. On August 15 2011, Minister Pravin 
Gordhan suggested that South Africa might have to relax its labour laws in certain cases to grow 
jobs.
74
 At a conference in Johannesburg, he told internal auditors that, “We may have to change 
the way we see the labour dispensation in South Africa.”75 His statements were prompted by 
threats made by Chinese owners of clothing factories in Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal to close and 
relocate to Lesotho, Swaziland or Botswana if they were forced to pay a minimum wage.
76
  
It appears from the minister‟s response that the view amongst some in the South African 
government is that jobs must be created even if such a development does not result in significant 
benefits to the workers. It is imperative to analyse the minister‟s views as they set a bad example 
to other countries in the region and give the impression that when faced with threats by foreign 
investors to leave due to a higher compliance with labour standards, a country must embark on a 
race to the bottom as a solution to such impending action. Indeed, the minister‟s statements add 
to the already growing concerns that: 
“…the process of competitive bidding between countries for FDI may be inducing 
countries to offer concessions on regulation, taxes, environmental protection and labour 
standards that are unnecessary. Apart from the direct social and environmental impact, 
these concessions may impair the competitiveness of the domestic economy, reduce the 
potential for such investment to contribute to development, and ultimately impede the entry 
of FDI. „Beggar-thy neighbour‟ investment incentive competition may even distort the 
international allocation of FDI away from sites with a potentially higher return in terms of 
development and to investors.”77  
 
Zampini has observed that, “It is worth nothing that the international labour movement has a 
fairly idiosyncratic relationship with the way information is presented in the Doing Business 
reports of the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) since their first issue in 
October 2003.”78 In a way, Zampini‟s view implies that the policy positions adopted by 
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countries, in particular developing countries, concerning how they conduct business are 
prescribed for them. It is from this perspective that in 2006 the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) claimed that data collected through the Doing Business process has been 
used to promote labour market deregulation and to recommend that governments implement 
specific measures to infringe workers‟ rights (such as social protection) with flagrant disregard to 
the poverty impact of such measures and their implications for employment, wages, working 
conditions and respect for workers‟ fundamental rights.79 
South Africa was given as an example of countries affected by proposals made through 
the Doing Business process. In the 2006 Doing Business report, South Africa was considered a 
business unfriendly environment with reference to the „Grounds for firing‟ category.80 The 
grounds for firing in South Africa were viewed as inconsistent with rules such as „the employer 
may not terminate employment contract without cause‟81 and „the law establishes a public policy 
list of “fair” grounds for dismissal‟.82 The report failed to remind the reader that the higher 
hiring-and-firing indicators for South Africa in comparison to the Organisation for Economic and 
Cooperation Development (OECD) countries were explained in part by the country‟s affirmative 
action programmes, adopted by post-apartheid governments to overcome the legacy of decades 
of racial discrimination in the labour market.
83
  
In 2008, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), the voice of South African organised 
business, expressed concerns over the methodology and approach adopted in the Doing Business 
reports.
84
 Reservations were expressed to the effect that Doing Business indicators, since 2003, 
have been used with a regional leverage.
85
 Countries were advised to gauge their labour market 
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rigidity indices as recorded under the „Hiring and Firing Workers‟ section and take actions to get 
them lower than the regional average.
86
 Unions argue that the „Doing Business‟ Report has been 
used in SADC countries to place downward pressure on workers‟ protection. For example, in the 
2006 International Monetary Fund (IMF)‟s Article IV Consultation report on Lesotho 
recommended a downward flexibility of real wages in Lesotho so as to „improve 
competitiveness‟.87 The IMF report did not mention that wage levels in Lesotho are already 
lower than those in other countries in Southern Africa. For example wages in Lesotho‟s garment 
manufacturing sector were already less than a third of those in neighbouring South Africa.
88
 In 
turn, Lesotho‟s low wage levels were mentioned in the IMF‟s 2007 Article IV report for 
Swaziland, in connection with a recommendation to the local government to „reduce the cost of 
doing business‟, which emphasises that wages in Lesotho were only half of those in Swaziland.89 
It is worth noting that Lesotho and Swaziland are the countries to which Chinese companies 
operating in Kwa-Zulu Natal threatened to relocate to. One can thus conclude that the fear of 
losing the Chinese as investors drove minister Gordhan to call for labour market flexibility in 
line with the World Bank and IFC proposals. After all, the ITUC has also noted how the World 
Bank in its Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for the Republic of Mauritius: 
“...announces the availability of a Development Policy Loan for „reforming the labour 
market‟, one facet of which will be „overhauling the current tripartite wage-setting 
machinery‟. The overall aim of the reform, according to the CPS, „is to secure a position 
for Mauritius in the top ten most investment and business-friendly locations in the world 
...”90 
 
The picture that is portrayed by the World Bank from the above analysis is that lowering labour 
standards attracts investors and makes countries eligible for investment loans. If that is the case 
then it is logical to ask how international trade and investment are influencing the quality of 
employment in countries if at all there is any such influence. This may help SADC policy makers 
to adopt the appropriate investment plans which are implemented in the best interests of their 
countries. 
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 Flanagan and Khor tried to establish how cross-border economic activity influences 
working conditions and core labour rights.
91
 They observed that, “Trade policies enhance or 
retard the evolution of international flows of economic activity with trade policy negotiations 
often provoking strong sentiments regarding the links between trade liberalisation and labour 
conditions.”92 They also argued that: 
“Recognising the powerful influence of per Capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) opens 
broad short-term and long-term policy menus for advancing labour conditions. In the short-
run, severe recessions tend to degrade the labour conditions of the employed in addition to 
reducing employment and output. Deploying a nation‟s fiscal and monetary policy 
weapons to remove gaps between actual and potential GDP restores both the quantity and 
quality of jobs. In the long run, even under autarky, a country‟s labour conditions can 
improve with higher rates of technical progress, investments in physical and human capital, 
and the establishment of institutions that clarify property rights enforce contracts and 
reduce corruption….”93 
 
Mashayekhi et al have stated that trade is an important element of creating productive 
employment and reducing poverty.
94
 However it still must be questioned why no distinct 
improvement in labour standards is being observed in SADC, a region which compared with 
other regional economic communities in Africa, has a relatively high share of intra-SADC trade 
at 11% of the region‟s total trade.95 Could this suggest that SADC leaders are only paying lip 
service to the objectives set in the SADC Social Charter whilst trying to conform to the demands 
of institutions such as the IMF with the hope of accessing loans? 
The answer to the above question could be partially found in Minister Gordhan‟s other 
proposal made in response to the Chinese threats. Gordhan argued that labour laws might have to 
be relaxed to allow young people to enter the workplace and gain skills and experience at lower 
wages, but not at the expense of people who already had jobs.
96
 Gordhan‟s proposal appears to 
be supported by Scarpetta et al who in 2010 stated that: 
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“One way to encourage the employment of young workers, very common in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development high-income economies, is to apply a lower 
minimum wage, called an “apprentice wage,” for young people below a certain age. This 
encourages employers to hire first-time employees, and it can ease the transition to 
permanent employment, especially where employers commit to training the young 
employees”.97 
Whether such a policy initiative would be successful in developing countries is subject to debate. 
South Africa through its National Youth Development Plan
98
 has tried to implement the South 
African Youth Wage Subsidy Plan.
99
 In his 2010 State of the Nation Address, South African 
President Jacob Zuma announced for the first time the proposed youth wage subsidy which was 
intended to help first-time job seekers gain entry to the labour market. COSATU objected to the 
subsidy which it claimed would open the door to cheap labour and jeopardize existing jobs.
100
 
COSATU‟s argument compelled the South African government to backtrack on its proposals to 
implement a R 5 billion youth wage subsidy. Was COSATU wrong in its analysis? Probably it 
was not. After all, could such an initiative in developing countries not simply expose the young 
workers to employers such as the Chinese who would gladly employ the young and cheap labour 
whilst doing away with skilled and fairly expensive labour? This must be viewed in light of the 
fact that the Chinese have been complaining about the imposition of a minimum wage and have 
even threatened to close their factories and relocate to Lesotho where there are extremely flexible 
labour standards.
101
 It appears that Gordhan‟s policy initiative is consistent with the IMF position 
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which calls for labour market policies that include measures to reduce labour costs and increase 
labour market flexibility.
102
 
The main political opposition party in South Africa, the Democratic Alliance (DA)
103
 
supported the views of Ministers Gordhan and Manuel. Its spokesperson Ian Ollis argued that, 
“Labour market rigidity is a major driver of our country‟s jobs crisis”.104 Ollis‟ view has been 
endorsed as the DA‟s official policy position concerning a trade-labour linkage in that whilst 
commenting on the proposed 2012 Labour Bills of South Africa, the party stated that: 
“The proposed amendments to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) and 
Labour Relations Act (LRA) will exacerbate existing regulatory rigidity and further stifle 
the labour markets. Additional regulation will only serve to raise the cost of employment 
for businesses and therefore intensify our current unemployment crisis.”105  
 
From the above statement, it is clear that the DA judges any proposed amendments to labour 
legislation on the merits of their impact on job creation.
106
 As such, the DA is of the view that 
before any labour legislation can be amended, it must be ascertained whether or not the proposed 
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labour bills will create a more job-friendly environment.
107
 Therefore the DA argued that a 
further tightening of the labour market in South Africa would only increase the cost of labour 
and therefore suppress employment even further.
108
  
As a basis for their policy position, the DA made reference to a 2009 study on labour 
market regulation across 73 countries by the University of Bath, which found that tight labour 
market regulation increased unemployment all over the world.
109
 The DA deemed the study as 
particularly relevant to South Africa as it is one of the first to cover not only industrial countries 
but also developing and transition countries. The research concluded that adverse labour market 
effects are probably due to lower investment by domestic firms as well as lower FDI inflows 
caused by stricter market regulation.
110
 Furthermore, the research found that stringent hiring and 
firing rules have particularly adverse effects on unemployment, with the most severely impacted 
being women and young people.
111
 The DA also made reference to a 2010 Regulatory Impact 
Assessment (RIA) carried out by the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of 
Cape Town which established that South Africa‟s wage-employment elasticity was estimated at 
0.7 % which means that an increase in the cost of hiring workers of 1% is likely to translate to a 
decrease in employment of 0.7%.
112
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The DA‟s position on labour market flexibility is also supported by the World Bank‟s 
controversial “Employing Workers Index” (EW Index),113 which the World Bank introduced as 
part of its Doing Business (DB) indicators.
114
 Lee, McCann and Torm note that: 
“Since the DB project was launched in 2004, the World Bank‟s assessment of existing 
regulations in developing countries has been predominantly negative. Rigid labour market 
policies are blamed for poor labour market performance, such as low productivity, high 
unemployment and informal employment, while a more flexible regulatory framework is 
perceived to be associated with increased growth and employment creation.”115 
 
The DB indicators mirror the Washington Consensus
116
 principles
117
 which were believed to be 
necessary for the recovery of Latin America from the economic and financial crises of the 
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1980s.
118
 Latin American countries embraced the Washington Consensus and almost 
immediately started to gain short term benefits from it.
119
 Frers the Director of the Fiscal Policy 
Program Centro de Implementación de Políticas Publicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento 
(CIPPEC)
120
 of Argentina noted that: 
 “Latin America strongly embraced the Washington Consensus. For example, as a result of 
monetary prudence, inflation went down to single digits almost everywhere. Also, as a 
consequence of fiscal discipline, average budget deficits went down from 5 percent of the 
GDP to an average of 2 percent, and public debt went from 50 percent of the GDP to less 
than 20 percent. After trade liberalization, tariffs went from an average of more than 40 
percent to nearly 10 percent. Also, after financial liberalization, direct credit controls were 
abandoned, interest rates were deregulated, FDI regimes were open, and foreign exchange 
and capital account controls were dismantled. Finally, more than 800 public firms were 
privatized between 1988 and 1997.”121 
 
Regardless of the almost immediate success of the Washington Consensus, Frers was quick to 
point out that: 
 “Not all results were as good as expected. On the positive side, there was a surge of private 
capital influx into the region that went from $14 billion in 1980 to $86 billion in 1997. 
There was also an expansion of investment and export volumes. On the negative side, it 
must be admitted that real GDP growth only amounted to 3 percent a year for a decade, or 
just 1.5 % per capita. That was barely better than the 2 percent displayed during the lost 
decade of the 1980s and well below the rate of 5 % displayed during the 1960s or the 
1970s. After the reforms unemployment rose, poverty remained widespread and there was 
generalized disappointment and sense of injustice. There was a sharp rise in crime and 
violence.”122 
 
The lessons to be learnt from the failures of the Washington Consensus according to Frers were 
that: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer 
protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions and legal security for property rights. 
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 “Today there is generalized consensus that countries should focus on equity and income 
distribution as objectives in themselves, and not only as preconditions for sustainable 
growth... There is consensus that there is a need to tax the rich and spend better on the 
poor. There is still consensus that economic cycles must be smoothed, and this can be done 
through fiscal rules and safety nets. Also, another item that is considered today very 
important is that liberalizations should be done gradually and cautiously until regulatory 
and supervision capacities are strong. There is an additional powerful rationale that crises 
are particularly harmful to the poor and others in the bottom half of the income 
distribution.”123 
 
The failure of the Washington Consensus upon which the DB indicators are modeled raises 
serious questions as to whether or not the Bretton Woods Institutions are playing a role in forcing 
developing countries to lower their labour standards in order to promote short term trade and 
investment gains. The starting point in addressing this question is to observe that there is an 
argument to the effect that rigid labour legislation could cause an undesired effect to the 
economy which has been used by developing countries to lower labour standards in order to 
attract investors.
124
 The DA suggested that there was need to introduce labour reforms that would 
make the labour market less rigid, more flexible in wage determination and introduce more 
accommodating hiring and firing regulations, whilst respecting the four key labour principles of 
the ILO.
125
  
However, questions are also raised about the DA‟s proposals which are in line with the 
DB indicators. One such question is that whilst it might be argued that rigid labour legislation 
could negatively impact the economy, would labour market flexibility not equally affect workers 
in developing countries, who are not as privileged as workers in developed countries, a 
development which could harm the economy in the long run and render the DA‟s model a 
failure? Could the failure of the Washington Consensus in Latin America not be an indication 
that labour market flexibility is not necessarily the best approach to promoting trade and luring 
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investment in developing countries? Perhaps the DA holds well meaning policy proposals which 
nevertheless could be ill-suited to the context of developing countries in which they have to be 
applied. In addition, it must be asked how less rigid labour legislation intended to protect the 
rights of the previously and still disadvantaged workers in South Africa should be when there are 
persistent challenges currently being faced by the workers due to the effects of globalisation. 
Could Ian Ollis and the DA be missing something which the two ministers also missed?  
COSATU spokesperson Patrick Craven pointed out what those who call for the weakening 
of labour standards could be missing when he argued that: 
“While executives continue to laugh all the way to the bank, with massive remuneration 
packages, millions of workers continue to earn starvation wages, from which they are 
forced to support more family members due to high levels of unemployment, and have 
suffered massive casualisation, including through intensive usage of labour brokers as a 
clear strategy by companies to circumvent progressive labour laws”.126 
 
The recent developments in South Africa‟s Platinum mining belt illustrate the dangers posed by 
companies profiteering at the expense of workers who are subjected to cheap labour in flexible 
labour markets which Craven referred to.
127
 The South African mining industry has been 
experiencing increased levels of industrial action, developments which have emerged as a 
significant risk to the industry and economic development in the country. Aquarius
128
 the world‟s 
fourth largest producer of platinum retrenched two thousand workers and closed operations at its 
Everest Mine in early 2012, citing labour unrest as the raeson for winding up its operations.
129
 
Another Platinum mining company Implats
130
 experienced a six-week industrial action in 
February 2012 which sliced 21 percent off its full-year output and, combined with declining 
metals prices, led to a sharp cut in its dividend, to R1.95 a share from R5.70 last year.
131
  Three 
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lives were lost during the strike at Implats.
132
 The industrial action cost the company, which 
produces 30 percent of global platinum, 120 000 ounces in lost production and translated into 
R2.8 billion in lost revenue.
133
  
In August 2012, the London listed Lonmin‟s Marikana mine experienced an illegal 
industrial action that resulted in the deaths of a total number of forty-four people. Webb has 
argued that, “What no one has dared to say, aside from the miners themselves, is that the mining 
industry remains dependent on cheap and flexible labour.”134 A Bench Marks Foundation study 
of platinum mines in the North West Province of South Africa revealed that a number of factors 
led to the rising discontent of workers.
135
 Lonmin was singled out as a mine with high levels of 
fatalities, very poor conditions for workers and unfulfilled community demands for 
employment.
136
 The company also effected a mass dismissal of nine thousand workers in May of 
2011, a development which raises questions as to whether or not there are any gains for 
developing countries from foreign investors on a long term basis.
137
 How such developments 
prevail in a company which in 2011 made nearly R2 billion in profit is difficult to 
comprehend.
138
 The company was able to pay its nine executive directors a total of R 45 million 
in the year 2011, a figure which is above the total salaries budgeted for all its mining employees 
for the year 2012 which was pegged at an estimated R 44 million.
139
 It is also hard to understand 
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how the miners who work hard to drill platinum which per ounce sells at about USD 1444 on the 
international market end up taking home around USD 500 per month.
140
  
The South African Chamber of Mines (SACM) has argued that the miners‟ demands for a 
salary of R12 500 per month are economically unsustainable.
141
 Whether or not this argument is 
plausible is subject to debate. A question which must be raised though is how the SACM 
addresses the observations made by Maleki to the effect that: 
“Lonmin Plc‟s 2011 revenues equates to an average of $71,665 per worker, if the money 
was divided equally between individuals (Calculated from the total 2011 revenue of $1,992 
billion divided between 27,796 employees. Those rock drill operators who were massacred 
by police on August 16 were paid a very small fraction of this total, only $3,600 to $6,000 
each per year (Calculated from the monthly wage range of rock drill operators: $300 - $ 
500). The more the workers are paid, the less can go to pay for the enormous profits of top 
investors and executives, such as the executive director‟s nearly $884,000 in compensation 
(This is the total cash compensation and does not include possible stock options). This is 
the simple recipe for the concentration of wealth: in the extreme, the chief executive earns 
the same as about 245 rock drill operators combined.”142 
 
It must be pointed that no one is against businesses profiteering as trade gains constitute the basis 
of doing business. However if business is done with a gross disregard of human rights then there 
might be a problem. After all, as has been evidenced by the developments in the aftermath of the 
Marikana massacre, the use of cheap labour is not a competitive advantage but a threat to 
business. Multiple strike actions have recently engulfed the South African mining industry. At 
the time of this study, Anglo-American Platinum the world‟s largest platinum producer had 
closed its mine in Rustenburg in fear of the victimisation of its workers by other striking 
workers.
143
 Goldfields‟ workers had also joined the strike demanding the same amount as the R 
12 500 which led to the impasse at Lonmin.
144
 A total of 55 people had been killed since the 
beginning of the strikes in the South African platinum belt in 2012.
145
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With the strikes threatening operations, the cost effect of Lonmin closing down its 
operations due to the difficulties of doing business would lead to 35 000 workers losing their 
jobs.
146
 This would worsen the situation in South Africa which has almost half of its 52 million 
citizens living in poverty with Labour Force Survey figures indicating that 60 % of all workers in 
South Africa earn less than R 2500 a month.
147
 Many of these workers are the sole income 
earners in their households. This development mirrors the failure of the Washington Consensus 
in Latin America as already alluded to in this chapter. Could this be the competitive advantage 
that cheap labour brings? The crippling strikes in the mining industry were continuing at the time 
of this study with Lonmin having missed the production target of a saleable 750 000 ounces of 
platinum which translates to lost revenue estimated at R 800 million within 37 days.  
However, the Lonmin strike came to an end after an agreement by the company and the 
workers which resulted in a 22% wage increase across the board for the mine workers in addition 
to a R2000 once-off bonus.
148
 Strike actions are continuing at other mines. There are concerns 
though that the wage increase may lead to job losses as Lonmin seeks to cut operating costs. 
Lonmin has tried to dismiss such concerns by indicating that it will not reduce the number of 
miners. Only time will tell. Important questions are raised though. Does it take workers to 
undertake an illegal strike action for them to be given a record pay rise in South Africa in the 
history of wage negotiations? If so what example does such behaviour set concerning wage 
negotiations and the investor friendly nature of the country? Should the government not develop 
a policy to address the workers‟ grievances as well as the role of companies in ensuring 
sustainable development? All these questions need proper answers in order to ensure an investor 
friendly environment in the country. 
There are lessons to be drawn from the Marikana Lonmin mine incident in relation to 
Craven‟s sentiments. Trade unions are also liable for the escalating poor labour conditions 
experienced by workers. The differences between the National Union for Mineworkers 
(NUM)
149
 and Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU)
150
 fuelled the 
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tensions already existing concerning legitimate calls for an increase in wages made by the 
Marikana mine workers. NUM, an affiliate of COSATU has been accused of ignoring the 
workers‟ interests in favour of promoting their business ventures and liaisons with companies.151 
AMCU has been accused of taking advantage of workers‟ plight and turning it into an 
opportunity to fan violence in the mining industry so as to appear as if they are concerned about 
the latter‟s problems.152 However, disrupting business is hardly the right course of action to take 
when the workers themselves are already impoverished due to the little wages they receive and 
the inescapable conclusion that companies may be forced to shut down as a result of the strike 
actions, a situation which further worsens the plight of the already disadvantaged workers and 
their families. The “no work no pay” principle has seen striking workers rely on borrowing 
money from loan sharks and receiving handouts from Gift of the Givers (an NGO requested to 
assist the workers in the face of a worsening humanitarian crisis) in order to feed themselves and 
their families.
153
 
On 14 September 2012, Gordhan who had initially proposed the relaxing of South 
African labour laws to allow for labour market flexibility noted that the increasing illegal strike 
actions in the country‟s mining industry would adversely affect its growth path, employment 
retention as well as creation agenda and investor confidence.
154
 Gordhan warned that if investor 
confidence is undermined, investment from inside and outside the country would be threatened 
as well.
155
  Investment can either be threatened in the short-term through mine shutdowns with a 
possible view to withdrawal of business operations by investors due to a business unfriendly 
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environment
156
 or in the long-term due to the reluctance by future possible investors to invest in 
the country due to an unstable business operating environment charasterised by labour unrest.
157
 
All such scenarios have crippling and dire consequences to the development prospects of the 
country. 
From Gordhan‟s assessment of the crippling strikes, it may be inferred that if flexible 
labour market conditions lead to labour market unrest which in turn threatens investor 
confidence and the growth path of the country‟s economy then labour market rigidity could be 
the safeguard to boosting investor confidence from within and without South Africa. After all 
one of the central issues at the heart of the labour unrest in South Africa‟s mining industry has 
been the omission from its labour laws to recognise minority trade unions.
158
 Labour market 
rigidity is against the recommendations of Bretton Woods‟s institutions that prefer labour market 
flexibility as a route to economic development as already alluded to in this chapter. Lessons from 
the failed Washington Consensus in Latin America indicate that labour market flexibility might 
not offer the long-term development goals which developing countries should be aiming for. 
From this argument, could Gordhan have indirectly admitted that flexible labour market 
conditions may not be conducive to creating investor confidence for trade purposes? It may be 
argued that his views appear to suggest so. 
Striking mine workers disowned both AMCU and NUM for failing to represent their 
interests. Nevertheless the position of NUM and AMCU in relation to the Marikana Lonmin 
mine incident does not undermine the importance of Craven‟s sentiments which are substantiated 
by the fact that in March 2006, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) adopted new 
environmental and social standards which contain new requirements for community health, 
safety and security; labour conditions; pollution prevention and abatement; integrated social and 
environmental assessments; and management systems.
159
 The standards adopt an „outcomes-
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based approach‟ which requires client companies to have in place effective management systems 
that allow them to handle social and environmental risks as an integral part of their basic 
operations and business model.
160
 DB in its 2012 report also acknowledged the need to change 
the approach to conducting business with a view to ensuring consistency with ILO Conventions 
and striking a better balance between labour market flexibility and social protection (including 
unemployment protection).
161
  
DB‟s stance comes in the aftermath of an ongoing research which commenced in 2010 
and is being conducted by the World Bank Group working with a consultative group which 
includes labour lawyers, employer and employee representatives, and experts from the ILO, civil 
society, the private sector and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).
162
 The research is working towards exploring the measurement of worker protection to 
complement the measurement of the cost to employers of labour regulations.
163
 The research has 
led to the collection of new data on issues related to the minimum wage in 2012. The guidance of 
the consultative group has provided the basis for several changes in the methodology of 
calculating the minimum wage ratio in employing workers. The change in the methodology of 
calculating the minimum wage ratio in employing workers has been effected to ensure that:  
“No economy can receive the highest score if it has no minimum wage at all, if the law 
provides a regulatory mechanism for the minimum wage that is not enforced in practice, if 
there is only a customary minimum wage or if the minimum wage applies only to the 
public sector. A threshold was set for paid annual leave and a ceiling for working days 
allowed per week to ensure that no economy benefits in the scoring from excessive 
flexibility in these areas. Finally, the calculation of the redundancy cost and of the annual 
leave period for the rigidity of hours index was changed to refer to the average value for a 
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worker with 1 year of tenure, a worker with 5 years and a worker with 10 years rather than 
the value for a worker with 20 years of tenure.”164  
 
However, there is a lot of criticism that has been leveled against the DB indicators. Critics have 
been particularly concerned with the use of the EW index, and in particular the country rankings 
to guide legal reform, as a benchmark against which to measure progress and a basis for 
providing financial assistance to developing countries.
165
 Kitching,
166
 Arrunada,
167
 Berg and 
Cazes
168
 and Lee and McCann,
169
 and Djankov
170
 have all challenged the conceptual and 
methodological foundations of the EW index and broader DB project and deemed them as 
problematic or unreliable.  
The conceptual limitations of the DB project can be argued to stem from its underlying 
understanding of labour laws, which are grouped together with the other legal measures covered 
by the index as a form of “business regulation”.171 This conceptualization of labour standards 
differs from conventional accounts of their purpose in policy, legal and other discourses, which 
tend to centre on the social objectives of such standards such as ensuring justice, protecting 
workers‟ well-being and security, or improving the quality of life of workers and their 
families.
172
  Lee et al have argued that, “In line with the classification of labour laws as an 
element of “the business environment”, the DB indicators are intended neither to recognize the 
social objectives of labour regulations, nor to assess the level of protection offered by the 
domestic standards they cover.”173  
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Key concerns have thus been raised to the effect that aside from the ILO‟s core labour 
standards, the EW index disregards many of the entitlements contained in the ILO‟s 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
174
 The 2008 DB report claimed that 
methodological improvements have aligned the EW index with the ILO‟s Conventions.175 Lee 
and McCann carried out an analysis with respect to the international standards on working time, 
finding the sub-index on “rigidity of hours” to be substantially in conflict with them.176 Also, the 
2008 DB report singled out Georgia as a model of labour market regulation,
177
 although its 
labour code has been heavily criticized by the ILO for granting employers an unlimited right to 
dismiss workers without cause and imposing severe restrictions on trade union action and 
workers‟ collective bargaining rights.178 Lee et al argued that: 
“In terms of the overall country rankings, moreover, the EW index generates some striking 
results that are, in some cases, out of line with the economic outcomes it purports to 
measure. Because of their deregulated labour markets, countries like Afghanistan, Haiti 
and Papua New Guinea, for example, earn higher marks on the index than do prosperous 
economies with low levels of unemployment and high productivity, such as Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, contradicting the World Bank‟s claim that more flexible policies 
are a recipe for high-quality job creation.”179  
 
The ITUC has argued that by discouraging countries from maintaining anything above the bare 
minimum level of labour market regulation, the DB project undermines the development goals 
promoted by international organizations, including the World Bank itself.
180
 Lee, McCann and 
Messenger have revealed that an examination of the “rigidity of hours” sub-index showed it to be 
broadly out of step with trends in domestic regulation and also to reward substantially 
deregulated working time regimes.
181
 McLeod has argued that the “rigidity of employment” 
component of the EW index provides no additional information: its only effect, he suggested, 
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was to introduce a bias towards the interests of employers by adding weight to the “hiring”, 
“firing” and “rigidity of hours” sub-indices.182 Berg and Cazes have pointed to the absence from 
the EW index of tripartite negotiation and collective bargaining measures, despite their role in 
encouraging dynamic and responsive labour markets.
183
 They have also questioned the models of 
“the business” and “the worker” that are applied to evaluate labour legislation for the purposes of 
the DB index.
184
 Assumptions about “the business” include, for example, that it is a limited 
liability company; operates in the manufacturing sector; and has 201 employees.
185
  
In their studies, Palmer, Wedgwood and Hayman
186
 and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO)
187
 noted that this model of the firm does not represent the 
bulk of the private sector in many developing countries, most notably because it misses the 
micro-enterprises that are characteristic of the informal sector. Kitching, in reference to sub-
Saharan Africa, has argued that since the DB project assumes a model of the enterprise atypical 
of the vast majority of micro and small enterprises, it is unable to offer meaningful information 
on any growth constraints that may affect these businesses.
188
 According to Lee et al, the image 
of “the worker” embedded in the index is also open to criticism as reflecting the “standard” 
model of labour market participation in that he or she is assumed to be 42 years old, engaged on 
a full-time basis and to have been employed by the same company for 20 years (The twenty 
years has since been revised to ten years).
189
 Fudge and Owen noted that this model of 
engagement in paid labour hypothesised by DB was alien to many workers and women in 
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particular across the industrialized countries, and it captures only a minority of workers in many 
developing countries.
190
  
Siems has argued that by comparing countries in which the context of particular rules is 
completely different, the DB approach did not allow for an assessment of individual countries‟ 
legal systems, thereby undermining the overall ranking system.
191
 Bath studied the application of 
the index to China and Australia established that the restricted scope of the EW index meant that 
the overall DB index does not provide an accurate picture of “ease of doing business”, thereby 
restricting its usefulness both for analyses of individual countries and for cross-country 
comparisons.
192
 Hoyland, Moene and Willumsen also questioned whether the EW index 
accurately captures the employment climate best suited to business and argued that countries 
may actually find it easier to shift their rankings in the index than to change their underlying 
business environment.
193
 This supports the suggestion of Menard and du Marais that the DB 
ranking system is superficial and measures the ability of countries to “fix the rules of the 
game”.194 Deakin, Lele and Siems have concluded that the current state of knowledge on the 
workings of labour legislation does not validate the belief that labour law reform towards 
deregulation will enable countries to improve their economic performance.
195
 Villaba has argued 
that: 
“These conceptual and methodological deficiencies of the EW index stand in contrast with 
the increasing references being made to it within global policy circles, raising suspicion in 
some quarters that the main motivation behind the EW index is international trade goals – 
for example, global competition for labour deregulation – rather than questions of national 
development.”196 
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From the above detailed current position assumed by actors in world business, Craven‟s views in 
2011 strengthen arguments that developing countries‟ leaders might be lacking foresight by 
focusing on quick political gains which do not offer a better long term future for their countries. 
It must also be accepted though that the lack of foresight amongst developing countries‟ leaders 
could possibly be compounded by the Bretton Woods institutions
197
 which incentivize labour 
market flexibility without paying much attention to the conditions under which workers in 
developing countries are living in. 
In June 2012, Rob Vos, the United Nations Director of Economics indicated that African 
countries must focus on long term economic gains rather than short term political gains. Vos was 
adding emphasis on recommendations made in the 2012 Economic Report on Africa which 
stressed the need for African countries to focus on investing in human capital
198
 and regional 
integration.
199
 As such when one contrasts the current position of South African labour and the 
statements of some members of the South African government with the initial softer approach of 
South Africa towards the trade-labour linkage taken at the end of the apartheid era, it can only be 
argued that the later differences in opinions between the government and the trade unions on the 
one hand and amongst government officials on the other hand,
200
 raises serious questions as to 
the sincerity of some in the South African government towards realizing sustainable 
development in the country. On the other hand, one could argue that it signals high levels of 
ignorance amongst South African trade unions concerning the place of core labour standards in 
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trade and development. An analysis of some of the violations of core labour standards in trade 
currently taking place in South Africa could help in clarifying which of the two arguments 
advanced is plausible.  
6 2 1 1 Low compliance with core labour standards in South Africa‟s wine industries  
South Africa is regarded as having sound labour legislation in the region and the world at large. 
Sadly, in August 2011 a Human Rights Watch report established that each year, millions of 
consumers around the world enjoy South African fruits and the well-known wines that come 
from its vineyards yet the farm workers who produce these goods for domestic consumption and 
international export are among the most vulnerable people in the South African Society.
201
 The 
workers work long hours in harsh weather conditions, often without access to toilets or drinking 
water and are exposed to toxic pesticides that are sprayed on crops.
202
 For this physically 
grueling work, they earn among the lowest wages in South Africa, and are often denied benefits 
to which they are legally entitled.
203
 They also face obstacles to union formation, which remains 
at negligible levels in the Western Cape agricultural sector.
204
  
All the labour standards violations continue to occur regardless of the safeguards offered 
at law for the workers. It is important to observe that the violations of core labour standards at 
hand are similar to those practiced by Chinese companies. This indicates that the problem goes 
beyond just being a China issue but an international issue. In that regard, it could be an 
indication that something beyond national legislation is required to address the violation of core 
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labour standards in trade. An analysis of legal instruments available to protect South African 
workers in farms from exploitation is thus necessary on the basis that the Social Charter requires 
national governments to implement measures which will ensure the realisation of its 
objectives.
205
 
6 2 1 2 South Africa‟s legal obligations 
The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law of the country.
206
 It 
notes that the Bill of Rights “enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”207 Furthermore it provides that, “the 
state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”208 The Bill of 
Rights guarantees a range of rights for every person in South Africa, as well as certain rights that 
are restricted to citizens.
209
 In respect of some of those rights the government must take 
reasonable measures to achieve their progressive realization.
210
 One such right of which the State 
must ensure a progressive realisation is the broad right to fair labour practices.
211
  
The South African government has enacted legislation and regulations that are relevant to 
the rights of farmworkers and farm dwellers. This includes Sectoral Determination 13, which 
was promulgated by the Minister of Labour to establish basic conditions of employment for 
farmworkers.
212
 The Government of South Africa is obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
rights enshrined in international and regional instruments it has ratified.
213
 The South African 
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Constitution also requires that international law be considered in interpreting the Bill of Rights 
and legislation.
214
 An analysis of some key labour-related rights being violated in the fruit and 
wine industries of South Africa follows below. 
6 2 1 3  Occupational health and safety 
As already indicated in the 2011 Human Rights Watch Report, workers in the fruit and wine 
industries in the Western Cape Province of South Africa, work long hours in harsh weather 
conditions, often without access to toilets or drinking water and are exposed to toxic pesticides 
that are sprayed on crops.
215
 All this is taking place regardless of the South African Constitution 
guaranteeing everyone the right “to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being”216 and “the right to have access to health care services,” which the government must take 
reasonable measures to achieve.
217
 Issues concerning the environment are some of the key issues 
that have come up for debate before the WTO. The Occupational Health and Safety Act 
(OHSA),
218
 regulates workplace health and safety for workers in all sectors. The OHSA requires 
employers to provide and maintain a safe workplace.
219
 Labour inspectors are tasked with 
ensuring that employers comply with health and safety regulations.
220
 Employers who fail to 
comply with occupational health and safety regulations may be subject to penalties.
221
 
Under the OHSA, the Department of Labour has promulgated the Regulations for 
Hazardous Chemical Substances
222
 and the Hazardous Biological Agents Regulations
223
 which 
apply respectively to employers at workplaces where persons may be exposed to hazardous 
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chemical substances or hazardous biological agents. Both sets of regulations require that 
employers provide employees with information and training, medical surveillance and attention 
in certain cases, and respiratory protective equipment and protective clothing. The Facilities 
Regulations
224
 also promulgated under the OHSA, require that employers provide sanitary 
facilities and an adequate supply of drinking water. The Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Act
225
 covers workers‟ compensation and disability benefits for injuries occurring 
on the job. Under the Act, employers must either pay into the workers‟ compensation fund or 
obtain insurance to fully cover any and all costs due to an injured worker.
226
 The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has interpreted the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
227
 to include: 
“preventive measures in respect of occupational accidents and diseases; the requirement to 
ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable water and basic sanitation; the prevention 
and reduction of the population‟s exposure to harmful substances such as radiation and 
harmful chemicals or other detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly 
impact upon human health [and] … the minimization, so far as is reasonably practicable, of 
the causes of health hazards inherent in the working environment.”228 
 
6 2 1 4  Freedom of association 
The South African Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of association,
229
 and all workers 
have the right “to form and join a trade union; to participate in the activities and programmes of a 
trade union; and to strike.”230 In addition, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)
231
 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR),232 the 
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South African government is obligated to respect the right to freedom of association.
233
 Having 
ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 98, South Africa has committed to ensure that workers have the 
right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing and that workers are protected 
against discrimination based on union activity.
234
 The ILO has determined that freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining are fundamental labour principles and rights.
235
 
The Labour Relations Act (LRA), a South African statute that formally adopts ILO provisions, 
prohibits discrimination against employees for exercising their rights of freedom of 
association.
236
  
6 2 1 5 Conditions of employment 
Under the South African Constitution, “everyone has the right to fair labour practices.”237 Under 
the BCEA,
238
 which governs basic conditions of employment in South Africa, the Minister of 
Labour has established Sectoral Determination 13.
239
 Among other things, Sectoral 
Determination 13 requires that employers pay at least the minimum wage and limits the amount 
of deductions that employers can make from wages, including no more than 10 percent for food 
and no more than 10 percent for accommodation.
240
 It requires employers to provide written 
particulars of employment
241
 and paid annual leave, sick leave, and maternity leave;
242
 regulates 
the hours of work, including payments for overtime work or work on Sundays and public 
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holidays;
243
 prohibits child labour and forced labour;
244
 and regulates the termination of 
employment.
245
 The Unemployment Insurance Act
246
 establishes the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund (UIF) and provides for the government‟s payment from the fund of unemployment 
benefits, maternity benefits, and other benefits.
247
 
As State Party to the ACHPR, South Africa must recognize and promote work under 
equitable and satisfactory conditions.
248
 This encompasses fair remuneration, a minimum living 
wage for labour, and equal remuneration for work of equal value; equitable and satisfactory 
conditions of work; and the right to rest and leisure.
249
 The ICESCR recognizes the right to just 
and favourable conditions of work, in a similar manner as section 23(1) of the South African 
Constitution which guarantees fair labour practices to everyone.
250
 It requires fair remuneration, 
safe and healthy working conditions, equal opportunity for promotions, and rest and leisure.
251
 
The ILO has also adopted conventions specific to farm workers, such as ILO Convention 129, 
Labour Inspection (Agriculture), 1969, which covers labour inspections in the agricultural sector. 
Although South Africa has not ratified these conventions, they provide guidance on international 
norms regarding hired farm labour.
252
 
 
6 2 1 6 Human rights responsibilities of private actors 
Although governments have the primary responsibility to respect, protect, and fulfil human 
rights, private entities such as business enterprises also have responsibilities regarding human 
rights. The basic principle that businesses of all sizes have a responsibility to respect human 
rights, including workers‟ rights, has achieved wide international recognition.253 This approach is 
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reflected in various norms and guidelines, including in the work of the United Nations Special 
Representative on business and human rights, Professor John Ruggie, who held the post until 
June 2011. During his mandate the longstanding concept that businesses have a responsibility to 
respect all human rights secured additional support, including from the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) and from business organizations.
254
 In particular, the “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” framework and the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” for their 
implementation, which were developed by Ruggie and endorsed by the UNHRC in 2008 and 
2011,
255
 respectively, reflect the expectation that businesses should respect human rights, avoid 
complicity in abuses, and adequately remedy them if they occur. Among other elements they 
outline basic steps that businesses should adopt consistent with their responsibilities. This 
includes undertaking adequate due diligence that encompasses risk assessments and monitoring 
in order to identify and effectively mitigate against human rights problems.
256
 Moreover, 
although not specified in the Guiding Principles, it is a best practice among companies, as well as 
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in multi-stakeholder initiatives designed to address business and human rights problems, to 
require independent third-party audits; some also communicate the results publicly.
257
 
6 2 2  Chinese trade practices 
As South African President Jacob Zuma visited the Democratic Republic of China to court 
investors for South Africa in 2011, Chinese companies were closing 85 apparel factories they 
own in Newcastle in the Province KwaZulu-Natal because of a wage dispute. The factories 
employ about 8,000 workers who produce an estimated three million garments a month. South 
Africa‟s National Bargaining Council had instituted a drive for clothing manufacturers to raise 
minimum weekly wage levels to 324 rand, or about $45 at current exchange rates. The factory 
owners, represented by the Newcastle Chinese Chamber of Commerce, contended that they 
could not afford the increase.  
Alex Liu, Chairperson of the Newcastle Chinese Chamber of Commerce, said the lowest 
paid workers earn 250 rand, or $34 a week, and the highest paid get 500 rand, or $69.
258
 He said 
it was impossible to pay the minimum wage being sought “because we are competing with 
imports from China and the price from our customers will not sustain us.”259  The South African 
Clothing and Textile Workers‟ Union sued the factory owners, arguing the closures were illegal.  
The union and factory owners then called on the government to intervene and Union General 
Secretary Andre Kriel wrote to Michael Mabuyakhulu, Provincial Minister for Economic 
Development.
260
 He argued that the union “... [is] very concerned about this state of affairs and 
its impact on the creation and protection of jobs in the KZN province and nationally”.261 Kriel 
further stated that, “The clothing, textile, leather and footwear industry is a vulnerable sector 
needing special support measures and, given its labour-intensive nature, steps must be taken to 
secure its future sustainability and growth”.262 Securing a solution which the union desires may 
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just require something much more than a national or regional approach. As long as there are 
countries which are eager to condone China‟s poor compliance with core labour standards, the 
protection of workers rights in trade will remain an endemic problem.  
The Chinese appear reluctant to strike a balance between profiteering and compliance 
with or conformance to internationally accepted labour standards. The Chinese‟s compliance to 
fair global trade practices must be questioned. Their assertion that the minimum wage is not 
sustainable in a competitive trade environment seems to advance claims that international 
competitive pressures degrade working conditions and labour rights in countries with open trade 
policies.
263
 Flanagan and Khor question how trade would diminish working conditions is a 
matter of some mystery and proceed to state that: 
“Open trade policies raise foreign demand for a country‟s exports and for the services of 
workers who produce those exports. What then happens to wages and nonmonetary 
working conditions depends on labour supply conditions, which themselves are determined 
by the domestic labour market alternatives available to workers. Where there is substantial 
unemployment or underemployment, increased export demand will raise employment 
without necessarily improving pay and non-monetary working conditions. This situation 
may be the norm in countries with significant reserves of underemployed rural agricultural 
labour or high urban unemployment rates. The additional employment derived from 
increased export demand will raise total wage income, while producing little change in the 
employment conditions of individual workers.”264 
 
Studies conducted by Aw and Batra,
265
 Bernard and Jensen,
266
 Hahn,
267
 Van Biesebroeck,
268
 
found that after allowing for industry and firm size, export firms pay higher wages than non-
export firms, and the export wage premium is largest in less developed countries. Flanagan and 
Khor also made an important observation concerning the direct and indirect effects of trade when 
they stated that: 
 “...free trade will improve a country‟s working conditions indirectly by increasing its per 
capita income. Whether comparative advantage or economies-of-scale motivates trade, a 
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country‟s resources are used more productively in a free-trade environment than under 
autarky. The greater efficiency permits higher monetary and/or nonmonetary 
compensation. Transfers of technology that may accompany increased trade flows likewise 
raise productivity and compensation. In each case, free trade should improve working 
conditions to the extent that it raises per capita income. To the extent that trade 
liberalisation raises per capita income, trade itself becomes one mechanism for improving a 
country‟s working conditions and labour rights.”269  
Flanagan and Khor also observed that, “Particularly for the poorest countries, international 
competition does not lead exporters to reduce wages below national norms...one can doubt that 
unobserved worker quality differences account for wage premia as large as 10-12% in Korea, 15-
17% in Taipei, China and 40% in sub-Saharan Africa.”270 Lipsey and Sjoholm have observed 
that, “It seems to be a universal rule that, in every country, foreign owned firms and plants pay 
higher wages, on average, than domestically owned ones. That is true not only in developing 
countries, but also in high income countries, such as Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom.”271  
Why then are the Chinese forcing South Africa into a race to the bottom with working 
conditions not improving? The answer could possibly be that the impact of a multinational 
company (MNC) on working conditions in a host country depends on the extent to which it must 
compete with other multinational companies (MNCs) or host country firms for its workers and 
on the local elasticity of labour supply.
272
 If MNCs establish inferior conditions in newly-
constructed plants, they will face recruiting and retention difficulties when competing with other 
firms for labour.
273
 If they instead acquire local companies and try to worsen working conditions, 
they will encounter increased quit rates as workers leave to join host country firms offering 
superior conditions.
274
 Whether the arrival of MNCs can improve working conditions, according 
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to Flanagan and Khor, depends on labour supply conditions in the host country and the human 
resource management policies of the firm.
275
  
Becker has argued that, “…the leading theory of labour market discrimination predicts 
that increased competition to hire labour should erode discrimination by providing labour force 
minorities with additional employment opportunities with employers who have less 
discriminatory tastes.”276 If Becker‟s view is correct, then it is proper to argue that to the extent 
that open trade policies increase the number of export firms and/or MNCs competing for labour 
in local labour markets, employer discrimination may decrease. The status and security that 
comes with higher income may become possible in the present day world. Flanagan and Khor 
contend that:  
“In markets with a limitless supply of labour available at the current wage, increased 
labour demand from MNCs or host country firms will raise employment, but not wages. 
When workers require inducements to overcome the costs of changing employers, 
however, labour supply is less elastic, and increases in labour demand from MNCs will 
raise both wages and employment. When firms compete for labour, the effect of increased 
demand on wages depends on what workers are willing to accept – not on what firms may 
wish to pay.  If MNCs do not compete with other firms for labour services, they may force 
labour conditions below competitive levels.”277 
 
From the above analysis, it may be argued that proper policies to promote free trade and lure 
investors rather than a race to the bottom could result in a social clause not being rejected in the 
multilateral trade system of the WTO as free trade appears to improve labours standards 
indirectly by increasing a country‟s per capita income as already indicated in this chapter. It is 
submitted that fewer investors in a country might posse a threat of monopoly which might result 
in the violation of labour standards by companies which lack competition. Perhaps this could be 
the problem which South Africa is facing. This argument is also important in matters related to 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in South Africa. A discussion follows below. 
                                                          
 
275
  Ibid. 
276
 Becker The Theory of Discrimination (1957) 30. 
277
 Flanagan and Khor 279. 
284 
 
6 2 3  Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart merger 
With the relaxation of many capital controls, a significant increase in investment flows between 
countries accompanied the late 20th century globalisation.
278
 As with international trade, much 
of the growth led to the regaining of the ground lost during the retreat from the late 19th century 
globalisation.
279
 A parallel growth of MNCs accompanied the resurgence of foreign direct 
investment.
280
 These developments raise two sets of questions about the relationship between 
foreign investment and labour conditions. First, do labour conditions influence FDI inflows? 
Does cheap labour, poor labour conditions and weak support of labour rights attract FDI? The 
Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart merger has become one of the most recent cases which depict the adverse 
effects of excluding a social clause from trade especially where Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) are concerned. Following the initial offer by Wal-Mart to purchase Mass-Mart in 
September 2010, the Labour Research Service (LRS) was commissioned to undertake a study on 
the structure and operations of Mass-Mart and the conditions of the company‟s workers in order 
to understand the position of workers in the context of the proposed deal.
281
  The study by the 
LRS found evidence that workers at Mass-Mart currently experienced a high level of 
victimisation and a hardening of management attitudes which they attribute to the desire by 
Mass-Mart management to make the company “globally competitive” in order to attract a global 
retailer as a buyer, and specifically Wal-Mart.
282
 There was confirmation of this in the form of 
Mass-Mart‟s disclosed strategy to attract a buyer, particularly Wal-Mart, with whom they have 
had a long relationship.
283
  
 In a presentation in November 2010 to investors, analysts and media, Mark Lamberti, 
founder, one-time Chief Executive Officer (CEO), now chairperson of Mass-Mart stated on 
behalf of the board that: 
“The relationship (with Wal-Mart) which commenced in 1990 has resulted in: exposure of 
many Mass-Mart executives to aspects of Wal-Mart‟s operations and training, many 
shared retail principles and business values, mutual respect....”284  
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As the LRS established, the above statement, whilst not clearly outlining the nature of the 
relationship between Wal-Mart and Mass-Mart, showed a formal rather than a casual relationship 
at an operational and strategic level, with shared values over an extended twenty year period, 
ever since the formation of Mass-Mart.
285
 Moorad has argued that the twenty year period was far 
longer than the date of introduction that current Mass-Mart CEO Grant Pattison gave in a 
presentation at the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) in February 2011 in which he 
stated that the relationship began in 2004.
286
 After a casual meeting in 2004, Pattison stated that 
Mass-Mart executives began meeting with retired Wal-Mart executives from 2007.
287
  
Pattison, according to Moorad, further confirmed that rumours of Wal-Mart‟s interest in 
Africa began to surface in 2008 and that, given Mass-Mart‟s long-term strategy of being bought 
by a global retailer, Mass-Mart took action.
288
 An Economist article noted that:  
“Ten years ago Mass-Mart, which is South Africa‟s leading wholesale warehouse business, 
decided that it needed a global partner. Wal-Mart began sniffing around South Africa three 
years ago, seeking a toehold on a continent where consumer spending power has risen 
sharply in the past decade. The obvious partner was Shoprite, Africa‟s biggest grocer. But 
Mass-Mart increased its allure by rushing into the food-retailing business, and the gamble 
paid off.”289 
 
Moorad then argued that the long-stated intention of Mass-Mart to be acquired by a global 
retailer was further confirmed by Pattison at the GIBS presentation where he stated that Mass-
Mart positioned itself to be bought by a global retailer in order to participate in the globalisation 
of retail. Pattison said, “…the first time they (Wal-Mart) were here, I made it absolutely clear 
that we were available for sale”.290  
Crotty then argued that whilst an answer as to why Pattison and the chairman of Mass-
Mart had different ideas of when the relationship between Mass-Mart and Wal-Mart commenced 
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was yet to be obtained, even the shorter timeline sets the context of the actions of Mass-Mart in 
the years from at least 2008 including the retrenchments and the acquisitions and sell-offs, high 
dividend payouts and general strategy that was described by the Competition Tribunal in 2009 as 
sinister.
291
 Mass-Mart Chairperson, Mark Lamberti, vowed to “.....take out competitors and force 
them into a position where they make no money. We cannot allow our competitors to flourish. 
Our margins may have to drop to fend off competitors”.292 As the LRS argued, the statement 
does not sound like one of healthy competition, but much like Wal-Mart‟s strategy of selling 
products below cost price and taking a loss on them in order to undermine the business of 
competitors.
293
  
The LRS then proceeded to question how Mass-Mart management understood and 
strategized over what it meant to be a “globally competitive” and attractive target for a global 
retailer and how that influenced its actions not over a matter of months but rather of years, at 
least since 2008.
294
 It must be questioned whether this is a healthy attitude to being competitive 
that should be supported in South Africa. A number of issues related to this question from an 
employment perspective were thus raised by the LRS. A discussion of those issues follows 
below. 
6 2 3 1 Value to shareholders not workers and retrenchments 
Over the years Mass-Mart has paid a higher percentage of profits to shareholders as dividends 
while its workers are at pains to improve their pay and working conditions.
295
 It is noteworthy 
too that in the year Mass-Mart workers went on strike for a R460 increase in wages, Mass-Mart 
paid a record R867 million in dividends to its shareholders.
296
 In addition, when the value added 
statement
297
 of Mass-Mart for 2010 was analysed, it showed that the proportion of the wealth 
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created applied to employee wages and salaries dropped dramatically in 2003 and has not 
recovered.
298
 When compared to its competitors, Mass-Mart distributes far less of its wealth to 
employees.
299
 In the same year, 2010, Shoprite distributed 58% and Pick n Pay 65% of wealth to 
employees as salaries, wages and other benefits.
300
 Concerning retrenchments, Mass-Mart 
contends that the retrenchments at Massdiscounters
301
 in 2009 had nothing to do with a possible 
take-over.
302
  
The Competition Commission concurred in their report that because there was no note of 
the retrenchments being influenced by the possible take-over in the board minutes of 2010 when 
they entered into discussions with South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU), there was no connection between the two.
303
 However, the LRS contends 
that: 
“…given that (1) Mass-Mart and Wal-Mart have been in a relationship for at least six, or 
up to sixteen, years where Mass-Mart executives had been exposed to Wal-Mart operations 
and training, (2) Mass-Mart had a stated aim of being purchased by a global retailer (3) 
Wal-Mart had already been sniffing around in 2008 and in 2009 (not 2010 as is stated by 
the Commission)”.304 
 
Mass-Mart noted that: 
 
 “We clearly moved from a speculative environment…It was our strategy to be bought by a 
global retailer; we did not have to wonder about how we were going to deal with it, or 
whether our shareholders would like it, or whether management would come along. We 
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sent them (Wal-Mart) a very clear message-if you want to chat to us we are ready and we 
had some good ideas”.305  
 
According to LRS, the retrenchments, which began in October 2009, were therefore right within 
the timeframe for increasing Mass-Mart‟s appeal to Wal-Mart at a time that would have been 
critical and cannot therefore be separated from the offer which followed without firm evidence of 
which there is none.
306
 Why evidence of a connection was only sought in board minutes, let 
alone board minutes of 2010 when the retrenchments began in 2009 and not in the stated 
company strategy could be questioned.
307
  
6 2 3 2 The deteriorating relationship between management and the union  
According to the LRS, Pattison, at the GIBs presentation made several unsubstantiated 
statements concerning workers at Mass-Mart, their feelings concerning the deal with Wal-Mart 
and their relationship with the union to which 38% of them, according to Mass-Mart‟s own 
figures, belonged.
308
 In the presentation Pattison stated that: 
  “It really is an exciting time for employees. And just so you are absolutely clear, our 
employees aren‟t driving any protest: you‟ll see there has been no strikes, no protests; in 
fact I would suggest that they have gone as far as to tell the union not to get in the way. It 
is all good for our employees”.309  
 
The LRS then argued that Pattison‟s making of an uncorroborated comment concerning the 
relationship, not just between management and the workers but between unions and their own 
members, had to be challenged.
310
 The likely outcome of that challenge would be that the 
commitment that Mass-Mart/Wal-Mart have made to maintain existing relationships with 
organised labour could be seen to have a negative outcome for workers as that relationship in its 
                                                          
 
305
 Ibid.  
306
  Ibid.  
307
  Ibid.  
308
  See the Mass-Mart Annual Report 2010. The Labour Research Service observed that, “The percentage given in 
this report is different from the Commission‟s report which states that the majority of Mass-Mart‟s employees 
are unionized. 38% is not a majority and it would be important to know where the Commission got its figures.” 
See also   Labour Research Service “Mass-Mart/Wal-Mart Merger: Statement by Labour Research Service” 4. 
309
 See also Labour Research Service “Mass-Mart/Wal-Mart Merger: Statement by Labour Research Service” 4. 
310
  Labour Research Service “Mass-Mart/Wal-Mart Merger: Statement by Labour Research Service” 4. 
289 
 
current state is antagonistic.
311
 Pattison‟s statement is seen in the context of deteriorating 
relationship between Mass-Mart and the unions, in particular since 2008.
312
 
The LRS also observed that when one looked at Mass-Mart‟s annual reports over the past 
decade, there was very little mention of the relationship between itself and the trade unions.
313
 
However, in Mass-Mart‟s 2009 and 2010 annual reports, there had been discussion of it and it 
had not been positive. The 2009 Annual Report noted an increase in:  
“…the stridency of populist rhetoric and the vigour of socio-economic demands, both 
indicative of a more open democracy. Service delivery rioters, striking workers, 
obstructive taxi owners, and officious youth leaders all contributed to an environment 
conducive to the first ever protracted dispute between certain Mass-Mart divisions and 
organised labour”.314  
 
The 2010 Annual Report stated that:  
“Labour relations were unfortunately strained in Massdiscounters as management sought 
more labour flexibility from the labour union, SACCAWU, in order to extract productivity 
improvements from our three-year investment in the supply chain. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to reach resolution and had to resort to retrenchment, which was devastating for 
those employees. …”315  
 
The disputes between the workers and Mass-Mart were recorded by SACCAWU in its June 2010 
press release on the current disputes between the former and the latter.
316
  
6 2 3 3 The deterioration of conditions of employment for workers and victimisation  
Mass-Mart‟s CEO, Pattison, could not substantiate his statement that workers would like the 
union out of the way, and that they are excited about the Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart merger.
317
 The 
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LRS held a workshop with Mass-Mart workers in February 2011 where three key points became 
apparent. These were:  
“1) Mass-Mart workers no longer want the union to be involved because 2) they are being 
increasingly victimised by Mass-Mart in what they understand to be a long-term strategy of 
Mass-Mart to drive the culture of repression 3) in preparation for the deal.”318 
While no protests and strikes in relation to the proposed Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart merger had 
occurred at the time of the writing of this thesis, there had been strikes and protests in relation to 
the conditions under which Mass-Mart workers worked.
319
 The general sentiment of the 
participants in the strikes and protests was that due to the take-over by Wal-Mart, workers, 
including the shop stewards, felt intimidated in the workplace by the fact that they could lose 
their jobs and livelihoods in an instant.
320
  
From their experience, the participants believed that this situation has been created so that 
by the time Wal-Mart took over, workers were already used to working in an intimidating 
environment in which they remained for the reasons given by Pattisson who stated that:  
“Also I suppose it would be fair to say that an employee of Mass-Mart can say well, at 
least it is us that got bought by Wal-Mart so if it is true and I certainly do not agree that it 
is true that competitors are going to suffer and suppliers are going to suffer, the employees 
of Mass-Mart should be fine”.321  
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The LRS argued that the above statement itself made no sense. Either competitors or suppliers 
are going to suffer, and therefore Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart employees should feel lucky to even have 
a job, or they are not, in which case Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart workers are not going to have anything 
in particular to be grateful for on this count.
322
 The precarious relationship between Mass-Mart 
workers and management as well as the union and management was what will carry over into the 
new company if the commitment by the merging parties is allowed to stand as the only assurance 
workers have.
323
 And since Mass-Mart itself is not sticking to the current agreements, there is 
little to no reason to believe that Wal-Mart will do so unless conditions of the buy-out force them 
to.
324
 
In its closing remarks, the LRS hoped that the Competition Tribunal saw South Africa‟s 
global competitiveness as something other than the race to the bottom for workers in terms of 
both wages and conditions in order to achieve lowest prices.
325
 A ruling against the merger, or a 
ruling with strict conditions and monitoring placed on the merging parties, would therefore not 
be, as the Commission stated, an adverse ruling, but a positive ruling, positive for the workers 
not just in Mass-Mart but in all sectors of the national economy.
326
 Further, given, as economist 
Dr Azar Jammine stated in January 2011, that “Wal-Mart only wants to use South Africa as a 
gateway to Africa and they can afford to comply with our strict labour laws because in other 
African countries the laws are much more relaxed,”327 it is perhaps South Africa‟s duty as the 
regional head office of Wal-Mart/ Mass-Mart and certainly the regional power, to impose 
conditions on any deal that would protect workers wherever this company operates in the 
region.
328
  
The issues noted are relevant to the social clause debate because they highlight what 
Mass-Mart management understands global competitiveness to be and how this differs from how 
South African workers and government should view the same concept. The LRS noted that:  
“Looking at the strategies of the company over the past years in the light of this statement 
reveals that to Mass-Mart management global competitiveness implies – high dividends to 
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foreign shareholders, turning over smaller competition in takeovers and sell-offs, an 
attitude to competitors that earned the censure of the Competition Tribunal, and 
victimisation of workers who, despite Pattison‟s statements, are not in support of the 
merger and should be aggressively protected should one be permitted. It is also noted that 
any promises made by the current Mass-Mart management should be understood as being 
made prior to a new owner, Wal-Mart, taking control of the company should the deal be 
permitted. Therefore, a commitment from them is not sufficient; conditions must be set on 
the new entity that would arise after any proposed deal.”329  
 
 The LRS then proposed that:  
“The new entity must therefore commit to the four core conventions of the ILO including 
the prohibition of child labour (ILO 138 and 192), the prohibition of forced labour (ILO 29 
and 105), non-discrimination (ILO 100 and 111) and freedom of association and the right 
to collective bargaining (ILO 87, 98 and 135) in all operations.”330  
 
The above statement replicates the key aspects covered in the scope of a social clause with 
regards to core labour standards. The LRS further went on to make another crucial finding. It 
observed that: 
“While, as noted in statements by the company, Mass-Mart is committed to local 
procurement, this does not protect local producers and manufacturers as imported goods 
can and are procured locally resulting in very little benefit to the local and national 
economy. A condition of the deal should therefore be a commitment from Wal-Mart/Mass-
Mart not only to procure locally but to procure locally produced and manufactured 
products. Without this commitment, as the CEO of Shoprite has stated as recently as the 
25th of February, where Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart goes, the other retailers will follow. While 
Mass-Mart management might deny now that more imports are part of the plan, it is again 
the merged entity, not the current entity that must be held to conditions of supporting local 
producers and manufacturers.”331  
 
The LRS then concluded by  recommending that the Competition Tribunal be wary of approving 
a deal that would come at the expense of the well-being of workers across the retail and related 
sectors in the interest of the so called “global competitiveness”.332 It recommended the putting in 
place of clear positive conditions and monitoring processes to protect workers should the deal be 
approved.
333
  The deal has since been approved. 
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SACCAWU was not at all impressed by the approval of the Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart 
merger. They launched an appeal with the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa.
334
 The 
trade union argued that the Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart merger was a direct affront to the intended 
benefits of FDI to the host economy.
335
 The trade union was basing its arguments on a 2011 
South African National Treasury discussion document which provided that: 
“Cross-border investment is widely viewed as beneficial for South Africa because of the 
expected (positive) impact on employment, productivity and growth, including the transfer 
of skills and technology from multinational parent to the host economy, spillovers through 
the creation of linkages with domestic (supplier) firms, and prospects for stronger 
integration with international markets.”336 
 
Amongst some of the key concerns raised by the trade union was the notion that the merger 
could only be allowed if it did not amount to a “...race-to-the-bottom on the terms and conditions 
of workers employment at retailers and suppliers that will follow Wal-Mart‟s entry in South 
Africa.”337 Emphasis was placed on 503 workers retrenched in the face of an impending Wal-
Mart/ Mass-Mart merger. In defence, the merging partners Wal-Mart and Mass-Mart argued that: 
“The specific public interest grounds raised by the intervening parties are, in particular, 
those relating to employment and procurement. The trade unions (and the Departments a 
quo) assumed that the proposed merger would adversely impact on employment (in that it 
would lead to job losses and poor work conditions); and negatively affect some industrial 
sectors, as a result of a reduction of local procurement (in that retail merchandise will, it is 
“feared”, increasingly be sourced from foreign suppliers, instead of South African entities). 
Based on these “perceptions” it was contended before the Tribunal that the merger should 
either not be approved or that some wide-ranging conditions (which they themselves were 
unable to formulate in a practicable and implementable version) be imposed. The facts are 
to the contrary, however.”338 
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In substantiating their view that SACCAWU‟s appeal was unfounded, Wal-Mart and Mass-Mart 
argued that the conditions of the merger more than adequately addressed every relevant public-
interest consideration contained in the Competition Act,
339
 and that the Tribunal‟s ruling should 
be upheld on appeal.
340
 Relying upon the case of Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited v 
Gold Fields Limited
341
 Wal-Mart and Mass-Mart argued that they were not required to justify a 
merger affirmatively on public-interest grounds. They argued that only once a substantial public-
interest concern had prima facie been established was an evidential burden of justification cast 
on the merging parties.
342
 They also argued that opponents of a merger could not base their 
opposition on assumptions, perceptions or speculation.
343
 They further argued that the evidence 
before the court amounted to no more than just “fears”, “concerns” and “perceptions”.344 To 
them, none of the fears, concerns or perceptions was factually supportable.
345
 They then stressed 
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that the merger was overwhelmingly in the public interest and brings the important advantages 
associated with foreign direct investment to South Africa.
346
 
 In its findings, the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) of South Africa dismissed the 
application for review made by the Ministers of Economic Development, Trade and Industry and 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries which sought to set aside the decision of the Competition 
Tribunal to sanction the Wal-Mart/Mass-Mart merger.
347
 The Ministers had argued that they did 
not enjoy a fair hearing before the Tribunal when it decided to approve the merger between Wal-
Mart and Mass-Mart.
348
 However, the CAC did uphold, in part, the appeal by SACCAWU. The 
Court held in favour of SACCAWU that 503 workers who had been retrenched were entitled to 
reinstatement.
349
 The Court justified this conclusion on the basis that the circumstances in which 
these workers had been retrenched from Mass-Mart were so closely linked to the merger and its 
timetable that the suggestion that the decision to retrench had been taken some 6-8 years earlier 
was unsustainable.
350
 The CAC found that SACCAWU‟s evidence indicated that the 
retrenchment was sufficiently „merger specific‟ to justify the reinstatement of these workers.351 
 The Court however rejected the argument that SACCAWU was entitled to a condition 
that Mass-Mart would become the subject of a closed shop agreement and that there should be 
group centralised bargaining.
352
 It found that these were issues which were the subject of the 
outcome of collective bargaining between Mass-Mart and SACCAWU.
353
 SACCAWU could not 
obtain these protections through competition law, in circumstances where it would not be able to 
obtain these claims as of right in terms of labour law.
354
 Although SACCAWU had raised 
significant concerns about Wal-Mart‟s labour policies (particularly in the USA) the concerns 
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were held to be well catered for by South African labour law and the independent institutions 
that adjudicate labour disputes.
355
 Whilst the Court‟s decision was a step in the positive direction 
for the trade union concerning the protection of the retrenched workers, it left a serious question 
as to which approach must be taken in the face of persistent violations of core labour standards in 
countries where labour laws are in place. Flanagan and Khor do however establish one clear 
aspect to the effect that: 
 “Poor labour conditions signal low productivity as well as low wages, and not all 
investments thrive in a low-productivity environment. Moreover, countries with poor 
labour conditions tend to be countries in which direct risks to investment are high. Risks of 
expropriation and repudiation of contracts are highest in countries with few civil liberties, 
for example. These risks effectively counter whatever advantages cheap labour might 
provide.”356  
 
6 3  CONCLUSION 
This chapter gave a background to debates surrounding a trade-labour linkage in Southern 
Africa. Using South Africa as a benchmark for its fairly progressive labour laws in the region, 
the chapter sought to address how trade affects workers‟ rights and/or the quality of their 
employment and wages. It had been hoped that South Africa could inform other countries in the 
region on the best practices of linking trade with labour standards but it is clear that from its 
current experiences, South Africa is also finding it challenging to protect workers‟ rights in 
instances where trade and investment opportunities are availed. The resultant effect has been the 
lowering of the levels of protection of workers‟ rights and/or employment conditions. This 
development appears to be contrary to the findings made from the studies referred to in the 
chapter, which established that trade must not translate into poor working conditions. If at all, the 
studies suggest that trade should in fact lead to an improvement in the protection of workers 
rights and employment conditions. This position is clearly contrary to developments which are 
currently prevailing in South Africa with MNCs seemingly pushing the country to a race to the 
bottom by either threatening to pull out of the country if minimum wages are enforced or making 
low labour standards a condition to FDI.  
An analysis of the views of the IMF and the World Bank‟s Doing Business on the link 
between trade and labour appeared to suggest that international monetary institutions compel 
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countries (especially developing countries) to ensure flexible labour market conditions and cost 
cutting measures such as low wages in order for the later to access development loans. This 
appears to justify developing countries‟ options of lowering labour standards in order to attract 
investment and resultantly resisting the incorporation of a social clause in the WTO. From the 
analysis made in this chapter, it may be concluded that the Bretton Woods institutions could be 
partly to blame for the decline in the protection of labour standards in developing countries. 
The chapter also alluded to the existence of a new approach to protecting labour 
standards in business with the World Bank‟s Doing Business in its 2012 report acknowledging 
that there is a need to ensure the protection of workers‟ employment conditions in undertaking 
business. However the Doing Business approach has been heavily criticized by casting doubt 
doubt on its usefulness in improving the recognition of labour standards in the business 
environment. This view is also shared by the World Banking Group and the ILO amongst other 
parties who at the time of writing this study were in the second year of their research on how to 
improve labour conditions in business environments.  
To its credit, the 2012 Doing Business report indicated that trade policies adopted by 
countries in the world might not entirely be sufficient as trade itself must have a positive indirect 
effect on labour conditions. This argument sets the basis for the analysis of the prevailing 
conditions concerning the trade-labour linkage debate in other SADC countries, excluding South 
Africa, in the next chapter. The chapter is the second part of the analysis of a trade-labour 
linkage in SADC. It acknowledges that Southern African countries have ratified most core labour 
standards conventions yet it reveals a sad story of unprecedented violations of core labour 
standards in the region. Even the SADC Social Charter referred to in this chapter is yet to have 
any tangible results in protecting workers rights with serious questions likely to be raised about 
SADC governments‟ commitments in achieving the objectives of the Charter. Perhaps something 
beyond national labour legislations and ratifying the core labour standards conventions is 
required. Could this be the void that a social clause in the WTO could fill? An analysis of the 
developments prevailing in other Southern African countries as regards the trade-labour linkage 
could give an insight in attempts to address this question. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Trade Agreements and the Social Clause: A Southern African Perspective (Part 2) 
 
7 1 INTRODUCTION 
The African Union (AU) is pursuing an integration agenda for the African continent with trade 
being used an important element to creating productive employment and reducing poverty.
1
 The 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of the AU‟s most recongnised 
regional economic communities and is regarded as a fundamental building bloc with member 
states that have a common objective of regional integration.
2
 Trade between SADC member 
states is relatively high compared to other regions in Africa.
3
 Recent studies have shown results 
that emphasise the essentially positive effect of regional integration in SADC and the importance 
of labour market policies to compliment trade policies in order to address employment concerns.
4
 
With regional integration being expected to increase wages and/or employment,
5
 one wonders 
why other SADC countries, just like South Africa, are finding it difficult to implement their 
Social Charter obligations to the benefit of workers. One also wonders why SADC is also 
reluctant to support the incorporation of a social clause in the WTO if there is a fair measure of 
sustainable trade in the region.
6
 Governments in the region have not been forthcoming with 
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policy positions as to why they continue to prefer trade gains over a balance between trade gains 
and the protection of core labour standards in trade. One can only ascertain their intention from 
the labour rights violations taking place in their countries and the complaints that are 
continuously lodged by trade unions and civil society organisations. 
This chapter proceeds along the lines of the previous chapter by seeking to establish why 
SADC countries are struggling to recognise labour standards in trade when trade is supposed to 
ensure an improvement in employment conditions.
7
 The study will also establish whether or not 
domesticating international labour legislation and using it as a tool to address the violation of 
core labour standards in trade may be adequate. In the chapter, it will also be argued that 
incorporating a social clause in regional trade agreements, though useful, may not exert the same 
force as it would on a multilateral level. Southern Africa has incorporated a social clause in its 
Southern African Development Community Agreement
8
 with little or no effect on the livelihood 
of the workers in the region as this chapter will show.  
A critical analysis of the current events taking place in Southern Africa in relation to 
trade-labour linkage will show that a more aggressive and sustainable legal strategy may need to 
be adopted in order to improve the protection of core labour standards in trade. The 
developments in Southern Africa might offer a basis for strengthening calls for a trade-labour 
linkage in multilateral trade. The basis of such an argument is that the conditions prevailing in 
the Southern African region could be a true reflection of challenges being faced by developing 
countries in other parts of the world. As such, any lessons drawn from the region‟s experiences 
could be of practical usage on a global scale. In the context of this thesis, it is also extremely 
important to ascertain whether or not SADC countries like any other developing countries would 
suffer by improving labour standards in trade.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
6
  See World Bank “Harnessing Regional Integration for Trade and Growth in Southern Africa” 2011 World Bank 
9. The World Bank indicated that, “The region has been growing and transforming. From 2000 to 2008, 
Southern African countries grew rapidly and at much higher rates that the world average, infusing the region 
with a new commercial vibrancy. Growth was fuelled, in part, by the commodity boom which led to very high 
increases in export values, especially for South African minerals, to new fast-growing markets such as India and 
China...for the smaller SACU countries, large increases in revenue transfers were derived on the back of 
significant increases in a few highly-taxed South African imports (especially motor vehicles and garments). 
Global markets were, and remain, the primary driver of the region„s growth.” 
7
  Klinger “Is South-South Trade a Testing Ground for Structural Transformation?” 2009 Policy Issues in 
International Trade and Commodities Study Series, No. 40, UNCTAD. 
8
  See Article 5(2)(d) of the SADC Treaty. 
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7 2  THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN SADC COUNTRIES 
A number of developments currently inform the individual experiences of SADC countries 
regarding the trade-labour linkage. With most SADC countries being both recipients and 
providers of trade systems such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), there is growing concern 
that the process of competitive bidding between countries for investors may be inducing 
countries to offer concessions on regulation, taxes, environmental protection and labour 
standards that are unnecessary.
9
 Many countries in the region have indeed sought to maximize 
trade gains at the expense of workers‟ rights and have preferred to lower their labour standards to 
attract investors, a development which appears to be advocated by influential institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as already indicated in the previous 
chapter.
10
 It could be argued that such policy positions apart from having a direct social impact 
in SADC countries may also impair the competitiveness of the domestic economy and reduce the 
potential for such investment to contribute to development.
11
 A discussion of how the need to 
attract and retain investors has negatively impacted on workers‟ rights in the region follows. The 
countries discussed in this chapter have been chosen on the basis of availability of information 
regarding the violation of core labour standards in trade. An analysis of developments regarding 
a trade-labour linkage in these countries could be a fair reflection of the overall picture of the 
countries‟ attitude towards a social clause. 
7 2 1  Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
Although the DRC is one of the richest African countries in terms of mineral resources it is 
struggling to develop. The 2012 Doing Business Report has indicated that the DRC is currently 
ranked 178th out of 183 economies in the world and classifies it as a low-income country.
12
 It 
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  Zapini “Developing a Balanced Framework for Foreign Direct Investment in SADC: A Decent Work 
Perspective” 2008 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook Chapter 5 1. 
10
  See Bretton Woods Update “Bank, Fund Sidestep Labour Standards: Promote Violation of Workers‟ Rights” 
2006 1. See also the World Bank‟s 2007 Doing Business report which indicated that the World Bank would 
reward countries with labour market flexibility (low levels of labour protection) with loans. The IMF‟s World 
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2012). 
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  Zapini 2. 
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  See the World Bank “Doing Business 2012: Congo Democratic Republic” 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc (accessed 22-06-2012). The DRC‟s ranking records a 2 point decrease 
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has a high incidence of violations of core labour standards. The United Nations Children‟s Fund 
(UNICEF) revealed that 29 per cent of boys and 34 per cent of girls aged between 5 and 14 
perform child labour in the DRC.
13
 As far back as the year 2000, the ILO estimated that nearly 2 
million children aged between 10 and 14 were economically active in the DRC, with an almost 
equal number of girls and boys.
14
 Currently, children working in mines and quarries comprise on 
average about one third of the DRC workforce.
15
 According to reports by NGOs and news 
agencies, the problem is prevalent in mining regions such as Katanga, Kasai and Kivu which are 
rich in cobalt, uranium, gold, diamonds, copper and other ores.
16
 Such mines are key sources of 
competitive advantage for the DRC in mineral resources and hence are a key component of the 
country‟s international trade.17 Children reportedly work in order to contribute to their family‟s 
income or to cover the education costs of other members of their family.
18
 In 2009, the ILO 
invited the DRC government, trade unions and employers to discuss the issue of child miners in 
Katanga and to design appropriate policies and programmes to withdraw children from the 
mines.
19
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from 2011. The decrease is regarded as being reflective the top three obstacles of running business in the DRC 
which include access to finance, electricity and practices of the informal sector. The doing business report makes 
no mention of the relationship between the low compliance with labour standards and the ease of doing business 
in the DRC. This could imply that prevailing low labour standards are a key factor to ease of doing business in 
the DRC in terms of the proposals of the Bretton Woods Institution which recommend flexible labour standards 
as a key component to the ease of doing business. See also chapter six of this study. 
13
  UNICEF “The State of the World‟s Children” http://www.unicef.org/sowc/ (accessed 17-06-2012). 
14
  See a report by the International Labour Organisation entitled “Global Child Labour Trends 2000-2004” 
http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=2299 (accessed 17-06-2012). 
15
  See the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) Report to the WTO General Council Review of the 
Trade Policies of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Geneva, 24 and 26-10-2010). See also Youant 
“Democratic Republic of Congo Children quit School for Mines” 
http://www.abscbnnews.com/lifestyle/youth/07/17/10/dr-congo-children-quit-school-mines (accessed 11-08-
2012) and United States Department of State “2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-Democratic 
Republic of the Congo” http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52ffc.html (accessed 12-08-2012).  
16
  See Guerin “Democratic Republic of Congo‟s Child Miner Shame” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5071172.stm 
(accessed 12-08-2012). See also Human Rights Watch “Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in North-eastern Congo” 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/03/29/trail-death-0  (accessed 13-08-2012) and Freedom House “Freedom 
in the World 2010 - Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo” 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c0ceafac.html (accessed 13-08-2012). 
17
  Cook “Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses” 2012 Congressional Research 
Service 18. 
18
  See UNICEF The State of the World‟s Children Report 2009. See also the ITUC Report for the WTO General 
Council Review of the Trade Policies of the Democratic Republic of Congo 1. 
19
  See the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), 
Reports, Individual Observations, general Observations and Direct Requests, 2008-2010. See also See also 
Peopledaily “Democratic Republic of Congo Frees 11,506 Children from Mines” 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90855/7093280.html (accessed 14-08-2012). 
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In November 2010, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) released a 
report on the state of core labour standards in the DRC.
20
 The release was timed to coincide with 
the review of the trade policies of the DRC by the General Council of the WTO at the end of 
November 2010. The report found prevalent violations of all core international labour standards 
especially with regard to child and forced labour. The report revealed that the DRC has ratified 
all eight core ILO labour Conventions.
21
 However, it noted that in view of restrictions on the 
trade union rights of workers, discrimination, child labour, and forced labour, resolute measures 
were needed to comply with the commitments the DRC accepted at Geneva and Doha in the 
WTO Ministerial Declarations during the period 1998-2001, and in the ILO‟s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 2008 Social Justice Declaration.
22
 The DRC 
Constitution recognises the rights to form and join a union, collectively bargain and the right to 
strike.
23
 However, many trade unions are organised by employers and there are many cases of 
unionists being arrested, prosecuted and punished illegally.
24
 In practice, the private sector is 
dominated by bogus unions with inactive members that have been created by employers in order 
to impede real trade unionism.
25
  
Employees are entitled to join only one union which is established by the employers with 
independent trade unions being constant victims of harassment.
26
 An example is that of the 
management of Société industrielle et forestière du Congo (Siforco), a wood production 
company belonging to the German group Danzer, which ordered the suspension of the union 
president and the dismissal of the trade union representatives at its facility.
27
 Like most African 
countries‟ governments, it is difficult to stop or curb violations of labour standards practised by 
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21
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Congo 1. 
22
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23
  See Articles 38 and 39 of the 2006 DRC Constitution. 
24
  See ITUC “Democratic Republic of Congo: Three Trade Unionists under Arrest” ITUC news 19 March 2009. 
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foreign companies as the governments tend to protect them.
28
 The DRC government favours 
some foreign investors, like the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC),
29
 that impede 
labour inspections, and discourages local authorities from enforcing trade union and other labour 
rights.
30
 Working conditions and safety regulations are often not respected in such companies, 
whose management rely on the government‟s favouritism in order to lower wages or abuse other 
labour rights.
31
 Furthermore, the authorities suppress attempts to report such abuses.
32
  
It is clear though that aside from the violations of labour standards where foreign 
companies are involved, the DRC, like many African countries, just has a poor record of 
compliance with labour standards. It is thus not surprising that they would not support the calls 
to include a social clause in trade agreements. There have been numerous allegations of lack of 
independence and efficiency of the courts of justice in the DRC where general labour matters are 
involved, without specific reference to trade. In September 2009, the Congo Labour Centre 
(CCT) had to lodge a complaint with the ILO because, following a serious case of interference 
by the Director of Congo Customs dating back to 2005, the court did not call the Director to 
answer the charges.
33
 It has also been reported that the police and the security authorities arrest 
persons arbitrarily.
34
 On 19 January 2009, the president of the CCT, Nginamau Malaba, and two 
other trade union leaders were arrested by agents of the National Intelligence Agency after 
signing a memorandum denouncing the misappropriation of public funds by the Ministry of the 
National Economy and Trade.
35
 The three unionists were held captive for a month and tortured.
36
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They were released on 23 March 2009 after each paying USD 150 bail but the magistrate refused 
to examine the unionists‟ complaint of torture.37  
In another case, in March 2009, Mulumba Kapepula, an employee of the National 
Railway Company of Congo (SNCC) was arrested by agents of the National Intelligence Agency 
for “insulting members of the government” because he had addressed a demonstration of the 
SNCC workers protesting because their wages were in arrears for 36 months.
38
 Mulumba 
Kapepula was savagely tortured and then charged with offences against the Head of State but 
acquitted on June 5 2009, for lack of evidence.
39
 In other cases police used excessive force to 
disperse demonstrations.
40
 In March 2008 in Katanga, the police fired into a crowd and killed a 
boy during a miners‟ strike and demonstration.41 Freedom of assembly is not always respected.42 
As earlier stated, it is thus not surprising that the DRC does not support the inclusion of a social 
clause in trade. However, it is important to question whether this is the most plausible approach 
for a country that is struggling to achieve a level of development commensurate with its vast 
mineral resources.  
It is advisable that the DRC government stops harassing independent trade unions and 
protect them from employers‟ harassment in order to improve the protection of the right to 
organise. Law enforcers should also address anti-union discrimination cases and facilitate the 
complaints procedures. The DRC government should also fight corruption especially among 
judges, public servants, law enforcers and prison officers, so as to achieve effective law 
enforcement. The police and the security authorities must be subject to the rule of law and must 
not be allowed to arrest persons arbitrarily or commit any other unlawful act. The National 
Intelligence Agency should not be used against strikers or citizens‟ assemblies. Freedom of 
assembly should be effectively guaranteed in the DRC. The police should not interrupt peaceful 
gatherings or arrest participants of assemblies. In this way, workers will be able to air their 
grievances without the fear of victmisation by government officials and employers. 
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7 2 2  Malawi 
The 2013 Doing Business Report on Malawi ranks Malawi as 133 out 183 economies in the 
world with reference to labour standards being made in respect to the redundancy cost regarding 
advance notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due to a redundant worker 
whose services are terminated.
43
 Malawi, like the DRC, has its fair share of problems concerning 
a trade-labour linkage. In June 2010, the ITUC, as it did with the DRC, released a report on the 
state of core labour standards in Malawi.
44
 The release was also timed to coincide with the 
review of the trade policies of Malawi by the General Council of the WTO in June 2010. The 
report indicated that Malawi ratified ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise in 1999, and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining in 1965.
45
 Malawi‟s Constitution allows workers to form and join trade 
unions, except those serving in the police and army.
46
 Unions must register with the Registrar of 
Trade Unions and Employers‟ Organisations in the Ministry of Labour, without previous 
authorisation or excessive requirements.
47
 The Registrar may suspend and cancel the registration 
of a union if it does not annually submit audited financial statements, a list of the names and 
postal addresses of its officers, and its number of members.
48
  
The law stipulates that union activities should be conducted without government 
interference.
49
 Labour laws apply in the country‟s sole export processing zone (EPZ) where 20 
companies operate.
50
 Nonetheless, many companies in the EPZ resist union activity and deny 
access to the zone to trade unionists.
51
 The law also establishes a formal process for the 
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settlement of labour disputes with the mediation of the Labour Ministry.
52
 The law provides for 
workers‟ right to strike if an agreement is not reached through the dispute settlement procedure.53 
The union has to give the employer and the Ministry of Labour seven days‟ notice after the lapse 
of the 21 days‟ notice to the Ministry‟s conciliators that the dispute is unresolved.54 However, the 
procedure is long and unclear as in 2006, 12 branch officials of the Communication Workers 
Union, Telekom Networks Branch were dismissed on allegations that their agitation caused their 
colleagues to go on strike.
55
  
Similarly, in August 2008, 297 members of the Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers 
Union of Malawi (TOTAWUM) were sacked by the Limbe Leaf Tobacco Company, a company 
within the Philip Morris group supply chain,
56
 for allegedly failing to respect the normal dispute 
settlement procedure, thus rendering their strike illegal.
57
 The workers had demanded a wage 
increase and proper equipment to protect themselves against toxic substances.
58
  
Malawi‟s biggest challenge concerning trade and labour is the use of child labour.59 
While it is acknowledged that child labour is on the decline in Asia and Latin America, the 
African situation appears to be different.
60
 The variation may be accounted for by the causes of 
child labour. In many African cultural settings for instance, boys are expected to work hard 
especially helping their fathers within the household.
61
 They are also expected to assist elderly 
people carry their load.
62
 In this sense, the role of a child in a family or society, which is 
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regarded as permeating social networks, is thus held as an important factor in promoting the use 
of child labour.
63
  The scale of the problem in Africa is among the key remaining challenges in 
tackling child labour, according to Constance Thomas, Director of the ILO‟s International 
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). Other challenges include a much-needed 
breakthrough in agriculture, where most child labourers work, and the need to address often 
hidden forms of child labour.
64
 It is an acknowledged fact that most child labour is rooted in 
poverty. The way to tackle the problem is therefore clear.  Thomas rightly points out:  
“We must ensure that all children have the chance of going to school, we need social 
protection systems that support vulnerable families-particularly at times of crisis-and we 
need to ensure that adults have a chance of decent work. These measures, combined with 
effective enforcement of laws that protect children, provide the way forward.”65 
 
The 2010 ILO Global Report on Child Labour also noted that: 
 
 “A number of initiatives invoke the linkage between trade policy and child labour, 
including incentive schemes in both the United States and European Union Generalized 
Systems of Preferences (GSP). The issue has recently regained further ground in 
discussions about child (and forced) labour as certain Member States have introduced 
trade-related mechanisms to induce others to take action regarding the use of child labour 
in the production of certain internationally traded goods.”66 
 
It is issues such as the role of child labour in the African community that seem to also contribute 
to the African governments‟ resistance to the inclusion of a social clause in trade. Put in another 
way, the child labour issue highlights the significance of the problem of universal application of 
human rights in concrete cultural and social settings such as the African context. It is submitted 
that this issue cannot be simply ignored as much as the use of child labour can not also go 
unchecked. A balance must be sought between human rights implementation, economic interests 
and cultural as well as social interests. As Fiszbein et al observed: “Work may be physically or 
mentally harmful, may interfere with schooling, and can undermine educational attainment and 
future earnings”.67 The Global March against Child Labour stated that: 
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“While the definition of child labour usually only involves labeling the types of work and 
children involved in a workplace, child labour has to be understood not only as a problem 
faced by individual children, but also as a system engraved in society perpetuating poverty, 
social evil, inequity, and unfair economic and social norms. Often poverty is believed to be 
the major cause of child labour but the fact that child labour causes and perpetuates poverty 
is little known. Children are not the cause of child labour but are victims of inadequate 
public and economic policy and ill-managed social systems that suppress the most 
vulnerable in society.”68 
 
Malawi is considered to have one of the highest incidences of child labour in the world.
69
 At the 
time of writing this thesis, Malawi had an estimated 1.4 million child labourers.
70
 In 1999, 
Malawi ratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention
71
 and the ILO Convention on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour.
72
 In Malawi, the law allows children older than 14 years of age to 
perform work in any public or private agricultural, industrial or non-industrial undertaking or any 
branch thereof.
73
 The scope of the law does not extend to cases of work done in homes, 
vocational technical schools or other training institutions.
74
 However, the law does prohibit 
hazardous work for children younger than 18 years of age.
75
 On the other hand the Constitution 
sets the age limit at 16 years for acceptance into hazardous work creating a legislative collision 
which is currently being addressed by the Tripartite Labour Advisory Council.
76
 Furthermore, 
the list of hazardous jobs is developed by the Labour Minister with the participation of 
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employers‟ organisations and trade unions.77 Every employer is required to keep a register of 
child employees.
78
 The law prescribes 20,000 Kwacha (about 134 USD) and imprisonment for 
five years as penalties for offenders.
79
 Whether or not the amount of 134 USD is deterrent 
enough raises a lot of questions. The legislation provides for light work for children younger than 
14 years of age without mentioning the lowest age limit allowed by the relevant ILO Convention, 
which is 12 years of age.
80
 This has seen renewed calls for the passing into law of the Tobacco 
Tenancy Bill which could address the incidence of child labour in Malawi.
81
  
Even though child labour is found in virtually all sectors of the Malawian economy, 
formal and informal, including 16 commercial farms, smallholdings, domestic work and micro-
industries, Malawi‟s effort to deal with it is directed towards the formal sector especially 
commercial agriculture.
82
 Commercial agriculture is important for the country‟s economy. 
Tobacco alone accounts for almost 70 percent of the country‟s foreign exchange earnings.83 Tea 
is an equally important crop for Malawi‟s economy as it is considered the second major foreign 
exchange earner.
84
 While accurate data on the magnitude of child labour is lacking, there are 
clear indications that child labour in Malawi is widespread and on the rise.
85
  
To appreciate the significance of the problem of child labour and the seriousness with 
which it has been addressed in Malawi, it is important to consider the kinds of activities which 
children on tea and tobacco estates perform. On tobacco estates, children perform a number of 
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activities. As far back as the year 2000, Eldring et al observed that children as young as nine 
were involved in what were called “light tasks” such as: 
“clearing fields, making nursery beds and watering nurseries during the first phase of 
tobacco production; uprooting, transporting and transplanting seedlings and weeding 
during the second phase; picking, transporting, tying/sowing the leaf, picking down the 
dried tobacco and bundling during the last phase”.86 
 
In 2009, Plan Malawi reported almost similar activities done by children on tobacco estates.
87
 
Children do almost every job that adults do.
88
 Their activities chiefly involve clearing the fields 
in preparation for planting, working in the nurseries, harvesting and grading the final product.
89
 
The report mentions other activities deemed hazardous like the spraying of pesticides.
90
 The 
activities have been branded “hazardous” because they involve the use of dangerous chemicals 
harmful to children‟s health.91 Chemicals can affect their respiratory systems.92  
Tobacco production is physically demanding on the children. Children carry heavy loads 
of tobacco and work for long hours.
93
 Some children help in operating heavy machinery when 
preparing tobacco bales.
94
 The Plan Malawi report indicated that children worked as much as 12 
hours or more for just US$0.17 a day.
95
 The report also indicates that on humid days, during the 
cultivation and harvesting of tobacco, the average field worker may be exposed to as much as 54 
milligrams of dissolved nicotine, equivalent to more than 50 average cigarettes, leading to Green 
Tobacco Sickness.
96
 Tobacco not only exposes child workers to health hazards involved in its 
production, but also subjects children to long hours of work with little or no rest at all in order to 
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make more money.
97
 Just like the tobacco industry, employers on tea estates see nothing wrong 
employing children to perform tasks which they regard as “light and suitable for children and 
young persons”.98 Many African traditional communities place a high value on children‟s work 
at home or on the family farm.
99
 This work is not perceived as harmful, but rather as socially 
necessary occupation, which is also of great benefit to children‟s experience.100 Household 
activities are carried over to the tea and tobacco estates as they are perceived helpful to both the 
parents and the children besides earning some money.
101
  
However what is not deniable is that most of the work that children perform on the tea 
and tobacco estates in Malawi is not good for their development. It would be of greater 
significance if the Malawian government were to establish a lower age limit of 12 years of age in 
the legislation on light work for children as prescribed by ILO Convention No 138. Urgent 
measures to withdraw children from farms where child labourers are exposed to pesticides, toxic 
substances and nicotine and to prosecute offenders must also be taken. Much emphasis must be 
placed on the educational development of the children, a factor which will lead to improved 
human capital on the continent. This, in turn, is likely to contribute to development rather than 
the continued increase in the number of uneducated people on the continent. 
7 2 3  Mauritius 
The Doing Business Report of 2012 regards Mauritius as number 1 in Africa and 23rd in the 
world when it comes to the ease of doing business.
102
 Mauritius has a significant number of 
export processing zones (EPZs). It has also ratified all eight ILO core labour Conventions.
103
 
However restrictions of the principles and rights laid down in those binding international legal 
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instruments are common.
104
 Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are 
guaranteed in law,
105
 and the corresponding rights also apply to workers in companies located in 
the EPZs.
106
 However the effective exercise of those rights is systematically denied, causing the 
ILO‟s supervisory bodies to denounce practices that are in breach of the ratified conventions.107 
National law allows the public authorities to cancel the registration of a trade union,
108
 and the 
procedures established in national legislation on the right to strike are ambiguous
109
 thus 
preventing the effective exercise of that right.
110
 There is still a very low level of collective 
bargaining in the EPZs, prompting criticism from the ILO which has urged the government to 
take measures to promote collective bargaining at production centres in the EPZs.
111
 
Mauritius ratified ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise on 1 April 2005 and ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and to 
Bargain Collectively on 2 December 1969.
112
 Its Constitution protects the right of workers to 
form and join trade unions, and this right was strengthened by the ratification of ILO Convention 
87 in April 2005.
113
 However there are certain restrictions.
114
 Authorities are entitled to cancel a 
union‟s registration if it does not adhere to specified legal obligations, including activities that 
may pose “a threat to public order”.115 The law protects collective bargaining and bans anti-
union discrimination.
116
 20% of the active population of Mauritius are members of trade 
unions.
117
  
The Mauritian Industrial Relations Act (MIRA) guarantees the right to strike.
118
 
However, the MIRA sets a deadline of 21 days following compulsory arbitration for industrial 
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action, which in practice prevents the exercising of that right.
119
 It gives the government 21 days 
in which to respond to any dispute and to refer it to the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal or the 
Industrial Relations Commission. If the government does not reply within 21 days the strike can 
proceed.
120
 The MIRA states that participation in an illegal strike is a ground for dismissal.
121
 
The MIRA also allows the Prime Minister to declare a strike illegal should he or she consider 
that the strike could damage the country‟s economy.122  
Foreign workers who take part in a strike can be deported.
123
 In 2006, there were a series 
of reports that workers from China and India who had tried to form a trade union or protest 
against their employers had been summarily deported.
124
 The unions have demanded that the 
right to strike be guaranteed by the Constitution.
125
 The ILO has reminded the government that 
any restriction of the right to strike should be accompanied by appropriate, impartial and speedy 
conciliation and arbitration procedures.
126
 It has stressed that the sacking of workers (for taking 
part in strikes) and the refusal to reinstate them were serious breaches of the right to freedom of 
association.
127
 The law covers workers in the EPZs, but the unionisation rate is low there.
128
 
Special laws are applied in some EPZs, such as those providing for longer working hours in the 
zones (45 hours per week and ten hours compulsory overtime if required).
129
 Some employer-
controlled councils prevent unions from organising workers in companies based in the EPZs.
130
 
It is extremely difficult to approach workers in Mauritian EPZs with a view to organising 
them into trade unions.
131
 Generally, union officials have to wait outside the factory gates to 
meet workers whom they mostly do not know; in addition, they report that most of the workers 
are women who are in a hurry to get home to their families.
132
 As a result, the organisation rate is 
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quite low (less than 12%) in the EPZs across the country.
133
 Owing to the lack of effective trade 
union representation, occupational health and safety hazards are sometimes not addressed in a 
timely fashion, if at all.
134
 The unions have reported how difficult they find it to approach and 
organise migrant workers, particularly those from South-East Asia and Madagascar, who tend to 
have long working hours and to be cut off from other workers.
135
 Some of them have intolerable 
living conditions, sleeping in dormitories on benches without mattresses or in tiny bedrooms 
housing up to a dozen people. Those who have tried to organise have been summarily 
deported.
136
  
It has also been reported that unions are finding it hard to organise workers in the 
expanding sector of offshore companies.
137
 Violations of workers‟ rights have been reported 
recently in the textile industry. Some employers have refused to recognise the union delegates 
and a wildcat strike in a clothing factory was brutally suppressed by the police.
138
 The 
government and the unions have still not reached an agreement on the draft law amending the 
MIRA.
139
 The unions fear that amendment to the law on collective bargaining could undermine 
the tripartite system.
140
 Migrant workers are openly discriminated against as they have much 
lower wages than Mauritian nationals.
141
  
The government of Mauritius must therefore do more to promote collective bargaining in 
enterprises based in the EPZs and ensure that the rights contained in ratified ILO Conventions 87 
and 98 are observed in the production centres located there. Measures to ban interference by 
employers‟ organisations in the activities of workers‟ organisations, supported by sufficiently 
dissuasive sanctions must also be taken. In addition, the labour laws of Mauritius must be 
amended to remove the right of the Prime Minister to declare a strike illegal should he or she 
consider that the strike can damage the country‟s economy. Measures should also be taken to 
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ensure that migrant workers also receive equal pay to that of Mauritian nationals and that they 
are fully informed of their rights. 
7 2 4  Mozambique 
In the 2012 Doing Business Report, Mozambique is ranked 139 out of 183 countries in the 
world.
142
 Mozambique has ratified all eight core ILO labour Conventions.
143
 However in view of 
restrictions on trade union rights, discrimination, child labour and forced labour, further 
measures are needed to comply with the commitments Mozambique accepted at Singapore and 
Doha in the WTO Ministerial Declarations of 1996-2001, and in the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
144
 The law allows for strikes in EPZs to be 
conducted on the same basis as strikes in essential services, although services provided by the 
export processing zones are not essential.
145
 It is reported that in the Mozal export processing 
zone,
146
 unionists face discrimination and unfair dismissals for going on strike or for trying to 
organise.
147
 The Mozambique Workers‟ Organisation (OTM) trade union centre reports that 
collective agreements are not respected in Mozal.
148
 However, up to now, there are not a large 
number of companies operating in Mozal.
149
 
While Mozambique has ratified both ILO core conventions on trade union rights and 
progress has recently been made with the enactment of a new Labour Code, the right to bargain 
collectively is under pressure since the authorities do not take measures requiring employers to 
respect collective agreements.
150
 Strikes are often suppressed and encounter violent reaction 
from employers and sometimes the police.
151
 Anti-union discrimination remains a problem as 
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adequate dissuasive sanctions have not been prescribed.
152
 Trade unions‟ ability to operate freely 
is hindered due to regulations applied to private gatherings.
153
 Trade union activities in the 
country‟s EPZs in Mozal are constrained due to the authorities‟ definition of work in EPZs as 
“essential” although clearly it does not fall under the ILO definition of “essential services”.154  
In 1977, Mozambique ratified both ILO Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration and 
ILO Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation).
155
 Both the 
Constitution of Mozambique and the law prohibit discrimination against workers on the basis of 
gender and provide for every worker the right to receive equal salary and benefits for equal 
work.
156
 The OTM claims that in the Mozal EPZ, the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value is not respected with regard to remuneration of nationals and foreign workers.
157
 In 2003, 
Mozambique ratified the ILO Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age and Convention No. 
182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.
158
 The law of Mozambique prohibits child labour and 
sets the minimum working age at 18 years.
159
 While child labour is not reported in industrial 
sectors, it is common in practice that children are involved as seasonal labour on family farms, in 
herding livestock and on commercial cotton, tobacco and tea plantations where they are paid on a 
piecework basis.
160
 
The Mozambican government must ensure that strikes in export processing zones are not 
treated as strikes in essential services sectors. Furthermore the government‟s listing of “essential 
services” for which compulsory arbitration is imposed must be amended in order to exclude 
postal, meteorological and other services that are not essential in the ILO‟s sense of the term. 
Measures also need to be taken to enforce collective agreements and promote collective 
bargaining in the private sector. 
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7 2 5  Zambia 
The Doing Business Report for 2012 ranks Zambia 84th out of 183 countries in the world.
161
 
Zambia has ratified all ILO core labour Conventions.
162
 In view of restrictions on trade union 
rights, discrimination, child labour and forced labour, resolute measures are needed to comply 
with the commitments Zambia accepted at Singapore, Geneva and Doha in the WTO Ministerial 
Declarations of 1996-2001, and in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work.
163
 Zambia has ratified the ILO Conventions on trade union rights.
164
 However the 
legislation on freedom of association and collective bargaining is not in full conformity with ILO 
Conventions.
165
 In practice trade union rights are widely flouted in the mining sector in 
particular, which is dominated by foreign owners.
166
 In view of the ITUC Report, the 
government must step up its efforts to ensure that workers‟ rights are respected in all companies 
including foreign companies and subcontractors.
167
 
In recent years the unions have protested frequently about the worsening social climate in 
the mining industry, which is mainly owned by Chinese investors who are often accused of 
intimidating and brutal attitudes.
168
 The government has not always been responsive. In March 
2008, 500 striking workers at the Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS) were sacked by their 
employer.
169
 The day before, seven branch officials of the National Union of Miners and Allied 
Workers (NUMAW) had been arrested by the police after a conflict broke out between the 500 
workers and 200 Chinese foremen, resulting in at least three people being injured.
170
 The 
workers, employed to build a foundry, had gone on strike on 3 March to demand pay increases 
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and better safety conditions.
171
 The union officials were released, and the workers were 
reinstated after some intensive negotiations.
172
  
In early June 2008, again in Chambishi, a union member working for another Chinese 
company, China Non-Ferrous Metal Industry‟s Foreign Engineering and Construction Company 
filed a complaint that he was assaulted by an engineer.
173
 This trade unionist had repeatedly 
complained about the inadequate financial compensation paid to the family of a worker who died 
in an occupational accident.
174
 After spending a few nights in prison, the engineer was released 
for lack of evidence.
175
 The trade unionist was sacked. More and more sub-contractors are found 
in the mining industry.
176
 When trade unions do manage to organize workers in these companies, 
they have to cope with employers trying to avoid any social dialogue. One specific result of this 
trend is that the number of occupational accidents, which are often fatal, is rising. The situation 
faced by foreign workers recruited by foreign investors is not always better. In May 2008, 24 
Indians were summarily repatriated to Bombay after being identified as the “ringleaders” of a 
strike involving over 300 of their compatriots employed by Onshore Construction Company, an 
Indian sub-contractor hired to build a copper foundry in Chingola.
177
 The workers were 
complaining about their pay and working conditions.
178
 
While disputes are a common feature of labour relations under capitalist conditions, what 
draws global media attention to China in Africa is the sometimes brutal boss-employee model 
practiced by the continent‟s new “imperial masters”.179 Although China has come a long way in 
its domestic labour relations, mass social unrest, worker exploitation and walkouts over pay 
show the ugly side of its rapid industrialization.
180
 Cheap labour has entrenched exploitative 
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labour practices which are now being exported to different countries around the world, some of 
which have poor labour records of their own.
181
 China is no longer just exporting mainly cheap 
goods, but also cheap labour practices.
182
 Chinese exploitation and ill-treatment of workers, 
sometimes like slaves, is rampant across the Continent, from Cape to Cairo.
183
 For instance, in 
October 2010, two Chinese managers opened fire on hundreds of protesting Zambian miners at 
Collum Coal Mine.
184
 The managers claimed it was in self-defence and the case was dropped. 
The decision not to pursue the matter meant that there was no justice for Zambians 
demonstrating against the US$4 per day wage and unsafe working conditions because China 
invests more than US$1 billion a year in infrastructure projects in Zambia.
185
 The Zambian 
government should put in place mechanisms to ensure that workers‟ rights are respected in all 
companies, including foreign companies and sub-contractors. 
7 2 6  Zimbabwe 
The World Bank Doing Business Report 2012 ranks Zimbabwe 171st
 
out of 183 countries in the 
world.
186
 Zimbabwe ratified ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour and Convention No. 105 
on the Abolition of Forced Labour in 1998.
187
 The Labour Act in section 4A prohibits forced 
labour but prescribes only a fine or two years imprisonment which is not deterrent.
188
 Moreover, 
the Labour Act fails to address the need for specification of the various forms of forced labour 
and does not have a definition of forced labour. The Chinese appear to be at liberty to violate 
workers‟ rights in the country. A pattern of brutality now exists between the workers, the ruling 
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elite and the Chinese investors and their managers in Zimbabwe.
189
 Arguably, the most well-
known case involves Anjin Investments, a controversial diamond venture between Zimbabwe‟s 
security establishment, the army, police and intelligence services and Chinese investors.
190
 
Through Anjin, top political and security figures have reportedly staked their claim to the 
Marange diamond fields.
191
 This has contributed to lack of transparency and accountability in the 
Marange diamond mining activities. Diamonds‟ contribution to the fiscus remains low due to 
lack of accountability.
192
 Commenting on the structure of Anjin‟s management, Farai Maguwu, 
Director of the Marange-based Centre for Research and Development once said:  
“Some very senior military personnel and well placed politicians are directly involved in 
the mining operations of Anjin. The involvement of the army in diamond mining in 
Marange is the saddest thing that has happened to the find of the century.”193  
 
Such practices are inconsistent with the objectives of the Kadoma Declaration (KD),
194
 entered 
into by government, business and labour to address the totality of the macro-economic problems 
and Country Risk Factors.
195
 The KD identified elements of risk in the country to include the real 
or perceived selective observance of the rule of law.
196
 It also identified one of the country risk 
manifestations as the commercial risk in which trading partners lack confidence in the 
investment policies of the country.
197
 The KD also identified one of the risk factors as the lack of 
respect for human rights.
198
 In his keynote address on the occasion of the official opening of the 
Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) social dialogue retreat held in Kariba in July 2009, before 
the signing of the KD, Zimbabwean Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, said: 
 “After almost two decades of relative stability and growth since independence in 1980, our 
macroeconomic indicators started to deteriorate, evidenced by soaring inflation and 
unemployment rates. It is also then that our negative balance of payments situation and 
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recurring budget deficits became untenable. On the back of such economic performance 
most businesses inevitably folded, leading to massive retrenchments and 
liquidations...Given this myriad of challenges, government and social partners decided to 
build partnership as a way to arrest further collapse.”199 
 
However the objectives of the KD and any hopes of re-building the country‟s economy seem to 
be eroding under the Chinese wave. Extensive research by international organisations such as 
Human Rights Watch and Global Witness shows that since its diamond mining venture began in 
Zimbabwe in 2009, a litany of abuses have also characterised Anjin‟s operations. In a report 
released in August 2011, Human Rights Watch noted with concern that “Zimbabwe police and 
private security guards are shooting, beating and unleashing attack dogs on poor, local 
unlicensed miners”.200 It is alarming that such violent methods of policing mines have become 
habitual practice in Marange since 2008 when 20 000 small-scale miners invaded newly-
discovered fields before being removed by military force.
201
 They were forcefully removed by 
soldiers and police; rights groups claim that an estimated 200 people were killed, but the 
government strongly denied this.
202
  
In a separate incident workers at a glass-making factory in Harare accused its Chinese 
owner of forcing them to work overtime for as little as US$1 per hour.
203
 It appears some 
politically-connected Chinese firms are exempted from abiding by the country‟s laws.204 
Maintaining good diplomatic relations is crucial to sustaining US$500 million worth of Chinese 
investments in Zimbabwe, but when the apparently “great friend of Africa” also starts to look 
like a brutal extractor of wealth, protecting the rights and interests of ordinary Africans must 
become critical.
205
 This is a principle factor which developing countries appear to constantly 
ignore. 
                                                          
 
199
  See the keynote address by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai on the 17th of 
July 2009 4. 
200
  See The Human Rights Watch “World Report 2011: Zimbabwe” http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2011/zimbabwe (accessed 10-06-2012). 
201
 See The Human Rights Watch Country Summary Report on Zimbabwe of January 2011 2. 
202
 Ibid. 
203
 Marima “Outrage over Brutal Chinese Labour Practices” The Independent 12 April 2012. 
204
 Ibid. 
205
 Ibid. 
322 
 
Zimbabwe has also ratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention
206
 and Convention No. 
182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour in the year 2000.
207
 Zimbabwean law sets the minimum 
age for admission to employment at 15 years of age.
208
 However, the law does not prescribe for 
compulsory education up to the age of 15 or other age.
209
 Also, the LRA does not apply to self-
employed workers.
210
 Children between 13 and 15 years old can be employed as apprentices and 
children between 15 and 18 can perform light work.
211
 Permitting the employment of apprentices 
from the age of 13 years is not in conformity with Convention No. 138.
212
 The LRA does not 
define child labour and does not cover many children‟s rights recognised in Convention 182 on 
the worst forms of child labour.
213
 Hazardous work is prohibited for children.
214
 
In practice, child labour is a problem in Zimbabwe. According to the latest state statistics, 
from 2004, 46 per cent of children between 5 and 17 years of age were at work.
215
 The data 
showed that 4 per cent of working children had never attended school and 14 per cent had 
dropped out of school. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) reported that young 
children engaged in work to pay for their school fees and proposed the reintroduction of free 
education at least at the primary level.
216
  Rural children often work in tobacco, sugarcane, 
cotton, tea and coffee plantations and other farms as well as in diamond and gold mines and in 
forestry.
217
 In many cases, children as young as 12 years old have been found in mines dealing 
with hazardous chemical and toxic substances without protective gear and operating dangerous 
machines without training in agriculture and mining.
218
 
Zimbabwe‟s Export Processing Zones Act (ZEPZA) was enacted in 1995.219 It provides, 
among other things, for the establishment of EPZs and an EPZ Authority. The EPZ Authority 
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was created in response to the need to develop a high value-added, export-oriented and 
technology-driven economy through the instrumentality of EPZs. The Authority facilitates the 
development of EPZs by granting permits to private developers and investment licences to 
companies, and monitors the EPZs based on guidelines set out in the ZEPZA. EPZs provide clear 
benefits to foreign investors. However, the ZEPZA provides for the non-application of the 
Labour Relations Act. It excludes key parties and authorities concerned with labour, basic health, 
and environmental standards from the EPZ Authority.
220
  
The picture presented above of the selected SADC countries is worrisome. Clearly apart 
from South Africa, regardless of its current challenges concerning a social clause, not much is 
being done to suggest that there is concern regarding a need to protect core labour standards in 
trade. This raises a serious question as to whether policy makers in the region have a justifiable 
basis for regarding the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO as a North-South debate. Perhaps 
the SADC policy makers fear that their countries could suffer from the effects of incorporating a 
social clause in trade agreements. However, it is important to establish whether or not these fears 
are genuine. 
 
7 3  WHO IS DISADVANTAGED BY THE EXCLUSION OF A SOCIAL CLAUSE 
FROM TRADE AGREEMENTS? 
 
Countries are clearly finding it difficult to protect labour standards in trade. All this is taking 
place regardless of the adoption by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) of the 2008 
Declaration on Social Justice and Fair Globalisation.
221
 There is an apparent desire to retain the 
low level of compliance with labour standards as a competitive advantage. On the one hand 
governments are clearly determined to attract investment and increase their export 
competitiveness on the backdrop of a lowered compliance with labour standards whilst on the 
other hand multinational companies (MNCs) are also seeking out the most favourable business 
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environment defined by a lowered compliance with labour standards among other variables.
222
 
This has resulted in SADC countries competing for investors on condition of concessions which 
are likely to hamper development. An analysis of some of the key issues emerging from 
discussions of the violations of core labour standards in trade as undertaken in this chapter will 
possibly inform SADC countries on the appropriate course of action to adopt concerning the 
social clause. 
7 3 1  Lowering labour standards in order to attract investors 
The Namibian Ramatex case illustrates the dangers of SADC countries lowering labour 
standards in order to attract investors.
223
  In 1995, the Namibian Government introduced the 
Export Processing Zones (EPZ) Act.
224
 Amongst other incentives such as tax holidays, 
exemption from import duties on imported intermediate and capital goods, free repatriation of 
profits given to lure investors,
225
 the Namibian government provided that the Labour Act of 1992 
would not apply to the EPZ sector.
226
 The government saw the non-application of labour laws in 
the EPZ sector as a delicate compromise in order to create employment.
227
 However, the 
National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW)
228
 challenged the exclusion of the labour laws in 
EPZs the result of which was a compromise to the effect that labour laws would be allowed to 
apply in the EPZs with strikes and lock-outs being outlawed for a period of five years.
229
 
In 2001, the Namibian Ministry of Trade and Industry claimed to have won a N$1 billion 
project ahead of South Africa and Madagascar which had also been considered as an investment 
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location by Ramatex.
230
 This was achieved by offering even greater concessions than those 
offered to other EPZ companies and an incentive package which included subsidised water and 
electricity, a 99-year tax exemption on land use as well as over N$100 million to prepare the site 
including the setting up of electricity, water and sewage infrastructure.
231
 This was justified on 
the grounds that the company would create three thousand to five thousand jobs during the first 
two years and another two thousand jobs in the following two years.
232
 Considering that 
Ramatex employed up to seven thousand workers at N$500 per month, the subsidy was 
equivalent to 34 months‟ wage bill.233  
In 2003, five thousand jobs were created in Namibia whilst Ramatex closed its Tay Wah 
Textiles and May Garments operations in South Africa.
234
 Two thousand five hundred jobs were 
lost in South Africa.
235
 In 2005, two thousand more jobs were created in Namibia but they were 
for mostly migrant workers from Asia.
236
 According to Zapini: 
“In 2008, workers were told to go home at 16h00, due to a power failure at the plant. When 
they returned the next morning they found the factory gates closed and were told that 
Ramatex had closed operations. Upon pressure by the Namibia government they receive 
one month‟s severance pay and one week‟s wage for each year of service.”237 
 
Cappucio also observed that Ramatex‟s operations in Namibia were fraught with complaints 
concerning poor labour practices related to low wages, unfair labour conditions and poor 
occupational health and safety standards.
238
 What then did Namibia gain from pricing investors 
away from South Africa with lowered concessions to attract investment? Zapini observed that 
the: 
 “„Beggar-thy-neighbour‟ investment incentive competition may even distort the 
international allocation of FDI away from destinations with a potentially higher return in 
terms of development and to investors, as well as a reduction of world efficiency and 
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welfare as compared to the level which could be attained if countries agreed not to pursue 
such policies.”239 
 
Zapini‟s comments were in apparent reference to the withdrawal of Ramatex‟s subsidiary firms 
from South Africa resulting in the loss of two thousand five hundred jobs. The net effect of 
Ramatex‟s business practices and the Namibian government‟s concessions was the loss of an 
estimated total of nine thousand five hundred jobs between South Africa and Namibia in addition 
to the huge financial losses incurred by the Namibian government in setting up structures to lure 
Ramatex. Does such an approach lead to sustainable development? The Ramatex case draws 
similarities to the Chinese companies‟ threats to re-locate from South Africa to Lesotho and 
Swaziland where labour standards are lower than those currently required in South Africa.
240
  
The effects of the Ramatex case were so devastating that the ILO was forced to seriously 
consider the need to develop feasible governance solutions to the bidding war to attract FDI.
241
 
The result was a FDI Policy Dialogue held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2008 
during the SADC meeting of Heads of State and Government.
242
 Amongst the issues addressed 
was the question of whether or not there should be a development-friendly regional policy 
framework for investment. In addressing this question, the factors behind investment decisions 
and the attraction of FDI had to be established. The ILO and SADC sought to ascertain how the 
business environment impacts on the relationship between labour standards and FDI.  Since 
SADC countries are ranked by both ease of doing business indicators and FDI inflows,
243
 it had 
to be established whether there was a link between FDI flows and ease of doing business. Labour 
argued that contrary to neo-liberal theoretical expectations linking FDI flows to the ease of doing 
business, there was no relationship between the two.
244
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A study conducted by Flanagan and Khor, and published in 2012 established key findings 
of great significance to this thesis. First, Flanagan and Khor revealed that 19th century 
globalisation included significant international capital flows, but most FDI flowed from capital-
rich European countries to less-developed countries, where capital was scarce and its marginal 
value was accordingly high.
245
 They also revealed that: 
“Following the interwar retreat from global economic activity, international capital flows 
regained their earlier peaks during the 1990s, but with a distinctive change in the 
destination of investments. Most capital no longer flows toward the least developed nations 
where capital is scarce. Capital-poor developing countries received less than a quarter of 
world FDI flows during the late 20th century.”246 
 
In 2003, Obstfeld and Taylor argued that, “...capital transactions seem to be mostly a rich-rich 
affair, a process of diversification finance rather than development finance.”247 A 2010 
UNCTAD World Investment Report indicated that only in the early 21st century did the share 
flowing to developing countries begin to increase, although it had reached only a third of FDI 
inflows by the end of the century‟s first decade.248 The entire continent of Africa received less 
than 4% of world inflows in 2007 to 2009, little different from the 1990s.
249
 The Report also 
showed that while the volume of FDI received by Asian countries increased throughout the 
period, their share of FDI inflows changed little over the past 20 years and their share of the 
flows to developing countries declined.
250
 The above highlighted data led Flanagan and Khor to 
conclude that: 
“Even this snapshot of FDI flows undermines the notion that countries with inferior labour 
conditions attract international investment flows. With most FDI now flowing between 
industrialised nations, which offer superior labour conditions, efforts to find cheap labour 
and weak labour standards cannot be the primary factor motivating the international 
distribution of FDI.”251 
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The findings of Flanagan and Khor are reflected in the Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Foreign direct investment inflows, 1990-2009 
 
Share of World FDI Inflows, percentages 
 1990-1992 1999-2001 2007-2009 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Developed countries 75.3 78.1 60.7 
Developing countries 24.3 21.1 33.6 
East Asia 6.3 8.2 9.9 
South Asia 0.3 0.5 2.5 
South-East Asia 7.4 2.2 3.2 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010. 
 
Flanagan and Khor also tested for the influence of several institutional and regulatory factors that 
might influence the costs of doing business in a country. Their analysis found that countries with 
large markets, low investment risks, and a large trade share of GDP attracted larger shares of FDI 
inflows.
252
 They also found no significant correlation between any of the measures of labour skill 
and FDI inflow shares.
253
 They then concluded that, “...at least in the early 21st century, there 
was no evidence that FDI was attracted to countries with abundant unskilled labour, ceteris 
paribus (All things being equal).”254 They proceeded to make a preliminary assessment of the 
effect of national labour regulations on FDI. The result was that countries in which business 
executives believed that labour regulations do not hinder economic activity received a larger 
share of world FDI, other influences being equal.
255
 They also observed that unlike other 
measures of labour regulation by country, this variable was available for several years, but it 
provided no indication of which labour regulations concern potential foreign investors the 
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most.
256
 Flanagan and Khor also tested for the influence of a country‟s labour conditions on FDI 
by adding measures of working conditions and labour rights to the baseline econometric 
model.
257
 The results indicated that high FDI shares were not significantly correlated with poor 
labour conditions such as low pay, long working hours, and limited freedom of association 
rights.
258
 This argument is sunstantiated by the data in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3. Trade and labour conditions, 2005-2009 
Working 
conditions 
In Per capita 
GDP 
Trade share of 
GDP 
Asia Number of 
Countries 
Hourly Pay 1.36 
(.11) 
-0.00015 
(0.0035) 
0.08 
(0.26) 
48 
Annual Work 
Hours 
-152.05 
(57.44) 
0.85 
(-1.29) 
-13.96 
(107.23) 
55 
Labour Rights     
Civil Liberties -0.46 
(-0.63) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
1.94 
(1.28) 
56 
Source: UNCTAD. 
 
The estimates in Table 3 confirm the powerful effect of per capita GDP growth in improving 
working conditions. The estimates also indicate that trade expansion in early 21
st
 century had 
only indirect effects on labour conditions via increased per capita GDP. They also reveal that the 
direct effect of trade expansion on labour conditions is positive. The above detailed information 
thus leads to the question of whether or not a social clause in the WTO legal framework would 
harm a developing region like SADC. The discussion follows. 
7 3 2  Would a social clause in the WTO core agreements disadvantage SADC countries? 
The incorporation of a social clause in trade agreements has been viewed as a legal arrangement 
which will make SADC countries suffer. However an analysis of how a social clause would 
ensure that child labour decreases and MNCs comply with labour standards will show that a 
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social clause might not after all result in future economic losses for SADC countries. This 
chapter has revealed that child labour is one of the problematic forms of labour violations within 
SADC. Businesses as already shown in this chapter prefer child labour because it is cheap. 
SADC governments seem unable to regulate effectively against child labour as doing so is 
deemed as an act limiting family incomes in the poor region.
259
 Such policy options will slow 
down the rate of elimination of child labour.  
 Developing country governments and international development agencies have long been 
aware that human capital accumulation, more than physical capital accumulation, is the 
mainspring of economic and civil progress.
260
 However many children in poor developing 
countries fail to complete even primary education, and some do not go to school at all with child 
labour being inefficiently high as according to Baland and Robinson, “…parents are either credit 
or bequest constrained.”261 Fuwa et al262 and Pouliot263 demonstrated that parents‟ inability to 
insure against the risk of a low return causes education investment to be inefficiently low and 
child labour to be inefficiently high. Beegle et al established that parents respond to a negative 
income shock by making their children work more, suggesting that households cannot insure 
against that kind of risk either.
264
 However, Fitzsimons reported that parents responded in this 
way to a downturn not in their own income, but in village aggregate income, suggesting that 
idiosyncratic income shocks are neutralized by informal insurance arrangements at the local 
level.
265
 Insuring families against the risk of a downturn in parental income could lead to the 
reduction of child labour.
266
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International trade can positively contribute towards increasing the incomes of parents 
hence ensuring that children concentrate on education with a view to improving the human 
capital of their countries which may boost future economic returns than working to increase 
family incomes for short term gains. However such a development can only produce the intended 
results if a social clause is incorporated in trade agreements. The simple reason for this argument 
lies in the attitude of MNCs and governments towards labour standards in developing countries. 
Flanagan and Khor made the following observations: 
“The impact of a multinational company on working conditions in a host country depends 
on the extent to which it must compete with other MNCs or host country firms for its 
workers and on the local elasticity of labour supply. If multinationals establish inferior 
conditions in newly-constructed plants, they will face recruiting and retention difficulties 
when competing with other firms for labour. If they instead acquire local companies and 
try to worsen working conditions, they will encounter increased quit rates as workers leave 
to join host country firms offering superior conditions.”267  
Flanagan and Khor further noted that: 
“Whether the arrival of MNCs can improve working conditions depends on labour supply 
conditions in the host country and the human resource management policies of the firm. In 
markets with a limitless supply of labour available at the current wage, increased labour 
demand from MNCs or host country firms will raise employment, but not wages. When 
workers require inducements to overcome the costs of changing employers, however, 
labour supply is less elastic, and increases in labour demand from MNCs will raise both 
wages and employment. When firms compete for labour, the effect of increased demand on 
wages depends on what workers are willing to accept-not on what firms may wish to 
pay.”268  
 
Their study led them to conclude that: 
 
“If MNCs do not compete with other firms for labour services, they may force labour 
conditions below competitive levels. Firms in isolated locations, such as some mining 
districts, may have such-monopsony power, but situations in which labour has no choice of 
employers seem too rare to accept monopsony as a general phenomenon. Indeed, by adding 
to the number of employers in a labour market, the arrival of MNCs should improve labour 
conditions by reducing monopsony power in host-country labour markets.”269  
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Flanagan and Khor made reference to the observations of Lipsey and Sjoholm who observed 
that, “It seems to be a universal rule that, in every country, foreign owned firms and plants pay 
higher wages, on average, than domestically owned ones. That is true not only in developing 
countries, but also in high income countries, such as Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom.”270   
Table 4. Ratio of compensation in Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and local 
manufacturing in 2000 and 2008 
 
 2000(a) 2008(b) Average annual % 
Change 
Bangladesh 21.29 19.28 -1.2 
Brunei 8.48 a 15.23 11.4 
China 7.24 3.10 -7.1 
Hong Kong, China 2.24 2.27 b 0.2 
India 11.63 11.43 b -0.2 
Indonesia 20.58 13.56 -4.3 
Japan (1) 1.36 1.14 -2.0 
Korea (1) 2.01 1.73 -1.7 
Malaysia 2.66 a 2.29 -3.5 
New Zealand (1) 1.24 1.08 -1.6 
Philippines 4.99 3.22 -4.4 
Singapore (1) 1.46 1.27 -1.6 
Sri Lanka 21.25 11.39 -5.8 
Taipei, China (1) 1.73 1.69 -0.2 
Thailand 4.02 4.05 0.1 
Viet Nam 3.62 6.87 11.82 
a) 2000 data: Brunei-2001, Malaysia-2004. 
b) 2008 data: Hong Kong-2007, India 2007. 
Source: ILO 
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Some of the superior productivity and pay of foreign affiliates reflects differences in industry, 
firm size, and use of skilled labour.
271
 Nevertheless, many studies find that foreign-affiliate pay 
premia (on the order of 3% to 5%) remain after controlling for differences in the characteristics 
of these MNCs and host-country firms.
272
 The premia themselves may reflect the tendency of 
MNCs to provide more specific training than host-country firms and other unobserved workforce 
or management quality differences between foreign and domestic firms.
273
 Evidence of this 
practice is reflected in Table 4. As such SADC governments must ensure that their concessions 
concerning FDI and their policies concerning the protection of labour standards in their countries 
must be in the best interests of their citizens. Such a principled disposition may ensure that the 
incomes that families receive are adequate to allow them educate their children leading to human 
capital investment for the countries and justifying the prohibition of child labour, a development 
which could lead to future sustainable development. However concessions such as those made in 
the Namibian Ramatex case, the state of child labour in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Malawi added 
to the Chinese trade practices in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Zambia amongst other issues 
discussed in this chapter may not be of great significance for SADC governments in pursuit of 
their aim of attaining development in their countries. It may thus be concluded that a social 
clause is likely to work in the best interests of SADC countries if they were to fully implement it. 
However, it is appropriate to question whether or not SADC countries and their African 
counterparts are ever going to recognise the significance of a social clause, let alone implement 
it? 
This question is made all the more important when one considers that the SADC Social 
Charter‟s effects are hardly being noticed with working conditions in the region deteriorating and 
the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (TAFTA) for Africa
274
 hardly showing any sign of 
sensitivity to the idea of a social clause. If the picture portrayed by the framework of the TAFTA 
is anything to go by, then a disturbing truth has been revealed which could depict African leaders 
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as having lost sight of one key vehicle to development,
275
 the protection of core labour standards 
in trade. Maybe the omission is temporal as the TAFTA was still in its infancy at the time of the 
writing of this thesis. A social clause could find its way into the TAFTA before it becomes 
operational, or a side agreement on labour could be drafted and adopted in due course. An 
examination of the TAFTA follows. 
7 4  THE TRIPARTITE FTA FOR AFRICA (TAFTA) 
As already alluded to in the previous chapter, regional trade agreements now incorporate social 
clauses to try and fill the gap created by the continued deadlock in efforts to incorporate a social 
clause into the multilateral trading system.
276
 Whilst debates have been dragging on regarding 
the effectiveness of social clauses in protecting core labour standards in trade, they can still be 
viewed as a positive step in trying to address the violation of labour standards in trade. SADC in 
its agreement and later its Social Charter has also incorporated a social clause. However, the 
proposed TAFTA appears not to have followed this route. Its framework is clearly devoid of any 
allusion to a social clause. The Declaration launching the negotiations for the establishment of 
the TAFTA signed on the 12
th
 of June 2011 (Herein after referred to as the Declaration) provides 
that the Heads of State or their elected representatives must: 
 “1. Adopt a developmental integration approach built on three pillars of industrial 
development, infrastructure development and market integration; 
2.   Direct that a programme of work be prepared on the industrial development pillar; 
3. Note progress made, and encourage further work, on the programmes on the 
infrastructure pillar; 
4. Launch negotiations for the establishment of a Tripartite Free Trade Area open to 
participation by all Regional Economic Communities and/or Member and Partner States on 
the market integration pillar; 
5. Note that the negotiations shall be Regional Economic Community and/or Member and 
Partner State driven and shall be in two phases 
a) The first phase will be for negotiations on trade in goods. Movement of business 
persons will also be negotiated during the first phase through a separate track in a 
committee to be established by the Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee; 
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b) The second phase will cover the built-in agenda in services and trade-related areas. 
6. Agree on the principles for the negotiations; a Roadmap providing the timelines for  
key activities relating to the negotiations and their conclusion; and the implementation of 
the outcomes as well as the institutional framework for the negotiations.”277 
 
From the provisions of the Declaration, there is no clear reference to a social clause. One would 
by inference assume that a social clause could be dealt with in terms of Article 5(b) which makes 
reference to “trade-related areas”. From this perspective, one could view trade-related areas to 
include labour standards. However when reference is made to the Guidelines for Negotiating the 
Tripartite Free Trade Area among the Member/Partner States of COMESA, EAC and SADC 
(Herein after referred to as the Guidelines),
278
 there appears to be a list of trade-related areas. The 
Guidelines provide that: “The second phase will cover negotiations on the following areas: trade 
in services, intellectual property rights, competition policy, and trade development and 
competitiveness.”279 Assuming this provision contains a closed list of trade-related areas, it may 
be correct to contend that a social clause may have been excluded from the TAFTA. However, 
when one considers the area of “trade development and competitiveness”, a social clause could 
be inferred as falling within the scope of the TAFTA. 
 But, the rationale behind not making direct reference to a social clause in the TAFTA by 
the African States must be established. Clearly when one also makes reference to the 
Memorandum of Understanding between The Department for International Development of the 
United Kingdom and The Tripartite Task Force of The Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa, The East African Community and The Southern African Development 
Community,
280
 there is no reference to labour matters at all. The basis of the partnership is given 
as working towards eradicating poverty, promoting economic growth and regional integration in 
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278
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East and Southern Africa.
281
 Maybe the TAFTA will eventually have a side agreement on labour 
as an appendage. But a question that quickly comes to mind is why African states did not 
prioritize the interface between trade and labour in a region majority of whose inhabitants 
survive on less than a dollar per day?  
If developing countries labeled the trade-labour linkage as a North-South debate, could 
the omission of a “direct reference” to a social clause be a manifestation of the views of 
developing countries to exclude labour matters from all their trade agreements, even amongst 
fairly equal partners? If it is, then some developing countries have not been sincere in their 
arguments against a trade-labour linkage. This gives credence to the argument that debates 
concerning a trade-labour linkage also include the violation of labour standards in trade between 
developing countries which in turn raises doubts about the credibility of the argument that a 
social clause will be used as a protectionist mechanism by developed countries against 
developing countries.  
However, since the TAFTA is still at its inception stage, it may be improper to reach 
definite conclusions as to whether or not there is room for a social clause in its framework since 
the North American Free Trade Agreement later established the North American Agreement on 
Labour Co-operation (NAALC) as a side agreement. It would be wise for African countries to 
draw lessons from other trade agreements which have successfully incorporated a social clause. 
The successes obtained in other regional trade agreements such as the NAALC, USA-Cambodia 
Textile Agreement,
282
 ASEAN Agreement,
283
 USA-Chile Trade Agreement
284
 amongst others 
raises serious questions as to whether or not adequate effort is being made by policy makers in 
Africa to dedicate sufficient time and resources to research work which could guide them in 
making policy decisions informed by their societal contexts and demands. Cases of violation of 
core labour standards in Southern Africa might just be an indication that free trade alone is not 
the answer to the growth challenges of developing countries‟ economies but a balance between 
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282
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free trade and trade-related areas such as labour. Could this provide sufficient basis for 
developing countries to review their position regarding trade-labour linkage in trade? This issue 
will not go away and at some point in the not so distant future, core labour standards might 
become a feature of the WTO system. As already indicated in this chapter, some countries are 
using trade measures to address the problem of the use of child labour for significant economic 
gains.
285
 This argument becomes more appealing if one considers that the recently published 
Economic Report for Africa for the year 2012 strongly recommends a change in the approach 
taken by African countries concerning human capital development.
286
  
Measured against the Economic Report for Africa, the fact that the agreement 
establishing the TAFTA clearly excludes a direct reference to labour matters might be a sign that 
African countries are not willing to ensure a balance between trade and the protection of core 
labour standards.
287
 Further, the fact that other areas linked to trade such as the environment have 
been included might be a clear indication that the exclusion of a direct reference to a social 
clause was deliberate. Should this be the position, it might be an opportunity lost in trying to 
alleviate poverty in Africa and ensure development through trade. 
7 5  IS THE WTO LIABLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF CORE LABOUR STANDARDS 
IN TRADE RELATED MATTERS IN SADC  
 
The WTO currently does not have jurisdiction over labour standards.
288
 In 1999, four years after 
the formation of the WTO, Wilkinson made reference to increasing calls for action on the labour 
standards issue, and requests for a “human face on the world economy”.289 The United Nations 
(UN) also added its criticism of the current WTO system, and called for a shift to a human rights 
oriented approach to trade, with steps to be taken, “....to ensure that human rights principles and 
obligations are fully integrated in future negotiations in the WTO, as the primacy of human 
rights law over all other regimes of international law is a basic and fundamental principle that 
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should not be departed from”.290 It is clear that states have both a legal and a moral obligation to 
uphold human rights standards, inclusive of their activities in the economic sphere. The UN 
Charter states that, “...in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.291 The UN Charter 
explicitly advocates the upholding of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
292
 This should be 
taken to mean that respect for human rights, and in particular, labour standards, effectively 
supersedes any conflicting WTO obligations. Such a position however may be different with 
respect to WTO members who are not members of the UN which scenario does not apply to 
SADC countries. 
Charnovitz, a former Director of the Global Environment and Trade Study (GETS)
293
 has 
claimed that the issues of labour and environment are steadfastly ignored.
294
 He argued that the 
WTO, “...should begin to address the link between trade and labour and environmental 
concerns.”295 He also argued that, “...in the absence of proper environmental regulation and 
resource management, increased trade might cause so much adverse damage that the gains from 
trade would be less than the environmental costs.”296  In 2006 Kennedy argued that, “Labour 
unions condemn the labour rights record of developing countries, arguing that to the extent the 
WTO succeeds at promoting globalization do the environment and labour rights suffer in equal 
measure.”297 However, Khor adopted a different perspective from Charnovitz and Kennedy. He 
argued that, “If environment and labour were to enter the WTO system ... it would be 
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conceptually difficult to argue why other social and cultural issues should also not enter.”298 
Khor also argued that, “...trade measures have become a vehicle for big corporations and social 
organizations in promoting their interests.”299  
Bhagwati appeared to support Khor‟s view and was also critical of what he regarded as, 
“...rich-country lobbies seeking on imposing their unrelated agendas on trade agreements.”300 
According to Bhagwati, these lobbies and especially the “...rich charities have now turned to 
agitating about trade issues with much understanding.”301 Bhagwati then concurred with 
Panagariya in their criticism of the introduction of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS)
302
 into the WTO framework, fearing that such non-trade agendas might 
overwhelm the organization‟s function. According to Panagariya, “Taken in isolation, TRIPS 
resulted in reduced welfare for developing countries and the world as a whole.”303 Bhagwati 
argued that, “Intellectual property does not belong in the WTO, since protecting it is simply a 
matter of royalty collection ... The matter was forced onto the WTO‟s agenda during the 
Uruguay Round by the pharmaceutical and software industries, even though this risked turning 
the WTO into a glorified collection agency.”304 Whilst they are worth noting, Bhagwati and 
Panagariya‟s views do not appropriately recognise the links that exist between trade and non-
trade related areas. They also do not consider the advantages which could be realized through the 
effective implementation of the TRIPS.
305
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The differences in opinions concerning key issues in the WTO as indicated above leads to 
another point of criticism leveled against the WTO. There is a serious lack of consensus in 
decision making which currently faces the WTO. In the year 2000, green room
306
 discussions in 
the WTO were branded as unrepresentative and non-inclusive by Blackhurst.
307
 Furthermore, the 
existence of more active participants, representing more diverse interests and objectives has 
complicated WTO decision-making and the process of consensus-building appears to have 
broken down.
308
 Blackhurst then concluded that the WTO thus could be viewed as being a non-
transparent international organisation because the vast majority of developing countries have 
very little real say in the WTO system.
309
 The apparent lack of consensus has indeed affected the 
trade-labour linkage debate. Contrary to Blackhurst‟s assertion that the majority of developing 
countries have very little real say in the WTO, the developing countries have been leading the 
resistance to a trade-labour linkage in the WTO.  
Could it be that the powerful countries in the world who are member states of the WTO 
have so far given in to the resistance of developing countries knowing fully well that such 
position greatly benefits them? If one considers that MNCs come from the developed countries, 
then perhaps this view could be plausible. This can only lead to the conclusion that the WTO 
could indeed be playing a role in addressing the problems faced in developing regions such as 
the SADC through adopting trade policies that facilitate realisation of the development agenda of 
such countries. However, the lack of consensus concerning the trade-labour linkage also partly 
shifts the criticism to the WTO member states, whether developed or developing, for not taking 
serious steps to address unfair trade practices that lead to businesses profiteering at the expense 
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of poor workers. Surely some form of compromise could be reached in the best interests of both 
developed and developing countries otherwise the WTO may lose its credibility. 
 
7 6  CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the linkage between trade and labour standards from a Southern African 
perspective with a view to showing that it may be necessary for the multilateral trade system of 
the world to adjust to the new realities of the linkages that exist between itself and other 
disciplines such as labour. Developing countries have strongly resisted such a linkage arguing 
that it is a threat to their competitive advantage based on cheap labour. The chapter showed that 
most Southern African countries have ratified the key ILO core labour standards Conventions 
and have labour legislations that capture the objectives and essence of those Conventions. 
However the chapter showed that most of the countries are reluctant to enforce the labour 
standards in favour of quick economic gains without paying much attention to the future as 
proposed by the 2012 Economic Report for Africa. This could suggest that domestication of the 
core ILO Conventions without their enforcement by international institutions such as the WTO 
might not lead to the attainment of the Conventions‟ intended objectives. The Bretton Woods 
institutions have not made the situation any easier by proposing labour market flexibility as a 
precondition for countries‟ ability to access development loans. Modern day trade has become 
very different and more multifaceted than it was before. In that sense, trying to isolate certain 
institutions from recognising core labour standards might be an act of rendering them inefficient 
in practice. 
It was also the objective of this chapter to show that the failure of sustainable economic 
growth to take hold in the SADC countries could demonstrate free trade‟s inability to deliver on 
its key objective of bringing prosperity to the poor. It has also been made clear that the new 
global economy forces SADC countries to compete based on their willingness to offer the lowest 
possible wages to multinational firms, ensuring that workers remain poor. Accordingly, it is 
proper to observe that if the major goal of the trading regime is to eradicate poverty, then there is 
a need to make explicit in the trading rules an enforceable social clause that prevents the worst 
forms of worker exploitation and protects fundamental labour rights. 
342 
 
Furthermore, the chapter showed that even though developing countries have a “weaker 
capacity” to implement core labour standards in trade than developed countries, they need not 
fear a trade labour linkage but should rather see it as an important vehicle for development. If 
not, global economic growth might take place with little or no tangible benefits to the majority of 
people in Africa. The harnessing of all development strategies which drive the development 
agenda of developing countries must be made a priority by SADC countries. As the analysis of 
violations of core labour standards in Southern Africa has shown, countries like the Democratic 
Republic of China and other private actors stand to benefit at the expense of African people. 
Clearly, there have been little or no attempts to vigorously support a trade labour linkage in 
Southern Africa with the exception of South Africa. This has resulted in the social clause 
incorporated in the SADC agreement and its Social Charter bearing little fruit.  
It is also disappointing that there is a reluctance to accept the inclusion of a social clause 
in trade agreements amongst African countries which could explain why the proposed TAFTA 
currently excludes any direct reference to a social clause resulting in a missed opportunity to 
exploit the opportunities offered by the agreement to the countries for the promotion of labour 
standards. This would have been an opportunity to dismiss arguments that developing countries 
are naive and not genuine in their calls against the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO 
system. The TAFTA could have shown how deep regional integration amongst African countries 
themselves could be pursued in a strategic and selective manner that advances the protection of 
core labour standards in trade. Perhaps it is an area which the TAFTA Member States will fully 
consider in due course.  
Clearly trade gains should now be balanced with human rights protection. The next 
chapter will thus look at the practical implications of a contemporary trade labour linkage 
provision in the WTO system. The chapter will seek to show that it is practical to incorporate 
social clauses in multilateral trade agreements since labour market policies related to trade 
cannot be dealt with at the national level alone. Broader policies concerning a trade-labour 
linkage should be formulated at the multilateral level to complement trade-labour linkage 
arrangements already in place at the regional level. Considerable opportunities exist for policy 
makers to analyse in-depth how and why regional policy coordination and policy making is 
being pursued differently in different regions and how such policy formulations could be 
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integrated and implemented on a multilateral level. Only then will developing countries be able 
to grasp the potential significance of a trade-labour linkage in ensuring human and economic 
development in the world.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Practical Implications of Incorporating a Social Clause in the World Trade Organisation 
 
8 1  INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a multilateral trade institution has tried to give 
consideration to the trade-labour linkage proposals.
1
 However, Member States of the WTO have 
failed to reach a consensus on the need to link trade to labour standards.
2
 As a result of the lack 
of consensus, a multilateral legal framework to address concerns related to trade distortions 
having direct, negative impacts on core labour standards is yet to be established. However, it is 
clear that there might now be need for a new social contract for countries in the world to address 
and/or reduce the inequitable as well as unacceptable imbalances between those who own 
businesses in the world and the workers.
3
 Recently, the European Union (EU) acting under the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
4
 recommended that the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) be given Observer Status at the WTO as a matter of priority and should 
gradually become involved in its trade policy review mechanism.
5
 The European Economic and 
Social Committee also recommended that the United Nations (UN) draw up a global charter 
setting out a minimum number of rights linked to the ILO‟s Social Protection Floor initiative,6 
which could be appended to the Millennium Development Goals review scheduled for 2015.
7
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  See Charnovitz “Triangulating the World Trade Organization” http://www.asil.org/ajil/wto3.pdf (accessed 07-
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  The Social Protection Floor is a United Nations initiated global social policy approach promoting integrated 
strategies for ensuring access to essential social services and income security for all. See ILO “ILO-UN Social 
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The global charter is intended to provide a coherent link between the commitments on trade and 
development.
8
 
The proposals by the European Union suggest that a social clause might soon form part 
of the WTO‟s legal framework. Negotiations on climate and environment9 also highlight the 
practicality of developing a new WTO framework which contributes to a more socially 
sustainable growth and economic development.
10
 Therefore, this chapter will examine the 
WTO‟s capacity to protect core labour standards in trade. Its objective is to argue for the 
transformation of the WTO from a traditional trade centred institution into a dynamic institution 
which will supplement efforts currently being made by the ILO in trying to advance workers‟ 
rights in the face of the current global economic crisis. It is important to note that the WTO has 
the power to review nations‟ domestic laws that create unfair trade advantages which could 
potentially include labour laws.
11
 With trade continuously overlapping with non-trade areas, the 
WTO could re-define fair trade to include the protection of core labour standards. A trade-labour 
linkage would be a historic change in the world‟s multilateral trading regime.  
It is apparent that gains from trade are well known from a business point of view.
12
 
However, what is less valued is that resources generated from trade present governments with an 
opportunity to broaden the scope of their political choices beyond the sphere of trade and 
respond to new challenges, such as raising social and humanitarian standards and for purposes of 
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Perspectives 91. 
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this study, the protection of core labour standards.
13
 It should be appreciated that the multilateral 
trade system is not only of significance to achieving trade goals but to realizing national 
objectives in other areas where governments aim to maintain orderly international relations and 
encourage international policy coordination.
14
 The trading system has the potential to increase 
international solidarity and provide a long-term basis for countries to remain on friendly terms 
with their neighbours with friendship being the best possible foundation from which to exert 
moral influence and build mutual respect.
15
 Obstructing the functioning of the trade system in 
any significant way would most certainly mean closing off opportunities to agree on other 
international policy objectives in a cooperative spirit with one‟s trading partners.16 Re-
emphasizing the significance of trade in this manner must not be taken to imply that trade is 
positioned higher than other international policy objectives. This chapter will examine practical 
implications of incorporating a social clause into the WTO framework.  It starts by evaluating 
misconceptions related to the likely outcomes of incorporating a social clause into the WTO 
framework. 
8 2  MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING THE SOCIAL CLAUSE 
There are a significant number of misinterpretations and/or misconceptions concerning the scope 
and implications of a social clause in the WTO. Opponents to incorporating a social clause into 
the WTO framework have often argued that no consensus exists on what constitutes core labour 
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European Commission “Global Europe: Competing in the World - A contribution to the EU‟s Growth and Jobs 
Strategy” http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (accessed 20-08-2012). 
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standards,
17
 that a social clause will destroy the world trading system,
18
 lead to a global 
minimum wage, undermine national sovereignty, and slow down economic growth. These and 
other misconceptions concerning the impact of incorporating a social clause into the WTO are 
examined below.  
8 2 1  Absence of consensus on what constitutes core labour standards 
According to Lee, the claim that a consensus on core labour standards is not practical is 
“puzzling” since it is evident that such a consensus not only exists but has existed for decades.19 
Tsogas has noted that the ILO‟s membership is nearly universal amongst developed and 
developing countries, a notion which implies acceptance of the principles enshrined in the ILO 
Constitution such as freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the rejection 
of inhumane treatment of labour.
20
 Lee has opined thus: 
“These principles have never been questioned; on the contrary they have…been reaffirmed 
repeatedly…in the Declaration of the World Summit on Social Development and the 
Singapore meeting of the WTO. This must indicate that some genuine, unforced consensus 
exists on labour standards. The argument that workers of different nationalities or races 
should be treated differently is extremely dangerous.”21 
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It is worrying to hear suggestions that core labour standards are inherently “culturally” unequal.22 
The universality of labour standards has been specifically addressed within the ILO framework 
through the Declaration of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
23
 and is widely 
recognised to be of particular importance.
24
  
ILO Conventions also contain a built-in flexibility which makes them applicable for all 
countries whatever their level of development.
25
 They are universally applicable, regardless of 
whether the relevant Conventions have been ratified, the level of development of a country or its 
cultural values.
26
 The ILO points out that, “These standards are composed of qualitative, not 
quantitative standards and do not establish a particular level of working conditions, wages or 
health and safety standards. They are not intended to undermine the comparative advantage that 
developing countries may hold.”27 Core labour standards are important human rights and are 
recognised in widely ratified human rights instruments including the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CROC), the most widely ratified human rights treaty with 193 parties, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with 160 parties.
28
 The core labour 
standards are: freedom of association;
29
 the right to collective bargaining
30
; the prohibition of all 
forms of forced labour
31
; the elimination of the worst forms of child labour
32
; and non-
discrimination in employment: equal pay for equal work.
33
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Whilst it is acknowledged that a few ILO member countries have not ratified all of these 
Conventions due to domestic constraints the fact that the rights contained in the conventions are 
also recognised in the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, and form a part of customary 
international law implies that all countries in the world are committed to respect these rights. The 
ILO in its supervision of the standards does not attempt to impose a global harmonization of 
labour laws but rather examines whether the effects of such laws and their practice achieve the 
objective for which the conventions were promulgated.
34
 This understanding must be embraced 
concerning proposals to incorporate a social clause into the WTO framework. The strength of 
ILO Conventions is that they summarize core values which enable trust and respect between 
nations, a prerequisite for an effective multilateral trade regime to evolve as a solid foundation 
for co-operation.
35
  
 “Culture” has been customarily advanced as the basis for employing child labour, 
advancing poverty wages to workers and subjecting them to unhealthy employment conditions.
36
 
Tsogas has observed that, “The fatalistic argument goes like this; it is just the way things are 
done here, so nothing much can be done.”37 Nichols noted that, “…the truth of the matter is that 
no culture considers factory work a desirable experience for children, condones the payment of 
poverty wages, or approves of working in unhealthy conditions.”38 Tsogas has summed up by 
arguing that:  
“All these are economic choices. Nevertheless…not everyone seems able to distinguish (or 
at least so it appears) what constitutes a cultural attribute and what is, in effect, an 
economic choice that can maintain wages and working conditions at an artificially low 
level.”39  
 
Yeager and Tuerck have argued that: 
“There would be a genuine distortion only if the especially low wages were due to 
something else than supply and demand factors (including productivity). It is hard to 
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imagine what this „something else‟ might be. One conceivable possibility would be an 
effective conspiracy among employers in the particular foreign industry to hold down 
wages and keep the workers ignorant of better opportunities in other jobs. . . . Removal of 
the wage distortions and correction of the price signals would benefit the exploited … 
workers and their country as a whole.”40 
 
Whether the above arguments sound like a conspiracy theory or not, Tsogas maintains that it is 
not at all difficult to see that this “something else” referred to by Yeager and Tuerck that keeps 
wages and conditions of employment artificially low is not “culture” or “the way things are done 
here”, but oppressive regimes that deny their citizens basic human rights and forbid unions and 
collective bargaining, often with the active support, encouragement or non-involvement of 
Multi-National Companies (MNCs).
41
 Removing these distortions and reinstating universally 
accepted basic human rights in trade would certainly benefit workers and their countries.
42
 
Accordingly, there is actually more agreement than there is disagreement on what constitutes 
core labour standards. Tsogas notes importantly that core labour standards represent basic human 
rights and should not be confused with labour codes governing pay, working-time, health and 
safety, welfare and social security.
43
 Undoubtedly, there is general acceptance among Member 
States of the UN, even those that have not acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)
44
 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),
45
 of the universality of the human rights embodied in these core labour standards.
46
 
8 2 2  Low wages lead to economic success  
Governments of developing countries insist that low wages form part of their competitive 
advantage in trade. However, Tsogas has argued that if low wages automatically translated into 
economic success, then the world‟s poorest countries would be economic superpowers.47 They 
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are not, because differences in wages reflect differences in productivity.
48
 Low wages tend to go 
hand in hand with low productivity.
49
 Countries must not lower wages but raise productivity.
50
 A 
practical example of how increase in productivity leads to economic success is offered by Brazil. 
Brazil‟s minimum wage policy which is regarded as a benchmark for social security benefits in 
the world is premised on the basis that workers can have a high minimum wage set for them in 
order to increase productivity and ensure economic growth.
51
 In 2006, the minimum wage in 
Brazil was set at a figure which was more than five percent points above inflation.
52
 Brazil today 
is one of the fast developing countries with a successful economy which provides evidence that 
labour standards play an important role in enhancing productivity and the resultant economic 
growth.
53
  
In addition, the most successful exporters in the developing countries do not suppress 
core labour standards to reduce production costs.
54
 The economic performance of the East Asian 
newly industrializing countries (NICs) was not due either to the brutal exploitation of labour or 
to downward real wages.
55
 What have been of greater importance are the productivity gains from 
education, infrastructure development and the restructuring of markets from low-wage labour-
intensive to higher value-added and skill-intensive techniques.
56
 A Citicorp representative at the 
88th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law opined that:  
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“In the long run, an educated and healthy workforce is necessary for continued economic 
development. It is logical for business to encourage government policies that support these 
goals. Employees whose basic nutritional and medical needs are met will be better and 
more productive workers. Company policies that assure adequate wages, workplace access 
to a good meal and most importantly superior local health care, will all support this 
objective.”57  
 
8 2 3  A social clause will lead to a global minimum wage 
Stern and Terrell have argued that core labour standards do not set minimum wages, but ensure 
that workers have a say in what their conditions of work and remuneration should be.
58
 
Furthermore, Golden has noted that ILO Conventions do not attempt to impose a rigid global 
harmonisation of labour laws.
59
 In a similar view Vandenbroucke has observed that since levels 
of productivity, price structures and the supply of labour vary so dramatically between countries, 
it is inconceivable that greater respect for core labour standards such as freedom of association 
would lead to a global minimum wage.
60
 Dingli has noted that most developing countries with 
low labour standards have virtually an unlimited supply of labour.
61 
Hossan et al have noted that 
under such circumstances, there will be little or no opportunity for workers to negotiate for the 
raising of wages above the market clearing rate.
62
 Brooks et al in a study of Asia have observed 
that globalization by bringing labour markets together actually creates an even larger pool of 
workers which further strengthens the ability of employers to force wages down, potentially to a 
level below the optimal market clearing rate.
63
 The only conclusion that can be drawn from this 
analysis is that compliance with core labour standards such as freedom of association and 
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collective bargaining would act as a counterbalance to labour standards violations in trade and 
actually aid the attainment of an efficient market outcome for both business and labour. 
 
8 2 4  A social clause will erode the comparative advantage of developing countries and is 
protectionist 
Conceptually or empirically, it is not clear that compliance with core labour standards results in 
increased labour costs.
64
 Improving compliance with labour standards does not necessarily result 
in a significant increase in total costs in low-standard countries but could in fact improve labour 
market efficiency and worker productivity.
65
 It has also been established that low-income to 
medium-income countries demonstrated export dynamism, regardless of their labour standards.
66
 
From this point of view, it may be argued that improved compliance with core labour standards 
could facilitate human capital development, which is one of the key drivers of long-term 
economic growth.
67
 
 Friedman has observed that, “Economists often do disagree, but that has not been true 
with respect to international trade…there has been virtual unanimity among economists, 
whatever their ideological position on other issues, that international free trade is in the best 
interests of trading countries and of the world.”68 It is submitted that free trade is important to 
world development and does not translate into the lowering of standards, including labour 
standards. That core labour standards are lowered in trade is not only a feature of the so-called 
protectionist agenda of developed countries but of developing countries as well.
69
 The use of the 
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they and myriad others complain about „unfair‟ competition from abroad and demand that government do 
something to „protect‟ them. Of course, no group makes its claims on the basis of naked self-interest. Every 
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protectionist agenda by it proponents (mostly developing countries) whilst not entirely 
questionable,
70
 could have significant shortfalls in that it ignores the interests of the workers. 
Freidman has observed that: 
 “One voice that is hardly ever raised is the consumer‟s. That voice is drowned out in the 
cacophony of the „interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers‟ and their 
employees. The result is a serious distortion of the issue. For example, the supporters of 
tariffs treat it as self evident that the creation of jobs is a desirable end, in and of itself, 
regardless of what persons are employed to do. That is clearly wrong. If all we want are 
jobs, we can create any number-for example, have people dig holes and then fill them up 
again or perform other useless tasks. Work is sometimes its own reward. Mostly, however, 
it is the price we pay to get the things we want. Our real objective is not just jobs but 
productive jobs-jobs that will mean more goods and services to consume.”71  
 
The protectionist agenda argument by developing countries, against the inclusion of labour 
standards in the WTO framework should also be analysed from globalization‟s record of 
alleviating poverty. There is little doubt that exports and foreign investment have played and still 
play a role in development.
72
 However, justifying why social welfare in developing countries has 
not improved is difficult to comprehend. However Rodrik has opined that: 
 “…while global markets are good for poor countries, the rules according to which they are 
being asked to play the game are often not. Caught between WTO agreements, World 
Bank strictures, IMF conditions, and the need to maintain the confidence of financial 
markets, developing countries are increasingly deprived of the room they need to devise 
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argument is plausible where governments implement policies which lead to growth. Most importantly, South 
Korean workers, as compared now earn significantly higher wages than their Chinese counterparts whose 
country has also followed a similar growth path as China. Questions should therefore be asked as to what 
accounts for such disparities. It must be borne in mind that China has been at the centre of the violation of core 
labour standards in trade. Has China not reached a reasonable level of growth to ensure an improvement in its 
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  See Lester, Mercurio and Davies World Trade Law: Texts Materials and Commentary (2012) 34. 
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their own paths out of poverty. They are being asked to implement an agenda of 
institutional reform that took today‟s advanced countries generations to accomplish. The 
US, take a particularly telling example, was hardly a paragon of free-trade virtue while 
catching up with and surpassing Britain. In fact, US import tariffs during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century were higher than in all but a few developing countries.”73 
 
Rodrik‟s view appears to give credence to the view that incorporating a social clause in the WTO 
legal framework could be a protectionist agenda for developed countries in that it provides 
obligations beyond what developing countries could possibly manage. Rodrik also questions the 
role of free trade in achieving development. However it cannot be doubted that free trade is 
central to development.
74
 As such, great care must be taken by developing countries when they 
suggest that a social clause erodes their comparative advantage. The argument is protectionist by 
nature and cannot be any different from what they contend about developed countries. It could be 
advisable if developing countries focus on policies which could help them integrate economical 
growth and the improvement in the social welfare of their people. Free trade can achieve this and 
lead to the improved protection of core labour standards in trade in the long run. 
Cheap manufactured goods from the developing countries are increasingly being blamed 
for job losses in industrialised countries, hence the ever-growing support for populist demands 
for protection in one form or another.
75
 The increase in unemployment in developed countries is 
likely to result in an increase in public pressure to restrict the flow of what are regarded as 
“unfairly” produced goods.76 The United States (US)77 and the European Union (EU)78 already 
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have legislation which could be used to enforce such restrictions on a unilateral basis as has 
already been discussed in chapter five of this thesis. Whether or not this argument has an 
economic basis it poses a serious challenge to the world trading system, with greater use of 
unilateral measures and regional trade agreements resulting in a possible demise of the rule of 
law in international trade and potentially to the establishment of even higher levels of 
protectionism.
79
 It may be argued that a social clause could restrict these unilateral measures and 
offer a clear, just, impartial and reasonable means for settling trade disputes. From this point of 
view, a social clause could lower rather than raise protectionist tendencies and help keep markets 
open by sharing the benefits of trade more fairly. 
8 2 5  A social clause in the WTO will lead to an indiscriminate use of sanctions  
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has no binding enforcement mechanism, although 
it does monitor it Member States‟ compliance with labour standards.80 The ILO Constitution 
prescribes that complaints can be initiated by an ILO Member State where it has reason to 
believe that another Member State was not implementing a convention it would have ratified.
81
 
Such a complaint, if successful, could give rise to the establishment of a commission to 
investigate the alleged non-compliance with labour standards with the possibility of „measures of 
an economic character‟ being recommended as a penalty, amongst other possible remedies.82 
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Charnovitz observed that this procedure has never been used,
83
 yet there is a plausible argument 
that core labour standards, by virtue of being human rights, inherently deserve protection.
84
 The 
ILO‟s enforcement record is clearly inadequate.85  
 A practical illustration of the ILO‟s weaknesses in enforcement is observed in the 
organization‟s response to the use of forced labour by Myanmar (formerly Burma) for both 
public and private purposes. The ILO Commission of Inquiry investigated and established that 
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(to prohibiting violations of core labour standards in trade) suffer from a number of limitations...they apparently 
apply to a small percentage of exports in a number of sectors where non-compliance with core labour standards 
is thought to be common...and they vary widely in various dimensions, for example (1) which core labour 
standards are recognized; (2) how these core labour standards are defined, if at all; and (3) how effectively 
adherence to these standards is monitored, if at all.” The point here is that the protection of core labour standards 
cannot be left to consultative processes alone without protection through hard law, which in most cases imposes 
sanctions for non-compliance with specific standards. The lack of concern by consumers in importing countries 
about human rights values and conditions under which products for trade are obtained makes soft law an 
inefficient legal instrument for protecting core labour standards in trade. In most instances, consumers in 
importing countries do not have information on how the products are produced in the exporting countries. To 
these consumers the cost of acquiring such information exceeds the value they place on the information itself. 
For example, that diamonds are produced at the expense of human rights protection in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Zimbabwe is likely to be of little interest to a consumer in the United Kingdom and such a 
consumer is unlikely to be willing to obtain information, at any cost, concerning the conditions prevailing in the 
exporting country or country of source. 
85
  See Chartes and Mercurio 673. Chartes and Mercurio point out that: “One such impediment is that the ILO 
suffers from a disparate, and sometimes rather low rate of ratification of its treaties (including by leading 
developed countries such as the United States). This in turn creates a „patchwork of inconsistent legal 
obligations‟ and serves as a major impediment to the global enforcement of labour standards. Moreover a 
number of ILO conventions are ratified but not implemented.” The implication of Chartes and Mercurio‟s 
observations is that the ILO approach could be viewed as a lip service approach to the protection of labour 
standards. This may need to be addressed with the reinforcement of the ILO‟s dispute settlement structures to 
perhaps include direct reference to penalties and sanctions.  
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there were extensive violations amounting to, “…a saga of untold misery and suffering, 
oppression and exploitation of large sections of the population inhabiting Myanmar by the 
Government, military and other public officers.”86 Regardless of the recommendations made by 
the ILO Commission of Inquiry requesting the Myanmar government to comply with the ILO 
Forced Labour Convention,
87
 no compliance could be obtained. The ILO Governing Body did 
evoke provisions of Article 33 of the ILO Constitution authorizing the International Labour 
Conference to take any necessary measures it would deem necessary to ensure compliance. 
Countries could not impose sanctions as this would be contrary to WTO rules.
88
 
 The reason why countries could not impose sanctions lies in the current framework of the 
WTO/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system. Trebilcock has observed that: 
 “Trade sanctions raise difficult questions under the GATT/WTO system as it currently 
exists. For example, conditioning the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment on 
adherence to core labour standards is likely to raise questions as to whether this form of 
conditionality violates the requirement of „unconditional‟ extension of MFN treatment to 
all GATT/WTO members under Article 1 of the GATT.”89 
 
An analysis of the existing WTO law and case law could inform whether sanctions can be 
imposed against WTO Member States which violate core labour standards in trade. Under 
Article 1 of the GATT, every WTO Member is required to provide unconditional MFN treatment 
to every other WTO Member with respect of like products. This could possibly imply that 
“unconditionality” might exclude the possibility of distinguishing between products based upon 
labour conditions prevailing in the exporting country.
90
 In the EC-Asbestos
91
 case, the WTO 
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  See Lester et al 877. 
87
   See ILO Forced Labour Convention No. 29 of 1930.  
88
  See Lester et al 877. Only the US proceeded to impose a ban on all trade with Myanmar in terms of the Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA) of 2003. The BFDA was signed into law on 28 July 2003 by the then US 
President, George W Bush and has since been renewed annually. Among other measures the BFDA bans imports 
of Burmese/Myanmar products. It also freezes assets of senior Burmese officials and bans virtually all 
remittances to Burma/Myanmar. However regardless of the US‟ sanctions, ILO Member States such as China 
and India maintained their trade with Myanmar whilst the European Union (EU) and Australia‟s trade 
restrictions only targeted the senior military officials and their family members. The approach taken by the US, 
EU and Australia (smart sanctions have a spill over effect and could have the force of outright sanctions as the 
military junta would likely abuse the limited resources left for their benefit at the expense of the masses) as 
opposed to India and China represents the divide in the debate to a trade-labour linkage.  
89
  Trebilcock 175. 
90
  GATT Article III:4 requires that products which are imported must receive treatment which must be no less 
favourable than that to be afforded to imported products. This therefore raises questions as to whether products 
have to be regarded as unlike if it is determined that the production processes and methods of one set of goods 
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Appellate Body established a framework for determining whether products are „like‟ under 
Article III: 4.
92
 According to Trebilcock and Howse, the process, “neither explicitly endorses nor 
rejects the idea that process and production methods are relevant to the assessment of likeness.”93 
They further observed that: 
 “…the WTO Appellate Body‟s reasoning strongly suggests that products may be 
considered „like‟ based on the consumer tastes and habits. thus if there is sufficient 
evidence that consumers between products produced in conditions violating core labour 
standards and those produced in conditions consistent with core labour standards, or would 
distinguish these products if they had perfect information, then the…products would be 
„unlike‟…”94 
 
Should likeness be proven in a case where products are produced in conditions that violate core 
labour standards, it would be necessary to further show that the difference in treatment between 
the „like‟ products leads to less favourable treatment of the group of imported products as 
compared to the group of like domestic products, before a violation of GATT Article III: 4 can 
be proven.
95
 Satisfying this requirement is almost impossible concerning core labour standards. 
As such sanctions preferred for violating labour standards in trade would be deemed to violate 
Article I of the GATT. This serves as reason why the ILO Member States did not impose 
sanctions on Myanmar.  
 However, another argument for the possibility of invoking sanctions against a WTO 
Member State that violates core labour standards in trade could be justified through the principle 
of “public morals”.96 In the United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
involved the violation of  core labour standards whilst the other did not. See also Trebilcock and Howse The 
Regulation of International Trade Law (2005) 572. 
91
  See European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products WT/DS135/R and 
Addendum 1 as modified by the WTO Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R 5 April 2001. 
92
  See Trebilcock 175-176. The question to be addressed in this case would be whether goods produced in 
exporting countries in circumstances that do not conform to core labour standards are like products produced in 
importing countries that conform to these standards. This question would have to be addressed on the 
understanding that should sanctions be imposed against a country producing like products yet violating core 
labour standards, a case of quantitative restrictions in terms of GATT Article XI would be raised. 
93
   See Trebilcock and Howse 572. 
94
  Ibid. In determining „likeness‟ the WTO Appellate Body placed emphasis on the need to avoid protectionism in 
terms of Article III:1 of the GATT. 
95
   See EC-Asbestos case para 100. 
96
  See GATT Article XX(a). GATT Article XX(a) permits otherwise GATT inconsistent measures “necessary to 
protect public morals” to be invoked to justify trade sanctions against products that violate labour standards. See 
also Marceau “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” 2002 European Journal of International Law 753 
and Charnovitz “The Moral Exception in Trade Policy” 1998 Journal of International Law 68. 
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Gambling and Betting Services (Gambling case)
97
 the WTO Panel in interpreting what could 
constitute the exception of „public morals‟ in terms of the WTO General Agreement on Trade 
and Services (GATS) held that:  
“In the Panel‟s view, the content of these concepts for Members can vary in time and 
space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and 
religious values.”98  
 
The Panel further suggested that each WTO Member has the discretion to determine which 
practices would violate the moral code of their community.
99
 Judging from the Panel‟s reasoning 
in the Gambling case, there would be no basis of objecting to a need to impose sanctions for the 
violation of core labour standards in trade on the basis of „public morals‟. This study has already 
established that there is no objection to the need to protect human rights in trade, with calls for 
the WTO to adopt a legal framework that acknowledges a need to protect human rights ever 
increasing.
100
  
Whilst the MFN provision and GATT Article I may pose serious challenges to imposing 
sanctions on countries that violate core labour standards in trade, there could be a legal basis for 
imposing sanctions in terms of the „public morals‟ principle under Article XX(a) of the GATT. 
Such enforcement mechanisms could be viewed as ideal alternatives to augment the weak 
enforcement mechanisms of the ILO. It is submitted that the WTO has a powerful enforcement 
mechanism at its disposal,
101
 so powerful in fact that great care has to be taken not to abuse it. 
The economic prosperity of many countries in the world is now highly dependent upon 
international trade, and the process of “globalization” is increasing their dependence further.102 
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 See United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services WT/DS285/R 10 
November 2004.  
98
  See the Gambling case para 6.461. 
99
   Ibid. See also Trebilcock and Howse 573. 
100
  See Trebilcock 176. Trebilcock observes that, “...a cogent argument can be made that the „public morals‟ 
exception under Article XX(a)...should be viewed as embracing the body of core international labour standards 
and universal human rights more generally...A recent decision by a WTO Panel and the WTO Appellate Body in 
the Gabling case, in interpreting the public morals-public order exception in Article XIV of GATS, which is 
analogous to the „public morals‟ exception in Article XX(a) of the GATT lends some support for this view.” 
101
  Bruce “UN, World Bank, WTO: Reform Them All” 2005 National Journal 220. Bruce argued that WTO 
decisions can so often affect domestic regulations, destroy jobs, and create new industries. See also Charnovitz 
“The World Trade Organisation in 2020” 2005 Journal of International Law & International Relations 170. 
102
  See the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 1981-2011. See also UNCTAD “DOHA Mandate and 
DOHA Manar” 2012 UNCTAD XII 19. See also UN “World Economic Situation and Prospects” 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/index.shtml (accessed 14-09-2012).  
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Countries‟ growing prosperity is widely acknowledged to be key to their ability to adopt higher 
social and humanitarian standards.
103
 Therefore, it may be argued that arming the trading system 
with the means to threaten their prosperity for breaches of non-commercial behavioral norms in 
increasingly competitive global markets could easily turn the use of trade restrictions into a first-
choice protectionist instrument rather than the measure of last resort which proponents of the so-
called “social clause” have claimed it should be. In doing so the social clause may create a 
tantalizing target for protectionist pressures and undermine international trade on a significant 
scale.
104
 A small number of WTO members would contend that they meet the entire extensive 
list of multilateral standards which the UN and other international bodies have established and 
are continuing to negotiate. It is therefore evident that most countries would not be compliant to 
a certain extent and as such are exposed to the threat of trade restrictions.  
Assuming that trade restrictions are to be applied in terms of the social clause, it is likely 
that there would be a significant obstruction of the trading system as well as collateral damage to 
international co-operation and other policy objectives. As such, if a social clause is to work, it 
must follow a transparent procedure which allows disputes to be resolved through negotiations. 
Safeguards against the indiscriminate use of sanctions must be incorporated in such a framework 
in which case, there would be the need for a multilateral agreement on how sanctions could be 
used. Sanctions perhaps would have to be used only as a last resort, when all other permitted 
legal steps have failed to persuade the offending party to address its violation of core labour 
standards in trade.  
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  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) “Beyond the Midpoint: Achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals” http://www.sl.undp.org/B6020566-1CD2-4DDF-A954-
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104
  Howse “From Politics to Technocracy- and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime” 
http://www.asil.org/B6020566-1CD2-4DDF-A954-A356894EC5D0/FinalDownload/DownloadId-
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8 2 6  Incorporating a social clause in the WTO threatens national sovereignty  
The principles established by core labour standards should not be compromised. However, how 
they are translated into national law and practice may differ, depending on the institutions and 
customs of the country concerned.
105
 Lim has argued that: 
“…by virtue of being members of the UN, States have already committed themselves to 
uphold basic human rights. These are in most respects synonymous with core labour 
standards. The social clause would not create any new human rights obligations but would 
strengthen the existing international enforcement mechanism. At the same time, the 
sovereignty of even major industrial countries on economic and social policy matters is 
being increasingly undermined by globalization. An internationally agreed social clause 
would strengthen national sovereignty by making countries less vulnerable to manipulation 
by powerful private economic actors, and would enhance their ability to pursue national 
economic and social objectives.”106  
 
The argument based on sovereignty is clouded by the new global realities.
107
 The position that 
sovereignty should not be ceded on issues such as domestic labour policy regulation needs to be 
re-assessed.
108
 The reality is that sovereignty has already been ceded and policy is being shaped 
to an increasing extent by the demands of the global market.
109
 The issue is not whether but how 
policy will be determined internationally through the market or through political negotiations. 
The problem is no longer avoiding a potential loss of sovereignty, but whether to take an 
opportunity to reclaim some measure of it.
110
 Lester et al concluded that: 
 “Indeed, on a practical level, the sovereignty argument does not stand up to scrutiny when 
one considers that all Members of the WTO (including developing countries) allow some 
degree of sovereignty erosion by virtue of membership in the organization (or, in fact, by 
membership in any international organization).” In exchange for the reduced sovereignty, 
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Journal of Economics 519. 
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english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/hoelim.htm (accessed 05-07-2012). 
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2001 Journal of International Economic Law 67. 
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Member States receive benefits of membership in an organization which assists in making 
trade more stable, predictable, and free, and in improving the overall wealth of citizens.”111 
8 2 7  A social clause in the WTO will threaten national culture  
Fear of a threat to culture due to international trade is something felt more strongly in some 
countries than in others.
112
 The notion that a social clause in the WTO will threaten national 
culture is a myth created by vested interests; in fact it is the pervasive commercialism of the free 
market which is the real threat.
113
 National culture cannot survive where people have no power to 
control the market for their own and their community‟s benefit.114 The social clause by 
promoting respect for human rights would effectively empower people and their communities to 
maintain their cultural identity in a global economy.
115
 Human rights and labour standards are 
culturally specific: numerous contemporary arguments against universal human rights, and by 
association international labour standards, hide behind the shield of cultural relativism but are 
often not supported by any discernible cultural basis.
116
 Arguments of cultural relativism tend to 
be made by economic and political elites. The very same elites who raise culture as a defence 
against external criticisms based on universal human rights often ruthlessly suppress 
inconvenient local customs, whether of the majority or the minority. Heyns and Stefiszyn have 
argued that all too often: 
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  See Lester et al 864. See also Dymond and Hart “Abundant Paradox: The Trade and Culture Debate” 
http://www.ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/north/dymond.doc (25-11-2012). Dymond discussed the concerns raised 
by Canada about the loss of their culture in the face of American or other cultural exports such as films, TV 
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“The debate is replete with paradox. The argument of cultural industries-that the production of cultural goods 
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  Hestermeyer “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the World Trade Organization: Legal Aspects and 
Reality” http://www.boletinderecho.udp.cl/docs/PaperHestermeyer.pdf (accessed 12-09-2012). 
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  Ibid. 
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  Ross Slaves to Fashion: Poverty and Abuse in the New Sweatshops (2004) 296. See also Lim 10. 
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 “…leaders sing the praises of traditional communities while they wield arbitrary power 
antithetical to traditional values, pursue development policies that systematically 
undermine traditional communities, and replace traditional leaders with corrupt cronies and 
party hacks. Such cynical manipulation of tradition occurs everywhere”.117 
 
In the Bangkok NGO Declaration, it is stated that:  
“We can learn from different cultures in a pluralistic perspective....Universal human rights 
are rooted in many cultures. We affirm the basis of universality of human rights which 
afford protection to all of humanity....While advocating cultural pluralism, those cultural 
practices which derogate from universally accepted human rights,....must not be tolerated. 
As human rights are of universal concern and are universal in value, the advocacy of 
human rights cannot be considered an encroachment upon national sovereignty.”118  
 
This position is in line with the Vienna Declaration, adopted by States at the Second World 
Conference on Human Rights, which provides that:  
“All human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated.....While 
the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”119 
 
8 2 8  Child labour cannot be replaced 
Common explanations given for using children are that they incur lower costs and have 
irreplaceable skills.
120
 Based on this reasoning, it is often argued that a social clause to eradicate 
exploitative forms of child labour is unrealistic. However, ILO studies have shown that the 
notion that only children with small fingers have the necessary skills to work in a number of 
industries, especially the production of for example fine hand-knitted carpets is simply not 
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true.
121
 In most industries, adults can be found working side by side with children performing 
unskilled tasks.
122
 In most cases, child workers are paid less than their adult counterparts.
123
 But 
the lower wages and other advantages claimed for child labour are not always as clear and 
compelling as is suggested.
124
 ILO studies in India in industries producing carpets and bangles 
estimated that labour cost savings resulting from the employment of children, calculated as a 
proportion of the final price of carpets or bangles were surprisingly small.
125 
The ILO 
calculations showed that the savings were less than 5% for bangles and between 5 and 10% for 
carpets.
126
 These findings only lead to the conclusion that protecting core labour standards in 
trade is in the best interests of the countries of the world regardless of whether or not they are 
developed. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the proposals on how to incorporate a social 
clause in the WTO framework which have been advanced to date. A discussion of the proposals 
follows. 
 
8 3  PROPOSALS FOR RESPONDING TO VIOLATIONS OF CORE LABOUR 
STANDARDS IN TRADE 
 
A number of proposals suggesting mechanisms to protect the violation of core labour standards 
in trade have been advanced. It is important to examine the strengths and weaknesses of such 
proposals in order to identify the shortfalls that have led to the current lack of consensus on 
whether or not to link trade to core labour standards.  
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8 3 1  Incorporating a social clause into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 
 
It might be possible to use the current WTO Agreement‟s general exceptions provisions to 
protect core labour standards in trade. Eres has argued that general exceptions in GATT Article 
XX could be used to protect specific human rights.
127
 GATT Article XX could be used to impose 
restrictive trade measures on countries which disregard the protection of core labour standards in 
trade.
128
 Such an approach would ensure that countries conform to their obligations of raising 
standards of living and ensuring full employment whilst pursuing their economic endeavors 
and/or relations in trade.
129
 However, difficulties posed by the wording of GATT Article XX 
have made it almost impossible to use the general exceptions as a mechanism for incorporating 
core labour standards into the WTO Agreement.
130
  This is due to the fact that that GATT Article 
1, the principle of most favoured nation (MFN) treatment, comes into play even when trade 
restrictive measures are successfully applied to a state.
131
 The MFN principle stipulates that if a 
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WTO member treats another country in a particular manner it then has to give identical treatment 
to all other WTO members.
132
  
The implication of the MFN principle is that if trade sanctions are preferred against a 
country for violating core labour standards in trade then all countries who abuse the same core 
labour standards must also have the same sanctions applied to them.
133
 If a social clause would 
be equally applicable to all WTO member states irrespective of their levels of development, it 
may be plausible to argue that the proposal to incorporate a social clause in GATT Article XX in 
its current state could be misdirected with substantial economic and political consequences. 
Developing countries are unlikely to attain economic growth as they are likely to be on the 
receiving end of sanctions which will impact negatively on their economies. Perhaps the 
proposal could have been more favourably received if it considered the differences in the levels 
of development of the countries. An analysis of the developments surrounding the linkage 
between trade and environment undertaken later in this chapter will reveal this omission. 
Apart from the political challenges of incorporating a social clause in GATT Article XX, 
technical legal problems concerning such an approach have been raised.
134
 Aaronson and 
Zimmerman have argued that, “The wording in the relevant sections of GATT Article XX means 
that it must be proved that it is “necessary” to restrict trade in a product in order to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health.”135 The retention of the word “necessary” implies that for 
legal unilateral trade restrictive measures to be taken by one country against another, a “necessity 
test” must be applied.136 Theoretically, such a test would possibly have three steps. It would have 
to be determined whether or not the interests protected are of importance.
137
 It would also have 
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found by the WTO panel to be violating WTO rules because it discriminated against the gasoline imports. As 
such WTO panel and WTO Appellate Body had to address whether or not treating domestic and imported 
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to be assessed as to whether or not any alternative measures to address the problem at hand are 
reasonably available and lastly be determined whether or not such alternate measures are less 
inconsistent with GATT.
138
 The implication of these steps would be that a link must be 
established between both the targeted risk, the product being targeted and the trade measures 
being undertaken, with the burden of proof solely upon the party seeking to invoke the clause.
139
  
Black‟s Law dictionary provides that the word “necessary” does not have to carry the 
meaning “indispensable” but can refer to the most appropriate or convenient option.140  In the 
case of Korea-Beef the word “necessary” was taken to mean “nearly indispensable”.141 Context 
is very important, and the greater the risk posed by a product the more leniency is granted when 
proving a link.
142
 From this perspective it may be extremely difficult to justify cases of labour 
standards abuse under GATT Article XX. Even if the necessity test is satisfied, the member 
wishing to use the impugned measures still has to show that they will neither be applied in a 
manner so as to constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, nor be a disguised restriction 
on international trade.
143
 The test of whether or not a measure imposed is GATT consistent is 
particularly important as there are arguments to the effect that inserting a social clause into the 
WTO framework would amount to permitting disguised restrictions on trade.
144
 Therefore it 
could be argued that a proposal which offers a mechanism that prevents the abuse of the WTO 
legal framework which includes a social clause would likely result in less resistance to a social 
clause. 
8 3 2  Unilateral trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism for the social clause 
It is difficult to enforce international law within the international system, particularly with regard 
to human rights. The former WTO Director General Renato Ruggeiro has argued that using trade 
sanctions as a coercive measure is an appealing prospect to ensure cooperation with core labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
products equally was necessary. They both agreed that it was necessary as not doing so discriminated against 
gasoline imports from domestic gasoline.  
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140
  Black‟s Law Dictionary is a widely used law dictionary in the US. It was founded by Henry Campbell Black and 
is a reference of choice for definitions in legal briefs and courts opinions and has been cited as a secondary legal 
authority in US Supreme Court cases.  
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standards but is an inappropriate mechanism for enforcing them in the WTO.
145
 Sanctions are 
generally contrary to WTO principles, and can only be used in very limited circumstances that 
are authorized by the WTO agreements, such as anti-dumping and countervailing measures.
146
 
Politically, it is unlikely that unilateral action would be allowed for breaches of labour standards. 
Even assuming that labour standards are able to be enforced through trade measures within the 
WTO, either through amendments to GATT Article XX, the introduction of a social clause or 
any other measure, they do not provide a solution to the complexity of the labour standards issue 
and should not be used to deal with disputes over labour standards.
147
 The UNDP has observed 
that trade measures have the effect of constraining access to markets, which is why they are 
effective as a deterrent but noted that this could be counterproductive, resulting in developing 
countries becoming even poorer without helping the workers.
148
 Flasbarth and Lips have argued 
that, “Trade sanctions are a blunt instrument, penalizing the country as a whole, not just those 
responsible for rights violations.”149  
Greenfield has argued that social clauses and the resulting sanctions could only be 
applicable to export sectors a limitation which will as cause considerable problems.
150
 He opined 
that:  
“For example, if sanctions were applied to the export sector because of the use of child 
labour, affected children would simply move into employment opportunities in the non-
export sector. Working in the unregulated and non-accountable „shadow economy‟ can 
lead to even worse conditions and human rights abuses.”151  
 
Greenfield has also argued that since sanctions would only apply to exported goods the abuse of 
core labour standards could occur domestically with few legal repercussions.
152
 Greenfield has 
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refered to the notion that the ILO Convention against Forced Labour was blatantly violated in the 
US where prison inmates make commercial products.
153
 The UN has expressed the view that 
where goods are supplied solely to the domestic market, the WTO would not have jurisdiction 
hence trade sanctions would not be applicable.
154
 However it is clear that the issues giving rise to 
the need to incorporate a social clause into the WTO relate to the violation of core labour 
standards in regional or multilateral trade practices and is not limited to domestic violations of 
such standards. Greenfield‟s argument may have been overtaken by events with the emergence 
of countries like the Democratic Republic of China as key trade actors whose products are 
exported and who also export cheap labour. 
Poor labour standards are usually rooted in poverty and this is not something that 
sanctions can resolve.
155
  If the root cause of the problem is not addressed and a worker loses 
his/her job because of a heavy handed approach such as trade measures resulting in mass lay-
offs, the family will lose its income and be plunged into greater poverty.
156
 However it has 
already been established in chapters six and seven that trade has the potential to address poverty 
concerns as the entry of foreign investors ought to force wages upwards. If wages increase, 
poverty is likely to decrease. Trade has been known to boost the Gross Domestic Product of 
developing countries a fact which must naturally lead to poverty reduction. Should poverty 
persist, it could be argued that it may not be a result of the policy measures aimed at improving 
the protection of labour standards but the overall economic policies adopted by the governments 
which may not be suitable to their countries‟ demands. 
8 3 3  Strengthening the relationship between the WTO and ILO  
Institutionalizing the relationship between the WTO and ILO has also been advanced as a way of 
addressing the need to link trade to core labour standards. The WTO Secretariat currently has 
some restricted interaction with the ILO “compiling statistics, research and technical assistance 
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and training”.157 Initially, the International Trade Organisation was supposed to have a strong 
working relationship with the ILO and “consult and co-operate” in all labour related matters, as 
well as cooperating in regards to economic development and reconstruction.
158
 The current WTO 
system is but a shadow of this, with very limited collaboration.
159
 During the Geneva Ministerial 
Conference, the US, EU and South Africa pushed for a more substantive relationship between 
the WTO and ILO which was strongly opposed by a group of developing countries led by 
Brazil.
160
 But despite the controversy and discussion about the issue, the Ministerial Declaration 
failed to make any mention of it.
161
 
The obvious reluctance of the WTO to deal with labour standards means that the link 
between the WTO and ILO is crucial in regulating labour standards. This relationship has never 
been formalised within the WTO and so will remain ineffective at best without proactive 
change.
162
  
The examination of proposals to establish a trade-labour linkage has revealed that there 
could be available legal options for incorporating a social clause into the WTO framework. 
However, it is also evident that none of the proposals advanced take into consideration the need 
to address the dangers of setting international standards which must be equally complied with by 
both developing and developed countries. Even so, the developing countries themselves are not 
of the same economic growth levels hence one would argue that the proposals discussed in this 
chapter to link trade to core labour standards are inadequate. A social clause in the WTO legal 
framework could act as a pro-development initiative which the WTO‟s Doha Development 
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Round of trade negotiations has so far failed to deliver.
163
 In particular, the special treatment 
rules for developing countries known as the special and differential treatment rules
164
 were 
supposed to have been reviewed to make them precise, effective and operational in relation to the 
social clause issue. But nowhere is the option or possibility raised. 
It is arguable that special and differential treatment rules could have been used to address 
the challenges posed by the inequalities amongst trade partners with regard to the recognition of 
non-trade matters in the WTO. This may necessitate the establishment of legal mechanisms 
which may lead to the incorporation of a social clause into the WTO framework without creating 
obligations for developing countries which they are unable to comply with. The efforts taken to 
link environmental concerns with trade could be useful in attempts to establish a framework for 
linking trade with core labour standards. However, it must be appreciated that the efforts made in 
the environment case have not been easy. It is submitted that there could be valuable lessons to 
be learnt from the approach taken by WTO members to date. 
8 3 4  Lessons learnt from the efforts to link trade and environment  
Just like trade and labour, trade and environment have a linkage.
165
 The linkage between trade 
and environment has resulted in the WTO assuming a limited competence on trade related 
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aspects of environmental policies.
166
 The WTO‟s limited competence has been acknowledged 
regardless of the fact that it is not a global environmental protection agency.
167
 In 2001, WTO 
members agreed to launch negotiations that would address the link between trade and 
environment at the Doha Ministerial Conference.
168
 The Doha Declaration adopted at the Doha 
Ministerial Conference mandates negotiations on three issues: the relationship between WTO 
rules and specific trade obligations set out in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs); 
procedures for regular information exchange between MEA secretariats and the relevant WTO 
committees; and the reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental 
goods and services.
169
  
Cooperation between the WTO and the MEAs has already started.
170
 The UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
171
 representatives attend regular meetings of the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) and the WTO CTE members in turn attend 
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the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COP).
172
 Gatherings of world leaders such as the 
Group of 20 London Summit held in April 2009,
173
 the Group of Eight L‟Aquila Summit held in 
July 2009,
174
 and most recently the November 2011 Durban COP 17 Climate Change Summit in 
South Africa
175
 all urgently called for the conclusion of the Doha Round negotiations. Of 
significance concerning measures to be taken to combat climate change is the notion that such 
measures should not distort international trade. The UNFCCC states that, “…Measures taken to 
combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”176 The Kyoto 
Protocol
177
 also states that, “…Parties … shall strive to implement policies and measures … in 
such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate change on 
international trade.”178 
While countries have repeatedly affirmed the importance of a successful conclusion, gaps 
between the positions expressed by developed and developing countries as in the debates 
concerning a trade-labour linkage are hindering any such conclusion.
179
 At an informal group 
meeting under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) held 
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in August 2009 in Bonn, India proposed the inclusion of a draft paragraph in the negotiating text, 
which reads as follows: 
 “Developed country Parties shall not resort to any form of unilateral measures including 
countervailing border measures, against goods and services imported from developing 
countries on grounds of protection and stabilization of climate. Such unilateral measures 
would violate the principles and provisions of the Convention, including, in particular, 
those related to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Article 3, 
Paragraph 1); trade and climate change (Article 3 paragraph 5); and the relationship 
between mitigation actions of developing countries and provision of financial resources 
and technology by developed country Parties (Article 4, Paragraphs 3 and 7).”180 
 
While developing countries are seeking ways to prevent countries from using border measures 
against them, the US Congress is seeking ways to address competitiveness concerns and 
incorporate them into a post-Kyoto treaty.
181
 
 The differences between the developed and developing countries emanate from the fact 
that at the 13th UNFCCC COP meeting held in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007, countries 
agreed to launch negotiations to write a successor accord to the Kyoto Protocol and adopted the 
Bali Action Plan.
182
 While the Bali Action Plan requires both developed and developing 
countries to take action to protect the environment, its requirements differ between the two 
groups, expressed by the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”183 The Bali 
Action Plan requires all developed countries to adopt “measurable, reportable and verifiable 
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, 
taking into account differences in their national circumstances.”184 For developing countries, the 
Plan requires “nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) by developing country Parties 
in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
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capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.”185 Hufbauer and Kim have 
observed that: 
 “Sharp differences in interpretation of this principle have separated the two groups. The 
United States and other developed countries want binding commitments from all major 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, notably the BICs – Brazil, India, and China – and their 
peers among developing countries. In pointed disagreement, India and China assert that 
“best efforts” are the most they are required to make under the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities.”186 
 
The sharp differences observed by Hufbauer and Kim‟s are compounded by the argument that:  
“…to the extent that the economic policies promoted by the WTO rules lead to growth and 
industrialization, there is a concern that the Earth‟s resources will continue to be used in a 
way that is not sustainable. The current rate of consumption of resources is perceived by 
some as too high and policies that increase this consumption in developed countries…will 
further deplete an environment that is already strained.”187  
 
However, reconciling the plausible argument of a need to preserve the earth‟s resources and the 
Bali Action Plan principle might be a difficult objective. As the case has been in the polarized 
trade-labour linkage debate, an argument of protectionism has been raised by developing 
countries against developed countries.
188
 As in the trade-labour linkage debate, fears of a „race to 
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the bottom‟ have been raised.189 In response to the „race to the bottom‟ phenomena Stiglitz has 
proposed that countries such as the, “US or any country which refuses to agree to or to 
implement emission reductions from inflicting harm on the rest of the world...” should have 
tariffs being imposed on them so that they avoid creating a race to the bottom.
190
 He has further 
argued that:  
“Fortunately, we have an international trade framework that can be used to force states that 
inflict harm on others to behave in a better fashion. Except in certain limited situations 
(like agriculture), the WTO does not allow subsidies-obviously, if some country subsidizes 
its firms, the playing field is not level. A subsidy means that a firm does not pay the full 
costs of production. Not paying the cost of damage to the environment is a subsidy, just as 
not paying the full cost of the workers would be.”191 
 
However, whilst attempts to justify the imposition of tariffs for the violation of environmental 
standards may be plausible and not far-fetched (under limited circumstances) in terms of the 
WTO law,
192
 doing so would violate provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM).
193
 Neumayer opined:  
 “No doubt, we continue to observe environmental degradation on a large scale. There is 
also no doubt that trade liberalization can at times lead to increased environmental 
degradation if strong environmental policies are not in place. Where massive negative 
environmental externalities are allowed to exist, trade liberalization can be like a fresh 
breeze of wind on a house that is already set on fire. But it is the responsibility of the 
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policy-makers from its member states, not the WTO itself, to put these policies in 
place.”194 
 
Whilst Neumayer‟s argument may be plausible under a multilateral trade regime in which WTO 
Member States fully comply with their environmental obligations at national level, Lester et al 
have observed that there is a significant concern regarding MNCs which seek out countries with 
weak environmental standards within which to conduct their businesses.
195
 Lester et al further 
note that, “This significance has arisen from disparities in the extent to which states have 
undertaken (if at all) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol.”196 It is 
thus submitted that leaving compliance to environmental laws (as is the case with core labour 
standards) in trade in the hands of WTO Member States might be misguided. As Hufbauer and 
Kim have noted: 
  “In the absence of parallel commitments, and given the resistance by India and China to 
accept binding emission targets, some developed countries (particularly the US) harbour 
fears that their own stringent GHG control programs will put domestic firms at a severe 
disadvantage in global markets. This will lead to the “leakage” of production and jobs to 
firms located in countries that do not adopt equivalent controls. A related concern is that, in 
the end, domestic action by developed countries will make no difference to climate change 
if emissions activity simply migrates to other countries and if domestic GHG control 
policies do not create enough “leverage” to prod China and India and other large but 
reluctant emitters to take action.”197 
 
Veel has suggested that it is necessary to press forward with efforts to consider the use of trade 
measures to address the violation of environmental laws in trade.
198
 Hufbauer and Kim then 
reveal that: 
 “To address these concerns, the United States and other countries are contemplating 
“corrective” provisions in their national GHG control programs, such as the allocation of 
free allowances, special exemptions from new controls, and border measures. In particular, 
border measures that penalize imports from countries that do not take comparable action 
enjoy broad political support. Production subsidies (through free allocations and 
exemptions), unilateral trade restrictions (through border adjustments), and performance 
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standards (adopted in the name of GHG controls) all promise commercial friction and 
stand a fair chance of being challenged in the WTO.”199 
 
Of the measures adopted by the US and other countries in their national GHG control programs, 
some of them may have trade implications. For instance, product for performance standards such 
as labeling requirements or energy efficient standards could easily operate as technical barriers to 
imports.
200
 Under the WTO, countries have great flexibility to design environmental regulations 
that have effects only within their territories.
201
 However, the same discretion does not apply to 
measures that affect exports or imports.
202
 An absence of clear guidelines on how to address 
some of these issues poses challenges to the effectiveness of an environment-trade linkage.
203
  
 Attempts to link the environment and trade have also resulted in some useful cases being 
decided by the WTO‟s Appellate Body which try to address serious questions about the WTO‟s 
capacity in addressing non-WTO laws.  Sinha has observed that the WTO‟s Appellate Body 
reports in the cases of United States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes
 204
 and United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products
205
 have re-ignited the debate on the WTO‟s role in balancing the rights 
of the sovereign to regulate health or environment within its domestic domain, with the need to 
maintain the sanctity of the multilateral trade order.
206
 The significance of the cases and 
questions raised concerning an environment-trade linkage is that the environment like labour is a 
non-trade area hence the progress in the negotiations to link it to trade could offer guidelines on 
how to link trade and labour in multilateral trade agreements.  
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The US-Clove Cigarettes case is one of the most controversial health-related disputes 
ever to arise in the history of the WTO, yet it is important as it establishes the relationship 
between trade and environment.
207
 In this case, Indonesia challenged a US measure in section 
907(a)(1)(A) of the US Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act
208
 that prohibits cigarettes and 
component parts containing a flavor herb or spice (clove) which gives a characterizing flavour to 
the product except for menthol and tobacco.  The US measure bans the production and sale of 
clove cigarettes, as well as most other flavoured cigarettes in the US. Indonesia is the world‟s 
main producer of clove cigarettes and the vast majority of clove cigarettes consumed in the US 
prior to the ban.
209
 It argued that the US ban on clove cigarettes was discriminatory and 
unnecessary. It also argued that the US acted inconsistently with procedural requirements of the 
WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.
210
 
The WTO Panel found that the US ban was inconsistent with the national treatment 
obligation in the TBT Agreement because it accords clove cigarettes less favourable treatment 
than that accorded to menthol-flavored cigarettes.
211
 The Panel found that menthol and clove 
cigarettes were like products in terms of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The Panel however 
rejected Indonesia‟s claim that the ban was unnecessary. The Panel found that Indonesia had 
failed to demonstrate that the ban was more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective which in this case was reducing youth smoking.
212
 The US appealed against the Panel‟s 
decision to the WTO Appellate Body.  
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel‟s finding that the US ban was inconsistent with the 
national treatment principle. However, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel that “like 
products” as referred to in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement should be interpreted based on the 
regulatory purpose of the technical regulation at issue. Instead, the Appellate Body found that the 
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determination of whether or not products are “like” within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement should be a determination about the competitive relationship between the products 
based on an analysis of the traditional likeness criteria.
213
 Of significance concerning a trade-
environment linkage was the Appellate Body‟s conclusion that the regulatory concerns 
underlying a measure such as the health risks associated with a product may be relevant to the 
determination of “likeness” to the extent that they have an impact on the competitive relationship 
between the products. 
In the US-Tuna Dolphin II case the Mexican Government alleged that the US measures 
under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
214
 which established the conditions for 
the use of a “dolphin safe” label on tuna products and conditional access to the US Department 
of Commerce official safe label upon bringing certain documentary evidence that varies 
depending on the area where tuna contained in the tuna product was harvested and the fishing 
method by which it is harvested were inconsistent with Articles I.I and III.4 of the GATT and 
Articles 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
215
 As such Mexico argued that the measures 
were discriminatory and unnecessary. The Panel first determined whether the US safe labeling 
provisions constituted a technical regulation in terms of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
216
 
The Panel rejected Mexico‟s claim that the US dolphin-safe labeling provisions were 
discriminatory against Mexican tuna products as the measures did not treat Mexican products 
less favorably than like US products.
217
 However, the Panel also found that the measures were 
more trade restrictive than necessary and thus contrary to Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.  
The Appellate Body while agreeing that the measures were a technical regulation 
reversed the Panel‟s findings on Articles 2.1 and 2.2.218 The Appellate Body agreed with the US 
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that the measures were mandatory and therefore a technical regulation because they formed part 
of the US law and imposed legally enforceable conditions that had to be met to have access to 
the dolphin-safe label.
219
 However, it concluded that the US had not demonstrated that the 
measures were even-handed and that the detrimental impact of the US measure on Mexican tuna 
products stemed exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinction.
220
 The Appellate Body thus 
found that the US labeling scheme provided less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products, 
contrary to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
221
  
Again as in the US-Clove Cigarettes case environment-related principles were used as a 
method of determining the legality of specific trade practices. Such an approach in the two 
leading cases both presided over by the WTO Appellate Body in 2012 indicates the WTO‟s 
acceptance of a trade and environment linkage. The basis set by the two cases concerning an 
environment-trade linkage is very important as it offers a platform to examine the legitimacy of 
the WTO especially in relation to its reluctance to incorporate non-trade matters which link with 
trade such as labour standards into its framework.
222
 In this connection Sinha noted that: 
 “It is important to mention … that the legitimacy of the WTO may not necessarily stand on 
the shoulders of sovereign actors alone. Indeed, there could be a case to argue that the 
WTO has the unenviable role of finding legitimacy across its economically and culturally 
diverse constituencies, prominent among which are environmental and human rights 
activists, regardless of their national or cultural affiliation or origin. While from a 
theoretical perspective, it could well be argued that the will of the people is expressed 
through the will of the sovereign, a realist may well take such a view with a pinch of 
salt.”223 
 
Kulovesi has argued that a “state-centred understanding of legitimacy”224 can “no longer be 
taken for granted”225 and also noted that the growing interest in the legitimacy and accountability 
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of international organizations “is coupled with re-invigorated interest in democracy at the inter-
state level”.226 Kulovesi also emphasized the accountability of a state to its people.227 Her aim 
was to show that if states are increasingly accountable to their people, directly or indirectly, then 
state centred or sovereign legitimacy would translate into the legitimacy of the WTO‟s policies. 
This would be an indication that the WTO‟s policy position concerning non-trade matters is 
plausible. Kulovesi also noted that: 
 “A reference to sustainable development in the WTO Preamble, the establishment of the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, the conscious jurisprudence of the WTO 
Appellate Body and the inclusion of environmental issues in the negotiating mandate for 
the Doha Development, has played a role in alleviating the tension surrounding the trade 
and environment linkage.”228  
 
Sinha has argued that, “The WTO‟s efforts to link environment with trade has further contributed 
in shaping a sense of legitimate expectation, based upon which the actions of WTO panels or the 
Appellate Body itself, may be adjudged in the future.”229 It becomes evident that the pressure to 
ensure that the WTO deals with non-WTO law issues emanates from the realization that its 
dispute settlement system, though less ideal, is the only international system that can settle 
disputes emanating from the linkage between trade and non-trade related areas, in this case the 
environment.
230
 It may then be argued that if the WTO is perceived as a solution to dispute 
resolutions in matters where trade is linked with non-trade matters then it is logical to argue that 
the WTO must resolve such a dispute.
231
  
 Dunoff on the other hand has argued that the WTO adjudicating body should simply 
refuse to decide any disputes which are too political for judicial resolution at the WTO.
232
 
Jackson has in turn expressed the view that the concepts of sovereignty and subsidiarity are tools 
through which linkage disputes should be decided.
233
 On his part, Petersmann argued in favour 
of incorporating principles such as human rights into the body of WTO law as “context” for 
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interpretation of WTO law.
234
 However, the WTO Appellate Body in Mexico-Soft Drinks made it 
clear that it will not make any determination as to whether or not a WTO member has violated 
non-WTO law.
235
 In apparent agreement with that position, Howse and Teitel have argued that 
the limited role of the WTO dispute settlement system is to test violations from the standpoint of 
WTO law.
236
 
 It therefore must be questioned whether the WTO panels and the Appellate Body, when 
interpreting the provisions of WTO laws, should refrain from engaging in an analysis simply 
because of its political ramifications or because of its linkages with the environment? It must 
also be questioned whether the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system will be 
compromised if it is seen to shy away from contentious issues or to apply itself to such 
contentious issues? Kulovesi‟s analysis of an environment-trade linkage suggests that neither of 
the two questions could be easy to address
237
 and that the legitimacy dilemma facing the WTO 
dispute settlement system is much like a “two headed dragon”.238 Kulovesi does not address the 
questions but concludes that the WTO dispute settlement system alone is ultimately ill-equipped 
to handle the kind of controversies that could arise from a conflict between organizations such as 
the WTO and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
239
 
However, if the questions are not addressed, the issue of the differentiation of 
international legal principles from the standpoint of whether such principles conflict with WTO 
law or not might not be clarified. An answer to the questions might be found in the importance of 
the principle of lex specialis.
240
 The principle of lex specialis may be understood by reference to 
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the relationship between the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law (IHL)
241
 and 
human rights law.
242
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made three pronouncements on 
the relationship between the two bodies of rules from which three interrelated propositions 
emerge.
243
 First, human rights law remains applicable even during armed conflict. Second, it is 
applicable in situations of conflict, subject only to derogation. Third, when both IHL and human 
rights law are applicable, IHL is the lex specialis. It might be thought that these pronouncements 
resolve the question of the relationship between the two bodies of international law rules. 
Applied in a trade context, Carmody has noted that: 
 “One view of obligations under the WTO Agreement is that they are bilateral, that is, they 
involve legal obligations between two countries. This is premised on the idea that the 
object of WTO obligations is „trade‟. According to this view, the WTO Agreement can be 
considered a „bundle of bilateral relations‟ and WTO obligations should be analyzed 
pursuant to rules concerning bilateral obligations under the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties and the Articles on State Responsibility.”244 
 
The other view according to Carmody argues that: 
 “WTO obligations are more appropriately regarded as collective because their principal 
object is the protection of collective expectations about the trade-related behaviour of 
governments. These form a common interest over and above the interests of WTO Member 
States individually. At the same time, while expectations may be the treaty‟s primary 
concern, they are not its sole concern. The treaty gives some flexibility to governments to 
deal with situations actually encountered in the pattern of trade. These two functions, the 
protection of expectations and the adjustment to realities, combine to produce law in a third 
mode, something that can be termed a law of interdependence. This is the tendency of the 
WTO Agreement to promote interaction among producers and consumers in different 
countries, and thereby to spin an indissoluble web of economic relations that goes beyond 
the interests of WTO Members individually. For this reason, the WTO Agreement can be 
thought of as a collective undertaking and WTO obligations are more appropriately 
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analyzed under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Articles on State 
Responsibility rules on collective obligations.”245 
 
An example which comes readily to mind concerning the lex specialis is the reference to the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in US-Shrimp Turtle,
246
 to 
highlight the importance attached to the protection of turtles. It was not argued in this case that 
CITES obligations were in conflict with WTO obligations. The sole purpose of recourse to 
CITES was to emphasize the magnitude of the dispute that the WTO Panel or the WTO 
Appellate Body was called upon to address.  
This may be distinguished from the situation in the US-Tuna (Dolphin I)
247
 case and the 
US-Shrimp Turtle case itself, where an amicus curie made reference to the obligation on fishing 
states to protect the marine environment by taking into account the effects on species other than 
target species.
248
 In this instance, government policies that discriminate against countries that 
engage in bad environmental behaviour were held to violate WTO rules.
249
 Complaining 
governments initially refused to regulate the practices of their nationals who were needlessly 
killing dolphins and sea turtles.
250
 The irony in those disputes was that while the GATT and 
WTO Panels pointed out the need for more environmentally-friendly fishery policies, the legal 
rulings were aimed at the US, the country seeking to prevent the avoidable drowning of dolphins 
and turtles rather than at the countries that were causing the environmental problems.
251
 In the 
United States-Shrimp case, the Appellate Body stressed that sovereign nations “should” adopt 
effective measures to protect endangered species and “should” act together “bilaterally, 
plurilaterally or multilaterally... to protect the environment.”252 Yet WTO rules do not give any 
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authority to the Appellate Body to request governments which violate environmental laws to do 
so.
253
  
A WTO Panel may be more willing to consider non-WTO sources as informing the 
“ordinary meaning” of WTO treaty terms, and take a more “legal” approach when non-WTO 
norms are in direct conflict with WTO norms.
254
 WTO jurisprudence has previously taken, 
although in a slightly different context, an extremely narrow view of conflict.
255
 Legal 
agreements such as the Rio Declaration or the Convention on Biological Diversity seem to have 
been referred to as factual evidence
256
 a principle which provides sufficient discretion to 
incorporate international environmental law as relevant in the WTO dispute settlement system.
257
  
In the EC-Hormones
258
 case, the WTO Appellate Body held that the legal status of the 
precautionary principle was irrelevant when considering scientific risk assessment and 
uncertainty under the SPS Agreement.
259
 This raises questions as to why the WTO Appellate 
Body in the Shrimp Turtle case noted that the “particular relevance” of Principle 12 of the Rio 
Declaration
260
 in assessing unilateral trade restrictions under the GATT while dismissing its 
application in the EC-Hormones case.
261
 Kulovesi argues that, “…what the WTO Appellate 
Body should have done…is to decide whether the precautionary principle is a norm of customary 
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law and then analyze…how it would affect the interpretation of the SPS Agreement”.262 In the 
interest of the WTO‟s legitimacy it was preferable for the WTO to address an issue of 
fragmentation of laws head on rather than side step it through “legal jugglery”.263 
The EC-Biotech
264
 decision also provides invaluable insight on the above arguments. In 
this case insufficient reasons were provided by the WTO Panel to explain why a harmonized 
reading of international environmental law principles and treaties with WTO laws was not 
applicable in resolving the dispute.
265
 This could be interpreted as a failure of the WTO dispute 
settlement system to integrate non-WTO law with WTO law. However, it may be argued that if 
the WTO system itself were to take due note of these concerns and respond to them, the system 
would be able to evolve into an integrated system. The legitimacy of the WTO system will no 
doubt be judged by the manner in which the system responds to such concerns in the future.
266
 
It is encouraging that cases and formal engagements at the WTO level have already 
started to explore the possibility of an environment-trade linkage which might lead to the 
establishment of an appropriate legal framework for such linkage. This position is in stark 
contrast to the trade-labour linkage which though obvious has been continuously excluded from 
the WTO legal framework. Carmody stated that: 
“It is therefore possible to conclude that the WTO Agreement as a law of realities is 
supplementary and assistive to the dominant task of protecting expectations. Reality based 
rules offer the option of seeking selective release from WTO disciplines, and hence work 
to reinforce the collectivity of the greater whole. Put differently, the freedom to derogate 
from this or that WTO rule, and therefore occasionally to disappoint collective 
expectations, is an integral part of the WTO package. No country would have agreed to it 
otherwise.”267 
 
Perhaps it is time efforts similar to those being directed towards the environment-trade linkage 
should also be directed towards the trade-labour linkage in order to broaden the scope of 
sustainable development especially for developing countries. It is hoped that the lessons obtained 
from the trade and environment case, though beset with serious challenges, will inform debates 
concerning a trade-labour linkage in order to have the latter adopted as one of the WTO‟s key 
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policy objectives towards sustainable development. This could assist in limiting the violations of 
core labour standards in trade. 
8 3 5  Why excluding a social clause could compromise the WTO’s legitimacy 
The global governance of trade is in a deadlock and the WTO is now suffering from a long 
standing crisis of legitimacy.
268
 This is confirmed by the eventual failure of the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations in 2011.
269
 Most of today‟s members of the WTO are involved in 
regional trade negotiations and agreements that go beyond the scope of WTO agreements in 
terms of their coverage.
270
 The WTO appears reluctant to address the issue of a trade-labour 
linkage which has now become a key concept in most regional trade agreements.  
This calls for a reform of world trade governance, especially of the objectives of the 
WTO within a renovated world economic order. The WTO stands as a central institution of 
international law and international economic relations.
271
 Of the major international 
organizations, only the WTO regularly carries out both negotiation and adjudication.
272
 Nowhere 
else in the multilateral system is there a formalized second-level judicial review of state-to-state 
disputes apart from the WTO.
273
 Since mid-2004, WTO members have decided that non-trade 
matters are off the agenda of the organization as if these issues have no relationship to trade in 
the present day globalized world.
274
 This could possibly be an oversight which sooner or later 
will call into question the legitimacy of the WTO. Charnovitz has observed that, “The legislative 
clout of the WTO comes not only through the indirect application of its rules but also in the 
dynamic way in which the WTO inter-penetrates other regimes.”275 
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The main objective of the WTO is to promote free trade.
276
 This mission is more 
restricted than the one which was assigned to the International Trade Organization (ITO) by the 
Havana Charter. The ITO not only had the objective of expanding production and trade, but also 
included a wider objective of “realizing the aims set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, 
particularly the attainment of higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development.”277 The improvement of wages and working 
conditions, “as productivity may permit”, was a central objective of the Havana Charter, which 
fully acknowledged interaction between trade and labour standards in the name of “fair trade”.278 
This implied strong collaboration with the ILO, an objective which has completely disappeared 
in the WTO partly because of the developing countries who are against the incorporation of a 
social clause into the WTO framework.  
According to Cling, reference in WTO articles to the UN Charter has disappeared.
279
 The 
implication of Cling‟s observation is that the WTO is born as an international organization out of 
the UN system.
280
 However, even the Bretton Woods Institutions which are largely independent 
of the UN refer to the UN Charter.
281
 Cling concludes that, “This makes the WTO the only major 
international organization which does not refer to the UN principles. This especially implies that 
the WTO does neither comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor with the UN 
Declaration of Economic and Social Rights.”282 Supiot argues that the WTO‟s failure to refer to 
UN principles corresponds to placing the market first before all other general objectives of 
human development.
283
 This regression is particularly obvious concerning the interest in 
development.  
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The Havana Charter was very ambitious in this respect as it was assigned the objective 
“to foster and assist industrial and general economic development, particularly of those countries 
which are still in the early stages of industrial development”.284 The WTO is, in this respect, 
much more modest as it only aims to help developing countries “secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development”.285 This is 
clearly illustrated in the Marrakech Agreements which appear to be biased against developing 
countries, a position which is consistent with arguments to the effect that the WTO has no 
emphasis on development. As such, in order to address the legitimacy crisis of the WTO and 
reinforce its mandate as the sole institution in charge of international trade, there might be a need 
to enlarge its scope while including it more narrowly in the UN system.
286
 The enlargement of 
the objectives of the WTO must be promoted together with its full integration into the UN 
system, a process which could lead to a clear framework for establishing a link between trade 
and human development.
287
 This would translate into reforming trade governance in order to 
increase the voice of developing countries in the WTO,
288
 which may result in the softening of 
developing countries‟ stance of resisting the incorporation of a social clause into the WTO 
framework. 
Widening the scope of trade governance is likely to go a long way in repairing the image 
of the institution in the aftermath of the failure of the Doha Round
289
 and in the face of some of 
the anti-globalization organizations which want it closed down.
290
 The reform of the WTO 
nevertheless must be accompanied with a reform of the world‟s economic and financial 
governance.
291
 This would mean that the Bretton Woods institutions must also be realigned to 
the objectives of human and/or sustainable development. It is submitted that the current world 
economic crisis has deepened the legitimacy crisis of the international institutions in charge of 
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world economic governance and has strengthened arguments for reinforcing the institutions.
292
 A 
“new Bretton Woods”293 which was talked about at the beginning of the 2008 global economic 
crisis has not taken place, but the need for it is urgent as ever.
294
  
The current challenges being faced by the WTO may not imply that trade liberalization as 
a process should be interrupted at the international level.
295
 Trade liberalization must keep 
progressing based on regional and bilateral agreements. However, the failure of the Doha Round 
only means that the multilateral trade liberalization process might be interrupted for a few years 
with increased regionalism possibly occurring.
296
 This leads to the debate of regionalism and its 
link with multilateralism. Debates about regionalism‟s contribution to strengthening the 
multilateral trade system or to weakening it has been going on for years without any clear 
resolution.
297
 It is a recognised fact that the regionalization process has been on the increase. 
Trade between neighbours keeps increasing. Krugman has noted that, “…the value of the 
distance co-efficient has doubled in gravity models since 1960. At the same time, trade 
agreements are signed between these countries to increase trade but also between distant 
countries (such as North-South regional agreements).”298 It is in these regional trade agreements 
that non-trade matters such as labour matters have been addressed by incorporation.
299
  
                                                          
 
292
 Ibid. 
293
  See Boughton “A New Bretton Woods?” 2009 IMF Finance and Development Magazine volume 46. See also 
Mattoo and Subramanian 15. 
294
  Cling 10. See also World Economic Forum “President Sarkozy calls for a „New Bretton Woods‟” 
http://www.weforum.org/node/65917 (accessed 25-11-2012). The former president of France in his opening 
address at the January 2011 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting said, “…it will not be possible to emerge 
from the global economic crisis and protect against future crises if the economic imbalances that are at the root 
of  the problem are not addressed…Countries with trade surpluses must consume more and improve the living 
standards and social protection of their citizens…Countries with deficits must make an effort to consume a little 
less and repay their debts…The prosperity of the post-war era owed a great deal to Bretton Woods, to its rules 
and its institutions. That is exactly what we need today, we need a new Bretton Woods.” 
295
  Ibid. 
296
  Ibid. 
297
  ARTNeT “Fighting Irrelevance: The Role of Regional Trade Agreements in International Production Networks 
in Asia” 2011 New York: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2. 
298
  Cling 11. 
299
  An evaluation of the process of trade liberalization over the past twenty years reveals that most trade 
liberalization has not been taking place within the WTO. Instead it has been taking place within regional and 
bilateral trade agreements. The main agreements signed since 1990 include the North American Free Trade 
Agreement of 1994, the Mercosur of 1995, the European Union-Mexico Free Trade Agreement of 2000 and the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement of 2010.  
393 
 
The WTO tries to downplay the impact of the proliferation of intra-regional trade, 
excluding intra-EU trade, by underlining that it only represents 16% of world trade.
300
 However, 
Cling makes an important observation that intra-regional trade, “…is a growing share and some 
new regional trade agreements might increase this share further in the medium term. Such would 
be the case if a transatlantic free trade agreement is signed between the EU and the USA, and 
potentially also between the EU and Japan.”301 The major change concerning regional trade 
integration is that regional trade agreements are not so much about trade preferences anymore 
especially as Most Favoured Nation tariffs have declined substantially,
302
 but increasingly about 
non-tariff barriers and national regulations.
303
 As such it may be argued that regional trade 
agreements are re-shaping the international normative trade framework, which could then 
influence the multilateral trade framework.  
It may also be argued that regional trade agreements benefit mostly developed countries, 
which are in a position to impose their agenda in bilateral relations.
304
 On the other hand, 
developing countries have the option of accepting regional or bilateral agreements where their 
bargaining power is limited or being excluded from such agreements and remaining in 
isolation.
305
 Regardless of the developing countries‟ choices, the signing of regional trade 
agreements by developed countries could reduce their motivation to reach an agreement for 
incorporating a social clause in the WTO legal framework.
306
 In this regard, an increase in 
regionalism is both a “stepping stone” and a “stumbling block” in relation to the multilateral 
trading framework.
307
 This development is likely to reduce the WTO‟s influence, and threaten its 
existence as a major international organization following the failure of the Doha Round.
308
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Linking globalization and development might increase the support of the WTO from 
developing countries which may strengthen its legitimacy. Developing countries have been 
implementing active trade liberalization policies but there have been diverging patterns between 
developing and developed countries‟ growth paths with a few exceptions such as China and a 
few emerging Asian countries.
309
 Special and differential treatment granted within GATT tried to 
compensate for development levels asymmetries and to reduce this divergence.
310
 However the 
single undertaking principle of the WTO has forced all countries into a “one size fits all” model, 
whatever their development level, thereby strongly reducing or even abandoning the special and 
differential treatment.
311
 Trade preferences granted to developing countries on a unilateral basis 
are being eroded by the multilateral liberalization process.
312
  
Linking globalization and development could make trade agreements more development 
friendly.
313
 To achieve this objective, an increase in special and differential treatment would be 
required. Bhagwati and Sutherland have argued that the, “…assumption that a development 
friendly trade deal must demand less of countries in a way that is proportionate to their state of 
development permeates the Doha Round and the final package will rightly have to be measured 
against it”.314 The Doha Round included asymmetric commitments between developed and 
developing countries concerning the extent of tariff reductions and reductions in agricultural 
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subsidies.
315
 A practical example of the importance of special and differential treatment for all 
developing countries, especially Least Developed Countries (LDCs), is seen in the need to 
remove trade distortions which were caused by European and American agriculture, as they push 
world prices of agricultural products downward.
316
 Addressing this issue would imply that 
developing countries should still be allowed to use some sort of agricultural subsidies.
317
  
LDCs were totally exempted from tariff reductions in the Doha Round.
318
 The reasoning 
behind such exclusion was to compensate for the fact that LDCs are widely considered to be the 
main losers in the Marrakech Agreements.
319
 It could also be argued that LDCs were 
disadvantaged by the Doha Round as far as tariff reductions were concerned, especially through 
the erosion of trade preferences.
320
 For example, in order to attain a progressive WTO system, it 
would be reasonable to grant LDCs duty free access to markets such as those of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development.
321
 However, this approach might face a stumbling 
block in the form of increasing differentiation between developing countries.
322
 This challenge is 
made complex by a country like China which has become the world‟s leading exporter and other 
fast developing countries such as India and Brazil which have become major players in world 
trade. It is problematic to address the question as to why such countries should continue to be 
granted the same preferences and derogations as less developed countries. This is one of the 
main difficulties that face multilateral trade negotiations as the fast developing countries reject 
any proposals to differentiate between developing countries since such a development would 
reduce their trade benefits. This challenge is currently being faced in multilateral negotiations on 
climate and environment as already alluded to in this chapter.  
8 4  CONCLUSION 
The survival of the WTO lies in its ability to address the challenges being faced in the aftermath 
of the global economic crisis and the linkage between trade and non-trade issues. This chapter 
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examined the fears that critics against the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO framework 
have raised. The fears have arguably been shown to be without basis. Solutions to the challenges 
of incorporating a social clause into the WTO as advanced by academics were analyzed. 
Proposals for a trade-labour linkage as discussed in this chapter are plausible but lack legitimacy 
as they do not acknowledge the differences in the levels of development of countries in the 
world. The proposed solutions to a trade-labour linkage emanate from an assumption that 
incorporating a social clause into the WTO framework demands equitable compliance with the 
set obligations by all countries regardless of their levels of development. This may not be 
possible as such proposals are likely to be resisted by developing countries which are of the view 
that such an approach would undermine their development agenda and threaten their sovereignty.  
By analyzing the progress made in attempts to link environmental protection concerns 
and trade, the chapter also revealed that it is possible but difficult to create a legal framework 
which establishes a trade-labour linkage. Reasonable efforts are currently being made in 
establishing a legal framework for linking trade and environmental laws in the WTO. However, 
the WTO Appellate Body and Panel have been reluctant to make determinations over cases in 
which trade law overlaps with non-trade law though it has been made clear that for the WTO to 
retain its legitimacy, it must deal with trade related matters such as labour and the environment. 
Its inability to do so could lead to its demise as a multilateral institution in the aftermath of the 
failure of the Doha round as regional trade agreements are fast incorporating non-trade matters. 
Such a development may result in developed countries losing confidence in the WTO system 
with developing countries on the other hand having to be content with subjecting themselves to 
the policy interests of developed countries through bilateral trade agreements with them. Such an 
arrangement may not be in the best interests of either side as free trade is a key tool to global 
economic development. 
Developing a legal framework which serves the best interests of both developed and 
developing countries would be important in addressing debates concerning a linkage between 
trade and non-trade matters. Such a legal framework should be sensitive to developing countries‟ 
agenda of sustainable development yet recognizing developed countries‟ need to sustain their 
economies. Such an objective cannot be achieved under the current WTO system. Accordingly, 
there is an urgent need to reform the current WTO system and establish a new WTO framework 
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which renders the institution effective in addressing the demands of its Member States in the face 
of global economic challenges. Perhaps all key stakeholders in international trade such as the 
WTO member States, the UN Economic Commissions, regional development banks, WTO 
bodies, institutions such as the ILO, amongst other organisations, should be encouraged to give 
their inputs on how they could work together with the WTO to achieve sustainable development 
and economic prosperity.  
Such a working party arrangement may be complemented by a work plan that could 
result in the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements critically exploring how non-trade 
matters such as labour standards could be linked to trade. This may even assist in establishing 
how overlaps between WTO laws and non-WTO laws should be addressed by the WTO without 
infringing upon the mandate of other institutions such as the ILO. It has been pointed out in this 
chapter that Article 33 of the ILO Constitution could allow for the use of sanctions with respect 
to members who violate labour standards as was proposed in the case of Burma (now Myanmar). 
However, it has also been established that even if the ILO would adopt such an approach, which 
the organisation is reluctant to do, the imposition of sanctions regarding violations of labour 
standards in trade is likely to infringe GATT Article I. This implies that the WTO and ILO have 
to work together to limit violations of core labour standards in trade. The reality of the 
globalization process is that different disciplines are merging hence solutions must be found on 
how to create a balance between the need to maintain traditional institutional frameworks of the 
WTO and those of other institutions. This process will not be easy but it is practical and possible 
as this chapter has attempted to show. Labour standards like environmental matters can form part 
of the WTO framework. Therefore, the next chapter, amongst others offers recommendations 
concerning a possible trade-labour linkage framework in the WTO system with emphasis on 
what the framework must be sensitive to.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
9 1  INTRODUCTION 
Labour standards have become a major issue in international trade.
1
 Critics of a trade-labour 
linkage in the multilateral trade system have argued that, “Labour standards have no place in the 
WTO because it is an organisation that exists primarily to promote mutually beneficial, non-
coercive trade through reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements aimed at reducing 
barriers to trade.”2 Such views might not be on the whole plausible as they fail to recognise that 
the WTO Agreement makes reference to “sustainable development” as one of its objectives 
which must be balanced against other economic objectives.
3
 This study, without undermining the 
significance of free trade to global economic growth, established that the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) has been reluctant to incorporate a social clause in its legal framework.
4
 
The WTO‟s reluctance to recognise a trade-labour linkage in its legal framework marks a 
significant point of departure from the position adopted by the failed International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) which explicitly embraced development as a key objective of its agenda and 
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clauses in bilateral and regional trade agreements as discussed in chapter five of this study is a plausible 
mechanism for the future incorporation of a social clause in the WTO legal framework.  
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sought to protect workers‟ rights in trade.5 This study has demonstrated the WTO‟s failure to 
protect values other than that of unrestrained free trade for the benefit of multinational 
corporations.
6
 The general impression created by the WTO‟s approach is that human rights 
protection and development are not part of the WTO agenda and any allusion to them in relation 
to multilateral trade is an afterthought or mere rhetoric. It is therefore plausible to conclude that 
the WTO, by failing to acknowledge the need to protect non-trade matters such as core labour 
standards in its framework, has to a certain degree promoted “unfair trade” policies when its 
envisaged role is to promote “fair trade”.7 Chartes and Mercurio have observed that whilst it 
might not be possible for the WTO to “...incorporate every area or subject matter which merely 
may have an effect on trade and traders, it is simply incorrect to state that the WTO has an 
inherent institutional difficulty imposing obligations that could be viewed as wholly internal.”8  
The WTO‟s dispute settlement system which undoubtedly is the best mechanism at the 
multilateral level for dealing with disputes, has been characterized as exceedingly inequitable, 
non-transparent, and biased based on the view that it is working to exclusively aid business 
                                                          
 
5
  See Article 7 of the Havana Charter. The Article titled “Fair Labour Standards” provided that, “Unfair labour 
conditions, particularly in production for exports, create difficulties in international trade...and each member 
shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.” 
6
  See International Forum on Globalization “The World Trade Organization Vs. The Environment, Public Health 
and Human Rights” http://www.ifg.org/EAEF27E2-EB48-4D68-A607-
C9733C066A48/FinalDownload/DownloadId-7B437A631401C6102A5C6AF8DB4A1CB6/EAEF27E2-EB48-
4D68-A607-C9733C066A48/pdf/cancun/issues-WTOvsEnv.pdf (accessed 23-07-2012). 
7
  Ibid. See also Lester et al 67. It is important to realise that maintaining that the WTO is exclusively a free trade 
institution might be a misguided approach to trade practices at the multilateral level. Lester et al argue that the 
WTO system “...does allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, other forms of protection. More accurately, it is 
a system of rules dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition.” This plausible argument creates the basis 
for incorporating a social clause in the WTO legal framework in that the violation of core labour standards in 
trade will be regarded as being contrary to the aim of supporting fair competition in trade. 
8
  Chartes and Mercurio 665. Chartes and Mercurio‟s views are plausible as they also make a significant 
observation to the effect that there has to be a criterion to assess the suitability of incorporating non-trade matters 
into the WTO legal framework. In trying to assess the suitability of incorporating core labour standards into the 
WTO legal framework, Chartes and Mercurio argued that, “The fact that labour directly affects market share and 
activity is relatively uncontroversial. Labour is by nature an „intrinsic part of the production process that 
culminates in the manufacture of goods and services for trade.‟ Simply stated, the conditions under which a 
product is manufactured or produced impact the quantity and cost of the product in the world market. As such, it 
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an appropriate legal framework to ensure that core labour standards are incorporated into the multilateral trade 
agreements. 
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interests at the expense of competing public objectives.
9
 This study has argued that for the WTO 
to maintain its legitimacy it is imperative that it integrates non-trade matters such as core labour 
standards into its framework. That way, the right to development will become an achievable 
international human right. However, the study did acknowledge that attempting to establish a 
trade-labour linkage in the WTO is fraught with challenges. It was therefore the objective of this 
study to make proposals which could be considered by the WTO and ILO to forge a way forward 
in trying to protect workers‟ rights in trade. 
It has been strongly argued that the institutional economics perspective regards 
compliance with core labour rights as being critical for sustainable development.
10
 The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) identified freedom of association,
11
 the right to organize 
and bargain collectively,
12
 prohibitions of forced labour,
13
 discrimination in employment,
14
 and 
child labour
15
 as the core labour standards. However, regardless of the ILO‟s position, violations 
of core labour standards in trade have been occurring on a massive scale.
16
 Southern Africa has 
been used in this study as a classical example of how countries are pursuing trade gains at the 
expense of tangible future development goals. A number of factors have been advanced as the 
possible reasons why countries still argue for lower levels of compliance with core labour 
standards as a competitive advantage. Those who violate core labour standards in trade have 
cited competitive pressures as the basis for their actions.
17
 The Bretton Woods Institutions have 
been fingered in the maintenance of a lowered compliance with labour standards as they regard a 
flexible approach to the protection of core labour standards as a key sign of the ease of doing 
business and offer development loans to countries which promote their perspective.
18
 On the 
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contrary, several studies have shown that non-compliance with core labour standards does not 
provide a competitive advantage, thereby denying any economic rationale for non-compliance.
19
  
This chapter thus concludes the study of the problems regarding the incorporation of 
labour standards in the WTO framework and offers tentative recommendations which could 
improve the protection of core labour standards in trade if implemented. In making 
recommendations concerning the need to incorporate a social clause in the WTO system, the 
study takes into consideration the fact that establishing perfect world markets devoid of power 
relations may not be easily achievable in a short space of time and may require long-term plans. 
Such an approach could reveal that regardless of the inequalities that exist amongst countries in 
the world, it remains important to establish a trade-labour linkage in the WTO framework as 
increased trade is a key component to attaining sustainable development. 
Escobar argued that, “…although development promises a kingdom of abundance…the 
discourse and strategy of development [has] produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment 
and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression, [including] [t]he debt 
crisis…increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence.”20 Rahnema has noted, “Nobody…seems 
to have a clear, and commonly shared, view of poverty. For one reason, almost all the definitions 
given to the word are woven around the concept of „lack‟ or „deficiency.‟ This notion reflects 
only the basic relativity of the concept. What is necessary and to whom? And who is qualified to 
define all that?” Postrel has observed that, “…these shortcomings include the failure to improve 
the material lives of the world‟s poor, to get twelve cent medicines to children to prevent 
malaria, and to provide four dollar bed nets to poor families despite spending USD 2.3 trillion on 
foreign aid.”21 Even worse, some critics believe development has continued the destructive 
processes of colonialism by eviscerating local cultures and by draining least developed countries 
of their most valuable resources, from oil and gold to the best educated young people and even 
healthy babies.
22
 It is therefore plausible to conclude that without a social clause incorporated 
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into it, international economic law of institutions such as the WTO would promote only the 
objective of maintaining the current neoliberal economic order, grounded in free markets and 
individual autonomy and not distributive justice. As the analysis on legal theories in chapter four 
of this study has revealed, distributive justice is an essential concept in a world that has 
increasingly become unequal. Using the distributive justice theory as a mechanism for advancing 
a trade-labour linkage proposal could thus be a plausible approach to eradicating the violation of 
workers‟ rights in trade.  
 
9 2  SUMMARY 
This study has shown that countries in the world, especially developing countries, have been 
robustly competing for investment by multinational companies with relaxed labour standards 
emerging as a mechanism to lure investors.
23
 This “race to the bottom” phenomenon has raised a 
serious question as to whether workers should be viewed as mere economic factors or as bearers 
of fundamental human rights. This issue informed this study which sought to establish whether 
or not the exclusion of human rights, in particular core labour standards from the WTO 
framework, impacts negatively on the development of developing countries and their citizens.
24
 
Attempts to address this question have led to the almost inescapable conclusion that a social 
clause must be incorporated into the WTO framework.
25
 However, every attempt to establish a 
trade-labour linkage in the WTO has failed due to a lack of consensus driven by a divergence of 
opinions between developed and developing countries.
26
 
 An analysis of the differences in opinions concerning the trade-labour linkage debate 
revealed that developed countries regard the incorporation of a social clause in the WTO 
framework as a means to avoid the use of cheap labour as a tool for gaining an unfair trade 
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advantage on trade competitors.
27
 However, developing countries consider the use of cheap 
labour as their competitive advantage and a key mechanism for ensuring that they industrialise.
28
 
As such, for developing countries, any proposals to incorporate a social clause into the WTO 
framework amounts to a protectionist move by the developed countries aimed at usurping their 
competitive advantage and the resultant gains from trade.  
An appraisal of the opinions held by both developed and developing countries in this 
study revealed a number of significant points. First, the study revealed that using cheap labour in 
trade is not so much of a competitive advantage for developing countries as they regard it to be.
29
 
While it may lead to quick short-term gains, cheap labour does not in the long-term lead to 
sustainable development. Evidence has been drawn from the failed Washington Consensus in 
South America and the developments in Southern Africa in which years of using cheap labour 
have not translated into industrialisation. Brazil, for example, has realised the importance of a 
well paid labour force for development and adopted a notable model for achieving a minimum 
wage in the country which has come to be known as the “Lula miracle”.30 It therefore is not 
surprising that Brazil‟s economy has emerged as one of the fastest growing in the world. It is an 
indicator that workers are a vital component to economic growth whose rights must be protected 
in the course of promoting business interests.
31
 Failure to observe core labour standards in trade 
is likely to result in negative effects on national and international economic performance both in 
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the short-term and long-term.
32
 The developments in the mining industry of South Africa, 
especially the platinum and gold mining industries, have revealed that cheap labour in trade is 
likely to fuel labour unrest, criminality and lower investor confidence. The same trends were 
observed in South America after the adoption of the principles of the Washington Consensus as 
chapter six of this thesis has established. Furthermore, cheap labour in trade has been shown as a 
means of impoverishing the workers and hampering development in developing countries. As 
such the developing countries‟ arguments of cheap labour being a competitive advantage seems 
misguided.     
 The developed countries‟ arguments of a social clause becoming a mechanism to prevent 
unfair trade have not been entirely genuine, as this study has established.
33
 Industrialisation in 
developed countries was characterised by similar if not worse human rights violations and labour 
abuses in comparison to those which currently prevail in developing countries.
34
 As such, 
depriving developing countries of the opportunity to use cheap labour for the purposes of 
maximising trade gains might appear to be a legitimate case of protectionism.
35
 However, in a 
global era in which human rights protection is a priority, it is prudent that developing countries 
desist from adopting the approach employed by developed countries to industrialise. It is 
proposed that developing countries, possibly with the assistance of developed countries, adopt a 
balanced approach to business underlined by the principle of a common but differentiated 
application of labour standards in trade.  
The legal basis of such an approach cannot be found in the 1947 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and the current WTO founding agreement.
36
 It is found in the system of 
Generalised Trade Preferences (GSP) for developing countries which was first discussed in the 
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1960s by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
37
 It is a system 
which has already been adopted in bilateral and regional trade agreements to protect labour 
standards in trade as established in chapter five of this thesis. However, the GSP system, in 
principle, violates the most favoured nation (MFN) principle.
38
 The 1971 Ministerial Meeting of 
GATT had to provide a clear legal basis for the GSP, which it did in 1971 by adopting a waiver 
known as the 1971 Waiver that allowed countries to deviate from their MFN obligations, when 
enacting a GSP, for ten years.
39
 However, the text of the 1971 Waiver contained no additional 
guidance on issues like GSP conditionalities or on the broader meaning of „mutual acceptability,‟ 
but merely recalled the principles and objectives of the GSP that UNCTAD had fixed three years 
earlier.
40
 Eight years later the MFN exception was extended indefinitely by the GATT Member 
States through the adoption of the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause).
41
 
Importantly, the objectives of the GSP in the UNCTAD
42
 resolution and the 1971 Waiver were 
converted from “increasing export earnings, promoting industrialization and accelerating 
economic growth” to a broader mandate.43 The Enabling Clause provided that: 
“Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause shall in the 
case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries 
be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial 
and trade needs of developing countries.”44 
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The Enabling Clause was officially extended at the establishment of the WTO in 1994.
45
 The 
legal framework of the GSP thus emerged incrementally, in different stages and within different 
international organizations.
46
 If this approach were adopted with respect to proposals to establish 
a trade-labour linkage in the WTO framework, the possibility of developing countries buying 
into proposals of a social clause in multilateral trade agreements could increase as their 
aspirations to industrialise might become a reality. Such a development could in future allow for 
the equal application of core labour standards, amongst other standards, at the multilateral level.  
At present, even if well intended, any calls for incorporating a social clause into the WTO 
coupled with expectations of equal compliance by unequal trade partners is for all intents and 
purposes misguided and could justifiably be regarded as protectionist. Issues of inequality of 
partners in the international community are not a hidden secret as the September 2012 United 
Nations Summit revealed.
47
 Developing countries are constantly regarded as the lesser parties in 
international arrangements and/or agreements with their needs not being taken seriously as they 
do not possess the necessary financial resources to exert influence at the global level. However, 
if the developing countries‟ trade potential and the resultant benefits could be measured, their 
development interests would be seriously considered as critical to the future success of the 
WTO.
48
  
A development-centred social clause which recognises the need to establish a balance 
between developing countries‟ needs and the objectives of developed countries to sustain 
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economic growth might face comparatively less opposition than one which appears to place the 
interests of developed countries over those of developing countries or vice-versa. Trade has the 
potential to raise the levels of protection of core labour standards and is a genuine mechanism for 
ensuring sustainable development for all countries in the world.
49
 Accordingly, calls for a trade-
labour linkage are unlikely to go away, hence the WTO would do well by making serious efforts, 
as in the trade and environment case, to address proposals to incorporate a social clause into its 
legal framework. This study showed that bilateral and regional trade agreements are already 
incorporating core labour standards, a development which could compromise the multilateral 
trade system of the WTO in the long-term as countries might lose confidence in it, preferring the 
former agreements as being more suitable to their developmental agendas. 
Article III of the Functions of the WTO in the Agreement Establishing the WTO reads, 
“With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall 
cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.”  The Article excludes the ILO. 
It is recommended that the ILO be inserted into this section. Furthermore, in order to establish a 
formal, more meaningful relationship, a Ministerial Declaration should be adopted 
acknowledging the high level of cooperation and interconnectedness of the organisations, similar 
to the Ministerial Declarations regarding the relationship with the IMF and World Bank.
50
 
The advantage of the relationship between the WTO and the ILO is that the latter would 
not be undermined by the former, as it will maintain its authority in regards to labour standards. 
The mandates of each organisation would be respected, and there would be no recourse to trade 
sanctions whilst maintaining a degree of basic protection for labour rights.
51
 Collaboration 
between the ILO and WTO should also make use of the joint research facilities available, and a 
series of reports on labour rights should be created, similar to the ILO and WTO report “Joint 
Study on Trade and Employment”,52 but with a focus on labour standards. Enforcing core labour 
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standards in trade may require that the need to protect core labour standards be emphasized in the 
Preamble to the WTO founding Agreement.
53
 Such an approach has both symbolic and legal 
value in that whilst it does not place any binding obligations upon states to take immediate action 
on the labour standards issue, it can be used for the purposes of interpretation. According to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “The context for the purpose of the interpretation of 
a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text... its preamble and annexes”.54 Incorporating core 
labour standards into the WTO Preamble would also lead to the examination of human rights 
abuses through existing WTO review mechanisms.
55
  
Government policies are reviewed in relation to the “functioning of the multilateral 
trading system” so as to encourage adherence to commitments under the agreements, and greater 
transparency.
56
 At present, the reviews focus solely on the issue of trade liberalisation, and 
whether a member‟s policies support this objective. Although free trade is an important issue, it 
is not the overall objective of the multilateral trading system. The real objectives of the WTO 
which are regulating trade practices with the aim of raising standards of living and ensuring full 
employment
57
 are conspicuously ignored. If labour rights were incorporated into the Preamble to 
the Marrakech Agreement, it would be easier to address labour standards through the trade 
policy review mechanism.  
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9 3  GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
Making core labour standards conditional for trade is in conformity with WTO law.
58
 The 
protection of core labour standards in trade is arguably a key element to meeting a 
“developmental need.”59 The WTO Appellate Body in the EC-Tariffs Preferences60 case 
considered the scope of the term “developmental need” which WTO law is yet to define.61 The 
Appellate Body held that: 
“The existence of a „development, financial or trade need‟ must be assessed according to 
an objective standard. Broad-based recognition of a particular need, set out in the WTO 
Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations, could 
serve as such a standard.”62 
 
The Appellate Body also found that: 
“…a sufficient nexus should exist between, on the one hand, the preferential treatment 
provided under the respective measure authorized...and...the likelihood of alleviating the 
relevant „development, financial or trade need‟. In the context of a GSP scheme, the 
particular need at issue must, by its nature, be such that it can be effectively addressed 
through tariff preferences.”63 
The WTO Appellate Body‟s ruling in EC-Tariff Preferences allows GSP conditionality per se 
but restricts the broad discretion of the GSP grantor in determining when access to its GSP 
scheme may be linked to non-trade concerns.
64
 To uphold GSP labour rights conditionality in a 
case before the WTO adjudicating bodies, the grantor would thus have to show that in applying 
the conditionality, they acted in the effective and positive manner suggested, in response to a 
widely-recognised development need and on the basis of objective entrance and exit criteria.
65
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The protection of core labour standards in trade could be classified as a developmental 
need. For example, in developing countries, the shift of resources from low productivity to high 
productivity uses is a key driver of economic growth.
66
 McMillan and Rodrick have observed 
that economies that have successfully made the transition from low-income to medium and high- 
income status have experienced significant changes in their economic structure, as factors moved 
from lower productivity to higher productivity uses.
67
 Since 1990, African countries which like 
many other developing countries favour a lowered compliance with labour standards as their 
competitive advantage, have moved from higher to lower productivity employment.
68
 
Unfortunately, cheap labour as a competitive advantage has been offset by other countries 
through superior productivity of skilled labour forces, modern infrastructure facilities and 
political stabilities,
69
 with non-compliance to core labour standards leading to labour unrest.
70
 
Trade can play an important role in creating better jobs, increasing and improving working 
conditions but it must be appreciated that gains from trade do not accrue automatically
71
 as 
policies which complement trade openness must be implemented to ensure full positive effects 
on growth and employment.
72
  
A social clause in the WTO could emerge as one such important mechanism to ensuring a 
balance between trade and unemployment. It must be appreciated that in adjusting to 
technological progress, the process of trade induced growth necessarily entails the continual re-
allocation of resources away from less productive activities to more productive ones which can 
mean that even as average wages and employment conditions improve, some workers may 
experience unemployment.
73
 As such, policies that entrench trade reforms in a context of 
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macroeconomic stability and a sound investment climate, protection for workers, maintenance of 
high-quality working conditions and facilitation of labour transitions can play an important role 
in realizing potential wage, employment and income gains associated with trade.
74
 Trade is 
indeed a key factor in promoting economic growth.
75
 Noquer and Siscart have concluded that a 1 
% increase in trade openness was associated with a 1 % increase in per capita incomes.
76
 
Bruckner and Lederman found that trade openness causes economic growth.
77
 They further 
argued that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of trade over gross domestic product is 
associated with a short-term increase in growth of approximately 0.5 % per year, and with an 
even larger effect in the long-run, reaching about 0.8 %.
78
 O‟Brien and Zandvliet examined the 
legitimacy of labour rights conditionality as a means to advance development needs.
79
 In their 
analysis, they established that, “The fulfilment of labour rights can be both constitutive of and 
instrumental to development. This makes trade-labour linkage and differentiation between 
developing countries based on compliance with certain labour standards, in principle, 
permissible under WTO law”.80  
9 4  RECOMMENDATIONS 
For any measures advanced concerning a trade-labour linkage in the WTO to be a success, 
political will and commitment is required to extend the protection of workers in trade through the 
enforcement of core labour standards. It would take special measures and a lot of compromise 
from all parties involved to achieve such an arrangement at the international level.
81
 On the one 
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hand, developed countries‟ governments must be willing to assist developing countries‟ 
governments to achieve a sustainable balance between trade gains and the development of their 
workers.
82
 Research has found that there is no clear evidence to suggest that countries can 
improve their trade performance by maintaining poor labour conditions, contrary to the “race to 
the bottom” point of view. Bhagwati has argued that: 
“Labour union lobbies and their political friends have decided that the ideal defence 
against competition from the poor countries is to raise their costs of production by forcing 
their standards up, claiming that competition with countries with lower standards is 
“unfair.” “Free but fair trade” becomes an exercise in insidious protectionism that few 
recognise as such.”83 
 
It is submitted that the objectives of the WTO must be re-defined to include the development 
agenda as was the objective of the failed International Trade Organisation (ITO). On the other 
hand, developing countries‟ governments must not expect developed countries to commit 
themselves to their cause without them realising that pressing for the retention of low labour 
standards as a competitive advantage is counter productive.
84
 The International Labour Rights 
Foundation has observed that: 
“As long as poor labour standards exist in one country, workers everywhere will be hurt. 
Governments that neglect or oppress their labourers make the choice to strip their own 
citizens of their rights as human beings. Not only this, but they create unfair pressure in the 
global economy. If one country offers oppressively cheap labour, other countries become 
compelled to do the same to merely remain competitive. This global „race to the bottom‟ 
creates poor conditions and loss of freedom in the global South, and causes workers in the 
global North to lose their jobs to cheap outsourced labour.”85 
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development and must be protected as such. 
82
  United Nations (UN) “„Fully Fledged War‟ needed to Eradicate Poverty” 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/gaef3338.doc.htm (accessed 04-09-2012). See also UN “The Future 
we Want-Zero Draft of the Outcome Document” http://www.uncsd2012.org/futurewewant.html (accessed 2-09-
2012). 
83
  Bhagwati “Obama and Trade: An Alarm Sounds” Financial Times 9 January 2009. 
84
  ILO “Changing Patterns in the World of Work” 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-c.pdf (accessed 01-09-2012). 
85
  International Labour Rights Foundation “Changing Global Trade Rules” http://www.laborrights.org/creating-a-
sweatfree-world/changing-global-trade-rules (accessed 27-08-2012). 
413 
 
It must be appreciated that a race to the bottom will not lead to development.
86
 Instead a lowered 
compliance with core labour standards diminishes economic growth,
87
 threatens investor 
confidence
88
 and leads to labour unrest.
89
 At the time of concluding this study, the South African 
mining industry was becoming almost ungovernable with illegal strike actions and mass 
dismissals increasingly becoming prominent features of the country‟s labour market. 
Productivity had fallen with the country‟s currency and economy facing noticeable declines.  
Fast developing countries‟ governments must also appreciate that they cannot expect to 
be treated in the same vein as least developed countries. For a social clause to work, it must 
acknowledge the differences in the levels of development of Member States to the WTO as was 
held by the WTO Appellate Body in the EC-Tariff Preferences case. The positions of countries 
such as India and China who themselves have high incidences of labour standards violations 
must be reviewed. They must accept that they have achieved significant growth in their 
economies such that they cannot be equated to least developed countries. However, it is also 
submitted that they cannot be treated in the same breath as developed countries. Should a 
consensus be established concerning the levels of compliance of developed and developing 
countries, a frame work and/or mechanism to manage a practical trade-labour linkage in the 
WTO can easily be achieved.  
It may be possible to establish a social clause in the WTO whose objective is not so much 
to punish or exclude countries with a low level of compliance with core labour standards from 
trade but to ensure that the punitive measures to be applied, where necessary, are aimed at 
correcting the violations in the offending country whilst trade continues.
90
 Practices in bilateral 
and regional trade agreements have shown that sanctions aimed at ensuring that any monetary 
penalty imposed on a state party that violates core labour standards will not be opposed to as 
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long as such a fine is used to improve labour standards compliance in the offending country.
91
 
This means that the social clause must be pro-development and must avoid measures which are 
likely to damage the underlying value of trade. In other words, the social clause must be 
attractive to the governments so much so that they may be willing to exercise the necessary 
political will and commitment needed to arrive at a trade-labour linkage framework in the 
WTO.
92
 Research has shown that agreements, when reinforced by factors such as enforcement 
mechanisms, positive incentives, and market forces, may improve compliance with labour 
standards, bringing about better labour market conditions.
93
  
9 4 1  Short-term measure 
Social clauses have become a regular feature of bilateral and regional trade agreements.
94
 These 
trade agreements have been entered into by developed and developing countries with special 
preferences being given to the latter in instances where they are compliant with labour standards 
incorporated into the respective agreements. Parties to bilateral or regional agreements are 
mostly members of the WTO.
95
 It is accepted that notifications of entry into bilateral and 
regional trade agreements are made to the WTO.
96
 Therefore, it is proposed that to establish a 
short-term and easily adaptable legal mechanism for a trade-labour linkage in the WTO, an 
agreement which recognises the incorporation of labour standards in bilateral and regional trade 
agreements as part of the WTO agenda to promote fair trade and development must be 
negotiated and adopted.  
A side agreement on a trade-labour linkage in the WTO which mirrors the NAALC and 
the environment-related example of the CANCUN agreements
97
 should form the basis upon 
which countries can negotiate or continue to enter into bilateral or regional trade agreements 
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which recognise a trade-labour linkage. The agreement should place emphasis on the need to 
acknowledge the differences that exist amongst countries in the world on a short-term basis using 
trade as a tool to building up countries‟ capacity, especially in developing countries, to meet the 
overall challenge of protecting core labour standards in trade and establishing effective 
institutions and systems that will ensure the successful incorporation of a social clause in the 
WTO in the long-term. Parties to the bilateral and regional trade agreements will be permitted to 
use legal mechanisms available in their bilateral or regional trade agreements to resolve issues of 
non-compliance with labour standards in trade.  
However, since the overall objective is not simply to establish a trade-labour linkage in 
multilateral trade that is not universally enforceable, minimum requirements which will serve as 
a guideline to countries on how to attain best practices in protecting labour standards in trade 
must be adopted. The Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat must be involved in drafting such a code 
of good practice on the trade-labour linkage.
98
 It should not be difficult to achieve such an 
arrangement as a Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat which looks into matters concerning synergies 
between trade and labour already exists. This code could ensure avoidance of conflicts between 
the two organisations in the event of potential overlaps in their mandates. The code could also 
create a foundation for establishing a stronger WTO and ILO relationship to address the 
challenges posed by globalisation. Such an approach is cost effective given that a joint WTO and 
ILO secretariat which works towards establishing areas of co-operation between the 
organisations is already in place.
99
 The secretariat can also be used as an advisory and informal 
but non-binding dispute settlement body which, through dialogue, tries to assist countries in 
dispute over labour violations in trade to reach amicable resolution. Where disputes are not 
resolved through the dispute resolution procedures provided in the bilateral or regional trade 
agreements, the joint WTO and ILO secretariat must recommend what it considers as the ideal 
course of action in addressing the dispute at hand.  
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The recommendations of the joint WTO and ILO secretariat whilst relying on the expert 
knowledge of qualified personnel already appointed to the secretariat shall not per se be binding 
but will serve as tentative guidelines on how best to settle the dispute in issue. Should the 
disputing countries be unwilling to rely on the recommendations of the joint WTO and ILO 
secretariat, the matter would be concluded as unresolved and the ultimate decision on whether or 
not to continue with the agreement left to the Parties to the specific bilateral or regional trade 
agreement in issue. This approach is unlikely to cause tensions amongst WTO member states 
because it retains the existing arrangements of the countries as provided for in their trade 
agreements, a feature which is not likely to infringe upon the sovereignty and political 
preferences of the countries. It is an approach which also recognises the differences in the levels 
of development of countries as bilateral and regional trade agreements are in most instances 
sensitive to the specific demands of State Parties. Since this proposal is a short-term measure, the 
joint WTO and ILO secretariat must be in a position to monitor each trade agreement with a 
view to establishing a record of the problematic areas in on going attempts to recognise a trade-
labour linkage through bilateral and/or regional trade agreements. These areas should then be 
reviewed by the joint WTO and ILO governing bodies with a view to establishing the ideal 
approach to incorporating a social clause in the WTO on a long-term basis. However, it must be 
appreciated that whilst this measure might not lead to political tensions, it might not be an ideal 
long-term measure as it does not provide for any enforcement and or punitive measures against 
state parties which violate labour standards in trade. Therefore a long-term measure which seeks 
to establish a balance between the need to recognise the sovereignty and/or political 
independence of countries in the world and the need to respect human rights in trade must be 
adopted.   
9 4 2  Long-term measure 
A long term measure to incorporate a social clause in the WTO can be achieved by reforming the 
WTO.
100
 The WTO must adopt a more flexible approach to trade negotiations, tailored to the 
needs of individual countries and groups.
101
 The institution should move beyond multilateral, all-
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or-nothing negotiations that are bearing little fruit and find ways to leverage opportunities where 
liberalization is taking place.
102
 There have been calls for reforming the WTO with some of the 
central issues in the proposals being related to the organisation‟s inability to recognise its linkage 
to non-trade related matters.
103
 It is submitted that in its current state, the WTO agreement which 
lacks a comprehensive development agenda does not have room for a social clause. It lacks the 
development agenda which was purposefully embraced in the failed ITO. The apparent failure of 
the Doha Round may be an indication that the WTO is fast outliving its relevance to 
contemporary global challenges. For it to remain legitimate, it is proposed that a new WTO 
agreement which mirrors the objectives of the failed ITO be adopted. The new agreement must 
recognise the need to link non-trade matters such as labour standards to trade. The wording of 
GATT article XX and the MFN clause make it almost impossible to incorporate a social clause 
which takes into consideration the levels of development of unequal trade partners. As such there 
is need to draft new provisions in a new international trade agreement which establishes a 
common but differentiated application of core labour standards in trade without evoking disputes 
relating to the MFN principle.  
The growing prominence of developing countries in global politics has contributed to a 
conciliatory approach among developed countries towards those demands perceived as 
legitimate, of which the development imperative of poor countries is clearly one that is now 
accepted as an imperative for the multilateral trade regulatory systems.
104
 The Stockholm 
Declaration of 1972 reflected this compromise.
105
 In deference to the desire of developed 
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countries to create a common environmental ethic, the Preamble recognized that environmental 
protection was „a major issue‟ and that it was the “urgent desire of the peoples of the whole 
world and the duty of all Governments”.106 Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration 
crystallized this sentiment, stating that the “environment should be handled in a co-operative 
spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal footing”.107 The recognition of a common 
protection imperative, however, was qualified by several principles that recognized the special 
needs of developing countries, including in particular their development imperative.
108
 
The trade-environment linkage experience brings about an important development to the 
principle of common but differentiated application of standards. The balance of power amongst 
countries in the world has changed since the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)
109
 was negotiated. Emerging economic powers like China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa no longer merit the extent of differential treatment to which they are entitled under the 
regime.
110
 As such they can no longer be treated in the same vein as other developing countries. 
Accordingly, the US has sought to differentiate between developing countries that are major 
economies and those that are not.
111
 The European Union has also argued that differences 
between developing countries must be taken into account, and that the economically advanced 
developing countries must make „fair and effective contributions‟ to the climate effort.112 Japan 
has suggested categorizing developing countries on the basis of their stage of economic 
development, and encouraging mitigation actions tailored to their common but differentiated 
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responsibilities.
113
 Australia has argued that if the Gross Domestic Product per capita of 
UNFCCC parties is taken into account, there are „more developing countries that are advanced 
economies than existing developed countries‟.114  
Australia recommended therefore that there should be an objective basis for graduation of 
developing countries with a view to all advanced economies adopting a comparable effort 
towards the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.
115
 These proposals have proved 
controversial. Many developing countries are opposed to efforts to differentiate between them, as 
they perceive such differentiation as threatening their identity and leveraging power.
116
 In their 
view the differentiation sanctioned by the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol stems not from 
differences in material conditions but from differences in historical and moral responsibility for 
causing climate change.
117
 They argue that any erosion of differentiation would blur the lines of 
responsibility, shift a disproportionate burden of mitigation onto developing countries, and 
thereby limit their development prospects.
118
 However, compromises have to be made and fast 
developing countries must realise that with development comes greater obligations and 
responsibilities on a multilateral level. It is thus proposed that for purposes of achieving a 
practical arrangement for a potentially successful social clause in the WTO, all developing 
countries for leveraging purposes be grouped together regardless of their economic performance 
but their responsibilities should be marginally different based on their economic performance. In 
that regard, it is proposed that a clause relating to the trade-labour linkage be incorporated into a 
new WTO Agreement as follows: 
“For purposes of protecting core labour standards in trade, developing country parties 
shall not be discriminated against by developed country parties, through the latter 
resorting to any forms of unilateral measures including countervailing border measures, 
against goods and services originating from developing countries on grounds of non- 
compliance with labour standards. Such unilateral measures would violate the principles 
                                                          
 
113
  See submission by Japan FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1/Add.1, 12 March 2008 4, 11. 
114
  See submissions by Australia FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/MISC.1/Add.2, 20 March 2008 5, 8 and 73. 
115
  See the Submission by Australia FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/MISC.1/Add.2, 5. 
116
  See submission by Philippines on behalf of the G77/China, FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part II) 10 
December 2008 48. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 Ibid. 
420 
 
and provisions of the WTO related to the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities. For the purposes of the operation of this clause, the common but 
differentiated responsibilities shall take into account differences in the levels of 
development of developed, fast developing and least-developed countries. This clause shall 
only be deemed applicable if labour standards and/or practices prevailing in fast 
developing and least-developed countries, in trade related matters, are held to be a true 
reflection of their best practices in efforts to attain a trade-labour linkage by a joint WTO 
and ILO Panel appointed in terms of this agreement.” 
To ensure compliance with core labour standards in trade, sanctions are proposed. However, the 
sanctions can only be used as a last resort. Bilateral and regional trade agreements have shown 
that such an approach is plausible. However, it is submitted that distinguishing between 
developing countries might pose a challenge when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions 
against countries which violate core labour standards in their trade practices. It is therefore 
proposed that any differences in sanctions between fast developing countries and least-developed 
countries must be marginal so as to avoid the former resisting the incorporation of a social clause 
into the WTO system. Proposed social clause provisions which capture this understanding are 
illustrated below. It is acknowledged that provisions such as a Preamble,
119
 definitions clauses,
120
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multilateral labour standards,
121
 levels of protection,
122
 governmental enforcement of labour 
standards in trade,
123
 cooperation and consultation with other state parties on programmes to 
improve labour standards
124
 and the establishment of the Joint WTO and ILO Panel,
125
 the Joint 
WTO and ILO Secretariat
126
 and the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body
127
 are necessary for a 
WTO framework designed to allow effective recognition of labour standards in trade. In addition 
to the provisions and bodies proposed below, the study proposes legal provisions required to 
establish an effective social clause in the WTO system. These legal provisions relate to how the 
protection of labour standards in the WTO system can be achieved without violating the interests 
of member states of the WTO.  
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9 4 2 1  A joint WTO and ILO approach 
With the advent of globalisation, governments are no longer the major players in the policy- 
making process given that socio-economic and even political problems that are usually 
multifaceted in nature now demand a holistic approach for their resolution.
128
 It is in light of this 
realisation that many governments are engaging labour and business in discussions that go 
beyond the traditional labour matters. Together Government, labour and business are called the 
social partners and the three parties are then involved in a process called social dialogue. The 
term social dialogue does not have a clear cut definition but broadly defined, it involves the 
interface and interchange of ideas between and within nations. Professor Tayo Fashoyin has 
argued that: 
 “Cooperation between labour and management is one of the outstanding features of 
industrial relations. Joint effort aimed at promoting workers‟ welfare and enterprise 
productivity is a manifestation of the resolve of the two sides of industry to work together 
on issues of mutual interest, such as enterprise performance and sustainability. Thus, 
labour-management cooperation can be seen as a step towards a social partnership by 
which work, productivity, reward and industrial peace are sought and achieved. Bipartite 
relation of this kind can promote or reinforce the tripartite process, which involves labour, 
employers and government, usually at the national level...This conception of social 
dialogue as an institutional configuration designed to facilitate consensus building, 
represents a broader perspective on the role of employment relations in organizing the 
world of work at both the enterprise and national levels.”129 
 
The ILO defines social dialogue as: “Negotiation, consultation and information sharing either 
among the bipartite parties in the workplace or the tripartite partners at the national level on the 
functioning of the labour market and broad issues of economic and social policy.”130 
Consultations are important in that: 
 “Through consultations, parties exchange information, assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of their respective cases, narrow the scope of the differences between them and, in many 
cases, reach a mutually agreed solution... Moreover, even where no such agreed solution is 
reached, consultations provide the parties an opportunity to define and delimit the scope of 
the dispute between them. Clearly, consultations afford many benefits to complaining and 
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responding parties as well as to third parties and to the dispute settlement system as a 
whole.”131 
 
WTO consultations, like the ILO social dialogue process, allow for a diplomatic approach 
enabling parties to a dispute to mutually resolve their differences. This could promote greater 
transparency and corporation in protecting workers‟ rights in trade in the countries of the parties 
in dispute should they be in a position to resolve their disputes without reliance on tribunals. The 
assumption in this case is that countries would be sensitive to each other‟s economic policies to 
the extent that future trade arrangements between such parties would be done based on an 
understanding of the development needs of each party. From the nature of the current 
consultation process in the WTO legal framework, the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
provides few rules on the conduct of consultations.
132
 A dispute settlement provision
133
 designed 
for the implementation of the social clause in a new WTO agreement could be structured as 
follows: 
The proposed Joint WTO and ILO Dispute Settlement system would see the Joint WTO and ILO 
Secretariat operating as the equivalent of the current WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
134
  
 
                                                          
 
131
  Van Den Bossche Law and Policy of the WTO: Cases, Texts and Materials (2008) 269.  Consultations are 
significant to the proposed Joint WTO and ILO dispute settlement system in that they are what Van Den Bossche 
terms “a political-diplomatic process” which most member states of the WTO would appreciate as they do not 
mirror the formalism brought by a rigid legal mechanism. See Van Den Bossche 270.  
132
  See Article 4.6 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
133
  See the US-Jordan FTA of 17 December 2001. The proposed dispute settlement provision in the proposed WTO 
side Agreement on Labour follows the model adopted in the US-Jordan FTA which has been able to embrace 
consultations and or dialogue as the first crucial step to resolving disputes at the multilateral level. See also 
Washington Times “Jordan Shutting Abusive Factories” 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/jun/16/20060616-105349-6847r/?page=all (accessed 5 October 
2012). The consultation process appears to be useful as the large numbers of sweatshops in Jordan have 
significantly decreased due to ongoing dialogue between the country and the US. See also Bessma “A Middle 
East Free Trade Area: Economic Interdependence and Peace Considered” 2007 The World Economy 1682. 
Bessma observes that the agreement has not only been successful from a consultative perspective but has also 
seen a significant growth in Jordan‟s economy. 
134
  See Article 2.1 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which establishes the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB administers the DSU‟s rules and procedures. Like the DSB, the Joint WTO 
and ILO Secretariat must be given an elevated status to assume the authority to establish dispute settlement 
panels, adopt the Joint WTO and ILO Panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of 
implementation rulings and if necessary authorise WTO Members to suspend concessions and other obligations 
to trade agreements where a WTO Member violates labour standards in trade. See also Lester et al 153.  
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Hierarchy of the proposed Joint WTO and ILO Dispute Settlement System 
 
 
                                   
 
                                              
 
                     
 
 
                                              
 
                              
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 above shows the hierarchy of the proposed Joint WTO and ILO dispute 
settlement system.  
Consultations (90 days) 
 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel 
(A panel is appointed if no agreement is 
reached through the consultations. A 
panel process will take up to 12 months 
depending of the merits of each case) 
Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body 
(90-120 days) 
A request for consultations 
must be made to the Joint 
WTO and ILO Secretariat 
The Joint WTO and ILO 
Secretariat establishes the 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel and 
adopts its reports (assuming 
there is no appeal) 
The Joint WTO and ILO 
Appellate Body reviews the 
findings of the Joint WTO and 
ILO Panel and its decisions are 
adopted by the Joint WTO and 
ILO Secretariat 
Implementation (Reasonable time) 
(Failure to implement the recommended measures 
with the Complainant or findings of the Joint WTO 
and ILO Panel and/or Appellate Body will translate 
to either a monetary penalty or sanctions) 
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The Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat will receive requests for consultations and only facilitates 
the consultation process. If the dispute cannot be resolved at the consultation stage, the Joint 
WTO and ILO Secretariat would establish a Joint WTO and ILO Panel to adjudicate over the 
dispute. If the Joint WTO and ILO Panel issues its findings and no appeal is lodged against such 
findings, the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat would then adopt the report. If an appeal is lodged 
against the findings of the Joint WTO and ILO Panel, the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body 
would then adjudicate over the appeal which would then be adopted by the Joint WTO and ILO 
Secretariat. For interpretation purposes, all time frames proposed in this social clause Agreement 
shall be regarded as working days with the exclusion of public holidays. 
It is proposed that the following provisions be adopted to establish the Joint WTO and ILO 
Dispute Settlement Process: 
“1. Member States of the WTO being Parties to any trade agreement shall through 
consultations make every attempt to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution whenever a 
Party considers that the other Party has failed to carry out its obligations in protecting core 
labour standards in trade or if a Party considers that measures taken by the other Party 
significantly distort the balance and resultant benefits of a trade-labour linkage or 
substantially undermine the fundamental objectives of a trade-labour-linkage in the WTO. 
 
2. The consultations shall be confidential between the parties to the dispute. There shall be 
no intervention by the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat or its officials. The consultations 
shall be pursued without prejudice to the rights of any Member in further legal 
proceedings. 
3. A Party seeking consultations in terms of subparagraph 1 above shall submit a request 
for consultations to the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat and notify the respondents within 
10 days of the circulation of such request thereof. The request as submitted to the Joint 
WTO and ILO Secretariat shall deal exclusively with matters of a substantial trade and 
labour linkage. 
4. Should an agreement be reached by the disputing Parties, the Joint WTO and ILO 
Secretariat must be informed about such agreement within 7 days from the date of 
reaching such an agreement. 
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5. If the disputing Parties fail to resolve their dispute within 90 days of the submission of 
the request to consult, notification of the subsisting dispute shall be made in writing by 
either Party to the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat requesting the establishment of a Joint 
WTO and ILO Panel to adjudicate over the dispute. The request must indicate whether or 
not consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and give a brief 
summary of the legal basis or claims in dispute (For the purposes of the WTO Dispute 
Resolution process, measures shall be interpreted as referring to any acts or omissions in 
the form of laws, regulations, administrative instructions, specific application of laws 
through tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping duties or safeguards taken to diminish the 
competitive advantage of one Party over another regarding the trade-labour linkage issue). 
The rationale for precision in the request is to: 
a) Define the measures and claims with respect to the dispute at hand which give the 
Parties to the dispute and third Parties sufficient information concerning the claims 
at issue in the dispute in order to allow them an opportunity to respond to the 
complainant’s case. 
b) Establish the jurisdiction of the Joint WTO and ILO Panel by defining the precise 
claims at issue in the dispute. 
6. The Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat shall establish a Joint WTO and ILO Panel with 
the objective of resolving the dispute.  
7. The Joint WTO and ILO Panel as established by the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat 
shall be an ad hoc Panel appointed on a case by case basis. It shall be composed of 6 
panellists (3 trade specialists and 3 labour specialists).  
8. The panellists shall be appointed subject to proposed nominations suggested to the 
Parties by the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat. The Parties reserve the right to oppose the 
nominations. If a disagreement subsists concerning any nominations for appointment to the 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel, the Panel shall be composed of 3 nominations of trade 
specialists and 3 nominations of labour specialists proposed jointly by the Director General 
of the WTO and the Director General of the ILO subject to a request by the complainants.   
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9. Subject to the establishing of the terms of reference and composition of the Joint WTO 
and ILO Panel, the Panel’s proceedings shall take up to 12 months, depending on the 
nature of each case, and the stages are outlined as follows: 
a) Parties’ file their first written submission(s); 
b) Lodging of Third party submission(s); 
c) First substantive meeting with the Parties and Third Parties; 
d) Submission of written rebuttals of the Parties; 
e) Second substantive meeting with the Parties; 
f) Release and circulation of the descriptive  parts of the panel report(s); 
g) Request for the Parties’ responses on the descriptive parts of the panel report(s); 
h) Conduct of interim review of the report; 
i) Issue of the final report to the Parties; and 
j) Circulation of the final report to the Parties and all WTO Members. 
 
10. If a matter referred to the Joint WTO and ILO Panel has not been resolved to the 
satisfaction of the Complainant after a period of 12 months from the date when the dispute 
was referred to it, or within such other period as the Joint WTO and ILO Panel has agreed 
to in consultation with the Parties to the dispute, the Complainant may appeal to the Joint 
WTO and ILO Secretariat to convene the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body to review 
the findings of the Joint WTO and ILO Panel.  
11. The Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body shall be a standing body composed of 6 
members. The members shall hold office on a part-time basis for a five year term which is 
renewable only once. The members shall be appointed by the Joint WTO and ILO 
Secretariat on consensus based on nominations by WTO Members who are also expected to 
be members of the ILO. Appointment as a member of the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate 
Body shall be subject to the following requirements: 
a) Authority and expertise in international trade law or labour law or both; 
b) Non-affiliation with any government; and 
c) Impartiality and broad representativeness. 
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12. Appeals shall be limited to issues of law related to a trade-labour linkage covered in the 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel report and legal interpretations on the trade-labour linkage 
developed by the Joint WTO and ILO Panel. 
13. The Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body shall, within 120 days of its convening, 
present to the Parties a report containing findings of fact and its determination as to 
whether: 
a) the Respondent has failed to carry out its obligations under this agreement; or 
b)  Whether a measure or measures taken by the Respondent severely distorts the 
trade-labour linkage provisions and the resultant benefits accorded by the social 
clause in this agreement. 
13(1) A further inquiry must be made to establish whether or not any such violations of 
core labour standards in trade as referred to in Articles 13(a) and (b) substantially 
undermine the fundamental objectives of a social clause in the WTO founding Agreement. 
Where the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body finds that the Respondent has failed to 
carry out its obligations under this agreement, it may, at the request of the Parties, make 
recommendations for resolution of the dispute.  
 
14. If, in its report, the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body determines that there has been 
a persistent pattern of failure by the Respondent to effectively enforce its labour standards, 
the Parties may agree on an implementation/action plan, which shall conform to the 
determinations and recommendations of the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body. 
15. If the Parties have not agreed on an implementation/action plan under Article 14 within 
90 days of the date of the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body report, or the Parties cannot 
agree on whether the Respondent is fully implementing an implementation/action plan 
agreed to under Article 14, the Complainant may request that the Joint WTO and ILO 
Secretariat to invoke the monetary penalties or sanctions against the Respondent subject to 
compliance with the findings of the Joint WTO and ILO Panel or Joint WTO and ILO 
Appellate Body (in the case of an appeal). 
16. Where a Joint WTO and ILO Panel has been reconvened under Article 15, it: 
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a. shall adjudicate whether any action plan proposed by the Respondent is sufficient to 
remedy the pattern of non-enforcement and 
(i) if so, shall approve the plan, or 
(ii) if not, shall adjudicate such a plan inconsistent with the law of the Respondent, and 
c) may, where warranted, impose a monetary penalty in accordance with this 
agreement. 
 
17. If the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body under the WTO founding Agreement to 
which both Parties are Party has been invoked by either Party with respect to any matter, 
the mechanism invoked shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that matter. 
18. If the mechanism fails for procedural or jurisdictional reasons to make findings of law 
or fact, as necessary, on a claim included in a matter with respect to which a Party has 
invoked such mechanism, Article 17 shall not be construed to prevent the Party from 
invoking another mechanism with respect to such claim. 
19. The WTO Member States, shall within 180 days after the entry into force of this 
agreement, enter into discussions with a view to developing rules for the selection and 
conduct of members of Joint WTO and ILO Panels, Appellate Body and Secretariat 
contemplated in this Agreement. 
20. Third Parties who were participants at the Joint WTO and ILO Panel Stage shall have 
the right to file submissions and participate in the oral hearing before the Joint WTO and 
ILO Appellate Body. However, Third Parties will not have the locus standi to appeal.  
21. The adoption of the Joint WTO and ILO Panel or Appellate Body Reports must be 
done within 60 to 120 days from the circulation of their reports.” 
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Figure2: The proposed Joint WTO and ILO Dispute Resolution Process 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Note that longer time frames have been proposed for each stage due to anticipated 
complexities in jointly dealing with disputes concerning a trade-labour linkage. 
Consultations 90 days 
(Conciliation and mediation can be 
relied upon at any stage during the 
entire dispute resolution process) 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel Interim 
Report Review 
-Interim Report compiled by the Joint 
WTO and ILO Panel is sent to the 
disputing parties for comments. (60 
days). 
-A review meeting on the interim 
report can be held upon request by 
the parties to the dispute within 30 
days from the lapse of the 60 day 
period. 
 
The Final Joint WTO and ILO Panel 
Report is issued to the parties to the 
dispute by the joint WTO and ILO 
Secretariat within 3 months from the date 
of issue of the interim report. 
The Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat 
establishes a Joint WTO and ILO Panel 
which is ad hoc and has 6 proposed panellists 
(3 from the WTO and 3 from the ILO) 
The Joint WTO and ILO Panel 
Examination  
-Receipt of written submissions from 
interested parties to the dispute 
-Two meetings with the parties 
-Third party participation 
-The process could take +/- 12 months 
 
The Final Joint WTO and ILO Panel Report is 
presented to the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat 
-The Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat adopts the 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel Report 
-If either of the parties files an appeal with the 
Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat, a Joint WTO 
and ILO Appellate Body composed of 6 members 
reviews the legal findings of the Joint WTO and 
ILO Panel within 60-120 days. 
-There after the report of the Joint WTO and 
ILO Appellate Body is adopted. 
Penalty 
-In cases of non-compliance with the 
findings of the Joint WTO and ILO 
Panel/Appellate Body a monetary penalty 
shall be imposed upon the offending party. 
 
Implementation of the Report Findings should 
be done within a reasonable period (depending 
on the merits of each case) from the date of the 
adoption of the Joint WTO and ILO Panel 
Report (Or the report of the Joint WTO and 
ILO Appellate Body) by the Joint WTO and 
ILO Secretariat. 
 
Sanctions 
-Sanctions will be preferred against an 
offending party subject to non-
compliance with the penalty imposed. 
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Figure 3: The proposed Joint WTO and ILO Panel Process 
 
                    
                                  
                                                                                      
 
                                                                       
 
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                       
 
                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                       
 
                                                                             
 
                                                                                                                           
 
                                                                                                                          
 
                                             
Joint WTO and ILO Panel is Established by the Joint WTO 
and ILO Secretariat 
Conciliation or 
mediation can be 
requested during all 
stages  
Joint WTO and ILO Panel Examination 
-Written submissions from parties 
-Two meetings with the parties 
-Third party submissions 
Experts in trade and 
labour matters 
adjudicate the matter 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel Interim Report Review Stage 
-Interim report is sent to parties for comments 
A review meeting can be 
conducted with the Joint 
WTO and ILO Panel 
upon request by a party to 
the dispute Joint WTO and ILO Panel Report issued to parties 
The Joint WTO and ILO Panel Report is presented to 
the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat Joint WTO and ILO 
Appellate Body Review of 
legal findings from the 
Joint WTO and ILO Panel 
Report 60-90 days 
Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat adopts the Joint WTO and 
ILO Panel Report or the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate 
Body Report 
Voluntary implementation- Report by the guilty party of the 
proposed implementation of outcomes within a reasonable period 
of time
Penalty- in cases of non-implementation, the offending party shall 
have to pay a monetary penalty to be used in improving the protection 
of labour standards in trade 
Sanctions-shall be imposed where there is 
non-compliance with the monetary penalty 
imposed. 
There can be 
arbitration on the 
nature and extent of 
sanctions to be 
imposed. 
 
Consultations (90 days) 
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Figure 4: Proposed Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body Process time table  
 
 
 
Nature of  process sought by the appellant 
 
 
 
General Appeals 
 
 
Appeals against 
sanctions 
 Days Days 
Notice  of Appeal  0 0 
Appellant’s submission 0 0 
Notice of other appeal 10 5 
Other appellant’s submission(s) 10 5 
Respondent(s) submission(s) 20 10 
Third Participant(s) submission(s) 25 15 
Oral Hearing 30-45 15-20 
Circulation of Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body 
Report 
 
60-90 
 
30-60 
Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat meeting for the 
adoption of the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body 
Report 
 
90-120 
 
60-90 
 
The adoption of a joint WTO and ILO dispute settlement system could be a plausible approach to 
addressing disputes regarding a trade-labour linkage. Trebilcock has observed that: 
 “...where trade sanctions have been invoked against imports from foreign countries for failure 
to observe core labour standards or other universal human rights, and these sanctions have 
been challenged before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body by exporting countries, it would 
433 
 
seem appropriate that the WTO Dispute Settlement  Body seek opinions from other 
international organisations whose mandates squarely embrace these issues about whether 
systematic violations of core labour standards or universal human rights have occurred or are 
occurring, leaving the WTO dispute-settlement system to address the proportionality of the 
proposed sanctions relative to the severity and persistence of the abuses in question and to 
screen out arbitrary or unjustifiable forms of discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade 
under the conditions in the chapeau of Article XX.”135  
 
From the proposed dispute settlement provision outlined above, it must be noted that reasonably 
lengthy time frames have been set aside for the consultation process with a view to avoiding 
quick and direct reliance upon sanctions as a means of punishing a party to trade that has failed 
to protect core labour standards in trade or has failed to take the necessary measures to redress 
any such violations to the detriment of trade partners due to such country gaining unfair trade 
advantage through a lowered compliance with labour standards. However, it must be appreciated 
that consultations alone may not achieve the intended objectives of incorporating a social clause 
in the WTO system. As such, the social dialogue approach of the ILO must be reinforced with 
the sanctions model of the WTO as sanctions could be an efficient tool to secure the compliance 
of offending state parties to their international obligations.
136
 The sanctions model of the WTO is 
undoubtedly the best legal mechanism at the multilateral level which is able to ensure 
compliance with international standards by offending parties.
137
 It is therefore recommended that 
a provision allowing for the use of sanctions in the aftermath of failed consultations be included 
                                                          
 
135
 Trebilcock Understanding Trade Law (2011) 177. Trebilcock posits that, “...rationales of a proposed trade-labour 
linkage in the multilateral trade system which focus on social welfare in importing countries rather than on social 
welfare in exporting countries where low labour standards prevail is problematic in that such an approach could 
carry a serious risk of depriving developing countries of their major source of comparative advantage, that is, 
low labour costs.” He however observes that, “[a] rationale for a trade policy-labour standards linkage that 
focuses squarely on social welfare considerations in exporting countries, rather than importing countries, and 
seems an entirely cogent basis for global action to ensure that core labour standards in all countries, conceived of 
as universal human rights, and other international human rights are respected.” See also Trebilcock 172. 
136
  Guzman “The Design of International Agreements” 2005 European Journal of International Law 579. See also 
the UN Security Council Resolution SC/1079 of 19 September 2012. The Resolution adopted the use of targeted 
sanctions as a means of punishing parties that violate the rights of children in armed conflict. Whilst the 
Resolution might have nothing to do with trade and labour matters, it underlines the significant role played by 
sanctions in international law in trying to address the continued violations of human rights. 
137
  WTO “Settling Disputes: The Priority is to Settle Disputes, not to Pass Judgement” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap3_e.pdf (accessed 5-10-2012). The WTO itself has 
observes that: “Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and the WTO‟s unique 
contribution to the stability of the global economy. Without a means of settling disputes, the rules-based system 
would be less effective because the rules could not be enforced. The WTO‟s procedure underscores the rule of 
law, and it makes the trading system more secure and predictable. The system is based on clearly-defined rules, 
with timetables for completing a case.” 
434 
 
in the proposed WTO Agreement in order to give effect to the social clause. The sanctions 
provision
138
 should be based initially on monetary fines which must be used to improve the 
levels of protection of core labour standards in the offending country. The wording of the clause 
should be as follows: 
“1. The preference of and/or imposition of monetary penalties and sanctions for the 
purposes of the operation of a social clause in the WTO founding Agreement and any 
bilateral and regional trade agreements shall be regarded as an option of last resort and 
will only be deemed permissible if all other reasonable  measures have been taken in terms 
of the joint WTO and ILO Dispute Settlement System. Parties must endeavour to resolve 
their disputes mutually without reliance on the punitive provisions of the social clause. 
2. Where a mutual resolution of the dispute fails, monetary penalties for the purposes of 
penalising a violation of labour standards in trade no greater than USD 20 million for 
developed countries, USD 12 million for fast developing countries and USD 9 million for 
least developed countries or its equivalent in the currency of the Respondent shall be 
imposed. 
3. In determining the amount of the monetary penalty, the Joint WTO and ILO Panel or 
Appellate Body, subject to the adoption of the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat, shall take 
into account: 
a. the frequency and duration of the Respondent’s pattern of failure to effectively enforce 
its labour standards; 
b. the level of enforcement that could reasonably be expected given the level of 
development and/or economic performance of the Respondent; 
c. the reasons, if any, provided by the Respondent for not fully implementing an action 
plan; 
                                                          
 
138
  The proposed monetary fines model is based on the Canada-Chile and Canada-EU models. However, it differs 
from the two agreements in that it proposes the acknowledgement of the differences in the levels of development 
which exist between fast developing countries and least developing countries. It therefore sets differences in the 
monetary fines to be imposed on fast and least developing countries. However it makes the difference fairly 
marginal to avoid resistance from fast developing countries who have argued that any significant differences in 
treatment between themselves and least developing countries, as observed in the environment case, would limit 
their potential to maximise their gains from trade and would amount to an act of discriminating against them in 
favour of least developed countries. 
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d. efforts made by the Respondent to begin remedying the pattern of non-enforcement after 
the final report adopted by the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat; and 
e. any other relevant factors deemed relevant by the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat. 
4. All monetary penalties shall be paid in the currency of the Respondent into a fund 
established by the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat and shall be spent  on improving or 
enhancing the protection of core labour standards in trade  in the Respondent State, 
consistent with its law.” 
 
It is submitted that no system is without its flaws. Therefore, should a country fail to pay its 
monetary penalty as imposed by the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat, it is proposed that the last 
stage in this sanctions-based model be activated. This stage allows the suspension of the trade 
benefits of an offending country.
139
 It is therefore proposed that such a suspension provision be 
incorporated in the proposed WTO agreement as follows: 
“1. Where the Respondent fails to pay a monetary penalty assessment within 180 days after 
it is imposed by a Joint WTO and ILO Panel or Appellate Body and adopted by the Joint 
WTO and ILO Secretariat: 
a. any Complainant may suspend the granting of benefits to the Respondent in an amount 
no greater than that equivalent to the monetary penalty. 
2. Where a Complainant has suspended trade benefits, the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat 
shall, on the delivery of a written request by the Respondent, reconvene the Joint WTO 
and ILO Panel or the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body (where an appeal was filed) to 
determine whether the monetary penalty has been paid or collected. The Joint WTO and 
ILO Panel or Appellate Body shall submit a report within 30 days after it has reconvened 
to the Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat indicating whether or not the monetary penalty has 
been paid or collected. Should the report indicate payment or collection of the monetary 
                                                          
 
139
  The suspension provision is based on the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) which 
was signed on September 14, 1993, by the Presidents of Mexico and the United States, and the Prime Minister of 
Canada, as one of the supplementary accords to the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It entered 
into force on January 1, 1994.  
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penalty to be used in improving the protection of labour standards in trade, in the 
Respondent State, the suspension of benefits shall be terminated forthwith. 
3. On a written request of the Respondent delivered to the Complainant and the Joint 
WTO and ILO Secretariat, the Joint WTO and ILO Appellate Body or the Joint WTO and 
ILO Panel (as the case may demand)
140
 shall reconvene to determine whether the 
suspension of benefits by the Complainant is manifestly excessive. Within 30 days of the 
request, the Joint WTO and ILO Panel or Appellate Body shall present a report to the 
Joint WTO and ILO Secretariat which after adopting the report would circulate it to the 
disputing Parties to appraise them of the determination by the Joint WTO and ILO Panel 
or Appellate Body. 
4. Where there is substantial evidence of non-compliance with the monetary penalty, a 
Complainant in considering what tariff or other benefits to suspend shall: 
a. first seek to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors as that in respect of which 
there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the Respondent to effectively enforce its 
labour laws; and 
b. where it is impracticable or ineffective to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors, 
the Complainant may suspend benefits in other sectors.” 
The proposed provisions designed to give effect to a social clause in the WTO are similar to 
provisions that have been successfully implemented in bilateral or regional trade agreements 
which include a social clause. It is hoped that the continuing application of these similar 
frameworks at the bilateral and regional levels could be the basis for adopting of an appropriate 
framework for the in inclusion of a social clause at the multilateral level.  
It is also plausible to propose that as an interim measure to address the need for a trade-
labour linkage at the multilateral level, the WTO amends its founding WTO Agreement to 
recognise the need to invite specialists in non-trade related matters such as labour economics to 
sit as specialist advisors to members of the WTO Panel or the WTO Appellate Body when they 
                                                          
 
140
  The written request could indicate that Respondent State due to its level of development or any other extenuating 
circumstances as may be influencing its economic performance, can not in whole or in part comply with the 
monetary penalty preferred against it. Proof of such inability to comply with the monetary penalty shall be upon 
the Respondent State with detailed financial reports of its financial status being plausible instruments to plead 
poverty or insolvency or any other legally recognised defence.   
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are adjudicating over disputes in terms of the present WTO Dispute Settlement System.
141
 The 
proposal of inviting ILO specialists to sit in panel and appeal processes of the WTO as advisors 
to the panellists is consistent with Trebilcock‟s views to the effect that “These issues of 
institutional competence and legitimacy would appear to require creative forms of horizontal 
coordination or linkage between the WTO and other international organisations, particularly in 
the WTO‟s dispute settlement role.”142 Chapter five of this study has established that in some 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, the ILO has been invited to offer guidance on specific 
issues in relation to disputes regarding the trade-labour linkage. This could be indicative of the 
fact that the WTO and ILO can in essence cooperate to curb the violation of labour standards in 
trade. Such an approach could provide another platform upon which a comprehensive WTO legal 
framework on the trade-labour linkage could be adopted in future. This study has established that 
there could in fact be novel and practical approaches to establishing a trade-labour linkage within 
the WTO framework. However, the study has indicated that there are challenges as regards WTO 
Members‟ consensus on recognising a trade-labour linkage in the WTO founding Agreement.143 
Perhaps innovative measures such as the ones proposed in this chapter which place emphasis on 
                                                          
 
141
  See Trebilcock 176.  
142
  Ibid. Take note that the advice of the ILO specialists would not be binding but would be regarded as opinions 
which could be persuasive to the panellists and members of the appellate body. It would thus be the duty of the 
panellists and members of the appellate body to rationalise the opinions advanced by the ILO specialists subject 
to WTO laws and procedures in order to determine the appropriate measure to adopt against an offending party. 
See also Trebilcock 177. Such an approach is likely to allay fears surrounding the usurping of powers of ILO by 
the WTO or vice-versa as there are clearly defined boundaries within which officials from either institution 
would operate. 
143
 See Lester et al 872. Lester et al observe that, there is a general feeling driven by the views of developing 
countries to the effect that labour issues, except prison labour, fall generally outside of the WTO, lying instead 
with the ILO. The primary basis of such an argument is that developing countries benefit from labour policies 
that do not comply with international standards. However, Chartes and Mercurio (as quoted by Lester et al 873) 
in criticising Bhagwati over his argument that labour standards have no place in the WTO because it is an 
organization that exists primarily to promote mutually beneficial, non-coercive trade through reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements aimed at reducing barriers to trade, observed that, “Bhagwati‟s view that 
the WTO‟s role is limited to regulating „pure‟ trade issues for the purposes of trade ignores that the GATT and 
WTO, as well as human rights treaties and organizations were created for the purpose of increasing human 
welfare...” The argument for a trade-labour linkage must not be construed as implying that the WTO replaces the 
ILO as the organisation that deals with labour matters. It must be viewed as a cooperative approach of 
international organisations to complement each other in advancing their aims, objectives and roles in a world in 
which countries are struggling to reach development goals in the face of challenges created by globalisation. 
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the need to mutually resolve trade-labour disputes before any penalties or sanctions could be 
implemented as an option of last resort could find support in the international community.
144
 
9 5  CONCLUSION 
There is a significant need to establish a trade-labour linkage in the WTO in order to address 
challenges related to development and the complex issues that have emerged in labour markets 
due to globalisation.
145
 This study was aimed at examining the calls to incorporate a social clause 
                                                          
 
144
 See Article XXII of the GATT 1947. See also Van Den Bossche 269. Van Den Bossche underscores the 
significance of consultations to dispute resolution as they have few rules to conducting them. It would thus be 
plausible to assert that establishing a practicable social clause in the multilateral trade agreement must place 
emphasis on consultations before penalties and sanctions could be imposed on offending parties. WTO Members 
would be encouraged to resolve their disputes mutually in a flexible manner which suites their socio-economic 
demands without having to directly rely upon and be subjected to the prescriptive and punitive measures which 
are usually associated with hard law, often building resistance against the adoption of such laws. Consultations 
could even strengthen free trade as WTO Members will be in a position to trust and understand each other 
without any suspicions being held regarding the intentions of one party over the measures advocated by another 
concerning a trade-labour linkage. See also Trebilcock and Howse The Regulation of International Trade (2005) 
112. Trebilcock and Howse observed that, “...the 1947 GATT made no provision for formal, juridical dispute 
settlement, nor was there any explicit provision for recourse to the International Court of Justice in resolving 
disputes. The emphasis was on diplomatic methods of consultation and consensus.” Trebilcock and Howse‟s 
observations are plausible in their analysis of the 1947 GATT. If all disputes could be resolved at the 
consultative level, then there would be no need for penalties and sanctions. However, managing relations 
between state parties at international level does not always lead to disputes being resolved through consultations. 
Therefore penalties and sanctions could be used as a last resort with primary emphasis being placed upon 
consultations. See also Trebilcock and Howse 566. Trebilcock and Howse are against the use of hard law 
instruments in the scope of trade-labour linkage. They argued that, “Surely genocide, torture, detention without 
trial...warrant at least a serious concern from the international community than core international labour 
standards.” However it is questionable whether it is prudent to downgrade core labour standards as human rights 
in preference of another set of human rights where action can be taken to improve the protection of both sets of 
rights. The case of the DRC has shown that torture be used as a tool to violating core labour standards in trade. 
As such a case for a trade-labour linkage could also be a future case for eliminating torture in trade related 
matters. If the torture, genocide and detention are not trade related, then the United Nations must be seen to 
develop the necessary instruments to hold accountable parties perpetrating such violations.  
145
 See Chartes and Mercurio 665. Chartes and Mercurio have argued that, “The incorporation of  Intellectual 
Property Rights into the WTO framework indicates that governments are willing to allow for the regulation of 
internal activity if such regulation has the net effect of expanding the volume of trade and, in so doing, 
increasing the security and predictability of markets. Yet, developing country governments, industry 
associations, certain economists, and some developing country Non-Governmental Organisations often argue 
that the inclusion of core labour standards into the WTO would not expand trade volumes, but rather operate as 
disguised protectionism to undermine developing countries‟ comparative in cheap labour vis-a-vis developed 
countries. Thus it is claimed that allowing WTO Members to impose restrictive measures on products 
manufactured in contravention of core labour standards would have the net effect of reducing world trade...a 
result that is irreconcilable with the WTO‟s objective to further promote trade-liberalization and the expansion of 
trade.” Basing on Chartes and Mercurio‟ views it would be plausible to argue that adopting a balanced approach 
between the views of those advocate for a trade-labour linkage and those who are against a trade-labour linkage 
could address the misconceptions concerning this issue as this study established. It is not in question that free 
trade is vital to economic growth as much as it is conceivable that the observance of core labour standards would 
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into the WTO framework as a mechanism to promote sustainable development in the countries of 
the world, especially developing countries. The study‟s analysis of how incorporating a social 
clause in trade agreements has positively contributed to the growth of Mexico has been 
juxtaposed with the effects of a lowered compliance with labour standards amongst Southern 
African countries. The developments currently taking place in South Africa were used as a case 
study of how poor compliance with labour standards should no longer be regarded as a 
comparative advantage in a world that seeks to prioritise the protection of human rights.  
The study also analysed the advantages and challenges regarding proposals to incorporate 
a social clause in the multilateral trading system. The main challenges, such as national 
sovereignty,
146
 lack of consensus and co-operation,
147
 as well as macro-economic imbalances 
and tensions within countries, were identified. The establishment of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements which have the potential to undermine the development of an international consensus 
that would strengthen multilateralism was also discussed. The study has established that the 
incorporation of social clauses in bilateral and regional trade agreements constitutes an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
strengthen the long-term economic performance of all countries regardless of their level of development. As such 
regarding one argument over the other would be misguided. Perhaps a balanced approach could be useful.   
146
  See Jackson The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO (2000) 404. Jackson argued that, “There have been some 
allegations made that the WTO Charter is an important intrusion into „national sovereignty.‟ Apart from the 
general problems of how to define „sovereignty‟ in a world that is increasingly interdependent ... [t]he 
protections for national sovereignty built into the WTO Charter rules on decision making are substantially 
enhanced.” This view could imply that the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO would not infringe the 
doctrine of national sovereignty as the WTO already has mechanisms in place to ensure that a trade-labour 
linkage does not threaten the ability of a country to self-regulate in the interest of its citizens and pursuit 
economic goals. 
147
 There have been strong arguments advanced against a trade-labour linkage in the face of strong arguments for a 
trade-labour linkage. See Hoekman and Kostecki The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO 
and Beyond (2009) 625-626. Hoekman and Kostecki argued that, “Populist calls to reduce differences in labour 
costs are not at the core of the issue in the WTO context. Labour costs reflect the income and productivity of a 
country. Insisting that liberalization of trade be made conditional upon convergence in labour costs makes 
absolutely no sense, and would constitute blatant protectionism. The gains from trade result precisely from 
differences in costs, which are due to differences in endowments, technological capacities and output per 
worker...Trade policy is an inefficient tool to enforce labour standards, assuming agreement could be reached on 
what the relevant standards should be.” Hoekman and Kostecki further opined that using the WTO system to 
enforce core labour standards would actually be harmful to those it is intended to protect. These issues have been 
dealt with in detail in this study. However, Hoekman and Kostecki‟s views can be disputed on the basis of 
Chartes and Mercurio‟s argument to the effect that, “...the imposition of fundamental worker rights can be 
pursued without necessarily injuring a nation‟s capacity to effectively export and trade with the world 
system...evidence suggests that many developing countries have (in taking a myopic view of the issue) 
completely ignored the benefits that acceptance of universal labour standards could bring and the correlative role 
that acceptance could play in the expansion of the world market.” The arguments clearly indicate that no 
argument concerning a trade-labour linkage stands exclusively above that other. This calls for a balanced 
approach to the debate which points to the adoption of a trade-labour linkage legal framework in the WTO which 
recognises a balance between free trade and the protection of core labour standards. 
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alternative to the multilateral negotiations in the WTO that were undermined by the slowness of 
the negotiations in the Doha Round and the negotiations‟ resultant failure.148 These agreements 
have proven to be a success with countries like Mexico benefiting immensely from the NAFTA 
agreement.
149
 As a result, the WTO could be forced to rethink its approach to non-trade matters 
and consider proposals such as those advanced in this study to recognise a trade-labour linkage 
                                                          
 
148
  See Hoekman and Kostecki 602. The Doha Round failed primarily as a result of the inability of WTO Member 
States to establish consensus regarding the relationship between trade and competition policies. This issue falls at 
the centre of the trade-labour linkage debate as was established in this study. Hoekman and Kostecki observed 
that, “In the case of trade policy, the pursuit of mercantilist objectives by trade negotiators leads to an outcome 
that is welfare-improving (unambiguously for small economies that are price takers on world markets). In the 
case of competition policy–trading commitments on competition policy motivated by market access objectives 
could have negative effects for the enforcement of competition law more generally.”  This approach was rejected 
by competition authorities who derailed the objective of establishing common competition principles which 
could have been in the interest of developing countries. The Walmart/Massmart merger discussed in this study 
illustrates this problem. It could thus be argued that a failure to negotiate and establish a legal framework for a 
trade-labour linkage in the WTO could also lead to the failure of the WTO as some Members lose confidence in 
its ability to adopt pro-development policies. See also Hoekman and Kostecki 666. 
149
 See Compa Justice for All: The Struggle for Worker Rights in Mexico (2003) 41. Compa appears to paint a 
pessimistic picture about the effectiveness of the North America Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) 
which is a side agreement to the NAALC. He argued that, “The NAALC has failed to achieve its high purpose. 
Apparently more eager to maintain diplomatic niceties rather than tackle and solve worker rights violations, the 
three governments have demonstrated a lack of will to hold one another to their NAALC commitments. Some 
investigations and reports have led to significant findings and recommendations, but they have not produced 
change. Ministerial consultations resulted only in research projects and trinational conferences. Although these 
are informative, they have not directly addressed or resolved worker rights violations documented and proven in 
NAALC proceedings.” However Compa‟s views concerning the impact of the NAALC might be questioned as 
they seem to ignore that arrangements such the NAALC must prioritise consultations over confrontational 
tendencies especially in agreements involving countries with different levels of development. The NAALC does 
have a dispute settlement mechanism which could allow an aggrieved party to prefer sanctions against the 
offender. However, since the objective is to build cooperation, one would not expect reliance on punitive 
measures at the spare of a moment. That the countries have come up with such an arrangement is commendable 
as the fruits of such efforts are now being realised. See also NAFTA “Myths vs. Reality” 
http://www.naftanow.org/myths/default_en.asp (accessed 01 September 2012). Here, the notion that the 
protection of core labour standards in trade is likely to promote future development is realised. After arguments 
were advanced to the effect that the NAFTA would result in job losses and hurt workers by eroding labour 
standards and lowering wages, statistical evidence after the adoption of the NAALC shows that the opposite has 
happened. Since NAFTA came into effect, the overall job growth in all three countries has been strong with an 
estimated total employment growth of 40 million from 1993 to 2012. Higher wages have been realised for 
workers. In Mexico for example, export firms employ one in five workers; these workers are paid 40% more on 
average than those in non-export jobs. Firms with foreign direct investment employ nearly 20% of the labour 
force and pay 26% more than the domestic average manufacturing wage. Should such growth patterns continue 
to be realized, it would not be surprising to realise a future improved protection of labour standards in trade. The 
NAFTA case could be an illustration that free trade can lead to an improved protection of labour standards with 
time. 
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in its regulatory system.
150
 Several years ago, Jackson criticised the treaty structure of the WTO 
and its Charter rules which make amendments difficult to effect.
151
 Jackson was particularly 
concerned with the fact that the WTO‟s new treaty structure and Charter were designed to make 
amendments difficult.
152
 
This study also acknowledged that developed countries are gradually withdrawing from 
multilateralism and engaging in bilateral trade deals where they can gain more concessions from 
individual developing countries. This is the reason why developing countries must prefer the 
multilateral approach where the rules should apply equally regarding the incorporation of a 
social clause in trade. Multilateralism has to deal with issues other than cross-border trade, such 
as labour matters. 
This study underscored the importance of ensuring that world governments, especially 
developing countries‟ governments improve in the enforcement of labour rights protection and 
legislation and support the proposals to incorporate a social clause in the WTO.
153
 It then 
proposed mechanisms for incorporating a social clause in the WTO both on a short-term and 
long-term basis. It is evident that businesses and governments the world over now need to have a 
                                                          
 
150
  See Trebilcock 191. Whilst not making allusion to labour matters, Trebilcock in commenting on the future 
challenges for the world trading system concluded that, “...it seems imperative that the WTO move to some form 
of delegated decision-making by a broadly representative executive body charged with formulating issues for 
negotiation and managing initial negotiations, with recommendations subject to a trade-weighted special 
majority vote for all members.” Failure to take such an approach would lead to the organisation likely becoming, 
“increasingly marginalized in international trade matters without an ability to move in a more decisive and 
timely fashion on current trade issues.” Trebilcock‟s views appear to confirm the incorporation of a social clause 
in bilateral and regional trade agreements with fears being held to the effect that developed countries might leave 
the multilateral trade system and focus on regional and bilateral trade agreements where their interests will be 
best served. See also Hoekman and Kostecki 670. Hoekman and Kostecki argued that there might not be a 
problem at all with the development currently emerging in the world trading system which renders the WTO‟s 
bargaining more complex due to the emergence of countries such as China, India and Brazil as major trade actors 
and the rise of developing country coalitions. They contend that the basic aspects of the WTO still remain 
relevant and could even increase. What is however evident is that the approach adopted by the organisation in 
dealing with emerging issues concerning trade will determine its fate. This could include the incorporation of 
core labour standards in its founding Agreement. 
151
  Jackson 342.  
152
 Jackson 343. That the WTO Charter makes amendments difficult to effect may translate to the fact that the WTO 
would find it difficult to adapt and evolve to meet the rapidly changing circumstances of international economic 
relations. It has already been argued that incorporating a social clause in the WTO founding Agreement in its 
current state would be almost impossible if not impossible. If one holds Jackson‟s views as plausible, it could 
thus be commendable to propose that the WTO system be reformed to allow it to adjust to the changes that have 
become synonymous with globalisation. This could allow for amendments to incorporate a social clause in the 
WTO founding agreement in its current state without coming into conflict with principles such as the MFN as 
alluded to in chapter eight of this study. 
153
  See Chartes and Mercurio 672. See also Lester et al 877. 
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dialogue concerning a culture of rule of law and employees‟ protection. Workers the world over 
should be treated as a critical component of an effective trade regime. The Bretton Woods 
Institutions‟ proposal that the ease of doing business is enhanced by flexible labour market 
conditions often characterised by low compliance with labour standards might need to be 
balanced with the conceptualization of trade as a key element for improving global welfare. 
Failure to do so could lead to social upheavals as currently taking place in South Africa, a 
development which threatens investor confidence and lowers productivity. An analysis of 
developments in some Southern African countries has established that focusing on quick 
economic gains on the basis of a lowered compliance with labour standards in trade, which does 
not lead to sustainable development, might be a misguided approach. Governments of countries 
in the world which are members of the WTO have the responsibility to promote a human rights 
approach to trade as does the WTO itself.
154
 And countries generally have the responsibility of 
legal compliance with human rights and labour standards.
155
  
Lastly, the study recommended that for the long-term, hard law provisions should be 
incorporated into the WTO system making it more regulatory rather than voluntary.
156
 There is a 
need to enlarge the capacity of developing countries in managing issues of labour and human 
rights protection.
157
 The study also made a detailed analysis of the attempts to link environmental 
                                                          
 
154
  See Petersmann “Time for a United Nations „Global Compact‟ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration” 2002 European Journal of International Law 
621. See also Lester et al 882. See also Trebilcock and Howse 583. Trebilcock and Howse observed that, 
“...beyond the labour context (in whole or in part), international human rights law is relevant to the interpretation 
and evolution of international trade norms, focusing on the WTO.” 
155
 See Lester et al 880. 
156
  See Trebilcock and Howse 566. Trebilcock and Howse are of the opinion that, “...trade or other economic 
sanctions should not be confined to core labour standards, but should extend to at least some subset of 
universally accepted rights more generally, and that such sanctions should not be limited to goods directly 
produced by the offending practices. This in fact suggests a very broad domain for linking trade and other 
economic sanctions with universal human rights. However, it also suggests some significant constraints on their 
invocation. In particular, both the substantive rules governing their invocation and the procedures by which they 
may be invoked should be consistent with the human rights rationale for intervention and should exclude the 
unfair competition and race-to-the-bottom rationales for intervention. ” In their assertion, Trebilcock and Howse 
do not object to the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO but the rationale by which they have to be 
incorporated. This view could appear to pave the way for the formulation of possible legal frameworks for 
incorporation a social clause in the WTO based on a human rights approach which is what this study argued for 
amongst other issues. 
157
  See Petersmann 621. Petersmann argued that, “...human rights law offers WTO rules moral, constitutional and 
democratic legitimacy that may be more important for the parliamentary ratification of future WTO agreements 
than traditional economic and utilitarian justifications.” His view is consistent with the one advanced by 
Trebilcock and Howse to the effect that a human rights approach would be a plausible approach for advocating 
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regulatory practices to trade with a view to showing that it is possible to achieve the same 
outcomes with core labour standards.
158
 In the short-term the study proposed that establishing a 
side agreement to the founding WTO agreement which recognises international investment 
agreements as part of the WTO system could be the route for developing a platform for labour 
issues to be eventually incorporated into the WTO‟s framework in the long-term. The study 
proposed that in the long term, the WTO may have to be reformed with a social clause being 
incorporated into a new multilateral trade agreement. The social clause in the new WTO 
agreement could place emphasis on the need to resolve disputes regarding the violation of labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for the inclusion of a social clause in the WTO legal framework. See Trebilcock and Howse 566. However the 
human rights approach is not without its critics. Alston argued that the proposed human rights-trade linkage was 
a radical approach which would have far reaching consequences for the existing human rights regime. His 
contention was that individuals would end up being objects rather than the holders of human rights as human 
rights would be deemed as an instrumental means for achieving economic policy objectives. See Alston 
“Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann” 2002 European 
Journal of International Law 815. However, it might not be plausible to assume radical position concerning the 
need to link the WTO to non-trade matters. It might be productive to pursue intellectual debates over the 
appropriate relationships that should subsist between trade and matters such as labour law.  This study sought to 
establish one such link between trade and labour from a human rights and developmental perspective. Perhaps a 
systematic and intellectually open way of acknowledging the opposing debates on the debate and establishing a 
common ground could lead to future productive working relations between the WTO and ILO as well as other 
institution which preside over non-trade matters which are linked to trade. 
158
  See Trebilcock 161. Just like the debate on the need to recognise a trade-labour linkage in the WTO legal 
framework, the trade policy-environment linkage has emerged as one of the controversial issues in the trade 
policy agenda. However attempts to ensure a differential application of standards in efforts to adopt multilateral 
rules on environmental practices as revealed in chapter 8 of this study, could provide the basis for a future 
agreement on trade and environment. The development in the trade and environment debate have been used in 
this thesis to ascertain whether or not there are any lessons which could be learnt to inform the trade-labour 
linkage debate. It is evident from the trade-environment debate that the uniform application of standards will not 
lead to any success in establishing a relationship between trade and non-trade areas. A differential application of 
standards could be a positive approach to achieving a uniform yet development specific application of standards. 
Such an approach could draw support from WTO Members if properly implemented. See also Steinberg “Power 
and Cooperation in International Environment Law” in Guzman and Sykes (eds) Research Handbook in 
International Economic Law (2007) 520. Guzman and Sykes observed that, “Trade-environment rules are less 
well developed and less environment friendly in the GATT/WTO than in some other trade organizations, such as 
the NAFTA and European Union.” The observations of Guzman and Sykes suggest that establishing a trade-
environment linkage (as would a trade-labour linkage) at a multilateral level could be complicated than it would 
be at regional level. However, if Member States of the WTO are the same parties adopting such an approach at 
bilateral or regional level and advocating for a similar approach at multilateral level, it poses the question 
whether or not it would be prudent for the WTO to continuously exclude a linkage with non-trade matters. It is 
submitted that such an approach could inadvertently weaken the organisation with time as its own Member 
States rely on bilateral or regional trade agreements to achieve linkages between trade and non-trade matters. 
This could be an unfortunate development in a world that is increasingly moving away from autonomous states 
to a global approach to governance and business operations. A global approach to governance and business 
operations should translate to an increased significance of the multilateral trade arrangement in establishing a 
balance with the bilateral or regional approach to conducting trade (as bilateral and regional trade agreements 
incorporate non-trade matters). This suggests a need to strengthen the capacity of the WTO in dealing with non-
trade related matters rather than weaken it by continuously excluding such issues from its framework.  
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standards in trade mutually with monetary penalties and sanctions being used as a last resort in 
instances where reasonable and adequate measures would have been taken to resolve the dispute 
in question. The approach of regarding low labour standards as a comparative advantage by 
developing countries might also need to be reviewed with emphasis being placed on 
technological development and training of skilled workers to produce quality goods for trade.
159
 
The WTO must revisit the principles of trade and its impact on global welfare as envisaged by 
the failed ITO. Samuelson in his famous dictum observed that: 
“There is essentially only one argument for free trade or freer trade, but it is an exceedingly 
powerful one, namely: Free trade promotes a mutually profitable division of labour, greatly 
enhances the potential real national product for all nations and makes possible higher 
standards of living all over the globe.”160 
Samuelson‟s dictum could offer much guidance going forward for strengthening the WTO‟s 
capacity to promote sustainable development. Whilst the organisation‟s commitment to free trade 
cannot be questioned, its commitment to development and human rights protection still raises 
key questions which could compromise its legitimacy going forward. It is thus recommended 
that trade be linked to non-trade matters such as labour as this could go a long way in sustaining 
the legitimacy of the WTO. 
 
                                                          
 
159
  See Lowenfeld International Economic Law (2007) 7. Lowenfeld observed that, “...the theory of comparative 
advantage has never been wholly satisfying. One major shortcoming, even when expanded beyond the two-
country, two-product, two-factor model, is that it would lead to the expectation that countries with similar levels 
of economic development would trade little with each other, apart from goods directly linked to geography, such 
as the products of agriculture or mining. In fact, industrial countries trade in great volume with one another, 
often in the same sector products.” This argument suggests that apart from merely relying on low labour 
standards as a comparative advantage, greater effort must be put in adjusting to appropriate trade policies which 
could offer an enhancement of the welfare of developing countries‟ citizens or even contribute to the general 
global welfare through sustainable and productive economic activities.  
160
  See Samuelson Economics (1980) 651. 
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